Malebranche, Nicolas
MALEBRANCHE, NICOLAS
French philosopher and priest of the Oratory; b. Paris, Aug. 5, 1638; d. there, Oct. 13, 1715. A son of King Louis XIII's secretary, Malebranche studied philosophy at the Collége de la Marche and theology at the Sorbonne. He entered the oratorians in 1660 and was ordained in 1664. Except for a few vacations in the country, he lived and died at the motherhouse in Paris. His philosophical search for, and defense of, truth culminated in religious meditation. As a scientist, he made detailed observations of insects, was well versed in mathematics, and presented the first analysis of colors in terms of frequencies of vibration at his election to the Académie des Sciences in 1699.
Works and Polemics. Disgusted with scholasticism, Malebranche renewed his interest in philosophy upon reading R. Descartes's Traité de l'homme in 1664. The editors of this work accentuated the spiritualist counterpart of its mechanistic physiology and certain affinities with the thought of St. Augustine. Malebranche's first work, De la Recherche de la Vérité (Paris 1674–75, 6th ed. 1712), espoused Cartesian dualism, stressing the opposition between thought and bodily extension. Sensible qualities, for Malebranche, are only a modification of the soul, a warning of what is or is not suitable for the conservation of life. Like other Cartesians, he explained the correspondence between sensations and bodily changes, as well as the soul-body union in general, in terms of the regularity of the laws of occasional causes, and held that God alone exercises true efficacy (see mind-body problem). Malebranche was to extend this solution to all relations between creatures. Although continuing the Cartesian criticism of scholastic physics and of human errors as originating in the senses, the imagination, and the passions, he parted company with Descartes by basing his rational argumentation on certain facts of faith and by rejecting the Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas. In Male-branche's view, the soul is directly linked to universal Reason and sees the essence of bodies in God.
Abbé Simon Foucher (1644–96), in his Critique de la recherche de la vérité (Paris 1675), disputed this mixture of reason and faith and, through his hasty interpretations, led Malebranche to clarify his differences with Descartes over eternal truths as uncreated and over ideas as essences and not as modes of human thought. Dom Robert Desgabets (1620–78) intervened but defended Malebranche clumsily in his Critique de la critique de la recherche … (Paris 1675). Malebranche himself replied in volume two of the Recherche (1675, 2d ed. 1676). After the Conversations chrétiennes (Paris 1677), the third edition of the Recherche adds a volume of Eclaircissements that contains, among other things, an explanation of "intelligible extension." Between 1680 and 1682 Malebranche engaged in a polemic with the Jesuit Le Valois (pseudonym, Louis de La Ville) on reconciling Cartesian physics with the doctrine of Tran-substantiation.
Malebranche's Traité de la Nature et de la Grâce (Amsterdam 1680; placed on the Index in 1690) evoked marked reservations from bossuet, fÉnelon, and especially arnauld; the better to undermine it, Arnauld first attacked the theory of knowledge (Traité des vraies et fausses idées, Cologne 1683), then the entire system. The writings of the two rivals multiplied; Malebranche later reedited his answers to Arnauld in Recueil de toutes les réponses… à M. Arnauld (4 v. Paris 1709). The principal points of the dispute are pointed out in the Méditations chrétiennes (Cologne 1683), the Traité de morale (Cologne 1684), the Entretiens sur la métaphysique et la religion (Rotterdam 1688), which is Malebranche's principal work, and the Entretiens sur la mort (Paris 1696).
In 1686 Malebranche engaged in a brief polemic with Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657–1757) over occasionalism and, in 1692, 1700, and 1712 successively, reworked his laws of impact in response to the criticisms of G. W. leibniz. Criticized also by P. S. regis in the latter's Système de la philosophie … (Paris 1690), Male-branche replied with his Réponse (1693), which dealt with the perception of distance, the beatific vision, and the intrinsic goodness of pleasure. Called upon to endorse quietism by Dom François lamy, he opposed it in his Traité de l'amour de Dieu (Lyons 1697), and again in three Lettres and a Réponse générale to Lamy in 1699 and 1700. His Entretien d'un philosophe chrétien et d'un philosophe chinois (Paris 1707) reveals some of his dealings with the Jesuits; in 1712 he dealt with them again in a review of Fénelon's Traité de l'existence de Dieu. but in both cases avoided polemics. Despite his distaste for argumentation, he replied to the Traité de l'action de Dieu sur les créatures of L. F. Boursier (1679–1749) in his Réflexions sur la prémotion physique (Paris 1715).
Though often fierce in controversy, Malebranche showed mildness and spiritual elevation in his works of piety, which were always nourished by philosophical reflection. Among these his Petites méditations pour se disposer à l'humilité et à la pénitence (Paris 1677) is noteworthy.
Teaching. Malebranche's occasionalism finds divine action everywhere, but this is not the "perpetual miracle" for which Leibniz reproved him. Malebranche distinguishes the true miracle, which depends on the particular will of God, from the general laws of occasional causes, which, for him as for other Cartesians, explain the communication of mechanical motion to bodies and the union between soul and body. To these laws of occasional causes Malebranche added the laws that regulate, through the intermediary of the attention, the mind's access to ideas in God, and, on the supernatural level, those that give to the angels control over bodies and to Christ omnipotence for the distribution of graces to souls and bodies. In conformity with the Christocentrism of Pierre de bÉrulle, the Second Person of the Trinity, as the Eternal Word and as Christ Incarnate, is at the very heart of Malebranchism.
As Universal Reason, Christ illumines man's mind by giving it, on the occasion of the "natural prayer" of attention, the intellectual intuition of essences. It is here that one can see how Malebranche's augustinianism converges with cartesianism, which reduces all modalities of bodies to extension. The absence of interaction between souls and real bodies and the absolute freedom of God with respect to creation makes the existence of bodies both indemonstrable and inaccessible. But faith makes clear that God really has created such bodies; and occasionalism establishes the correlation between the vision in God of their essences, where they appear as determinations of intelligible extension, and the sensations that concretely diversify extension and correspond to cerebral modifications.
Because Malebranche places intelligible extension in God, he has been compared with B. spinoza; yet he sharply criticized Spinoza and insisted on a difference between intelligible extension, the spiritual archetype of corporeity, and materially created extension. The first ideally comprises the infinity of geometrical figures; only the second is actually divided and changing. Therefore, man sees the essence of God only "as participable by corporeal creatures," that is, according to an order of determined perfections but without understanding how these perfections are reconciled with God's transcendent unity; vision in God is not vision of God. Malebranche, however, has been accused of ontologism (A. Fonck, Dictionnaire de théologie catholique 11.1:1046). Certainly he grants to the human mind the vision of the infinite or indeterminate being as a condition of all determinate thought. But Malebranche rejects the basic error of ontologism, viz, the confusion between man's knowledge in the present life and the beatific vision. He insists that no one can see God without first having died.
Again, on earth man does not see the essences of souls. Malebranche limits the Cartesian cogito to the unquestionable awareness of the existence of spirit, while denying that spirit is more clearly known than body. Man, in his view, experiences his own attributes in a confused way and will contemplate his archetype only in the future life; the vision of God, however, will then prevent him from being absorbed by his own perfections. He holds that immortality is sufficiently founded on spirituality and is confirmed by revelation.
As the Incarnate Christ, Jesus unites in Himself both corporeal and spiritual substance and makes creation infinitely priceless. Original sin, foreseen by God, enriches the plan of the Incarnation—which in itself is independent of the Redemption, following the Scotist tradition. Malebranche holds that evil is positive; contrary to St. Augustine, he refuses to explain disorder as a simple dissonance contributing to universal harmony. A man of his time, he excludes from salvation pagans, heretics, and children who have died unbaptized, and is shocked by the great numbers of the damned. An almighty and infinitely good God can save all men and wills to save them (against Jansenism), but He must in His wisdom reconcile the perfection of the work with the simplicity of the means available. Just as physical evils (monsters, cataclysms, etc.) are the consequence of the simplicity of mechanical laws, so inequalities in the distribution of grace are traceable to the cause that best glorifies God, viz, the desires of the soul of Christ, subject as it is to the succession of human thoughts. Bossuet and Fénelon protested against this limitation of the soul of Christ, and Arnauld saw in it an intimation of the Nestorian heresy. Yet through it, Malebranche sought to avoid the opposed errors of Jansenism and Pelagianism. As he viewed the matter, original sin did not destroy nature, and every man who discovers his true Good has access to the graces of light. But through sin the soul is subject to concupiscence and, without the grace of reparation, is incapable of always preferring the good. Malebranche, like St. Augustine, considers this grace as a "prevenient delectation" that opposes itself to the attraction of concupiscence and reestablishes man's freedom. Its proper use follows on the distribution of grace by Christ, and neither commands this giving of grace (contrary to Pelagianism) nor follows from it necessarily (contrary to Jansenism). For human freedom, which conditions man's access to clear ideas through the agency of his attentiveness, permits man to follow or not to follow the divine impulse that draws him toward the Good. God gives man the impulse always to go farther, to the infinite, but sin stops man at false particular goods. The love of God includes beatitude (contrary to quietism), and the queen of virtues, charity, includes the love of God and that of neighbor. The resulting morality is "Christian," as is all of Malebranche's philosophy. It is also rational, however, and is founded on the intellectual vision of the order of perfections. Male-branche applied its principles to defend the dignity of all human beings and the rights of conscience, and concerned himself with concrete efforts in the fields of social relations and of pedagogy.
Influence. Through the breadth of his synthesis and the richness of his psychological and moral analyses, Malebranche attracted many readers. There have been numerous reeditions and translations of his major works, both in his lifetime and after his death. His philosophy was developed by his disciples to the end of the 18th century, principally in France by the Oratorian Bernard lamy and the Benedictine François Lamy, both contemporaries of Malebranche, and later by the Jesuit Yves Marie André (1675–1764) and, in the second half of the 18th century, by Charles Hercules of Keranflech; in England, by John Norris (1657–1711); and in Italy, by the Franciscan Michelangelo Fardella (1650–1718) and, at the end of the 18th century, by Cardinal H. S. Gerdil (1718–1802). Malebranchism appeared, at that time, as the best bulwark of spiritualism against unbelief.
See Also: occasionalism; ontologism.
Bibliography: Works and translations. Oeuvres complètes, gen. ed. a. robinet, 20 v. (Paris 1958–66) v.1–3, ed. g. rodis-lewis; v.5, ed. g. dreyfus; v.17.1–2, ed. p. costabel; Treatise concerning the Search after Truth. Treatise of Nature and Grace… Defense against Accusations of Mr. De La Ville, tr. t. taylor, 2 v. (Oxford 1694), 2d ed. with Discourse upon Light and Colours (1700); Search after Truth, tr. r. sault, 2 v. (London 1694–95); Christian Conferences (London 1695); Treatise of Morality, tr. j. shipton (London 1699); Dialogues in Metaphysics and on Religion, tr. m. ginsberg (London 1923), pref. by g. d. hicks, exposition of M.'s epistemology and metaphysics by Ginsberg. Studies. a. del noce, "Bibliografia malebranchiana," Male-branche nel terzo centenario della nascita spec. suppl. of Revista de filosofia neo-scolastica 30 (1938) 361–380. g. sebba, N. Male-branche: A Preliminary Bibliography (Athens, Geo., 1958). a. robinet, Documents biographiques et bibliographiques, v.20 of malebranche, Oeuvres complètes, op. cit. Copleston v.4. j. moreau, Enciclopedia filosofica, 4 v. (Venice-Rome 1957) 3:272–277. j. wehrlÉ, Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, ed. a. vacant et al., 15 v. (Paris 1903–50) 9.2:1774–1804. g. rodis-lewis, Nicolas Malebranche (Paris 1963). r. w. church, A Study in the Philosophy of M. (London 1931). b. k. rome, The Philosophy of M.: A Study in His Integration of Faith, Reason and Experimental Observation (Chicago 1963). v. delbos, Étude de la philosophie de M. (Paris 1924). h. gouhier, La Vocation de M. (Paris 1926); La Philosophie de M. et son expérience religieuse (2d ed. Paris 1948). m. gueroult, Malebranche, 2 v. in 3 (Paris 1955–59) v.1 La Vision de Dieu; v.2 Les Cinq abîmes de la Providence. y. de montcheuil, M. et le quiétisme (Paris 1946). g. dreyfus, La Volonté selon M. (Paris 1958). a. robinet, Systéme et existence dans l'oeuvre de M. (Paris 1965). l. verga, La filosofia morale di M. (Milan 1964).
[g. rodis-lewis]
