The Constitution

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The Constitution

David Gray Adler

There is no comprehensive grant of a foreign affairs authority in the U.S. Constitution. Rather, the constitutional text carefully enumerates and allocates to the three branches of government a series of specific foreign relations powers, responsibilities, and duties. The relatively lean text, and the fact that it omits mention of particular powers, has no doubt contributed to the constitutional tension, controversy, and occasional crises that have marked American foreign affairs. Nevertheless the Constitution vests in Congress the bulk of the nation's foreign policy powers, a design which assigns to Congress senior status in a partnership with the president for the formulation, management, and conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The constitutional blueprint for foreign relations reflects the Constitutional Convention's conspicuous penchant for collective decision making and its fear of unilateral executive power.

This arrangement, however, has been over-whelmed in the post–Cold War era by sweeping assertions of unilateral presidential power that have laid the basis for a presidential monopoly over foreign affairs and advanced a conception of executive authority so capacious that it has produced a wide gulf between constitutional principle and governmental practice. To understand the constitutional allocation of foreign relations powers, it is necessary to examine the Constitution—the text, its design, the intentions of its Framers, and its history.

CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT

The preference for collective, rather than individual, decision making runs throughout the constitutional provisions that govern foreign policy. In addition to its exclusive jurisdiction over legislation and appropriation, Congress derives broad authority from Article 1, Section 8, to "provide for the Common Defence," to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," "to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas … and offences against the Law of Nations," and make rules governing immigration and naturalization. Congress, alone, has the power to "declare War" and to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal" as well as to develop rules regarding "Captures on Land and Water." Congress also possesses the authority to raise, support, and maintain an army and navy, to "make Rules" for the regulation and government of the "land and naval Forces" and to call forth "the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." It is also assigned the power and responsibility to organize, arm, discipline, and govern the militia.

As Article 2, Section 2, of the Constitution indicates, the president shares with the Senate the power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors. Specifically, the president is granted the authority, "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." Another provision, known as the "supremacy clause," in Article 6, makes treaties, along with the Constitution and acts of Congress, the "supreme Law of the land." The constitutional grant of authority to the president to "appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.

The Constitution assigns to the president only two exclusive roles in foreign affairs. He is "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several states, when called into the actual Service of the United States," and he is enjoined by Article 2, Section 3, to perform two duties: "he shall receive Ambassadors, and other public Ministers," and "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." This list exhausts the textual grant of authority to the president and Congress in foreign affairs. The president's constitutional powers are few and modest, and they pale in comparison with those vested in Congress.

The judiciary is assigned constitutional power that bears on the conduct of foreign policy. Article 3, Section 2, confers upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls," while it generally lodges in the federal courts jurisdiction in "controversies between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."

The Constitution also imposes some significant and specific prohibitions, the effect of which is to ensure that control over foreign relations is vested in the national government. For purposes of foreign relations, federalism is virtually irrelevant. Bulked by the supremacy clause, federal acts are supreme and require the acquiescence of states. In United States v. Belmont (1937), the Supreme Court observed: "In respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the State … does not exist." Thus, Article 1, Section 10, categorically forbids states from entering "into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation." Moreover, no state may, without the consent of Congress, "enter into any Agreement or Compact … with a foreign power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded," or in "imminent danger" of invasion. Other prohibitions touch upon the conduct of foreign affairs, although none of them in practice is very important. Thus, Article 1, Section 9, provides that no holder of any "Office of Profit or Trust" under the United States may "accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign state," without the consent of Congress.

Some foreign affairs powers are not mentioned in the Constitution. For example, the Constitution is silent on the repository of authority to negotiate treaties, terminate treaties, recognize foreign governments and states, and make or declare peace. It may be plausibly argued that these powers are subsumed under enumerated grants of power or fairly inferred from the Framers' intentions or other constitutional provisions. This approach is faithful to the principle, articulated by the Court in Reid v. Covert (1957), that the government is "a creature of the Constitution. Its powers and authority have no other source." It has been asserted, however, that foreign relations constitute an exception to the principle that the federal government has only those powers expressly enumerated in the Constitution. In the controversial decision of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936), the Court announced that the president's powers over foreign affairs are not derived from the Constitution but are a direct inheritance from the Crown of England. That case involved the constitutionality of an embargo that President Franklin D. Roosevelt had imposed upon the export of arms to Bolivia and Paraguay during the Chaco War. Roosevelt had issued the embargo on the basis of authority delegated to him in a joint resolution passed by Congress.

In a bizarre opinion, Justice George Sutherland argued that federal power in the field of foreign affairs differed radically from that with respect to internal matters. He observed that the internal federal power had been carved from "the general mass of legislative powers then possessed by the states," but that this was not at all true of the control of foreign policy, which had never been in the possession of the states. Instead, he maintained, before the Revolution general power over foreign affairs had been lodged in the British Crown. But with the Declaration of Independence, "the power of external sovereignty had passed … to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States." The power over foreign affairs was "older than the Constitution" and had been inherited by the newly formed "Union" from the Confederation. It did not depend upon any direct grant of authority from the Constitution, for it is a necessary attribute of nationhood and sovereignty. Not only did the foreign affairs power inhere in the union, but it belonged to the president, who would exercise "plenary" power in his capacity as "sole organ" of American foreign policy, although the opinion did not explain how such authority came to belong to the executive.

Justice Sutherland's opinion has been roundly criticized. Scholars have criticized his reading of Anglo-American legal history by demonstrating that in 1776 states were sovereign entities. They point to Article 2 of the Articles of Confederation which stated: "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power … which is not … expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." As sovereign entities, and jealous of their sovereignty, states only delegated powers to the Continental Congress. Through Article 9, for example, states delegated the war and treaty powers. That grant alone undermines Sutherland's premise that these powers were derived from a source other than the states. Moreover, even if it were assumed that the power of external sovereignty had been by some method transferred directly from the Crown to the union, it remains to be explained why that power would be vested in the president. Justice Felix Frankfurter noted in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer (1952) that "the fact that power exists in the Government does not vest it in the President." Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled on several occasions that the sovereign power in foreign affairs is held by Congress. There is nothing in Sutherland's theory that would explain the location of this power in the presidency.

The contention, moreover, that the conduct of foreign policy is not restricted by the Constitution is at odds with Madison's statement in Federalist No. 45 that "the powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined … [they] will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce." Thus the foreign affairs powers are strictly constitutional. Since Curtiss-Wright the Court has taken the position that foreign affairs powers are tethered to the Constitution. In Youngstown, Justice Hugo Black, speaking for the Court, delivered a weighty rebuke to the claim of "extra-constitutional" power. In the same case, Justice Robert Jackson dismissed Sutherland's claim of an extra-constitutional presidential power as mere "dictum." The theory of extra-constitutional authority is irreconcilable with the central premise of American constitutionalism: All powers of the government—expressed and implied—have been delegated by the sovereign. As a consequence of this constitutional principle, all governmental acts—executive, legislative, and judicial—must be grounded within the four corners of the Constitution.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

The Constitutional Convention was called for the purpose of correcting the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation. Chief among the deficiencies were those that weakened the international position of the United States. Accordingly, few issues rivaled in importance the maintenance of national security and the conduct of foreign affairs, and thus the search for an efficient foreign policy design was a primary goal and an animating purpose of the convention.

There was broad agreement among American leaders that the foreign affairs flaws of the Articles of Confederation stemmed not from the absence of an independent executive but from the lack of authority granted to Congress. The Articles had created an ineffective national government that lacked coercive power over the states. Indeed, the outstanding characteristic of the Articles—state sovereignty—was reflected in theory by the fact that the governing document did not capitalize "united states," and in practice by the refusal of states to honor their federal obligations.

Contemporaries discussed three particular weaknesses. First, a depleted treasury undermined national defense and rendered the young Republic vulnerable to its enemies and adversaries. The Spanish in the South, British in the Northwest, and Indians throughout the land represented an ongoing threat. Second, without authority to regulate foreign commerce, Congress lacked bargaining power in its attempt to strike favorable trade agreements. Third, and most important, Congress had no power to prevent states from violating treaties negotiated in the name of the United States, which meant that individual states could undermine the reputation, integrity, and security of the nation. Indeed, the pervasive infidelity of the states to the international obligations and treaty agreements of the United States subverted the ability of the union to maintain its foreign credit and position as a sovereign nation. The frequent treaty violations, according to James Madison, justly known as the father of the Constitution for his role as its chief architect, constituted one of the principal "vices of the political system of the United States." They led Alexander Hamilton to lament in Federalist No. 22: "The faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole Union, are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed. Is it possible that foreign nations can either respect or confide in such a government?"

The inadequacies of the Articles—mainly the debilitating weakness of the national government—supplied a critical focal point for the Framers' deliberations. The convention's decision to create the supremacy clause was a pivotal move, for the declaration in Article 6 that, "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States and all Treaties, … shall be the Supreme Law of the land, … any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding," signified the end of "state sovereignty" and enabled the federal government to wrest control of foreign policy from the recalcitrant states. While the supremacy clause certainly had profound implications for areas other than diplomacy, there is no exaggeration in the observation that it provided the sine qua non of a vital and vibrant national foreign policy.

The Articles of Confederation also supplied, in some key respects, a point of departure. The Articles had vested executive as well as legislative authority in Congress. Article 6 granted Congress control over the conduct of foreign policy, and Article 9 granted it "the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war." But the Philadelphia convention had embraced the principle of separation of powers, and now the delegates were forced to fashion a division of authority between the legislative and executive branches.

The Framers might have adopted the English model for reasons of familiarity, tradition, and simplicity; like other nations, Britain concentrated virtually unlimited authority over foreign policy in the hands of the executive. For the Framers were of course thoroughly familiar with the vast foreign affairs powers that inhered in the English Crown by virtue of the royal prerogative. Sir William Blackstone, the great eighteenth-century jurist, explained in his magisterial four-volume work Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–1769) that the king exercised plenary authority over all matters relating to war and peace, diplomacy, treaties, and military command. Blackstone defined the king's prerogative as "those rights and capacities which the King enjoys alone." The monarch's prerogatives, "those which are 'rooted in and spring from the King's political person,'" include the authority to send and receive ambassadors and the power to make war or peace. The Crown, moreover, could negotiate "a treaty with a foreign state, which shall irrevocably bind the nation," and he could issue letters of marque and reprisal, which authorized private citizens to perform military actions on behalf of the nation. The king, according to Blackstone, was "the generalissimo, or the first in military command," and he possessed "the sole power of raising and regulating fleets and armies." In the exercise of this lawful prerogative, Blackstone explained, the king "is, and ought to be absolute; that is, so far absolute that there is no legal authority that can either delay or resist him" (vol. 2, pp. 238–250).

The Framers' rejection of the English model could not have been more emphatic. Their discussion of foreign affairs in Philadelphia began on 29 May 1787 with the introduction of the Virginia Plan, which provided for the creation of an executive that, in addition to "a general authority to execute the national laws … ought to enjoy the Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation." The apparent clarity of the proposal was illusory, however, since the Articles of Confederation had created only a single branch of government—Congress—and had not attempted to categorize powers as legislative, executive, or judicial. As a consequence the vague proposal allowed for the possibility that "Executive rights" might be interpreted to include the full panoply of foreign affairs and warmaking powers exercised by the English king—the authority to determine war and peace, and the powers of sending and receiving ambassadors and entering treaties and alliances, among others—all of which the Articles of Confederation had granted to Congress.

The prospect that the Virginia Plan might involve a transfer to the president of these broad powers provoked alarm in the convention barely a week into the proceedings, triggering a release of the Framers' deep-seated aversion to unilateral executive power in foreign affairs. In a critical debate on 1 June, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina stated that he favored a vigorous executive but feared that the Virginia Plan's proposal to place in a newly created executive the "Executive rights vested in Congress" might include its authority over decisions of war and peace, which, if delegated to a new executive, would make that office a "monarchy of the worst kind," an "elective one."

Pinckney's preference for congressional control over matters of war and peace was supported by his fellow South Carolinian John Rutledge, who argued against vesting such authority in the executive. James Wilson of Pennsylvania, second only to Madison as an architect of the Constitution and a future member of the U.S. Supreme Court, sought to assuage Pinckney's concerns by pointing out that "the prerogatives of the British Monarch" did not properly define the executive powers. Those prerogatives, he explained, included some powers that were of a legislative nature, among them war and peace. In fact, the only powers that Wilson considered to be "strictly executive" were enforcing the laws made by the legislature and the choice of officers not to be appointed by the legislature. Wilson agreed with Roger Sherman of Connecticut, who believed the executive was merely an agent of the legislature, which ought to retain authority over matters of war and peace. In the debate that day every speaker who addressed the issue shared that opinion, including Madison, who reminded the convention that as a matter of definition, executive powers did not include war and peace. Moreover, the delegates, filled with misgivings and apprehension, voted to delete the ambiguous proposal to vest in the president the "Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation." Later the Framers would embrace Madison's proposal to fix the extent of the executive powers through careful enumeration.

Wilson's reference to the "prerogatives of the British Monarch" captured the Framers' greatest fears about unilateral executive authority in foreign affairs. There was a deep worry in the convention's discussions about executive power, epitomized by Edmund Randolph's characterization of it as the "foetus of monarchy." The Framers' trepidations about executive power were greatly influenced by the constitutional crises and political convulsions of the seventeenth-century English Civil Wars. The absolutist claims of the Stuart Kings and the abuse of authority by manipulative ministers had hardened their view toward the executive. Their deep concern about executive abuse of power was not merely a reflection of their perceptive readings of history but also an out-growth of their own experience, for the fear of power resonated from the colonial period. These pervasive fears, doubts, and concerns about executive power, which conduced to preclude, in the minds of the Framers, any unilateral presidential power over foreign affairs, were summed up by Hamilton in Federalist No. 75: "The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a president of the United States."

Behind the Framers' emphatic rejection of the British model, rooted in a deep aversion to an unrestrained, unilateral executive power, lay an equally emphatic commitment to the republican principle of collective decision-making, grounded in the belief that the conjoined wisdom of the many is superior to that of one. The Framers perceived a broad equatorial divide between the hemispheres of monarchism and republicanism, between the values of the Old World and the those of the New World. The convention's deliberate fragmentation of powers relating to diplomacy, treaties, and war and peace, and the allocation of the various foreign affairs powers to different departments and agencies of government, reflected the Framers' determination to apply the doctrines of separation of powers and checks and balances, the principle of the rule of law, and the elements of constitutionalism to the realm of foreign relations as rigorously as they had been applied to the domestic domain.

This critical decision represented a bold departure from the prevailing wisdom of the day, which urged the unification and centralization of foreign relations powers in the executive and warned that the separation of those powers would invite chaos, disorder, and even disaster. But the Framers brought a fresh outlook, a new vision, to foreign policy, one that recognized that the conduct of foreign policy includes some elements that are primarily legislative in nature, others that are essentially executive, and still others characteristically judicial. In Federalist No. 47, Madison observed that "treaties with foreign sovereigns" assume, once they are made, "the force of legislative acts." The Constitution, moreover, characterizes the power to declare war as legislative, and the power to conduct it as executive. The supremacy clause imposes upon judges the duty to enforce treaties as the law of the land. The Constitutional Convention discarded the British model as obsolete and inapplicable to the republican manners of the United States.

The purpose of this new constitutional arrangement for foreign affairs, a distinctively American contribution to politics and political science, was to require and implement collective decision-making—joint participation, consultation, and concurrence—by the political branches in the formulation, conduct, and management of the nation's foreign policy. The Framers supposed that the infusion into the foreign policy process of checks and balances would maintain the constitutional allocation of powers and, therefore, prevent executive unilateralism, aggrandizement, and usurpation. They believed, moreover, that the structure of shared powers in the conduct of international affairs, bottomed on the premise and promise of legislative deliberation, would produce wise policies and, in the words of Wilson, "a security to the people," for it would afford in Congress an airing of the various political, economic, and military interests that were bound up in the nation's external relations.

But two centuries of history and practice have witnessed the virtual eclipse of the Framers' blueprint for foreign affairs. The premise of congressional primacy has given way to executive dominance, and the promise of joint participation has been subverted by presidential unilateralism. In the context of foreign affairs, the United States has been marching backward, for the president has largely secured the prerogatives of the English Crown that the Framers denied to him in the Constitutional Convention, and which the nation had roundly condemned since the writing of the Declaration of Independence. In truth, the rise of presidential hegemony, so ably captured by the title of Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s influential book The Imperial Presidency, is the product of a regrettable mixture: one part usurpation and two parts acquiescence. Presidential aggrandizement of foreign affairs powers has been aided and abetted by a quiescent Congress, seemingly indifferent to the usurpation of its powers, and by a judiciary that has exhibited an attitude of deference to the executive, as reflected in its refusal to restrain presidential adventurism abroad.

The presidential monopoly of American foreign relations finds its justification not in constitutional norms but in the claims of necessity and national security, pleas that have flown high in the Cold War period and beyond, as the values of unity, speed, and dispatch have replaced the values of deliberation, concurrence, and consent. The growth of presidential power has been conspicuous in the aggrandizement of the war power and in the assumption of the authority to make international agreements, often in disregard of the principles and processes that govern the treaty power. It also has been reflected in the exercise of the president's duty to receive ambassadors, and in the executive's penchant for secrecy and the control of information.

THE WAR POWER

The Framers of the Constitution vested in Congress the sole and exclusive authority to initiate military hostilities, including full-blown, total war, as well as lesser acts of armed force, on behalf of the American people. The constitutional grant to Congress of the war power, which Justice William Paterson described in United States v. Smith (1806) as "the exclusive province of Congress to change a state of peace into a state of war," constituted a sharp break from the British model. The Framers were determined to deny to the president what Blackstone had assigned to the English King—"the sole prerogative of making war and peace." The president, in his role as commander in chief, was granted only the authority to repel invasions of the United States. But what the Framers sought to deny to the president has become a commonplace. Indeed, executive usurpation of the war power in the period since World War II has become a dominant characteristic of American foreign relations as presidents have routinely committed acts of war without congressional authorization.

The war clause of the Constitution provides: "The Congress shall have power … to declare War [and] grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal." On 29 May, in an early debate in the Constitutional Convention on the repository of the war power, a clear understanding developed among the delegates that the power of "war and peace"—the power to initiate war—did not belong to the executive but to the legislature. On 6 August the Committee of Detail circulated a draft constitution that granted Congress the power to "make" war. This bore sharp resemblance to the Articles of Confederation, which vested the "sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war" to the Continental Congress. When the war clause was considered in debate on 17 August, the familiar voice from South Carolina, Charles Pinckney, was initially reluctant to place the power in the House of Representatives: "Its proceedings were too slow…. The Senate would be the best depository, being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions." Another South Carolinian, Pierce Butler, startled the convention when he announced that he "was for vesting the power in the President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the nation will support it." Butler's opinion shocked Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, who declared that he "never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war." Butler stood alone in the convention. There was no support for his opinion and no second to his motion.

The proposal of the Committee of Detail to vest Congress with the power to "make" war proved unsatisfactory to Madison and Gerry. In what must be regarded as one of the most famous joint resolutions in American history, Madison and Gerry moved to substitute "declare" for "make," and they explained that the purpose of the motion was to allow the president "to repel sudden attacks." The meaning of the motion was clear. The power to initiate war was granted to Congress, with the reservation that the president need not await authorization from Congress to repel a sudden attack on the United States. There was no quarrel whatever with respect to the sudden-attack provision, but there was some question as to whether the substitution of "declare" for "make" would effect the intention of Madison and Gerry. Roger Sherman of Connecticut thought the joint motion "stood very well." He believed that it permitted the executive "to repel and not commence war." Virginia's George Mason announced that he "was against giving the power of war to the Executive, because not safely to be trusted with it," then said he preferred "declare" to "make." The adoption of the Madison-Gerry proposal made it clear that Congress alone possessed the authority to initiate war. The warmaking power was specifically denied to the president; he was given only the authority to repel sudden attacks against the United States. No delegate to the Philadelphia convention and no member of any state ratifying convention contested this understanding. James Wilson, one of the most penetrating constitutional theorists of the founding generation, captured the precise intent of the convention: this system "will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress."

At the time of the convention, the phrase "declare war" enjoyed a settled understanding and an established usage. As early as 1552 the verb "declare" had become synonymous with the verb "commence"; they both implied the initiation of hostilities. This was the established usage in international law as well as in England, where the terms to "declare" war and to "make" war were used interchangeably. This practice was thoroughly familiar to the Framers. Given the equivalence of commence and declare, it is clear that a congressional declaration of war would institute military hostilities. According to international law commentators at the time of the founding, a declaration of war was desirable because it announced the institution of a state of war, and the legal consequences it entailed, to the adversary, to neutral nations, and to citizens of the sovereign initiating the war. Indeed, this is the essence of a declaration of war: notice by the proper authority of intent to convert a state of peace into a state of war. But all that is required under American law is a joint resolution or an explicit congressional authorization of the use of military force against a named adversary. This can come in the form of a "declaration pure and simple," or in a "conditional declaration of war." There are also two kinds of war, those that U.S. courts have termed "perfect," or general, and those labeled "imperfect," or limited, wars. In 1782, in Miller v. The Ship Resolution, the federal court of appeals, established by the Continental Congress, stated: "The writers upon the law of nations, speaking of different kinds of war, distinguish them into perfect and imperfect: A perfect war is that which destroys the national peace and tranquillity, and lays the foundation of every possible act of hostility. The imperfect war is that which does not entirely destroy the public tranquillity, but interrupts it only in some particulars, as in the case of reprisals."

It was decided at the dawn of the Republic that the power of determining perfect and imperfect war lay with Congress. In Talbot v. Seeman (1801), Chief Justice John Marshall wrote for the Court that the war power of Congress comprises the power "to declare a general war" and also to "wage a limited war." The power of Congress to authorize limited war is, of course, a necessary concomitant of its power to declare general war. If the president might authorize relatively minor acts of war or perhaps covert military operations in circumstances not demanding full-blown war, that power could be wielded in a way that would easily eviscerate the Constitution's placement of the war power in Congress. But the Framers withheld from the president the power to work such mischief. The Constitution granted the executive only the authority to respond defensively to the initiation of war through sudden attack upon the United States. In United States v. Smith (1806), Justice William Paterson of the Supreme Court, who had been a delegate to the Constitutional Convention from New Jersey, explained that, in the event of an invasion of the United States, it would be lawful for the president to resist such invasion for the "plain reason that a state of complete and absolute war exists between the two nations. In the case of invasive hostilities, there cannot be war on the one side and peace on the other…. There is a manifest distinction between our going to war with a nation at peace, and a war being made against us by an actual invasion, or a formal declaration. In the former case, it is the exclusive province of Congress to change a state of peace into a state of war." But the president's power of self-defense does not extend to foreign lands. The Framers did not give the president the authority to intervene in foreign wars, or to choose between war and peace, or to identify and commence hostilities against an enemy of the American people. Nor did they empower him to initiate force abroad on the basis of his own assessments of U.S. security interests. These circumstances involve choices that belong to Congress, under its exclusive province to change a state of peace into a state of war.

All of the offensive powers of the nation, then, were located in Congress. Consistent with this constitutional theory, the convention gave to Congress the power to issue "letters of marque and reprisal." Dating back to the Middle Ages when sovereigns employed private forces in retaliation for an injury caused by the sovereign of another state or his subjects, the practice of issuing reprisals gradually evolved into the use of public armies. By the time of the convention the Framers considered the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal sufficient to authorize a broad spectrum of armed hostilities short of declared war. In other words, it was regarded as a species of imperfect war.

THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF CLAUSE

While the Framers granted Congress the authority to decide for war, they provided in Article 2, Section 2, that: "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several states, when called into the actual Service of the United States." The Framers thus vested command of the military forces in the president, which meant that once Congress authorized military hostilities, the president as commander in chief would exercise authority to conduct and prosecute the war effort. As Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 74: "Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand." But the designation of the president as commander in chief conferred no warmaking power whatever; it vested in the president, as Hamilton proposed to the convention, only the authority to repel sudden attacks on the United States and to direct war, "when authorized or begun." In this capacity, he would direct those forces placed at his command by an act of Congress.

The Framers adopted the title of commander in chief and its historical usage from England, where it was introduced in 1639 by King Charles I. The title was used as a generic term referring to the highest-ranking officer in a particular chain of command or theater of action. But the ranking commander in chief was always sub-ordinate to a political superior, whether a king, Parliament, or, with the development of the cabinet system in England, a secretary of war. The practice of giving the officer at the apex of the military the title of commander in chief and of making him subject to instructions from a political superior was embraced by the Continental Congress and by most of the states in their early constitutions. When, on 15 June 1775, the Continental Congress unanimously decided to appoint George Washington as "General and Commander in Chief, of the Army of the United Colonies," it issued instructions that kept Washington on a short leash. He was ordered "punctually to observe and follow such orders and directions, from time to time, as you shall receive from this, or future Congress of these United Colonies, or Committee of Congress." Congress did not hesitate to instruct the commander in chief on military and policy matters. This usage had been established for a century and a half and was thoroughly familiar to the Framers when they met in Philadelphia. It is probable that this settled understanding and the consequent absence of concerns about the nature of the post accounts for the fact that there was no debate on the commander in chief clause at the convention. It is telling, moreover, that there was no effort at the convention or at any state ratifying convention to redefine the office of commander in chief.

Hamilton's speech on 18 June captured the essence of the president's power as commander in chief when he stated that the executive was "to have the direction of War when authorized or begun." There was no fear of the legal authority granted by the commander in chief clause, and there is no evidence that anyone believed that his office as commander in chief endowed the president with an independent source of warmaking authority. The narrow, military role of the executive was explained by Hamilton in Federalist No. 69, in which he said the president's power as commander in chief "would be nominally the same with that of the King of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces … while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies,—all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature." The president as commander in chief was to be "first General and Admiral" in "the direction of war when authorized or begun." But all political authority remained in Congress, as it had under the Articles of Confederation. As Madison explained it in a letter to Thomas Jefferson in 1798: "The Constitution supposes, what the History of all Governments demonstrates, that the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care vested the question of war in the Legislature."

THE WAR POWER IN PRACTICE

The early practice and understanding of the government on the issue of warmaking closely conformed to the constitutional framework. There was, throughout the nineteenth century, no instance of a presidential assertion of a unilateral warmaking power. But there were disputes in the margins.

In 1793 war broke out between Great Britain and France. President George Washington declared that the Treaty of Alliance of 1778 did not obligate the United States to defend French territory in America, and he issued a proclamation of neutrality. Whether this power belonged to the president or Congress set off a remarkable debate between Hamilton and Madison. In a series of articles signed "Pacificus," Hamilton defended the substance of the policy as well as the president's unilateral authority to promulgate it. Hamilton acknowledged that "the legislature have the right to make war on the one hand," but it remained "the duty of the Executive to preserve peace till war is declared." In the fulfillment of that duty, Hamilton argued, the president "must necessarily possess a right of judging what is the nature of the obligations which the treaties of the country impose on the government." By this time, France was involved in several wars, and Hamilton's concerns about the force and nature of the treaties was evident: Did they obligate the United States to assist the French in their foreign adventures? He properly denied the existence of any such ironclad obligation, but his view that the president possessed discretionary authority, as part of his "duty" to preserve peace "till war is declared," triggered a response from Madison, who wrote under the pseudonym of "Helvidius" and asserted that if Washington's proclamation were valid, it meant that the president had usurped congressional power to decide between a state of peace or a state of war. Despite this difference, both agreed that the power to initiate war is vested in Congress. Madison wrote that the "executive has no right, in any case, to decide the question, whether there is or is not cause for declaring war; that the right of convening and informing Congress, whenever such a question seems to call for a decision, is all the right which the Constitution has deemed requisite or proper." It is to be emphasized that throughout their lives both Hamilton and Madison maintained the doctrine that it is for Congress alone to initiate hostilities. That agreement reflected the understanding of the war clause throughout the nineteenth century. In fact, presidents—Washington, Adams, and Jefferson among them—were particularly careful to avoid military actions that might encroach upon the congressional warpower.

In 1798 France repeatedly raided and seized American vessels. When asked whether a new law that increased the size of the navy authorized the president to initiate hostilities, Hamilton stated that he had not seen the law and that, if it did not grant the president any new authority but left him "at the foot of the Constitution," then the president had only the power to "employ the ships as convoys, with authority to repel force by force (but not to capture) and to repress hostilities within our waters, including a marine league from our coasts. Anything beyond this must fall under the idea of reprisals, and requires the sanctions of that department which is to declare or make war. "

Contrary to the claim that President John Adams engaged in an exercise of unilateral warmaking in the Quasi-War with France (1798–1800), the facts demonstrate that the war was clearly authorized by Congress, which debated the prospect of war and passed some twenty statutes permitting it to be waged. Moreover, Adams took absolutely no independent action. In Bas v. Tingy (1800), the Supreme Court held that the body of statutes enacted by Congress had authorized imperfect, or limited, war. In Talbot v. Seeman (1801), a case that arose from issues in the Quasi-War, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote for the Court, "The whole powers of war being, by the Constitution of the United States, vested in Congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this inquiry." In Little v. Barreme (1804), Marshall emphasized the control that Congress can wield over the president as commander in chief. One of the statutes passed by Congress during the Quasi-War with France authorized the president to seize vessels sailing to French ports. President Adams issued an order directing American ships to capture vessels sailing to or from French ports, but in the opinion for the Court, Marshall held that Adams's order had exceeded his authority since congressional policy set forth in the statute was superior to presidential orders inconsistent with the statute. Subsequent judicial holdings have reiterated the fact that the commander in chief may be controlled by statute.

As president, Thomas Jefferson acknowledged that his powers of war were limited to defensive actions. In his first annual message to Congress in 1801 he reported the arrogant demands made by the pasha of Tripoli. Unless the United States paid tribute, the pasha threatened to seize American ships and citizens. Jefferson responded by sending a small squadron to the Mediterranean to protect against the threatened attack. He then asked Congress for further guidance, stating he was "unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense." It was left to Congress to authorize "measures of offense also." Jefferson's understanding of the war clause underwent no revision. In 1805 he informed Congress of the dispute with Spain over the boundaries of Louisiana and Florida. Jefferson warned that Spain evidenced an "intention to advance on our possessions until they shall be repressed by an opposing force. Considering that Congress alone is constitutionally invested with the power of changing our condition from peace to war, I have thought it my duty to await their authority for using force."

Other early presidents, including Washington, Madison, James Monroe, and Andrew Jackson, also refused to exercise offensive military powers without authorization from Congress, which they understood to be the sole repository of the power to initiate war. There was no departure from this understanding of the war clause throughout the nineteenth century. In 1846 President James K. Polk ordered an army into a disputed border area between Texas and Mexico. One of its patrols was attacked by Mexican forces, which were defeated by the U.S. soldiers. In a message to Congress, Polk offered the rationale that Mexico had invaded the United States, which prompted Congress to declare war. If Polk's rationale was correct, then his action could not be challenged on constitutional grounds, for it was well established that the president had the authority to repel sudden attacks. If, however, he was disingenuous—if he had in fact initiated military hostilities—then he had clearly usurped the warmaking power of Congress. It is worth noticing that he made no claim to constitutional power to make war.

Although Congress declared war, the House of Representatives censured Polk for his actions because the war had been "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United States." It seemed evident that Polk had dispatched troops into the disputed area for the purpose of precipitating war by provoking a Mexican attack on American soldiers. His manipulative efforts were effective. Representative Abraham Lincoln voted with the majority against Polk. As president, Lincoln maintained that only Congress could authorize the initiation of hostilities. None of his actions in the Civil War, including the suspension of habeas corpus, the appropriation of funds from the U.S. treasury, or his decision to call forth regiments from state militias, each of which was eventually retroactively authorized by Congress, constituted a precedent for presidential initiation of war. Moreover, in the Prize Cases (1863), the Supreme Court upheld Lincoln's blockade against the rebellious Confederacy as a constitutional response to a sudden invasion that began with the attack on Fort Sumter. The Court stated that the president, as commander in chief, "has no power to initiate or declare war either against a foreign nation or a domestic state." Nevertheless, in the event of invasion by a foreign nation or a state, the president was not only authorized "but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority." According to the Court, the president had to meet the crisis in the shape it presented itself "without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name given to it by him or them could change the fact."

THE CONTINUING WAR POWERS CONTROVERSY

Until 1950 it had long been established and well settled that the Constitution vests in Congress the sole and exclusive authority to initiate total as well as limited war. But at the midcentury mark, President Harry Truman asserted a unilateral executive warmaking power, and claimed authorization from the United Nations, to justify his decision to introduce U.S. troops into the Korean War without congressional authorization. Truman's decision in June 1950 to intervene in South Korea in order to counter the communist North Korean invasion commenced what was to become one of the bloodiest wars in America history. The president claimed that he acted in response to a UN Security Council call for military action. In fact, Truman had committed U.S. forces before the Security Council issued its request. Several senators and representatives attacked Truman's unilateral act on the floor of Congress as a violation of the Constitution. They point out that the UN Charter carried no specific obligation to go to war in support of its decisions any more than a treaty obligation alone could commit the United States to war without a decision to that end by both houses of Congress. Thus, Robert Taft of Ohio, in an embittered speech on the Senate floor, charged that President Truman had "usurped power and violated the Constitution" by his Korean intervention. Despite constitutional doubts expressed by Taft and several other senators, Congress regularly appropriated ample funds to support the war. In reality, it had little choice in the matter, unless it wished to see an American army far from home overwhelmed in the field.

In 1951, while the Korean War was still in progress, Truman announced that he was sending four army divisions to Germany in support of the new U.S. obligation to defend the Continent, in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and the Lisbon and Ottawa agreements. It was obvious that a large-scale American army on the Elbe River opposite Soviet-occupied East Germany constituted a heavy American commitment to go to war in the event of a Soviet invasion of western Europe, regardless of any constitutional limitation upon the war power. Indeed, the American divisions were commonly described as a "trip wire" for the very purpose of committing the United States to war should such an invasion occur.

Truman denied that he need congressional authorization before deploying the troops in Europe, and his decision triggered the so-called "great debate" on the constitutionality of his action. Several senators, among them Paul Douglas and Thomas Connelly, argued that the president has the power under the Constitution to move troops overseas, both in pursuance of treaty obligations and by virtue of his constitutional powers as commander in chief of the armed forces. In contrast, Taft and John Bricker criticized the president's action as grossly unconstitutional.

The outcome of the debate was a substantial victory for the president. The Senate adopted a weak resolution expressing its "approval" of the president's action, but declaring it to be "the sense of the Senate" that in the future the president ought to obtain the approval of Congress prior to the assignment of troops abroad, "in the interests of sound constitutional processes and of national unity." The acquiescence of Congress in the fact of Truman's usurpation of power inaugurated a new theme in matters of war and peace.

Since then a steady pattern of presidential warmaking has developed: Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon in Vietnam, Gerald Ford in Cambodia, Ronald Reagan in Lebanon, Grenada, and Libya, George H. W. Bush in Panama, and William Jefferson Clinton in Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Bosnia, all without congressional authorization.

Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, President George H. W. Bush began deploying U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia and other sites in the Middle East. By November, Bush had doubled the size of the deployment and established the capacity to wage war. Bush did not seek authorization from Congress, but persuaded the United Nations Security Council to authorize the use of military force, which it did on 29 November. Bush never sought authority (only support) from Congress, but on 12 January 1991 Congress authorized military action against Iraq. The approval, however, bore the appearance of a rubber stamp in the face of a presidential fait accompli, backed by a bloc of 439,000 U.S. troops that Bush had amassed in the region. There is surely nothing in the constitutional grant of authority to the president that justifies the deployment of troops, but in the postwar era, presidents frequently have deployed troops into hostilities or into situations in which hostilities were imminent, in numbers large and small and for durations long and short, a practice that has served to preempt the congressional power to decide on matters of war and peace.

Congressional acquiescence in the presidential usurpation of its authority to deploy troops has become a central factor in the demise of legislative control of the war power which, Madison stated, includes the power "to commence, continue and conclude war." President Bush's claim of UN authority—like Truman's in Korea or Clinton's invocation of authority from NATO to order air strikes against Yugoslavia on 24 March 1999— lacks credibility. These mutual security treaties provided that they would be carried out by the United States in accordance with its "constitutional processes," which vests in Congress the sole power to decide for war. The fact that treaties are the supreme law of the land does not imply that a mutual security treaty can amend the Constitution. In Geofroy v. Riggs (1890), the Court stated that the treaty-making power does not "authorize what the Constitution forbids, or [effect] a change in the character of government." Thus, the president and the Senate may not, through the exercise of the treaty power, deprive the House of Representative of its constitutional role as a joint partner in the warmaking power with the Senate.

Presidents have asserted a variety of arguments in defense of their unilateral military actions. Invocation of the commander in chief clause has become a commonplace. As Justice Robert H. Jackson observed in the Steel Seizure Case (1952), the clause has been adduced for the "power to do anything, anywhere, that can be done with an army or navy." Yet neither the history of the clause nor the debates in the Constitutional Convention afford any evidence to support this presidential claim. Moreover, no court has ever cited it as a source of independent warmaking authority for the president.

Twentieth-century presidents including Truman, Nixon, and Clinton also have advanced the executive power clause as authorization for presidential warmaking. Article 2, Section 1, of the Constitution provides: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." As we have seen, the claim that the executive power clause includes authority to initiate hostilities was considered and rejected in the Constitutional Convention. For the Framers, the phrase "executive power" was limited, as James Wilson said, to "executing the laws, and appointing offices." No delegate to the convention sought to ascribe to the president a more capacious understanding of "executive power" than that articulated by Wilson.

Advocates of a unilateral executive warmaking power also have invoked the "Lockean prerogative," or the doctrine of necessity, as a source of inherent presidential power. Drawing on John Locke's defense of the right of an executive to act for the common good, even if it requires breaking the law, defenders have adduced a similar claim for the president. But there is no evidence whatever that the Framers intended to incorporate the Lockean prerogative in the Constitution. The lack of a textual statement to that effect renders such an intent indispensable to the presidential claim of a constitutional power. In fact, the evidence runs in the other direction. Fears of executive power led the Framers to enumerate the president's power and to "define and confine" the scope of his authority. An undefined reservoir of discretionary power in the form of Locke's prerogative would have unraveled the carefully crafted design of Article 2 and repudiated the Framers' stated aim of corralling executive power.

Presidents have also asserted a presidential warmaking authority on the basis of his role as the "sole organ" of American foreign policy. In Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland stated that the authority in foreign affairs was essentially an executive power, which he explained "as the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise, an act of Congress." Sutherland appropriated the term "sole organ" from a speech delivered by then Representative John Marshall in 1800 on the floor of the House of Representatives. Marshall noted: "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations…. Of consequence, the demand of a foreign nation can only be made on him." At no point in his speech did Marshall argue that the president's exclusive authority to communicate with a foreign nation included a power to formulate or develop policy. All Marshall had in mind was the president's role as the sole organ of communication with other governments, a rather unremarkable point, at that, since officials had acknowledged since the founding that the president was the "sole" channel of communication with foreign nations. Thus it was Sutherland who infused a purely communicative role with a substantive policymaking function and thereby manufactured a great power out of the Marshallian "sole organ" doctrine. Of course, the sole organ doctrine completely undermines the Framers' design for cooperation in foreign affairs. And, given the allocation of foreign relations power to both Congress and the president, the claim is by definition indefensible.

Extollers of presidential control of the war power also have fashioned the argument that executive warmaking, if repeated often enough, acquires legal validity. This is the contention that history has legitimated the practice of presidential warmaking. The argument rests on the premise that the president frequently has exercised the war power without congressional authorization. The actual number of these episodes varies among the several compilations, but defenders usually list between one and two hundred unilateral acts, each of which constitutes a legitimizing precedent for future executive wars. In detail and in conception the argument is flawed. In the first place, the lists are inaccurately complied. An error common to the lists—the claim that President John Adams initiated unilateral executive warmaking in 1798 in an "undeclared war" with France—is altogether false. The fact is that Adams took absolutely no independent action. Congress passed some two dozen statutes that amounted, so the Supreme Court said, to a declaration of "imperfect war," and Adams complied with those statutes. Moreover, many of the episodes involved initiation of hostilities by a military commander, not by authorization from the president. If practice establishes law, then the inescapable conclusion is that every commander of every military unit has the power to initiate war. What is perhaps most revealing about presidential understanding of the constitutional locus of the war power is that in the one or two dozen instances in which presidents personally have made the decision unconstitutionally to initiate acts of war, they have not purported to rely on their authority as commander in chief or chief executive. Rather, in those cases the presidents have made false claims of authorization, either by statute or by treaty or by international law. It cannot be maintained that constitutional power, in this case the war power, can be acquired through practice. Writing for a unanimous Court in Inland Waterway Corp. v. Young (1940), Justice Frankfurter echoed a centuries-old principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence when he wrote: "Illegality cannot attain legitimacy through practice." If the president could acquire power through usurpation he might aggrandize all governmental power. Neither Congress nor the judiciary could lawfully restrain the exercise of the president's accumulated constitutional powers. This practice would scuttle U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. Thus, the most recent act of usurpation stands no better than the first.

In the post–World War II period presidential usurpation of the war power has been indulged by congressional acquiescence, for policy as well as political reasons. But it is unwarranted to conclude that presidential aggrandizement, indulged by congressional passivity, attains a legal status. Congress cannot divest itself of those powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, a necessary predicate of the separation of powers doctrine. Neither congressional abdication nor acquiescence can accomplish a transfer of power to the executive. As the Court held in Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Company (1950), harking back to an old axiom of English law, once powers are "granted, they are not lost by being allowed to lie dormant, any more than non-existent powers can be prescripted by an unchallenged exercise."

In a somewhat anemic effort to reassert its control of the war power, Congress passed, within the context of the debate surrounding the Vietnam War, the War Powers Resolution of 1973, over President Nixon's veto. The statute sought to curb presidential warmaking and to require "the collective judgment" of the president and Congress before U.S. troops could be committed to hostilities. In the absence of a declaration of war or authorization by statute, the statute required the president to consult Congress before introducing U.S. forces into hostilities "in every possible instance," to report to Congress when he has done so, and to terminate the involvement after sixty days unless Congress authorized an extension. The resolution was criticized as an ill-conceived and poorly drafted piece of legislation. Its chief defect from a constitutional standpoint lay in the fact that it represented an unconstitutional delegation of the war power. In its grant to the president of the authority to choose an "enemy" of the United States, and to initiate hostilities against the nation, it not only repudiated the statutory aim of ensuring "collective judgment" of both branches, but it also vested in the president power that is denied to him by the Constitution. Virtually every American president who took office after its passage found ways to circumvent the resolution. Unconstitutional, ill-conceived, and ineffective, the resolution amounted to what Arthur Schlesinger Jr. described as a "toy handcuff," and by the early twenty-first century there was wide agreement that it ought to be repealed.

THE TREATY POWER

Assumption of broad foreign relations powers by the executive, largely built atop the removal of specific checks by the Senate, has claimed the treaty power as one of its principal casualties. The diminution of the Senate's constitutional role as a treaty partner could not have been envisioned by the Constitutional Convention, which, with less than two weeks left in its proceedings, vested in the Senate alone the power to make treaties. As late as 6 September, the draft constitution of the Committee on Detail had given the Senate the exclusive authority to make treaties and appoint ambassadors. During the debate Madison pointed out that the "Senate represented the states alone," and, consequently, "the president should be an agent in Treaties." Madison, who hailed from Virginia, along with other delegates from large states, were concerned about Senate control of the treaty power. As a result of "the Great Compromise," which gave states equal representation in the Senate, large-state delegates were seeking means to control the Senate. They feared that the Senate would be convulsed by regional economic and state interests that would compromise the national interests in the pursuit of commercial treaties. A version of Madison's proposal eventually prevailed. Article 2 of the Constitution gives the president the "power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."

The convention's belated addition of the president to the treaty-making power reflected the Framers' desire to "check" the Senate in the formulation of foreign policy, an application to foreign relations of the doctrine of checks and balances and collective decision-making. There was nothing in the language of the provision, or in the records of the convention debates, to indicate that the president would assume the dominant role in foreign affairs. There was no hint that the president would enjoy any significant independent role in treaty-making. The requirement of a two-thirds majority acted to limit any independent power of the president in foreign relations. In fact, as Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 75, "the vast importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in the making of them…. It must indeed be clear to a demonstration that the joint possession of the power in question, by the president and Senate, would afford a greater prospect of security, than the separate possession of it by either of them." Hamilton's emphasis on the cooperative nature of treaty-making, from negotiation through ratification, is reflected in the further requirement of senatorial "advice and consent." The Framers borrowed the phrase from English parliamentary practice, which was descriptive of continuous participation in lawmaking. No bill could be enacted into law by the king without the advice and consent of both houses of Parliament. The employment of that phrase in the treaty clause was meant to convey Senate participation in all stages of treaty-making. It is not suggestive in any way of a treaty-making process that is divided into two distinct stages: negotiation by the president and approval by the Senate. But that phrase is otherwise employed in the appointment clause to indicate a process that does depend on exclusive and sequential steps: the president "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors."

When President George Washington first communicated with the Senate regarding the appropriate procedure for treaties, he assumed the process of negotiating treaties was a matter of joint participation. He advised a Senate committee that oral communications "seem indispensably necessary; because in these a variety of matters are contained, all of which not only require consideration, but some of them may undergo much discussion; to do which by written communications would be tedious without being satisfactory." This approach indicates an active, continuous, consultative role for the Senate. Washington, moreover, repeatedly expressed his intention to send "propositions" to the Senate, a solicitation of Senate "advice" on of treaties.

In a well-known message to the Senate on 21 August 1789, Washington stated his intention to meet with senators in the Senate chamber "to advise with them on the terms of the treaty to be negotiated with the Southern Indians." Washington intended to seek the Senate's advice before, not after, the negotiation of a treaty. He met with senators the next day, put to them a series of questions, and sought their advice on the instructions that should be given to the commissioners selected to negotiate the treaty. Both sides were disappointed. Senators exhibited unease in relying solely on the information supplied by the secretary of war, who had accompanied Washington. The noise from carriages traveling past the chambers made it difficult to follow the discussion. When the senators announced that they would not commit themselves to any positions that day, Washington felt inconvenienced by the trip. He returned two days later and obtained the Senate's answers to his questions and its consent to the treaty, but he never again went to seek the Senate's advice on a treaty proposal.

It is a misreading of the incident to conclude that Washington had determined to exclude the Senate from any role in the negotiation process. Oral communications proved to be impracticable; but Washington continued to seek the Senate's advice through written communications rather than personal appearances. Senators were asked to approve the appointment of treaty negotiators and to advise on their negotiating instructions. Since the earliest day of the Republic, there have been many examples of executive-Senate discussions regarding treaty negotiations.

The twentieth century, however, witnessed the erosion of this joint effort and the assumption by presidents that negotiation was an exclusively executive concern. As an academic, Woodrow Wilson had argued, in Congressional Government (1885), that the president could treat the Senate with indifference. He encouraged the president to pursue negotiations independently, without consulting the Senate. He reasoned that after these unilateral actions, the Senate could be bullied into granting its "consent," if not its "advice," with the nation's honor at stake. This "mousetrap theory" had disastrous consequences for the nation in the aftermath of World War I. One of Wilson's gravest miscalculations was his decision to exclude prominent senators from the negotiation of the Versailles treaty. Efforts by the executive to present the Senate with a fait accompli can backfire; the Senate may retaliate by adding amendments, shelving treaties, or rejecting them outright.

While the Constitution requires joint action by the president and Senate in making treaties, it is silent on the repository of the authority to terminate treaties. The Framers certainly were aware of the fact that treaties, for a variety of reasons, might require termination, and international law provided rules and regulations to govern their repeal. Madison and Jay, among others, seemed to believe that treaties ought to be terminated by the president and the Senate, and, historically, some have. But the historical record also includes repeal by unilateral presidential action and by Congress as a whole. Since Article 6 vests treaties with the same domestic status as federal statutes, treaties may be terminated by subsequent acts of Congress through the regular legislative process. The fact that the House of Representatives, which is not a part of the treaty power, can play a role in terminating, if not making, treaties, may appear to be anomalous. The same may be said of the argument for a unilateral presidential termination power, which would negate the philosophy of the convention and the entire foreign policy apparatus, which is erected on the premise of collective decisionmaking. The issue of the authority to terminate treaties came to a head in 1979 with President Jimmy Carter's announcement that he intended to terminate the 1954 mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. The decision resulted in a lawsuit, Goldwater v. Carter (1979), in which the Supreme Court declined to reach the merits of the case and dismissed it as "nonjusticiable." The practical effect of the decision left President Carter's act of termination intact. While the question of treaty termination was pushed aside temporarily, it seemed likely to become prominent again.

The president and the Senate may clash over the continued meaning of a treaty. Once a treaty takes effect, the president is principally responsible for its interpretations and implementation. A treaty is a law, and under the Constitution the president is charged with its faithful execution. But a president may not "reinterpret," that is, ascribe to a treaty a meaning contrary to what the Senate understood it to mean at the time it granted its consent. Disagreements have arisen between the president and the Senate on interpretations of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, on the question of the amenability of that treaty to the development of new weapons systems. As a result it is likely that the Senate will carefully examine future treaties and make publicly known in clear terms its understanding of particular treaty provisions.

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

Reliance on the treaty power has declined since World War II, as presidents have increasingly turned to the use of executive agreements as a means of securing unilateral control of American foreign relations. When the president acts unilaterally, the agreement is referred to as a "sole executive agreement." When the president acts with the approval of a simple majority of both houses of Congress, the agreement is known as a "legislative-executive agreement." Presidents have "assumed" discretion to decide whether to pursue an international agreement as a treaty, a sole executive agreement, or in the form of a legislative-executive agreement. The president's decision typically hinges on political factors, including the likelihood of securing Senate approval. Presidents often have chosen to exclude the Senate in making some controversial and historic international pacts through the channel of executive agreements, among them, the destroyer-base deal with Great Britain in 1940, the Yalta and Potsdam agreements of 1945, the Vietnam peace agreement of 1973, and the Sinai agreements of 1975.

Controversy surrounds the legal authority of the president to make executive agreements. The practice of unilateral presidential accords with foreign nations conflicts with the constitutional emphasis on joint decision-making, and with the Framers' understanding of the reach and breadth of the treaty power, which Hamilton described in a letter under the pseudonym "Camillus" as "competent to all the stipulations which the exigencies of national affairs might require; competent to the making of treaties of alliance, treaties of commerce, treaties of peace, and every other species of convention usual among nations…. And it was emphatically for this reason that it was so carefully guarded; the cooperation of two-thirds of the Senate with the president, being required to make any treaty whatever." The text of the Constitution makes no mention of executive agreements. Moreover, there was no reference to them in the Constitutional Convention or in the state ratifying conventions. The Federalist Papers are silent on the subject as well. There is, then, no support in the architecture of the Constitution for the use of executive agreements. Yet their usage has flourished; presidents claim independent constitutional power to make them, and the judiciary has sustained such presidential claims of authority. The question of the constitutional authority that affords presidents a unilateral capacity to make executive agreements is to be distinguished from what would properly be characterized as legislative-executive agreements, which Congress has authorized the president to make and usually inspire little controversy, if only because they are more desirable than unilateral agreements from a constitutional perspective.

Presidents have advanced four sources of constitutional authority: (1) the president's duty as chief executive to represent the nation in foreign affairs; (2) the authority to receive ambassadors and other public ministers; (3) the authority as commander in chief; and (4) the duty to "take Care that the laws be faithfully executed." These claims are particularly open-ended, undoubtedly in conflict with congressional powers, and they strain the reach of credibility. It may well be the case that the president, in the context of military hostilities authorized by Congress, may, in his capacity as commander in chief, find it desirable to enter into a cease-fire agreement with an enemy, although this would be subject to congressional control. It may be necessary as well, in a military context, for the president to strike an agreement regarding protection of troops or deployment of troops. But it is difficult to justify unilateral executive agreements on the basis of these other claims.

Congressional efforts to rein in the practice of executive agreements and stem the tide of unilateralism have been largely unsuccessful. The first and most prominent effort occurred in 1951, when Senator John Bricker proposed a constitutional amendment to limit the use and effects of executive agreements and treaties within the United States. Supporters of the Bricker Amendment, including leaders of the American Bar Association, found virtue in the proposal for various reasons. Some "resented," as Alexander DeConde explained, "executive agreements such as those made at Yalta," and sought to curtail presidential unilateralism in foreign affairs. Others were fearful of the effect within the United States of such treaties as the UN Charter, the Genocide Convention, and the UN's draft covenant on human rights. Still others supported it as a useful "isolationist" response to the "internationalism of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman.

The Bricker Amendment, approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee in June 1953, reaffirmed the Constitution's supremacy over treaties; required implementing legislation "which would be valid in the absence of treaty" before a treaty could be effected within the United States; and granted Congress the authority to regulate all executive agreements.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower opposed the amendment on grounds that it would hamstring the presidency in the conduct of foreign policy. In a letter to his brother Edgar, an attorney who supported the resolution, Eisenhower declared that it wold "cripple the executive power to the point that we become helpless in world affairs." The Eisenhower administration was keenly aware that most Republicans embraced the proposal and thus its opposition was carefully measured. After failing in his efforts to seek compromise with the Bricker forces, Eisenhower sought assistance from Senate Democrats. Senator Walter George of Georgia introduced his own amendment, which reiterated the Constitution's supremacy over treaties and executive agreements. In a key passage that reflected the widespread opposition to the expansive use of unilateral executive agreements, the George proposal would have required implementing legislation for executive agreements (but not for treaties) to take effect within the United States. The Eisenhower administration lobbied intensively for the defeat of both the Bricker and George proposals, principally because advisers believed it would strip the president of important prerogatives and transfer authority over foreign affairs from the executive to the legislative branch. The Bricker Amendment was defeated in the Senate on 25 February 1954 by a vote of 50 to 42. But the George Amendment fared better; it fell just one vote short of the two-thirds required for approval.

Congress has attempted to curtail the practice of making secret executive agreements. A subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee learned in 1969 and 1970 that U.S. presidents had negotiated significant covert agreements with South Korea, Laos, Thailand, Ethiopia, and Spain, as well as other nations. In response, Congress passed the Case Act of 1972, requiring the secretary of state to send to Congress within sixty days the text of "any international agreement, other than a treaty," to which the United States is a party. If the president decided that publication would compromise national security, he could transmit it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs under an injunction of secrecy removable only by the president. But presidents from Nixon to Clinton ignored or circumvented the statute, and congressional enforcement efforts have been largely ineffective.

RECEPTION OF AMBASSADORS

Presidential reception of ambassadors and other public ministers, understood by the Framers as a clerklike duty, a mere administrative function, was transformed by presidents in the twentieth century as a wellspring of discretionary authority to determine which nations the United States would have relations with and what the tone and temper of those relations would be.

The reception of an ambassador entails consequences under international law, chiefly the recognition of foreign governments and states. The Framers, operating against the backdrop of international law principles that held that the sovereign nations have a duty to receive ambassadors from other sovereign nations, determined, as Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 69, to impose this duty on the president as a matter of "convenience." Hamilton said that the authority "to receive ambassadors and other public ministers … is more a matter of dignity than authority. It is a circumstance which will be without consequence in the administration of government; and it was far more convenient that is should be arranged in this manner, than that there should be a necessity of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign minister, though it were merely to take the place of a departed predecessor." Given Hamilton's explanation, there was no reason to view the "reception clause" as a source of discretionary policymaking authority for the president. In fact, Article 2, Section 3 of the Constitution emphatically declares, "He shall, [not 'may'] receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers," an injunction that stands in sharp contrast with the discretionary constitutional powers that the president may choose to exercise, such as the decision to "convene both Houses" of Congress. Thus, the Framers, as James Madison wrote in 1793, gave the president no prerogative whatever to reject foreign ministers. Madison explained that "when a foreign minister presents himself, two questions immediately arise: Are his credentials from the existing and acting government of his country? Are they properly authenticated?" Those questions, Madison noted, "are merely questions of fact," and if answered affirmatively, the president was duty bound to receive the minister.

The Framers' emphasis on the mechanical nature of the reception function, reflected their acceptance of the doctrine of de facto recognition, which requires diplomatic relations with the government that actually exercises controlling power, as opposed to the principle of de jure recognition, which counsels a determination of the legitimacy or legality of a governing regime. In a letter written on 30 December 1792 to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, the U.S. minister to London, for the purpose of clarifying U.S. policy toward the revolutionary French government, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson explained the rationale behind the American doctrine of de facto recognition: "We certainly cannot deny to other nations that principle whereon our own government is founded, that every nation has a right to govern itself internally under what forms it pleases and to change those forms at its own will."

The transformation of a humble administrative duty into a broad discretionary power to conduct foreign policy began under Woodrow Wilson. From 1913 to 1921 President Wilson, adhering to a theory of democratic legitimacy with respect to Latin American countries, refused to grant recognition to governments in that region that had come to power through revolution or violence when lawful constitutional means of achieving change existed. Then in 1920, Wilson, through Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, declared that the United States would not recognize the Soviet Union, on the ground that the USSR was dedicated to the revolutionary overthrow of other governments in the state system. During the next thirteen years successive presidents adhered to Wilson's unilateral decision to refuse recognition of the Soviet Union, a policy that went largely unchallenged by an isolationist Congress. Ironically, this process of turning the Framers' reception function into a broad-based presidential foreign policy tool reached its full development when, in 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided to reverse the policy and recognize the Soviet Union, under the same constitutional authority that Wilson had abused to refuse recognition. Roosevelt's act of recognition then broadened into a unilateral agreement called the "Litvinov Assignment"—an agreement on property claims between the two nations. In United States v. Belmont (1937), Justice Sutherland upheld the validity of the agreement and said the pact derived its force from both the president's status as the sole organ of American foreign policy and his power to recognize foreign governments. Justice Sutherland stated that Senate consultation was not required. The Court again considered the validity of the Litvinov Assignment five years later in United States v. Pink (1942). Once more, the Court upheld the agreement, and enthusiastically embraced the "sole organ" doctrine and a capacious view of executive power. These decisions represented an exercise in judicial activism, and inflated the reception function into a towering structure of executive power. Thus in later years President Harry S. Truman felt authorized in his decision not to recognize the People's Republic of China as well as several of the communist satellite states of Eastern Europe. Under changing circumstances in later years, President Richard M. Nixon felt similarly authorized to reverse that policy in 1972 to extend what amounted to diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China, an effort that was completed in 1978 when President Jimmy Carter fully "normalized" relations with China through a unilateral decision to recognize the regime of Beijing and derecognize the competing government in Taiwan.

For many observers the extraordinary power exercised by the executive in the conduct of foreign policy is a principal element in Schlesinger's "imperial" presidency, and it constitutes a major threat to the democratic foundations of the American constitutional system. Yet the practice of executive usurpation, revelations of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency abroad, the constitutional corruption inherent in the Iran-Contra affair, and the dangers posed by a pattern of unilateral presidential warmaking from Korea to Vietnam to Bosnia, have not moved Congress and the public to implement meaningful constitutional and political checks to halt presidential aggrandizement of power. Occasionally, individual members or even large blocs of members of Congress will challenge a unilateral presidential action. On 28 April 1999 the House of Representatives, by a tie vote, rejected a motion to authorize President Bill Clinton to conduct air and missile strikes against the former Yugoslavia. Clinton ignored the House vote and waged war on his own claim of authority. But the relatively infrequent and isolated criticisms that emerge from Capitol Hill have not risen to the level of an institutional challenge, in which Congress summons the will to defend its constitutional powers in foreign affairs. While defenders of the constitutional design for foreign policy might hope for a resurgent Congress, and even dare to dream of an ascendant Congress, there seems to be little political incentive for members to act because international issues rarely assume a significant role in election campaigns. There remains the possibility that some international issues, among them trade matters and environmental concerns, may assume greater importance among voters, which would transform those issues into constituent demands and thus stir Congress to assert its broad powers. However, George W. Bush declared early in his first term that he would halt U.S. participation in the Kyoto Accords, a worldwide effort to control global warming; announced that he would use military force to defend Taiwan against mainland China; and stated his intention to terminate the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, all unilateral executive actions that constitute a rank usurpation of congressional powers. Yet those declarations brought forth few protests from Congress in defense of its constitutional frontiers and provinces. Indeed, at century's turn, congressional acquiescence in the face of executive aggrandizement seemed as fully entrenched in the practice of American foreign policy as it did when the imperial presidency first took flight.

For others, however, the vast discretionary power exercised by the president is the price the nation pays to safeguard its national security interests abroad and its freedom at home. Executive domination of foreign policy, it has been asserted, is a reflection of the overweening realities of the international realm, which cannot be adequately addressed by a Constitution that is no longer relevant to international politics. Congressional primacy has become obsolete. There remains a debate, one initiated in the Constitutional Convention two centuries ago, on the question of whether unilateral executive control of foreign policy or legislatively inspired collective decision making is more suitable in a nation grounded on republican principles. It may well be the case that the values underlying the war clause and the other constitutional provisions that govern the conduct of American foreign policy are as compelling today as they were two hundred years ago.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Berger, Raoul. Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth. Cambridge, 1974. Penetrating study that includes valuable chapters on presidential power in foreign affairs and warmaking.

Bestor, Arthur. "Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined." Seton Hall Law Review 5 (1974). Powerful analysis of the legislative history behind the foreign affairs provisions of the Constitution.

Casper, Gerhard. "Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign Policy: A Nonjudicial Model." University of Chicago Law Review 43(1976). Influential study of foreign affairs from a legal and constitutional perspective.

Corwin, Edward S. The President: Office and Powers, History and Analysis of Practice and Opinion, 1787–1984. 5th rev. ed. New York, 1984. Very valuable on presidential powers in foreign policy.

DeConde, Alexander. Presidential Machismo: Executive Authority, Military Intervention, and Foreign Relations. Boston, 2000. Important account of the reasons why presidents engage in unilateral acts of warmaking.

Draper, Theodore. A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs. New York, 1991. Detailed and critical analysis of the political, legal, and policy issues.

Ely, John Hart. War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath. Princeton, N.J., 1993. Insightful critique of the constitutional debate and controversies surrounding the Vietnam War.

Fisher, Louis. "How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?" American Journal of International Law 83 (1989). An examination of the use of the power of the purse in foreign affairs.

——. Presidential War Power. Lawrence, Kans., 1995. Concise, penetrating analysis of the war power.

——. Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President. 4th rev. ed. Lawrence, Kans., 1997. Excellent examination of the separation of powers issues.

Glennon, Michael J. Constitutional Diplomacy. Princeton, N.J., 1990. Highly useful study of the constitutional arrangement for the conduct of foreign policy.

Hayden, Ralston. The Senate and Treaties: 1789–1817. New York, 1920. Fine historical and analytical study of the Senate's role in treaty making.

Henkin, Louis. Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs. New York, 1990. Fine analysis of theoretical and constitutional issues relevant to foreign policy.

——. Foreign Affairs and the Constitution. 2d ed. Oxford, 1996. Excellent, comprehensive analysis of the constitutional law of foreign policy, with good footnotes.

Johnson, Loch K. The Making of International Agreements: Congress Confronts the Executive. New York, 1984. Examination of the nature, uses, and impact of executive agreements.

Keynes, Edward. Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power. University Park, Pa., 1982. Powerful, illuminating study of the legal issues surrounding the war powers debate.

Koh, Harold Hongju. "The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 107 (1959). Useful on relationships between treaties and acts of Congress.

——. The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair. New Haven, 1990. Detailed examination of foreign relations law and the responsibilities of the three branches of government.

Lobel, Jules. "Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 134 (1986). Valuable examination of the legal and constitutional issues involved in limited war.

Lofgren, Charles A. "War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding." Yale Law Journal 81 (1972). Outstanding examination of the Constitutional Convention and constitutional governance of the war power.

Robinson, James A. Congress and Foreign Policy Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative. Homewood, Ill., 1962. Concise study of foreign policy as Congress influences it.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Imperial Presidency. Boston, 1973. Acclaimed study of the evolution of presidential powers in foreign policy and warmaking.

Scigliano, Robert. The Supreme Court and the Presidency. New York, 1971. Useful catalog and discussion of judicial rulings on presidential power.

Sofaer, Abraham D. War, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power: The Origins. Cambridge, Mass., 1976. Comprehensive analysis of the constitutional origins and early practice of foreign affairs powers.

Sutherland, George S. Constitutional Power and World Affairs. New York, 1919. Early publication of the future Supreme Court Justice's view on the constitutional law of foreign affairs.

Wormuth, Francis D. "The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique." University of California Law Review 60 (1972). Outstanding analysis of the constitutional issues involving presidential warmaking.

Wormuth, Francis D., and Edwin B. Firmage. To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congress in History and Law. Dallas, 1986. Nearly encyclopedic examination of war powers issues.

Wright, Quincy. The Control of American Foreign Relations. New York, 1922. Classic modern analysis of the subject.

See also Congressional Power; Judiciary Power and Practice; Presidential Power .

THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER

The rise of presidential hegemony over foreign affairs is perhaps the most outstanding, though lamentable, characteristic of a constitutional system that establishes congressional primacy. The emergence of what Arthur Schlesinger Jr. aptly described in the title of his splendid book The Imperial Presidency —the exaltation of presidential power in foreign affairs—is deeply in conflict with the constitutional blueprint for the formulation and conduct of American foreign policy. The Framers, who feared the exercise of unilateral presidential power in foreign affairs, rejected the conventional wisdom of their time—centralization of foreign affairs powers in the executive—and assigned to Congress senior status in a partnership with the president for the management of foreign relations.

That arrangement largely prevailed for most of the nation's first 150 years, but it succumbed to presidential domination in the post–World War II era. Thus constitutional governance of foreign affairs was a principal casualty of the Cold War, a chronic international crisis that afforded a pretext for the executive assumption of prerogative-like powers that the Framers had denied to the president.

In the context of the Cold War, Americans—members of Congress, judges, scholars, and reporters—exhibited fawning deference to the president in foreign affairs. Lacking confidence in its own information and judgment, the citizenry imbibed the rhetoric of presidential expertise, experience, and judgment; a literature of abnegation advised the nation of the virtues of unfettered executive control of foreign policy. The pervasive sentiment of the Cold War urged blind trust of the executive on the ground that he alone possessed the information, facts, and experience necessary to safeguard U.S. interests. And presidents acted the part. Executive usurpation of the war power became a commonplace; executive secrecy and control of information became the norm; and covert operations—military, political, and economic—avoided congressional radar and public perception. Congress was reduced to the role of spectator.

For many, presidential practice across two centuries confirms the wisdom of the original design, for the theory of executive unilateralism, as well as its traditional, underlying arguments, was exploded in the tragedy of the Vietnam War. Few doctrines have been so troubling, dangerous, and antidemocratic. It led not only to the Vietnam War and to the Iran-Contra affair but to the entrenchment of presidential supremacy in foreign relations, with its attendant military and policy failures from Cuba and Cambodia to Lebanon and Somalia.

Moreover, nothing in the broader historical record suggests that the conduct of foreign relations by executive elites has produced wholesome results. Indeed, the wreckage of empires on executive foreign policies provides ample evidence that, as the British jurist and diplomat Lord Bryce noted, the wisdom of "classes" is less than the "masses." The contention that the wisdom of one is superior to that of many is philosophically defective, historically untenable, and fundamentally undemocratic. Since Aristotle, we have known that information alone is not a guarantee of political success; what matters are the values of the system and ultimately those of its decision makers. There is "nothing more fallible," wrote James Iredell, a member of the first Supreme Court and a delegate to the North Carolina ratifying convention, than "human judgment," a fundamental philosophical insight reflected in the Framers' embrace of the doctrines of separation of powers and checks and balances, and their rejection of presidential unilateralism in foreign affairs.

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