Commons, House of
The Commons soon began to act as a channel for receiving petitions and took the lead in legislating to remove grievances. Their chief weapon was control of taxation and as early as 1395 the formula was in use that the grant was made ‘by the Commons with the advice and assent of the Lords’. The principle of elective representation stood them in good stead in relation to both the crown and the Lords. At an early stage members took refuge in the reply that they must consult their constituents. The crown could and did intervene in elections and could create new parliamentary boroughs but its influence over the Lords was even more direct by the creation of peers. During the 18th and 19th cents. the House of Commons, through the prime minister, seized this prerogative and used it to bring the Lords to heel.
The use of Parliament by the Tudors to regulate the succession to the throne and to reform the church enhanced the standing of that body. Two further developments helped to confirm the Commons' identity. In 1547 they were granted St Stephen's chapel as their meeting place and stayed there until the great fire of 1834. At the same time, the House began a formal record of its own proceedings, the Journals of the House of Commons.
The result of the great struggles of the 17th cent. was to increase the power of the Commons at the expense of the Lords. Indeed, when the Commons in 1649 galloped out of control, Lords and monarchy were abolished as ‘dangerous and useless’. Though the pendulum swung back after 1660, the strengthened position of Parliament after 1688 helped the Commons, particularly by limiting the power of the crown to govern without Parliament or to retain a complaisant Parliament. This helped to neutralize the advantage that lords had, that they could lobby the monarch through the court and their privilege of direct audience. In addition the Commons reasserted its sole right to decide matters of taxation. Though the House of Lords retained considerable influence, the balance was further affected by the extensions of the franchise from 1832 onwards, which increased the Commons' claim to speak for the nation, and by a slow loss of faith in the hereditary principle.
J. A. CannonThe starting-point of any discussion of the modern House of Commons is two related features—the near dominance of the executive and the ever-present power of the political parties. Romantic parliamentarianism looks back to a golden age in the mid-19th cent. that probably never was—the age of the private member.
Among the functions of the House of Commons, that of legislation would be given pride of place. But legislation bears the stamp of the executive, especially of the bureaucracy, rather than that of the Commons. Most important bills are introduced by the government of the day, which reflects both the privileges accorded in fact, if not always in name, to the government in the procedures of the House, and the quasi-monopoly of knowledge enjoyed by the executive. Popular criticism of the modern role of the House of Commons focuses on the alleged rigour of party control over the backbenchers, exercised through the whips, and tends to overlook the advantage the executive would have, even if the House were composed of 659 genuinely independent members.
Note first the long-standing rule that increases in taxation and expenditure can be imposed only on the proposal of the crown. Any private member who sponsors a bill that would increase public expenditure must either obtain the backing of the government or impose the new duties on local councils. More recent procedural changes allocate most of the time of the House to the government, an arrangement which rests ultimately on the government's control of its majority. Private members are allotted ten days a year for the discussion of their bills and the privilege of being awarded a day is decided by ballot. If a member's bill is controversial, there will be an attempt to ‘talk it out’. If, at the end of the allotted time, the member seeks to move the closure, he faces two hurdles. The Speaker may think that the measure has not been adequately debated and may refuse to accept the motion: if a motion is accepted, it may not be passed by the numbers required—a majority, with at least 100 members voting in that majority. Lacking the organization of the whips' office, the backbencher may simply not be able to ensure the attendance of 100 supporters; and if it passes this test but faces obstruction in standing committee, he will not, as the government can, be able to propose and carry a guillotine motion to limit the time spent debating his bill.
A second element of the strength of the executive in and over the House of Commons lies in its near monopoly of knowledge. Ministers are backed by an experienced and informed department: the backbencher has only his personal resources. Moreover, the way in which the House of Commons deals with legislation deprives it of the information it might have to counter the accumulated wisdom of the department. The principle of the bill is debated by the whole House, normally at second or third reading, but the detail of the bill is discussed in standing committee. These standing committees are neither permanent in composition nor specialist in subject-matter. Members may indeed have knowledge derived in their personal capacity but they do not through their work on bills develop a corpus of information to match that available to ministers. In the 1960s, the House made fitful attempts to form specialized select committees to inquire into particular areas of government activity, and these arrangements were extended, systematized, and made permanent in 1979. Service on these select committees certainly makes for more informed backbenchers. But the select committees do not themselves examine legislation: this remains the province of the transient and unspecialized standing committees.
The third feature is party loyalty and party organization. Virtually every member (bar the Speaker) is elected as the candidate of a party, and members most of the time vote in the House with their party. The cohesion of parties in the division lobbies of the House dates from the 1890s and reached its peak in the 1950s. Since 1966 there has been a perceptible decline in party cohesion, but conformity rather than rebellion remains the most prominent feature of backbench life.
Many explanations have been offered for the strength of party cohesion in the British Parliament. The whips have the task of mobilizing their party's backbenchers: popular mythology ascribes to them powers beyond their reach. The whips cannot in themselves deny reselection to a dissident member, though withdrawal of the whip, itself rare, can rouse difficulties with the member's constituency association. In both parties the hope of office, and in the Conservative Party the thirst for honours, may prompt the potential rebel back into line, bearing out the truth of Napoleon's observation that ‘men are governed by baubles’. Members, most of the time, follow the party line, in voting if not in debate. But such behaviour usually poses no strain on a member's conscience. Most of the time the House is debating humdrum questions on which many members are uninformed. When the division-bell rings, members stream into the House, many having heard not a word of the debate, and ask the whips, ‘Which is our lobby?’ Sanctions, threats, and rewards become important on the great dramatic issues. But most of the time the House is not witnessing drama, but an ill-attended tedious ritual of claim and counter-claim.
Nevertheless, ministers do sometimes give way to disquiet voiced on the floor of the House; more often, they yield to the importunities of their backbenchers expressed through party committees or behind-the-scenes deputations. When the government has a narrow majority, the discontents of small groups of backbenchers will be listened to even more attentively.
The government then is the dominant force in the legislation passed by the House. But in exercising these and other powers it is accountable to the House. Traditionally this accountability was exercised most obviously through question time, but the value of question time is greatly exaggerated. The Blair government of 1997 curtailed it to one period per week, usually devoted to ‘sound-bites’ between the prime minister and the leader of the Opposition. The ordinary process of debate is another way in which members can highlight blunders, abuse of power, or mismanagement. But members may well be inhibited from embarrassing a minister of their own party by the delight it affords their opponents. The sanction against ministerial, or indeed departmental, incompetence is supposed to be that ministers who fail to convince the House of their competence and integrity will be obliged to resign, but the doctrine of individual ministerial responsibility is more myth than reality.
Today, the select committees, with all their limitations, are becoming the chief means by which ministers are made accountable to the House. Even though they do not debate legislation, they enable the House to scrutinize the work of the departments, and the publicity given to their reports is a salutary check upon ministerial evasion and bureaucratic complacency.
House of Commons
HOUSE OF COMMONS
CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES
History and Procedure
Histoire et Procédure
The Constitution Act, 1867 provided for an elected House of Commons consisting of 181 Members. The representation in the House of Commons was to be readjusted on the basis of the 1871 general census and after each decennial census thereafter. As new provinces entered Confederation, they were granted representation in the House of Commons. Section 51 of The Constitution Act, 1867, which provides the formula and rules that determine the number of Members to be elected in each province, has been amended several times, most recently in 1986.
Until the early 1960s, the readjustment of electoral boundaries was undertaken by the House of Commons itself or its committees, but in 1964-65 Parliament enacted The Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act. An electoral boundaries commission is appointed for each province or territory following each decennial census, and is responsbile for readjusting electoral boundaries following the determination of the number of seats to which the province or territory is entitled under section 51 of The Constitution Act, 1867.
As of 2003, there are 308 Members of the House of Commons, each elected to represent a constituency. The representation by province is as follows: Alberta 28, British Columbia 36, Manitoba 14, New Brunswick 10, Newfoundland and Labrador 7, Northwest Territories 1, Nova Scotia 11, Nunavut 1, Ontario 106, Prince Edward Island 4, Quebec 75, Saskatchewan 14, and the Yukon 1.
The duration of a House of Commons is not to exceed five years except in times of war or apprehended insurrection. It is subject to earlier dissolution by the Governor General usually at the request of the Prime Minister. In the event of a vacancy occurring by reason of death or resignation of a Member during the life of a Parliament, a writ for the holding of a by-election must be issued within six months, although there is no time limit for the holding of the by-election itself.
Section 5 of The Constitution Act, 1982 provides for a sitting of Parliament at least once every 12 months.
La Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 prévoyait l'élection d'une Chambre des communes composée de 181 députés. La représentation à la Chambre devait être rajustée à la suite du recensement général du 1871 et, ultérieurement, après chaque recensement décennal. Les nouvelles provinces qui entraient la Confédération étaient représenteés à la Chambre des communes. L'article 51 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867, dans lequel sont énonceés la formule et les règles servant à déterminer le nombre de représentants de chacune des provinces, a été modifié plusieurs fois, la dernière modification ayant été apportée en 1986.
Jusqu'au début des années 60, la révision des limites des circonscriptions électorales était entreprise par la Chambre des communes elle-même ou un de ses comités, mais en 1964-65, le Parlement promulgua la Loi sur la révision des limites des circonscriptions électorales. Depuis ce temps, une commission de délimitation des circonscriptions électorales est nommée pour chaque province et territoire à la suite d'un recensement décennal; cette commission est chargée de réviser les limites des circonscriptions lorsque le nombre de sièges auquel une province a droit a été établi en vertu de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867.
En 2003, la Chambre des communes comptait 308 députés, représentant chacun une circonscription. La représentation par province est la suivante: 28 pour l'Alberta, 36 pour la Colombie-Britannique, 4 pour l'Île-du-Prince-Édouard, 14 pour le Manitoba, 10 pour le Nouveau-Brunswick, 11 pour la Nouvelle-Écosse, 1 pour Nunavut, 106 pour l'Ontario, 75 pour le Québec, 14 pour la Saskatchewan, 7 pour Terre-Neuve et Labrador , 1 pour les Territoires du Nord-Ouest et 1 pour le Yukon.
Une Chambre des communes ne peut siéger plus de cinq ans, sauf en temps de guerre ou d'insurrection appréhendée. Elle est susceptible d'être dissoute par le gouverneur général avant l'expiration de cette période à la requête du premier ministre. Lorsqu'un siège devient vacant, par suite du décès ou de la démission du député durant une législature, un bref d'élection doit être émis dans un délai de six mois, même si la tenue de l'élection complémentaire n'est soumise à aucune échéance.
Selon l'article 5 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982, le Parlement doit siéger au moins une fois tous les 12 mois.
Candidates and the Electoral Process
Candidats et Processus électoral
The present federal franchise laws are contained in the Canada Elections Act (RSC 1985 C. E2). The franchise is conferred upon all Canadian citizens who are 18 years old or will reach that age on or before polling day. However, certain persons are denied the right to vote (e.g. officials holding certain positions - Chief Electoral Officer, Assistant Chief Electoral Officer, returning officers during their term of office, inmates of penal institutions, and other persons disqualified by law).
With certain specified exceptions, any elector qualified under the Canada Elections Act may be a candidate at an election. Among the specified exceptions are government contractors, members of the legislature of any province, certain public officers, and persons found guilty of corrupt or illegal election practices during designated periods following a conviction. To be nominated, a candidate must have the signature of 100 qualified electors on his nomination papers and must deposit the sum of $1,000.
La Loi électorale du Canada (S.R.C., 1985, C. E2) régit actuellement le droit de vote en matière d'élections fédérales. Ont droit de vote tous les citoyens canadiens âgés de 18 ans ou plus le jour du scrutin. Toutefois, n'ont pas droit de vote: certains fonctionnaires comme le directeur général des élections, l'adjoint au directeur général des élections, les présidents d'élection au cours de leur mandat, les détenus des pénitenciers et des établissements ainsi que toute personne exclue par la loi.
Sous réserve de certaines exceptions précises, tout citoyen apte à voter en vertu de la Loi électorale du Canada peut se porter candidat à une élection. Au nombre des cas d'exception précisés se trouvent les entrepreneurs de l'État, les membres des Législatures provinciales, certains fonctionnaires et les personnes reconnues coupables de corruption électorale ou de pratiques électorales illicites, durant des périodes déterminées consécutives à leur condamnation. Tout candidat éventuel doit faire signer son bulletin de présentation par 100 électeurs et déposer la somme de 1,000 $.
House of Commons
HOUSE OF COMMONSHouse of Commons
Parliaments Since 1867 - House of Commons
The Ministry - House of Commons
Ministries Since Confederation - House of Commons
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Principal Officers and Officials
CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES