Locke, John
LOCKE, JOHN
John Locke (1632–1704), was an English philosopher, Oxford academic, and occasional bureaucrat. He was born at Wrington, Somerset, on August 29 and died at Oates, Essex on October 28. Locke's fame as a philosopher rests chiefly on two works: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) and Two Treatises of Government (1689). The former became a chief textbook of the European enlightenment and subsequent philosophy. The latter deeply influenced both the Declaration of Independence (1776) and the Constitution of the United States (1787), a document that made promoting the "progress of science and useful arts" one of its distinguishing features (Article I, section 8). These facts establish his reputation as one of the most influential modern philosophers and signal his importance in issues related to science, technology, and ethics.
Locke's strategy in his two most influential works is characteristic of early modern thought. First he sets out to clear away errors and conceits left over from classical and medieval science. Next he reduces the subject to its most basic natural constituents, as yet unmodified by culture. Only then does he set about reconstructing new systems of epistemology and political philosophy.
The Essay
Part One of the Essay is devoted to a refutation of the doctrine of innate ideas, according to which all human beings are born with certain principles already stamped upon their minds. It might seem doubtful that the importance of this doctrine justifies the attention that Locke devotes to it; however, its demolition whets the appetite for a more satisfactory account of the mind.
Locke holds to the view that all human ideas are reducible to experiences, a doctrine known as empiricism. An idea here means anything in the contents of the mind that is definite enough to have a name. Impressions, such as hot and red, received from the external world are the primary source of ideas. But unlike more uncompromising empiricists, such as David Hume, Locke admits of a second source of ideas: reflection upon the operations of human minds. One may observe what the mind does with the material provided by sensation and so acquire ideas of thinking, willing, and the like. So, though there are no innate ideas, there are innate sources of information.
Some ideas, such as hard or perception are indivisible. These are received passively by the mind. But the mind can also act on elementary ideas in three ways: by combining several into one complex idea; by comparing one with another; and by abstracting some idea from the setting in which it actually occurs. By such operations the mind can furnish itself with a potentially unlimited stock of complex ideas. These in turn fall into three categories: relations between ideas, substances that may exist on their own; and modes that exist only in something else. Thus the sun is a substance; it is bright in relation to terrestrial fire; and its brilliance is one of its modes.
Though all complex ideas are products of the mind, they can be anchored in the real world. A substance is known only by its qualities, which are the impressions it makes on the senses. Its primary qualities belong to it independently of observation, so a stone has weight and shape whether anyone perceives it or not. Secondary qualities depend on an observer. The stone is brown only in the right light, and in the eyes of some beholder. One cannot conceive but that these qualities subsist in some underlying thing, but has no idea of what that thing is. Locke subscribes, however, to the corpuscular or atomic theory of matter and supposes that the substratum consists of invisibly small particles.
Locke's philosophy of mind narrows the distance between speculation and technology. Chemistry, once it has purged itself of any alchemical conceits and has arrived at knowledge of the elements, not only understands the world better but provides human beings with means to manipulate it. Similarly Locke offers both a better account of human knowing and a set of useful instruments both for scientific and philosophical investigation.
This raises the question of the rank of philosophy with respect to science and technology. In one respect Locke's view of this matter seems closer to the medieval than to the classical conception. For the Greeks, philosophy was more elevated and more complete than any science, if indeed it did not incorporate all the sciences. In medieval scholarship, philosophy is famously regarded as the handmaiden of theology, usually in so far as it supports and clarifies faith. For Locke, philosophy seems to become the handmaiden of the sciences.
In the Epistle to the Essay Locke distinguishes between the Master-Builders and the Under-Labourers of the sciences. Among the former are Robert Boyle, Thomas Sydenham, Christiaan Huygens, and Isaac Newton, whose works stand as monuments to posterity. Locke counts himself among the latter, whose job it is merely to clear the ground and remove the rubbish that obstructs the advance of science. If this is Locke's view, he has reduced philosophy to a preparatory exercise, much of which is necessary only because of the abuses of language committed by psuedophilosophers. Locke's Essay is certainly similar to contemporary academic philosophy, which understands itself as clarifying questions up to the point that science can get a grip on them.
The scientists named by Locke are conspicuous for both theoretical and technological achievements. Boyle constructed an air pump; Newton and Huygens built advanced telescopes; Sydenham pioneered new medical treatments. But it is clear that for Locke their greatness lay more in their theoretical work than in any useful devices they may have contrived. He shows no inclination to subordinate the sciences to technology. A few lines after mentioning Newton, he identifies philosophy as "nothing but a true knowledge of the nature of things" (Locke 1975, p. 10). Whatever Locke's view of his business in the "Essay," he had a view of philosophy broad enough to encompass the sciences. It is closer to the classical view than is often supposed.
The Two Treatises
In his First Treatise, Locke demolishes Robert Filmer's argument in favor of the divine right of kings. This sets the stage for the Second Treatise: If political authority does not originate in God's appointment of Adam, then its origin must be sought in human nature.
Typically Locke identifies and isolates the elementary building block of political societies: This is the human being in the state of nature. The latter indicates a condition of perfect freedom and equality, with no one having any authority over another. But it is not, as Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) supposed, a state of license. For there is a natural law available to all human beings, directing them to respect one another's life, liberty, and property.
Oddly enough, it is not viciousness that requires the formation of governments, but the human capacity for righteous indignation. In the state of nature, each person is entitled to punish any transgression of rights. But as each person judges primarily in his or her own favor, one person's enforcement of natural law is another's transgression of the same. Thus the universal distribution of the executive power can lead to endless cycles of revenge. The way to avoid this is for all to surrender their portions of the executive power to some common judge, to whom appeal may be made in case of conflict.
Human beings thus leave the state of nature in order to more securely enjoy those rights that they possessed while still in it. Universal consent is the foundation of political authority, which may be invested in such forms (for example, kings and parliaments) as the subjects think fit. However that grant of authority is always conditional rather than absolute. When the government forfeits the consent of its subjects, or by aggression or neglect fails to protect their liberties, it effectively abdicates. The people are then entitled to abolish it and form a new one.
Property Rights
Locke's theory of property, set forth in Chapter 5 of the Second Treatise, is among the greatest achievements of seventeenth-century political and economic thought. Here Locke cuts to the original position immediately: In the beginning all things belonged equally to all human beings, and each had leave to take from the earth whatever he or she needed. What then is the origin of any private rights to property?
Each person has ownership of his or her own body and labor. In order for some external good such as food to be enjoyed it must sooner or later be appropriated. After an apple is consumed it joins with the perfect privacy of the flesh. Locke argues that the moment of appropriation comes when someone's labor is mixed with the bounty of nature. When acorns are first gathered from the wild, they become private property. The right of appropriation is universal, the only limit is that one may gather only what one can use.
Locke weds this account with a theory of economic progress, which includes in turn a labor theory of value and a theory of money. The greater part of the value of any product originates in the labor required to produce it. Invested in a loaf of bread, for example, is a plowed and cultivated field, harvested and milled wheat, a bricked and furnished bakery. All this labor represents a vast increase in the wealth available to humankind over what unimproved nature provides.
But how is it possible to encourage people to labor beyond what their needs require or the durability of their produce allows? The answer lies in money, the exchange of the products of one's labor for some durable medium of nominal rather than real value. When someone settles and improves a piece of land, it is taken out of the common stock; however, in return for money, the settler gives back more value than he or she took away. Locke understood that this process, repeated across a wide range of industries, was an engine of unprecedented economic growth. For that reason, one of the most important ends of government was the protection of private property.
Locke's theory of property may be set comfortably in the context of a fundamental modern project: the conquest of nature. The natural world is not charitable to human beings. It provides little of what they need in advance of their labor. But the potential wealth that exists in nature is vast beyond calculation. Thus the aboriginal inhabitants of America who, Locke says, "are rich in land but poor in the comforts of life" exemplify the situation of human beings in the state of nature (Locke 1988, p. 296). By encouraging labor, a system of money and property rights will result in the most thorough cultivation of nature, for the comfort of all humankind.
It is clear that Locke's approach to all three topics elevates the products of human invention far above the natural materials from which they are fashioned. Complex ideas are more interesting and useful than simple ones. There is both more security and more freedom under government than out from under it. If a government acts to protect property rights, human beings will then make whatever they need to relieve the poverty into which the species was born. Nature will be reduced to a storehouse of useful materials.
KENNETH C. BLANCHARD JR.
SEE ALSO Hume, David;Liberalism;Libertarianism;Mill, John Stuart;Skepticism.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Goldwin, Robert. (1987). "John Locke." In History of Political Philosophy, 3rd edition, ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1st edition, 1963; 2nd edition, 1972. One of the most thorough essays on Locke's place within the larger context of modern thought.
Locke, John. (1975). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Locke, John. (1988). Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. A very useful edition of Locke's most important political work, including a very extensive introductory essay on the historical context of the works.
Locke, John. (1997). Political Essays, ed. Mark Goldie. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. A thorough collection of Locke's major and minor essays, including his essays on the Law of Nature.
Mackie, John L. (1976). Problems from Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press. A consideration of Locke's essay in light of contemporary science and analytical philosophy.
Walmsley, Jonathan. (2004). "Locke's Natural Philosophy in Draft A of the Essay." Journal of the History of Ideas 65(1): 15–37. A treatment of Locke's early views and of his collaboration with Sydenham.
