Continental Congress

CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. One of the most serious weaknesses the colonists faced at the outset of their war with Britain was the lack of a central government. Individual colonies (soon to become states) were fortunate in having a long tradition of local government rooted in the supremacy of the locally elected legislature. Although there was no lack of savvy politicians, the relations among the thirteen colonies were marked by a long history of jealousy. One of the surprises of the Revolution was Americans' ability to unite politically. The Albany Congress of 1754 and the Stamp Act Congress of 1765 gave politically active colonists a foretaste of how to work together and of how to achieve the consensus that made "congressional" action possible.

As protest mounted against the Intolerable Acts of 1774, the first of many calls for an intercolonial congress came from Providence (17 May), Philadelphia (21 May), and New York City (23 May). Radicals in Boston had asked the other colonies to join in an immediate nonimportation agreement, but when they saw this hope was not to be achieved they fell in with the movement for a meeting. The Boston leaders framed a Solemn League and Covenant, which was a form of nonimportation agreement, and twelve days later, on 17 June, the Massachusetts House of Representatives proposed that a congress be held in Philadelphia in September. By 25 August twelve colonies (all except Georgia) had named delegates.

FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

Fifty-six delegates from twelve colonies met for the first time at Carpenter's Hall, Philadelphia, on 5 September 1774. Peyton Randolph of Virginia was elected president and Charles Thomson of Pennsylvania, although not a delegate, was named secretary. (The congress was never really "continental," since the other British North American colonies—Canada, Nova Scotia, and the two Floridas—did not join the rebellion.)

According to the notes of James Duane of New York, "the first question debated was whether the Congress should vote by colonies and what weight each colony should have in the determination." Patrick Henry of Virginia, who said "he conceived himself not a Virginian but an American," thought that "one of the greatest mischiefs to society was an unequal representation," and advocated "such a system as would give each colony a just weight in our deliberations in proportion to its opulence and number of inhabitants, [and] its exports and imports." Because such a system would favor larger, more populous colonies, Samuel Ward of Rhode Island "insisted that every colony should have an equal vote" and argued "that we came if necessary to make a sacrifice of our all and that the weakest colony by such a sacrifice would suffer as much as the greatest." The matter was resolved in favor of giving each colony a single vote when it was realized that "the delegates from the several colonies were unprepared with materials to settle that equality"—that is, no one had an objective count of any colony's population or wealth (Smith, vol. 1, p. 31).

Word of the British seizure of colonial powder stored at Charlestown, Massachusetts (the Powder Alarm), arrived on 6 September. This news helped the radicals build a consensus in favor of resolute action that led Congress to endorse the Suffolk Resolves (17 September) and defeat Galloway's Plan of Union (28 September 1774). In a set of declarations, the First Congress subsequently denounced the Intolerable Acts, the Quebec Act, all of the revenue measures imposed since 1763, the extension of vice-admiralty courts in the colonies, the dissolution of colonial assemblies, and the peacetime stationing of regular soldiers in colonial towns. Thirteen parliamentary acts since 1763 were declared unconstitutional, and the delegates pledged to support economic sanctions until these acts were repealed. Ten resolutions set forth the rights of the colonists as they saw them. They signed the Continental Association (a complete suspension of trade) on 20 October, prepared addresses to the king and to the British and American people, and agreed to reconvene on 10 May 1775 if their grievances had not been redressed. They adjourned on 26 October.

SECOND CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

On 10 May 1775 the delegates met at the State House (later Independence Hall) in Philadelphia and reelected the same president and secretary. On 24 May Randolph withdrew, and John Hancock was elected president of Congress. Still without an official representative from Georgia, the delegates took a score of actions that amounted to the de facto assumption of the rights and responsibilities of an independent state. They resolved that the colonies be put in a state of military readiness (15 May); adopted an address to the Canadians asking them to join the resistance (29 May); resolved to raise ten companies of riflemen in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia to support the New England army besieging Boston; agreed to pay for the New England army (thus adopting it as a "continental army"); named a committee to draft rules for the administration of the army (all on 14 June); elected George Washington, a delegate from Virginia, as commander in chief of the Continental Army (15 June); elected four major generals (Artemas Ward, Charles Lee, Philip Schuyler, and Israel Putnam); elected eight brigadier generals (Seth Pomeroy, William Heath, John Thomas, David Wooster, Joseph Spencer, John Sullivan, Richard Montgomery, and Nathanael Greene); elected Gates to be adjutant general and voted $2 million in bills of credit to finance the war (all on 22 June); and adopted articles of war on 30 June.

As events continued to cascade toward full-scale war (the New England army fought its only battle, at Bunker Hill on 17 June, not knowing it had become a "continental army" three days earlier), Congress assumed more powers that made it look like a government. The delegates made a last-ditch effort to patch up the quarrel by approving the Olive Branch Petition on 5 July, one of several important papers drafted by the conservative John Dickinson, and the next day promulgated a "Declaration of the Causes and Necessities of Taking Up Arms," the joint work of Dickinson and Thomas Jefferson, to explain to the people of Britain and America why armed resistance was now necessary. On 15 July they voted to waive those provisions of the Continental Association that might slow the importation of war supplies, and on 31 July they rejected Lord North's plan for reconciliation as too little, too late. They appointed commissioners to treat with the Indians (19 July) and established a postal department (26 July) with Benjamin Franklin as head. On 2 August 1775 the Second Congress adjourned.

The Second Continental Congress reconvened on 12 September 1775, this time with delegations from all thirteen colonies present. Learning on 9 November that George III had on 23 August proclaimed the colonies to be in revolt (thereby rejecting the Olive Branch Petition), on 6 December Congress replied with a statement of continued allegiance to the king but not to Parliament. A continental navy was authorized on 13 October, and on 14 December a Marine Committee to oversee it was appointed. On 29 November the delegates appointed the Committee of Secret Correspondence to conduct relations with foreign governments (a precursor of the modern State Department). The movement toward independence was spurred by Thomas Paine, who published his pamphlet Common Sense on 10 January 1776. Across the late winter and spring of 1776, leaders in the various colonies took actions that made them, in all but name, independent states. On 15 May 1776 the de facto Virginia state government authorized its delegate, Richard Henry Lee, to take the initiative in acknowledging what was already the reality on the ground in the states and in Congress. On 7 June Lee introduced the resolution that led to the Declaration of Independence. The delegates voted to declare independence on 2 July, and on 4 July promulgated their final bill of indictment against the imperial government and George III, in which they explained to the world why independence was their only possible course of action.

MANAGEMENT OF THE WAR AND OTHER BUSINESS

Managing all aspects of a war of unprecedented complexity always absorbed the bulk of the delegates' time and attention. Sometimes action was delayed or deferred by the need to build consensus. Particularly difficult issues might have to be addressed by the entire Congress, which resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, but the delegates did a remarkable amount of business through an evolving sequence of committees and boards. Although the system was not particularly efficient, it was effective in keeping the war effort up and running. Many of the congressional initiatives were ambitious. In late March 1776 the delegates sent a special committee to Canada to explain the political purpose behind the invasion and to salvage support for a campaign that was rapidly failing. On 12 June they appointed a Committee to Prepare Treaties with European countries. On 17 September they adopted the report of this committee and on 23 December authorized its three commissioners (Silas Deane, Benjamin Franklin, and Arthur Lee) to borrow money for their operations.

Congress could do little to influence active military operations, and during 1776 it watched as its armies triumphed at Charleston and Boston, failed in Canada and at Long Island, saw New York City fall into British hands, received increasingly discouraging reports in connection with the New York campaign, fought the overtures resulting from the Peace Commission of the Howes, were cheered by the delay Benedict Arnold bought by his victory at Valcour Island, and on 12 December ran for the safety of Baltimore as the British success in the New Jersey campaign threatened Philadelphia. It granted Washington extraordinary authority ("dictatorial" powers) during this crisis; some joked nervously that 1777 promised to be the "Year of the Hangman." Robert Morris remained in Philadelphia, and on 21 December 1776 Congress formally appointed him, George Clymer, and George Walton as its "executive committee."

At Baltimore the three-story brick house of Henry Fite was the meeting place of the twenty to twenty-five members of Congress who showed up for business, fewer than half the number that had decided the great issues in 1775 and 1776. The members continued to plan for the future. They resolved on 30 December 1776 to send commissioners to Austria, Prussia, Spain, and Tuscany. (William Lee of Virginia was assigned the first two posts on 9 May; Franklin covered the Spanish post, in addition to France, from 1 January 1777 until Arthur Lee of Virginia was named to succeed him at Madrid on 1 May; Ralph Izard of South Carolina was assigned to Tuscany on 7 May.)

Back at Philadelphia on 4 March 1777, Congress reconstituted the Committee of Secret Correspondence as the Committee on Foreign Affairs (17 April 1777), passed the Flag Resolution creating the Stars and Stripes (14 June), and on 19 September fled the city again. Howe's threat to Philadelphia was more effective this time, and Congress was forced to flee, first to Lancaster and then to York, Pennsylvania (30 September). The so-called Conway Cabal that challenged Washington's leadership, the problems of Burgoyne's Convention Army, and Lafayette's abortive "irruption into Canada" were among the important military matters that occupied the talents of the delegates during the winter of Valley Forge. Congress also sent a committee to confer with Washington about reorganizing the army, an effort that complemented the efforts of Steuben to complete the transformation of the Continental Army into an effective, professional military force. Congress adopted, finally, the Articles of Confederation on 15 November 1777, and with the French alliance a reality on 8 January 1778, it ratified the implementing treaties on 4 May. With some hope on the horizon, Congress was better able to fend off the peace commission of the earl of Carlisle after June 1778.

During the last years of the war, Congress coped with a wide range of problems. Perhaps the most serious was the collapse of the economy, caused in part by trying to pay for a protracted war with too much continental currency and not enough taxing authority. The military situation continued to raise more immediate issues. British success in the south after May 1780 seemed to herald the reestablishment of royal government in the former southern colonies. The American effort slowly recovered over the summer of 1780, with Congressional approval of Washington's pick to command the theater (Nathanael Greene, on 14 October 1780) one of the milestones along the way. British raids in Virginia (most seriously after December 1780) were damaging, but marked the beginning of the end of Britain's strategy to recover the South. Washington, with the indispensable aid of French soldiers and sailors, managed to capture Britain's last field army at Yorktown in October 1781, but that crucial victory was not easily achieved. The American military effort had seemed to be crumbling from within following the revelation of Benedict Arnold's treason (25 September 1780) and the mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line (early January 1781), but Washington's leadership helped to hold the army together.

The way Congress did business also matured and changed during these years, most notably in 1781. Under the crushing pressure of events, Congress authorized the creation of four executive departments, foreign affairs on 10 January and finance, war, and marine on 7 February. This essential step helped to streamline the daily working of government by lifting a great deal of the burden of clerical and routine duties from Congress as a whole. On 1 March 1781 Congress acknowledged that Maryland had ratified the Articles of Confederation, the last state to do so. Strictly speaking, the Second Continental Congress ceased to exist on that day; the delegates met the next day as "the United States in Congress Assembled." Congress also began the tortuous negotiations for a final peace settlement. It began by setting minimum conditions as early as February 1780, appointed peace commissioners in June 1781, and ratified the proposed text of the Treaty of Paris on 15 April 1783.

On 24 June 1783 Congress again demonstrated its strategic mobility by fleeing to Princeton when some three hundred Continental soldiers marched in to demand their rights. Remaining at Princeton until 3 November, it reconvened at Annapolis on 26 November under a plan calling for alternate sessions there and at Trenton. The day before, the British had evacuated New York City, thereby implementing some of the final provisions of the peace treaty. At the end of December the Continental Army ceased to exist, and Congress, and the nation, faced for the first time the challenges of the postwar era of reconstruction and recovery.

The first federal Congress met on 4 March 1789 in New York City and began regular sessions on 6 April. The new federal city of Washington, District of Columbia, became the seat of Congress when the second session of the sixth U.S. Congress met there on 17 November 1800.

SUMMING UP

Over the course of fifteen years (5 September 1774 to 3 March 1789), 435 delegates to Congress were elected by the states. Only 80 percent of those elected (342) actually served in Congress, some for only a few weeks or months. The number of delegates that served during the nine years of military mobilization and actual fighting (5 September 1774 to 31 December 1783) was smaller still: only 245 men, or 70 percent of the total of 342 who served. Turnover in membership was rapid and continuity in office (and thus the amount of experience members could accumulate in running the business of the new nation) was limited to a handful of delegates who were willing and able to make the personal and financial sacrifice needed to attend Congress on a regular basis. In Reluctant Rebels, the military historian Lynn Montross notes that, "before the war ended, more than half of the members were fated to have their property looted or destroyed. Others were to be imprisoned or driven into hiding by man hunts, and even their families would not escape persecution" (p. 131). The record of military service compiled by the members of Congress "has probably never been bettered by any other parliament of history. Of the 342 men elected during the fifteen years, 134 bore arms in either the militia or the Continental army. One was killed in action, twelve seriously wounded, and twenty-three taken prisoners in combat." Given that a majority of the delegates were in their forties or older, "the valor of Congress needs no apologies" (Reluctant Rebels, pp. 190-191).

ASSESSMENT

Congress received some harsh criticisms from contemporaries, including from some of its own members, and subsequent historians have echoed this assessment. It certainly displayed inefficiency and dithered over decisions that might have been more palatable if made more quickly. It saw its share of badly run committees, ill-conceived experiments in organization and oversight, and poorly timed meddling in the responsibilities of its field commanders, most notably Washington himself. Petty political infighting and rivalries were all too common, based as much on personal dislikes as on principled differences about policy. Behavior that can only be called corrupt was also in evidence. In all of these things, the Continental Congress was similar to American legislative bodies before and since.

Against these criticisms, a slew of achievements can be entered on the positive side of the ledger. The mere fact that Congress existed and functioned at all was a significant milestone. All of the men who served in this new experiment in political organization had knowledge of or had served in the legislative assemblies of their individual colonies and states. Overcoming the provincialism and parochialism of those assemblies, legislative bodies that jealously guarded their prerogatives and power not only from the imperial government but also from each other, was no small achievement. Few men as yet agreed with Patrick Henry's assertion that they owed their primary allegiance to "America" (in Henry's case, too, rhetoric exceeded reality). In everything Congress did, consensus had to be built before unanimity could be achieved, and, without unanimity on all major issues, the British might readily break the rebellion into fragments. Because the nature of their resistance to imperial authority had schooled them to be extremely suspicious of power in all its forms, the delegates undertook management of continental affairs as a collective exercise, unwilling to concentrate power in the hands of one man or a few under all but the worst circumstances. Only in the blackest days of the war did the rump Congress give Washington, himself a member of the Virginia oligarchy and a former delegate to Congress, the authority to act without congressional approval of major decisions. When the crisis passed (due largely to Washington's leadership), Congress was a bit more solicitous of the realities of field command; but it never relinquished its desire to oversee the minutia of military organization, appointments, movements, and operations that would today be left in the hands of the military professionals. Washington continually chaffed at the conflicting tugs of congressional oversight, indecision, misunderstandings, and downright meddling. But because he was one of them he never disavowed the fundamental principle of civilian control of the military, vested in the hands of the delegates to Congress.

Gradually, the delegates' understanding of the nature of government began to evolve, as they realized, under the intense and unrelenting pressure of running a war far longer than anyone had anticipated, that, if declaring independence had been an act of unprecedented courage that required genius and faith, erecting a working government required the talent, integrity, and energy to slog through the unrelenting demands of daily business. The erection of four executive departments in early 1781 was an important milestone on the road to rebuilding the sort of faith in extralocal government that the imperial crisis had shattered.

Given the circumstances in which it was created, Congress, although inefficient, was also remarkably effective. As the historian John Richard Alden, in The American Revolution, observes:

The Congress declared the independence of the United States; appointed the commander in chief and higher officers of the Continental army; established the American navy and the marine corps; formed a diplomatic service; negotiated treaties with European nations and Indian tribes; organized a postal service; issued currency; and borrowed money. It even gave advice to the colony-states with respect to the making of their constitutions; and it drew up the Articles of Confederation…. It was created in emergency, endowed with uncertain authority, and plagued by rapid changes in personnel. Hence it exhibited obvious defects lacking or less conspicuous in long- and well-established legislatures…. [But Congress's] record, when the difficulties to be faced are taken into account, is splendid rather than dismal. (pp. 166-169)

SEE ALSO Admiralty Courts; Albany Convention and Plan; Articles of Confederation; Association; Boston Siege; Canada Invasion; Canada Invasion (Planned); Canada, Congressional Committee to; Charleston Expedition of Clinton in 1776; Committee of Secret Correspondence; Continental Currency; Convention Army; Conway Cabal; Declaration of Independence; Declaration of the Causes and Necessities of Taking Up Arms; Dickinson, John; French Alliance; Galloway's Plan of Union; Hangman, Year of the; Intolerable (or Coercive) Acts; Long Island, New York, Battle of; New Jersey Campaign; New York Campaign; North's Plan for Reconciliation; Olive Branch Petition; Peace Commission of Carlisle; Peace Commission of the Howes; Peace Negotiations; Philadelphia Campaign; Powder Alarm; Quebec Act; Riflemen; Solemn League and Covenant; Stamp Act; Suffolk Resolves; Valcour Island; Valley Forge, Pennsylvania; Washington's "Dictatorial Powers."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alden, John R. The American Revolution. New York: Harper, 1954.

Burnett, Edmund C. Letters of Members of the Continental Congress. 8 vols. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1921–1936.

??????. The Continental Congress. New York: Macmillan, 1941; Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975.

Henderson, H. James. Party Politics in the Continental Congress. New York: McGraw Hill, 1974; Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1987.

Jensen, Merrill. The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 1774–1781. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1941.

??????. The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation, 1781–1789. New York: Knopf, 1950.

??????. English Historical Documents. Vol. 9: American Colonial Documents to 1776, general editor, David C. Douglas. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955.

Montross, Lynn. Reluctant Rebels: The Story of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789. New York: Harper, 1950; New York: Barnes and Noble, 1970.

Nevins, Allan. The American States During and After the Revolution, 1775–1789. New York: Macmillan, 1924; New York: A.M. Kelley, 1969.

Onuf, Peter S. The Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States, 1775–1787. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983.

Rakove, Jack N. The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental Congress. New York: Knopf, 1979; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.

Smith, Paul H., et al., eds. Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774–1789. 26 vols. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1976–2000.

U.S. Congress. Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774–1989. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989.

U.S. Continental Congress. Journals of the Continental Congress. 34 vols. Edited by Worthington C. Ford et al. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1904–1937.

U.S. Continental Congress. Papers. National Archives, Washington, D.C.

                              revised by Harold E. Selesky