TRW Inc.
TRW Inc.
1900 Richmond Road
Cleveland, Ohio 44124-3719
U.S.A.
(216) 291-7000
Fax: (216) 291-7758
Public Company
Incorporated: 1916 as The Steel Products Co.
Employees: 61,200
Sales: $7.95 billion
Stock Exchanges: New York Boston NASDAQ Philadelphia
Pacific
SICs: 3714 Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories; 2399
Fabricated Textile Products, Not Elsewhere Classified;
3764 Space Propulsion Units and Parts; 3769 Electronic
Components, Not Elsewhere Classified; 3761 Guided
Missiles and Space Vehicles; 361 Pumps and Pumping
Equipment; 3494 Valves and Pipe Fittings, Not Elsewhere
Classified; 3812 Search and Navigation Equipment; 3769
Space Vehicle Equipment, Not Elsewhere Classified; 7370
Computer and Data Processing Services; 7323 Credit
Reporting Services
After eight decades of highly praised management and growth, TRW Inc.’s unique combination of mundane and high-tech products ran into roadblocks in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Its space and defense division had been a major manufacturer of satellites and an important contractor in the U.S. Department of Defense’s Strategic Defense Initiative program (better known as “Star Wars”). Virtually every car manufactured featured a TRW part, whether it was a seat belt, steering system, or engine valve. And at least half of America’s citizens were registered in its credit reporting system. But when the late 1980s brought the end of the Cold War, a global recession, and intense competition, TRW found itself with lagging sales, lackluster earnings, and a stagnant stock price. A new chief executive officer, Joseph T. Gorman, brought a restructuring plan and a renewed commitment to the corporation’s historic emphasis: automotive parts.
TRW’s conglomerate structure grew out of the company’s history. The company was founded in 1901 as the Cleveland Cap Screw Company to manufacture and supply bolts for early automotive engines. Name changes, to Electric Welding in 1908 and Steel Products Company in 1915, reflected the firm’s expansion into a wider variety of auto parts. During the 1920s, Charles E. Thompson, a welder at the company, conceived of a new method of valve manufacture that catapulted the parts company into the vanguard of global valve making. The firm was renamed Thompson Products in 1926 in recognition of his vital breakthrough.
By the early 1950s the company had made a name for itself in automotive and had expanded into aircraft engine parts. It had also become well known by sponsoring the famed Thompson Trophy Race, the aeronautical equivalent of auto racing’s Indianapolis 500. But in the postwar era, the company faced a decline in manned aircraft and saw opportunities in aerospace and electronics. J. David Wright, the company’s general manager, and Horace Shepard, a vice president, thought the auto valve and steering component maker needed more technical sophistication and looked to acquisition to get it.
To break into the budding high-tech industry, Wright and Shepard tried to buy Hughes Aircraft Co. Hughes was willing to listen to bids but scoffed at the Thompson offer, which was thought to be ten times too low. Just a few months later, two of Hughes Aircraft’s top scientist-executives, Simon Ramo and Dean Woolridge, decided to leave Hughes to form a new electronic systems company, and Thompson put up $500,000 to bankroll the venture. Not long afterward, Ramo-Woolridge Corporation was established in Los Angeles and quickly gained solid standing in the advanced technology business, being awarded the systems engineering and technical direction contracts for such important missile programs as Atlas, Minuteman, Titan, and Thor.
By 1958 Thompson Products had invested $20 million—20 percent of its net worth at the time—for a 49 percent interest in Ramo-Woolridge, and the two operations were merged as Thompson-Ramo-Woolridge. Though united on paper, the company maintained separate corporate headquarters, with Woolridge president in Los Angeles and Wright chairman in Cleveland. Ramo and Shepard, a former chief of production procurement for the Air Force, also had an active role in management.
The merger could hardly have started less auspiciously. In the midst of a recession, the Cleveland-based group was hit with a 14 percent drop in automotive business and a 34 percent drop in manned aircraft business. When business improved for the Cleveland division, Los Angeles got into trouble. Its venture into semiconductors collapsed in 1961, and the McNamara era was beginning at the Pentagon.
The West Coast scientists, who had only known cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, had to learn how to go from spending money to making it. This education was hampered by hard feelings between the two groups. The electronics end was not living up to its promise of being the business of the future. In its first four years following the merger, profit margins that had been at the 4 percent-plus level in the mid-1950s dropped to an average of barely 2 percent.
With the company facing such mundane tasks as cost-cutting, Woolridge, who reportedly never really wanted to be a businessman anyway, resigned in 1962. As Woolridge was getting settled in at his new job as a professor at the California Institute of Technology, Shepard was promoted to president and Ramo was named vice-chairman. With Cleveland now in control of the company, the Los Angeles scientists were quickly reassured when the new management team instituted a number of reforms to get the company back on its feet, including writing off $3 million in inventory.
In 1963, Shepard and Wright began pruning unprofitable divisions. They sold most of the unprofitable Bumkor-Ramo computer division to Martin Marietta. The company retained partial ownership in Bumkor-Ramo but no longer played a large role in the company’s plans. Shepard and Wright continued hammering out the company’s plans for long-term growth, seeking specifically to raise profit margins. To this end, in 1964 they sold the microwave division and the division that made high fidelity components, intercoms, and language laboratories.
To shore up the company’s auto parts division, they bought Ross Gear & Tool, a maker of mechanical and power steering units, and Marlin-Rockwell, a ball bearings manufacturer. The 7 percent profit margin of the new acquisitions, which had combined profit of $5.7 million on sales of $76.5 million, helped boost TRW’s overall margin to 4 percent in 1964, up a percentage point from a year earlier.
In 1965, in another look toward the future, Thompson-Ramo-Woolridge adopted a shorter, less cumbersome name, the now instantly recognizable initials TRW. Also that year the company’s investment in aerospace and electronics was becoming increasingly clear. In the previous decade, sales in space and electronics shot up from $14 million to $200 million. But despite that dramatic growth, the company’s earnings still came mostly from its oldest business, auto parts. New and replacement parts accounted for 34 percent of TRW’s $553 million in sales and 40 percent of its earnings. Chief among those products were its steering linkages, valves, and braking devices that it sold to General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler.
Things improved for TRW in 1966. An auto parts boom was helping the company’s profitability. The Cleveland-based automotive group had a return of 6 percent on sales of $350 million. The equipment group, also in Cleveland, had an increase of sales to $200 million in aerospace and ordinance technology, but lower profit margins because of start-up costs for unexpected demand in commercial aircraft. The Los Angeles-based TRW Systems had $250 million in sales and a 3 percent profit margin building and designing spacecraft and doing research. Totals were up to $870 million in sales for TRW, producing $36 million in profit for a 4.2 percent return. Even with the upturn in sales, the company was relying less on government contracts, down to about 44 percent from 70 percent ten years earlier. With the company’s financial picture on the upturn, the wrangling between Los Angeles and Cleveland declined. As Business Week reported, the discord was “under control, if not cured.”
The company continued its tightening of operations in 1966. It bought United Car with $122 million in sales and sold its one consumer business, a hi-fi manufacturer. Nevertheless, TRW had grown into a conglomerate, a term disliked by company management. In 1969 TRW operated six groups that, in turn, administered 55 divisions. The company derived 32 percent of its revenues from aerospace products and computer software, 28 percent from vehicle components for autos and trucks, 23 percent from electronic components and communication, and 17 percent from industrial products ranging from mechanical fasteners to automated controls.
To manage the increasingly far-flung company, TRW maintained strict management control over all operations. By encouraging communication between all levels of management and holding monthly manager meetings, TRW avoided the problems that had plagued Gulf & Western, which had grown into a rambling giant. Another of TRW’s successful management styles caught Fortune’s eye in 1966. The magazine covered in depth the happenings of a TRW management meeting in Vermont, where 49 of the company’s top executives had gathered annually since 1952 at an old farmhouse to think about the company’s future.
The next year TRW continued beefing up its auto parts business, acquiring Globe Industries, a Dayton-based maker of miniature AC and DC electric motors. At the same time, TRW’s electronics group had grown to more than 20 plants in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The company continued to evade problems that had plagued other conglomerates, posting a slight pre-tax gain of 16.4 percent, above the industry average of 13.3 percent.
In 1969 TRW named a new president, Ruben F. Mettler. One of his first big projects was a contract for a laboratory that NASA would send on the Viking probe to Mars. TRW won the challenge to provide one black box weighing 33 pounds with complex instruments capable of making biological and chemical tests to detect the most primitive forms of life. The NASA contract was only worth $50 million, not a big financial risk for a multi-billion dollar company like TRW, but the job was important for the company’s prestige.
The auto parts business, in the meantime, was once again proving to be immune to cyclical trends in car output. The market for new parts was in a slump, but it was made up for by the accompanying increase in demand for replacement cars as consumers kept their cars on the road longer. TRW also parlayed the computer programming expertise it had garnered along the way into another business, credit reporting. This “sideline” would eventually record the credit ratings of over half of the U.S. population.
The company’s sound financial condition was unmistakable. For the five years preceding 1970, the company had average earning jumps of 27 percent annually and an average 23 percent annual increase in sales. But company officials conceded that TRW—which had acquired 38 companies through 1968—could not keep growing at that rate forever. The company looked for future growth to run about 10 percent.
TRW’s skillful management again became apparent in 1971, when the company was forced to make cuts because of an aerospace recession. Its TRW Systems division had to cut the number of employees by 15 percent. Managers were not spared cuts either; 18 percent of the professional staff was laid off. The company’s open management style enabled TRW to build a strong enough relationship with its employees that two-thirds of them were non-union, perhaps preventing labor squabbles that had appeared in other companies.
TRW made a risky venture in 1976, entering the tricky market of electronic point-of-sale (POS) machines. Those machines had boosted profits for retailers, but not for manufacturers. Its proposed 2001 system aimed at the general market and cost $4,000 per unit, similar to competitors. TRW’s move into POS machines was largely a defensive tactic. The electronic credit authorization business it had pioneered in the 1960s was coming under increasing competition. Competitor NCR, the overall leader in POS machines, launched a POS system that incorporated a credit check in 1975. TRW attempted to enter the market with an established customer base by acquiring the service contracts for the 65,000 customers Singer had built up during its short, ill-fated move into the POS market. TRW remained cautious, however, only delivering 200 to 300 machines in 1976, mostly to the May Co. Altogether that year non-food retailers ordered 24,500 POS terminals worth $94 million, and the market was picking up.
In 1976 TRW achieved the moment of glory it had long awaited with Viking’s historic landing on Mars. The company took out full-page newspaper ads proclaiming, “That lab is our baby.” Appropriately, Mettler, 52, who had pushed for TRW to compete for the Viking contract, was named to succeed Horace Shepard as chairman and chief executive officer when Shepard retired the next year.
Aerospace ventures continued to play an important role in the company’s finances. In 1977 TRW was still the chief engineer for U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles. Aerospace and government electronic revenues were providing a cool $60 million in profits on revenue of $440 million. The electronics division had $300 million in sales. The data communications unit was also doing well with over $150 million in sales. It had established a retail credit bureau and a business credit system, and was an international maker of data equipment. But auto and commercial parts were still accounting for twice as much in sales and five times as much in earnings.
In 1980 TRW and Fujitsu Ltd., Japan’s largest computer maker, formed a joint venture that aimed to grab a large share of the U.S. market. TRW had a 3,000-person service organization, reportedly the largest independent network in the U.S. for data processing maintenance, with a special team to develop software. Each company invested $100 million, with Fujitsu keeping a 51 percent share and TRW 45 percent. TRW initiated the venture, seeking a foreign partner to perform maintenance work for its POS machines. Fujitsu, which obtained 68 percent of its revenue from data processing, was eager to expand overseas to increase its economy of scale to compete with IBM back home. Fujitsu named a majority of the directors of the new company so it could qualify for Japanese export and financing tax breaks, but TRW took charge of running it. One of new company’s first moves was to buy TRW’s ailing POS and automated teller machine (ATM) division. The company, hoping in the beginning to capture a large segment of the small and medium-sized computer market, predicted sales of $500 million to $1 billion by the decade’s end.
Despite TRW’s careful planning, the POS and Fujitsu deals both proved unsuccessful. The competition from established POS makers, particularly IBM and NCR, was too great. And to make matters worse, evidence that the company’s traditionally high ethical standards were eroding surfaced mid-decade. The credit reporting group, for example, violated its own code of ethics by gathering non-credit information on consumers for use in direct mail. TRW also plead guilty to charges of conspiring to overcharge the federal government on contracts for military aircraft engines, and agreed to pay $14.8 million in penalties and refunds.
Joseph T. Gorman, a 22-year veteran of TRW, advanced to the conglomerate’s chief executive office in 1988 upon Ruben Mettler’s retirement. Unfortunately for Gorman, however, he took the helm just as the end of the Cold War gutted federal defense and space spending, a global recession squeezed profits for auto makers and their suppliers, and competition in the credit information industry froze TRW’s sales, earnings, and stock price. To make matters worse, the corporation’s most encouraging business, automobile air bags, was plagued by seemingly unshakable losses and a 1990 plant explosion that hampered shipments.
Gorman called in a series of consultants, including Jim Womack, one of the authors of The Machine That Changed the World. According to Robin Yale Bergstrom, editor-at-large of Production, Womack told TRW’s management at their annual retreat that the venerable manufacturer was hopeless. Nonetheless, Gorman decided to base TRW’s restructuring on Womack’s book, which detailed Toyota’s “lean production system.” TRW management wrote its own 3.5-pound “total quality management bible,” titled The Lean Production System, Principles and Techniques, and began applying its concepts in December 1991, after TRW lost $140 million on sales of $7.9 billion.
The restructuring’s financial goals included a 20 percent return on equity and positive cash flow. To achieve these standards, Gorman shifted TRW’s emphasis back to its historic strength in automotive parts, emphasizing air bags. TRW invested $500 million in this segment, whose sales were boosted by growing consumer demand for such safety restraints. The company aggressively pursued international markets, especially those in Europe and Japan. As a result, sales to Japanese automakers increased from $50 million in 1988 to $600 million in 1992.
Proceeds from divestments totaling about $475 million in 1992 and 1993 were used to pay down corporate debt, which was reduced to its lowest level in five years by 1993. Gorman pronounced the restructuring complete in his 1993 annual letter to shareholders. That year, the company reported its first net profit—$195 million on sales of $7.9 billion—of the 1990s.
Principal Subsidiaries
TRW U.K. Ltd.; ESL Inc.; TRW Vehicle Safety Systems Inc.; TRW Automotive Products Inc.; TRW Steering Systems Japan Co. Ltd.; TRW Canada Limited; TRW Components International Inc.; TRW Italia SpA; TRW Title Inc.; TRW France S.A.; TRW Koyo Steering Systems Co. (51%).
Further Reading
Bergstrom, Robin Yale, “Reinvention in the Rustbelt: An Essay,” Production, October 1993, pp. 50–52.
England, Robert Stowe, “Less Sizzle, More Steak,” Financial World, August 4, 1992, pp. 20–21.
Mettler, Ruben F., The Little Brown Hen That Could: The Growth Story of TRW Inc., New York: Newcomen Society, 1982.
—updated by April Dougal Gasbarre
