Paneth, Friedrich Adolf

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PANETH, FRIEDRICH ADOLF

(b. Vienna, Austria, 31 August 1887; d. Mainz, Germany, 17 September 1958), radiochemistry, inorganic chemistry, philosophy of science. For the original article on Paneth see DSB, vol. 10.

Unlike many chemists, Paneth was deeply interested in the historical roots and philosophical foundations of science in general and of chemistry in particular throughout his entire scientific life. This postscript will concentrate on his historical and philosophical contributions. He read primary sources from antiquity (pre-Socratics, Aristotle), the Renaissance (Robert Boyle), classical (Benedict Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill) and contemporary authors (Heinrich Rickert, Moritz Schlick, Emile Meyerson, Gaston Bachelard), and was well aware of the main achievements and developments of philosophy. His epistemological point of view can be considered as Kantian, and his philosophical writings as highly influential to modern philosophy of chemistry.

The discovery of isotopes and radioactivity meant that it was no longer strictly the case that all atoms of the elements as listed in the Periodic Table were identical. (Consider, for example, carbon-12 versus carbon-14.) In addition, in the process of radioactive decay, one element was destroyed and a new element was created. Paneth was the first to grapple with the implications of these discoveries for the most fundamental concepts in chemistry. In 1914 Paneth had published on general problems of isotopy, and in 1916 he produced a systematic survey on the concepts of element and atom in which he referred critically to the “law of substance” (Stoffgesetz). With this law, Wilhelm Ostwald had claimed that two chemical substances are identical with respect to all properties if they are identical in a few of these. Paneth explicitly denied the validity of this expression because isotopy, strictly taken, had made it invalid. However, Paneth conceded that a strict interpretation of this denial would lead to a devaluation of the concept of the element within chemistry: similar to uncreatability and indestructibility, it would also be necessary to abandon the idea that there was a limited number of basic chemical substances (1916, p. 182). Because of this dilemma, Paneth suggested the following definition of an element: Two elements are assigned with the same name if a mixture of these cannot be separated by chemical operations (1916, p. 183). It is noteworthy that this definition is operational and phenomenological. It is operational because it delivers a kind of recipe on how to treat two substance samples in order to differentiate or identify them. It is phenomenological because it uses real, macroscopic materials only, rather than an atomistic vocabulary.

Sixteen years later, however, there no longer was consensus regarding strictly phenomenological, non-atomistic approaches to the foundations of chemistry. Referring to ancient atomists and their reception, and more particularly to the theoretical work of Frantisek Wald (1861–1930) and Ostwald, Paneth said in 1931: “We wholly disregard here the deliberations of Wald and Ostwald, who depart from the usual notion of element and follow their own anti-atomistic lines of thought” (1962, p.9). The source of this quotation, a lecture presented in Königsberg titled “Die erkenntnistheoretische Stellung des chemischen Elementbegriffs” (The epistemological status of the chemical concept of element), was his main philosophical contribution. In his introduction, Paneth discussed the question of why chemistry has been of only minor interest to philosophers. He came to the conclusion that the deficient chemical knowledge of philosophers is primarily responsible for the neglect of chemistry in the humanities.

The two main topics of the Königsberg lecture were the question of persistence of elements in compounds and the problem of reduction of chemistry to physics. Referring to the former topic, Paneth suggested a dualist interpretation of the notion element. This distinction marks clearly the difference between two traditional conceptions of element that are often conflated. If one says, as did Boyle, that elements are the last products of analysis, then one is using the concept of simple substances (einfache Stoffe). However, if one thinks of elements as the ultimate constituents of matter that are invariant during chemical reactions, one is dealing with the concept of basic substances (Grundstoffe). In modern philosophical terms, simple substances are observables, basic substances are nonobservables. Here is seen a hint of the Kantian phenomena(the observables) and noumena (the non-observables). Paneth claimed: “to understand the change of properties of substances we require transcendental hypotheses” (1962, p. 14). Hence, he expanded his former merely phenomenological point of view and added the realm of transcendental ideas to his philosophy of chemistry.

Referring to reductionism, Paneth said: “Even if the essential character of chemistry should change in the future as the result of the expansion of mathematical-physical methods, its history during the nineteenth century, when it achieved such successes without mathematics, must never be ignored in its philosophic evaluation” (1962, p.8). Thus, as the result of his Kantian philosophy of science, he rejected the reduction of chemistry to physics (or mathematics) with the argument that chemistry never will lose contact to the realm of observables.

SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY

WORKS BY PANETH

“Über den Element- und Atombegriff in Chemie und Radiologie.” Zeitschrift für Physikalische Chemie 91 (1916): 171–198. Über die erkenntnistheoretische Stellung des chemischen

Elementbegriffs. Halle/Saale: Niemeyer, 1931. Published as “The Epistemological Status of the Chemical Concept.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (1962): 1–14, 144–160. Translated into English by Paneth’s son.

OTHER SOURCES

Ruthenberg, Klaus. “Friedrich Adolf Paneth (1887–1958).” Hyle 3 (1997): 103–106.

Scerri, Eric. “Editorial 14.” Foundations of Chemistry 5 (2003)107–111.

Schummer, Joachim. Realismus und Chemie. Würzburg:

Königshausen und Neumann, 1996.

Van Brakel, Jaap. Philosophy of Chemistry: Between the Manifest and the Scientific Image. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2000.

Klaus Ruthenberg

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