Illegal Aliens
CHAPTER 5
ILLEGAL ALIENS
When you're undocumented in any country, it's like you're in a shadow. No one sees you. No one notices. They can see your work, that you're contributing to the economy and consuming goods, but you don't really exist.
—Norberto Terrazas, member of the Mexican consulate in New York City (Lisa Adams, "Kin Struggle for Proof of Foreign 9/11 Victims," The Denver Post, September 24, 2004)
WHAT IS AN ILLEGAL ALIEN?
Illegal aliens are also known as illegal immigrants, illegal migrants, unauthorized migrants, undocumented immigrants, undocumented residents, and undocumented aliens. People often assume that the term illegal aliens refers specifically to Mexicans who have crossed the U.S.–Mexico border to work illegally in the United States. Although Mexicans may account for a number of the unauthorized entrants to the United States, illegal aliens can come from anywhere in the world.
An illegal alien is defined as a person who is not a U.S. citizen and who is in the United States in violation of U.S. immigration laws. An illegal alien could be one of the following:
- An undocumented alien, also known as an EWI (Entry Without Inspection), who entered the United States without a visa (such as a stowaway), often between land ports of entry
- A person who entered the United States using fraudulent documentation
- A person who entered the United States legally with a temporary visa and then stayed beyond the time allowed; this person was referred to as a nonimmigrant overstay or a visa overstay
- A legal permanent resident who committed a crime after entry, became subject to an order of deportation, but failed to depart
HOW MANY ILLEGAL ALIENS ARE THERE?
Because illegal aliens do not readily identify themselves for fear of deportation, it is almost impossible to determine how many illegal aliens are in the United States. Various sources have estimated between two and twelve million, but most estimates are little more than educated guesses and are often politically influenced. (The wide variance among the estimates is an indication of their unreliability.) The figures also vary somewhat between winter months and summer months based on availability of agricultural work.
Illegal Alien Estimates
Figure 5.1 provides an estimate of the number of illegal aliens living in the United States from 1986 to 2002. It also indicates some of the differences in estimates between Census Bureau and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) demographers. (Karen Woodrow and Jeffrey Passel worked for the Census Bureau and Passel later joined the Urban Institute. Robert Warren worked for the INS.) These estimates indicate that the total number of illegal aliens rose from 3.2 million in 1986 to 9.3 million in 2002. In Undocumented Immigrants: Facts and Figures (Jeffrey Passell, Randy Capps, and Michael Fix, Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, January 12, 2004), the demographers estimated that nearly two-thirds of all illegal aliens lived in just six states: California (27%), Texas (13%), New York (8%), Florida (7%), Illinois (6%), and New Jersey (4%).
Figure 5.2 shows that in 2002, 57% of all illegal aliens in the United States were from Mexico, compared to an estimated 69% in 1986. While the percentage share of illegal aliens from Mexico decreased between 1986 and 2002, their total numbers still increased dramatically. Sixty-nine percent of 3.2 million total illegal aliens in 1986 equaled 2.2 million from Mexico. By 2002 the number of illegal aliens from Mexico rose to 5.3 million (57% of 9.3 million).
A November 2004 report by the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) also estimated the number of illegal aliens in the country at about ten million (Steven A. Camarota, Economy Slowed, But Immigration Didn't: The Foreign-Born Population, 2000–2004, Washington, DC). However, in The Underground Labor Force Is Rising to the Surface (New York: Bear Stearns Asset Management, January 3, 2005), Robert Justich and Betty Ng disputed the estimates of the illegal alien population based on Census Bureau counts. Justich and Ng suggested that the Census Bureau accounted for only half of the illegal alien population. By the authors' projections, the 2004 illegal alien population was as high as twenty million. They based their projections on sources such as increases in school enrollments, foreign remittances (money sent by foreign workers to their families back home), border crossings, and housing permits. They suggested that more small businesses had taken advantage of illegal workers, moving four to six million jobs into the underground market. They also noted that many employers of illegal aliens resorted to unrecorded revenue receipts (paying "under the table" or "off the books" by cash). Justich and Ng estimated five million illegal workers were being paid on such an untaxed cash basis. They argued that this "stealth workforce" distorted economic statistics and government budget projections by understating job growth, inflating U.S. productivity, and shortchanging tax revenues by some $35 billion per year.
Counting Who Comes and Goes
Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA; PL 104-208) mandated that the INS develop an automated system to track the entry and exit of all noncitizens—nonimmigrants and immigrant residents entering or leaving all ports of entry, including land borders and sea ports. The INS, the Canadian government, and the airline industry, among others, opposed Section 110. According to the INS, it lacked the resources to put in place such an integrated system. The Canadian government claimed that filling out the entry form (Form I-94) and having it checked by INS inspectors would cause large backups at the border. Airlines considered Section 110 an additional reporting burden.
On June 15, 2000, Congress passed the Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act (PL 106-215) to amend Section 110 of the IIRIRA. It required the INS to develop an electronic system that "provides access to, and integrates, alien arrival and departure data," using available data to identify lawfully admitted nonimmigrants who might have overstayed their visits. A deadline of December 31, 2003, was set for all airports and seaports to have the system in place. Fifty land border ports, determined by the U.S. attorney general to have the highest number of arrivals and departures, were given until December 31, 2004, to have the system operating. All remaining land ports of entry were to have the system operating by December 31, 2005.
NATIONAL SECURITY ENTRY-EXIT
REGISTRATION SYSTEM
Exactly one year after the terrorist attacks it was intended to prevent, the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) was launched. It consisted of three components: point-of-entry registration, special registration, and exit/departure controls. Special registration established a national registry for temporary foreign visitors (nonimmigrant aliens) coming from twenty-five designated countries and others who met a combination of intelligence-based criteria that identified them as potential security risks.
One by one, immigration-related security deficiencies were being addressed by NSEERS. For example, as of January 2003 all commercial carriers were required to submit detailed passenger lists electronically before an aircraft or vessel arrived in or departed from the United States.
In December 2003 certain provisions in NSEERS were suspended, including the need to reregister each year, a process commonly known as "domestic registration." Certain provisions of NSEERS remained in place, however, including the requirement for foreign nationals from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and the Sudan to go through special registration at ports of entry and to report to immigration officials before leaving the country. Foreign nationals from all other countries were registered if Customs and Border Protection Officers deemed it necessary based on initial questioning upon arrival. By January 2005, individuals from more than 160 countries had been registered in the NSEERS program. The registry provides detailed information about the background and purpose of an individual's visit to the United States as well as departure confirmation.
NONIMMIGRANT OVERSTAYS
An April 2002 report from the U.S. Department of Justice (Follow-Up Report on INS Efforts to Improve the Control of Nonimmigrant Overstays, Report no. I-2002-006, Washington, DC, April 2002) stated:
Data from the 2000 Census suggests the number [of overstays] may be at least 8 million. Scholars at Boston's Northeastern University estimated the number as close to 13 million in a February 2001 study, An Analysis of the Preliminary 2000 Census Estimates of the Resident Population of the U.S. and Their Implications for Demographic, Immigration, and Labor Market Analysis and Policymaking. The common perception that the vast majority of illegal aliens entered the United States by surreptitiously crossing the southwest or northern border is inaccurate. INS officials have testified before Congress that 40% to 50% of the illegal alien population entered the United States legally as temporary visitors but failed to depart when required. The INS commonly refers to these illegal aliens as nonimmigrant overstays, and according to the INS this population is growing by at least 125,000 a year.
Under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for collecting documents from incoming travelers, but airlines and shipping lines are responsible for collecting departure forms and for sending those forms to ICE. However, departure forms may have gone unrecorded because they were not collected, they were collected by the airline but not sent to ICE, or the forms were returned to ICE but incorrectly recorded. Therefore, the number of visa overstays is difficult to estimate.
In a May 2004 report to Congress (Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a Layered Defense, report to the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, GAO-04-82, http://www.gao.gov/htext/d0482.html), the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported the DHS had estimated the number of overstays in the United States to be 2.3 million in 2000. However, the GAO noted this figure did not account for an unknown number of short- and long-term overstays from Mexico and Canada. (See Figure 5.3.) Citizens of Canada admitted for up to six months and Mexican citizens with border crossing cards entering at a border in the southwest for a stay of less than seventy-two hours are exempt from the visa admissions procedure. The GAO report also noted weaknesses in the tracking system that identified who entered the country on visas but which did not accurately track when, or if, those individuals left.
In fiscal year (FY) 2001 the INS reported 32,799,000 arrivals at U.S. ports of entry, not including Mexican and Canadian business or pleasure visitors. Of these arrivals, 79% departed before their authorized stay expired and another 1% departed after their initial authorized stay expired. While there were no departure records for 15% of those persons who arrived by air or sea, departure records were missing for nearly three-fourths (71%) of all persons who arrived by land. The document that formed the basis of the tracking system was the Form I-94 completed on arrival. (See Figure 5.4.)
OPERATION TARMAC
Post–September 11 investigations identified "thousands of overstays and other illegal immigrant workers who (despite background checks) had obtained critical infrastructure jobs and security badges with access to, for example, airport tarmacs and U.S. military bases" (Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and A Layered Defense, U.S. Government Accountability Office report to the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, GAO-04-82, May 2004). The GAO report also claimed that of the six hijackers who actually flew the planes on September 11 or were apparent leaders, two were overstays and one had violated a student visa by not attending school. The DHS initiated an ongoing multiagency effort, known as Operation Tarmac, to identify unauthorized foreign nationals working in places vulnerable to terrorism, such as security areas of airports.
The GAO further reported in Overstay Tracking that as of April 2004, 195 airports had been investigated and
| Airport | Over stays | Not over stays(EWIs and others)* | Total unauthorized workers arrested |
| Atlanta Hartsfield (ATL) | 14 | 4 | 18 |
| Austin (AUS) | 1 | 22 | 23 |
| Baltimore (BWI) | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Boston Logan (BOS) | 6 | 14 | 20 |
| Burbank, California (BUR) | 5 | 5 | 10 |
| Chicago O'Hare (ORD) and Midway (MDW) | 10 | 28 | 38 |
| Dallas (DFW) | 26 | 41 | 67 |
| Denver (DIA) | 6 | 36 | 42 |
| Detroit (DTW) | 2 | 4 | 6 |
| Houston Bush (IAH) | 3 | 100 | 103 |
| Jacksonville (JAX) | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Los Angeles (LAX) | 5 | 18 | 23 |
| Manchester, New Hampshire (MHT) | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| Newark, New Jersey (EWR) | 8 | 5 | 13 |
| New York JFK and La Guardia (LGA) | 11 | 15 | 26 |
| Omaha (OMA) | 0 | 9 | 9 |
| Orlando (MCO) | 12 | 1 | 13 |
| Phoenix Sky Harbor (PHX) | 7 | 21 | 28 |
| Salt Lake City, Utah (SLC) | 23 | 25 | 48 |
| San Francisco (SFO) | 4 | 13 | 17 |
| Sarasota (SRQ) | 1 | 6 | 7 |
| Tampa (TPA) | 10 | 1 | 11 |
| Washington Dulles (IAD) | 7 | 40 | 47 |
| Washington Reagan National (DCA) | 13 | 15 | 28 |
| Total number | 182 | 425 | 607 |
| Percent | 30.0% | 70.0% | 100.0% |
| Note: Data are for operations conducted from October 2001 through April 2004. | |||
| *Entered without inspection (surreptitious border crosser). | |||
5,877 businesses had been audited. Checking I-9 employment eligibility forms and badging office records of some 385,000 workers located 4,918 unauthorized workers. Table 5.1 provides a profile of Operation Tarmac results in 25 airports. Of 607 unauthorized workers arrested, 30% were overstays. The greatest number of unauthorized workers arrested (103) were identified at Houston's Bush Intercontinental Airport. A total of ten unauthorized workers arrested were from countries identified as "of special interest" under the NSEERS program and five of these were overstays. According to the GAO report, the unauthorized workers with access to secured areas were employed by airports, airlines, and support service companies in jobs such as aircraft maintenance technicians, airline cabin service attendants, airplane fuelers, baggage handlers, and predeparture screeners. One unauthorized worker was employed in the airport badging office. In most cases these individuals had misused Social Security numbers and identity documents to obtain airport jobs and security badges.
Operation Tarmac also investigates employees working at critical infrastructure sites (such as nuclear power plants, sensitive national landmarks, military installations, or the Alaska pipeline) and special events (such as the 2002 Olympics in Salt Lake City and the annual Super Bowl game). Seventy-nine unauthorized workers were arrested at the 2003 Super Bowl in San Diego, according to the GAO report. Eight were overstayers and twelve others were from countries that became part of the NSEERS "special registration" requirements.
WHERE DO ILLEGAL ALIENS COME FROM?
The 2000 census data was used by the INS to estimate that a total of seven million unauthorized residents were in the United States, double the 3.5 million estimated for 1990. That analysis identified Mexico as the leading country of origin of illegal aliens to the United States, accounting for 68.7% (4.8 million) of the estimated undocumented population in 2000. Fourteen countries were each estimated to be the source of 50,000 or more illegal aliens. Of the top fifteen countries of origin, only China, the Philippines, India, and Korea are not within the Western Hemisphere. (See Table 5.2.)
| Estimated population | Percent of total population | ||||
| Country of origin | 2000 (1) | 1990 (2) | Growth 1990–2000 (3) = (1) - (2) | 2000 (4) | 1990 (5) |
| All countries | 7,000 | 3,500 | 3,500 | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| Mexico | 4,808 | 2,040 | 2,768 | 68.7% | 58.3% |
| EI Salvador | 189 | 298 | ?109 | 2.7% | 8.5% |
| Guatemala | 144 | 118 | 26 | 2.1% | 3.4% |
| Colombia | 141 | 51 | 91 | 2.0% | 1.4% |
| Honduras* | 138 | 42 | 96 | 2.0% | 1.2% |
| China | 115 | 70 | 45 | 1.6% | 2.0% |
| Ecuador | 108 | 37 | 71 | 1.5% | 1.0% |
| Dominican Republic | 91 | 46 | 45 | 1.3% | 1.3% |
| Philippines | 85 | 70 | 14 | 1.2% | 2.0% |
| Brazil | 77 | 20 | 58 | 1.1% | 0.6% |
| Haiti | 76 | 67 | 8 | 1.1% | 1.9% |
| India | 70 | 28 | 41 | 1.0% | 0.8% |
| Peru | 61 | 27 | 34 | 0.9% | 0.8% |
| Korea | 55 | 24 | 31 | 0.8% | 0.7% |
| Canada | 47 | 25 | 22 | 0.7% | 0.7% |
| All other countries | 795 | 537 | 259 | 11.4% | 15.3% |
| *Includes 105,000 Hondurans granted temporary protected status in December 1998. | |||||
WHO ENFORCES IMMIGRATION LAWS?
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it became apparent that some or all of the perpetrators had entered the United States legally and many had overstayed their allotted time with no notice taken by the INS or any other enforcement agency. On March 1, 2003, INS functions and those of the U.S. Customs Service were folded into the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Within the DHS, the new U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) oversees the movement of goods and people into the United States, while Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for enforcing immigration laws within the United States and along its land and water boundaries. On March 17, 2004, Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security Asa Hutchinson reported before the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security (http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/2004_h/040317-hutchinson.doc) that ports of entry into the United States stretched across 7,500 miles of land border with Mexico and Canada, and 95,000 miles of shoreline and navigable rivers. Conditions and venues varied considerably, from air and sea ports of entry in metropolitan New York City with dozens of employees, to a two-person land entry point in North Dakota.
The U.S. Border Patrol
The U.S. Border Patrol, the mobile uniformed law enforcement arm of the CBP, is responsible for the detection and apprehension of illegal aliens and smugglers of aliens at or near U.S. land borders—a difficult, sometimes dangerous, and often frustrating job. The United States is divided into twenty-one Border Patrol Sectors. Nine of the Border Patrol sectors are along the southwest border. (See Figure 5.5.)
THE SOUTHWEST BORDER.
The biggest illegal entry problems occur along the 1,956-mile border between the United States and Mexico. The four states bordering Mexico—Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California—have 39 ports of entry. About five million Mexican nationals reside in the Mexican municipalities (municipios) along the southwest border.
RECRUITING BORDER PATROL AGENTS.
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) mandated that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) add 1,000 Border Patrol agents each year starting fiscal year (FY) 1997 through 2001. In 1997 and 1998 the INS fulfilled the law's mandate but fell short in 1999, when just 363 agents were added. In March 1999 the Clinton administration announced it would not request more funding for Border Patrol positions, citing the problems that could result from having too many inexperienced agents.
In 2000 the INS strengthened its recruiting efforts by training Border Patrol agents as recruiters and offering entrance exams throughout the country. It advertised in movie theaters, on television, and on the Internet. About 80% of those interested applied over the Internet. In addition, the INS offered a $2,000 recruitment bonus to each recruit. As a result, the INS reported that more than 1,700 new agents were hired, bringing the total number of agents to 9,212.
The aggressive recruitment effort continued, and in 2001 legislation was passed that increased the base pay for new agents to about $41,000. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, the need for Border Patrol agents became acute. In his testimony on October 17, 2001, before the House Committee on Government Reform, INS Commissioner James W. Ziglar pointed out that even before September 11, Border Patrol agents were routinely recruited away by other federal law enforcement agencies that offered better pay. In fact, as Jonathan Peterson of the Los Angeles Times reported, about 2,000 Border Patrol agents and immigration inspectors left the INS between October 2001 and August 2002 ("'Mass Exodus' of Agents Leaves INS Scrambling," August 5, 2002). Many took better-paid airline security jobs with the newly created Transportation Security Administration. According to Peterson, in FY 2002, 1,499 new Border Patrol agents were hired—but 1,459 veterans left. Border Patrol agents complained of low job satisfaction, low pay, and the poor image of the INS as well as uncertainty over its continued existence.
After INS responsibilities were turned over to the DHS, a recruiting campaign was launched on college campuses in an effort to meet President George W. Bush's goal of hiring 570 new Border Patrol agents in FY 2003. The nation's post–September 11 southwest border strategy called for 14,000 Border Patrol agents to be in place by 2010 (Jerry Seper, "14,000 Agents Needed to Patrol Mexico Border," Washington Times, September 23, 2002).
THE NORTHERN BORDER.
The September 11 terrorist attacks also highlighted the vulnerability of the nation's northern border, where fewer than 300 Border Patrol agents guarded the nearly 4,000-mile border with Canada, and several ports of entry were not staffed around-the-clock. In FY 2002, 245 Border Patrol agents were allocated to the northern border. On July 2, 2003, CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner announced that 375 additional Border Patrol agents would be deployed to the northern border, bringing the total number of agents there to 1,000 (http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/press_releases/archives/cbp_press_releases/072003/07022003.xml).
APPREHENSION OF ILLEGAL ALIENS
In FY 2003 the Border Patrol located 931,557 deportable aliens, down from 955,310 in 2002, and from more than one million in each of the previous five years. The majority (882,012, or 94.7%) of the deportable aliens were from Mexico. Most of the Mexican aliens located (810,671) were identified as "seeking employment." (See Table 5.3.)
More than one million aliens were expelled from CBP field offices in 2003. (See Table 5.4.) The majority (887,115) were voluntary removals compared to 186,151 formal removals, including deportations and exclusions. Given the high volume of migrant traffic along the Southwest border, it was no surprise that the San Diego, California, and Phoenix, Arizona, offices had the greatest number of removals. The Phoenix field office processed 44% (395,757) of all voluntary departures and 17.5% (32,609) of all formal removals.
Customs and Border Patrol FY 2004 Activities
In a January 11, 2005, press release ("Border Agency Reports First-Year Successes," http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/press_releases/0012005/01112005.xml), the CBP reported that 428 million passengers and pedestrians were processed and cleared through U.S. air, land, and sea ports of entry during FY 2004. A total of 121 million privately owned vehicles entered the United States—91 million at the U.S.–Mexico border and 30 million at the U.S.–Canada border. CBP officers processed more than 262 million aliens at U.S. ports of entry. Of that number, 643,091 were deemed inadmissible under U.S. laws, including 19,740 criminal aliens. Since new fingerprint matching systems were installed on the Mexican and Canadian borders, arrests of criminals and criminal suspects attempting to enter the country jumped from 2,612 in FY 2002 to 29,501 in FY 2004. In tallying its successes, the CBP noted that officers at ports of entry arrested 6,709 persons on drug-related charges and 7,516 on outstanding state or federal warrants, a 41% increase over FY 2003. They also intercepted 566 stowaways. Nationwide, Border Patrol agents arrested 1,158,800 illegal aliens, including 643 special interest aliens, and intercepted 78,255 fraudulent documents.
| Activities and accomplishments | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 |
| Persons processed by the border patrol a | 1,422,829 | 1,566,984 | 1,591,969 | 1,689,195 | 1,277,576 | 967,044 | 946,684 |
| Deportable aliens located by the border patrol | 1,412,953 | 1,555,776 | 1,579,010 | 1,676,438 | 1,266,213 | 955,310 | 931,557 |
| Mexican aliens | 1,387,650 | 1,522,918 | 1,534,515 | 1,636,883 | 1,224,046 | 917,994 | 882,012 |
| Working in agriculture | 3,521 | 3,270 | 1,599 | 1,330 | 1,248 | 1,821 | 1,908 |
| Working in trades, crafts, industry, and service | 10,146 | 6,616 | 2,383 | 2,167 | 2,678 | 2,897 | 3,856 |
| Seeking employment | 1,279,923 | 1,398,892 | 1,422,970 | 1,525,422 | 1,107,550 | 822,161 | 810,671 |
| Canadian aliens | 2,935 | 2,329 | 2,724 | 2,211 | 2,539 | 1,836 | 1,611 |
| All others | 22,368 | 30,529 | 41,771 | 37,344 | 39,628 | 35,480 | 47,934 |
| Smugglers of aliens located | 12,523 | 13,908 | 15,755 | 14,406 | 8,720 | 8,701 | 11,128 |
| Aliens located who were smuggled into the United States | 124,605 | 174,514 | 221,522 | 236,782 | 112,927 | 68,192 | 110,605 |
| Seizures (conveyances) | 11,792 | 14,401 | 16,803 | 17,269 | 5,892 | 7,250 | 9,355 |
| Value of seizures (millions of dollars) | 1,095 | 1,405 | 2,004 | 1,945 | 1,581 | 1,564 | 1,168 |
| Narcotics | 1,046 | 1,340 | 1,919 | 1,848 | 1,519 | 1,499 | 1,608 |
| Other | 49 | 64 | 86 | 97 | 62 | 65 | 72 |
| *Includes deportable aliens located and non-deportable (e.g., U.S. citizens). | |||||||
| Note: Data for aliens previously expelled, aliens located with previous criminal records, and conveyances examined are not available starting in fiscal year 1990. Data for narcotics for fiscal year 1995 and for other for 1992–94 and 1996–97 have been revised. | |||||||
| Field office | Formal removals a | Voluntary departures b |
| All field offices | 186,151 | 887,115 |
| Atlanta, GA | 3,647 | 1,918 |
| Baltimore, MD | 4,546 | 416 |
| Boston, MA | 1,979 | 2,379 |
| Buffalo, NY | 1,366 | 375 |
| Chicago, IL | 5,279 | 1,404 |
| Dallas, TX | 5,378 | 2,966 |
| Denver, CO | 4,027 | 2,914 |
| Detroit, MI | 1,500 | 1,695 |
| El Paso, TX | 11,431 | 93,811 |
| Houston, TX | 11,144 | 1,759 |
| Los Angeles, CA | 13,116 | 6,435 |
| Miami, FL | 7,695 | 6,074 |
| New Orleans, LA | 4,339 | 552 |
| New York, NY | 2,877 | 162 |
| Newark, NJ | 3,162 | 271 |
| Phoenix, AZ | 32,609 | 395,757 |
| San Antonio, TX | 15,372 | 165,005 |
| San Diego, CA | 40,325 | 195,678 |
| San Francisco, CA | 7,355 | 3,625 |
| Seattle, WA | 4,321 | 2,249 |
| St. Paul, MN | 3,342 | 1,408 |
| Washington, DC | 1,341 | 262 |
| aFormal removals include deportations, exclusions, and removals. | ||
| bVoluntary departures include aliens under docket control required to depart and voluntary departures not under docket control. | ||
Source Countries of Apprehended Aliens
According to the 2002 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, October 2003), in FY 2002 nationals of 186 countries were apprehended by the INS. Almost all of those arrested were from Mexico (94%). The next largest source countries were Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Brazil, Canada, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, the People's Republic of China, Jamaica, Colombia, Pakistan, Haiti, and Ecuador. However, the INS counted apprehensions, not individuals. Many of those apprehended and returned to Mexico would return to the border to attempt to cross again. According to U.S. Border Patrol statistics reported in a USA Today article ("Despite New Technology Border Patrol Overwhelmed," http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-02-22-borderpatrol_x.htm, March 22, 2005), 1,073,468 persons from Mexico were caught illegally crossing the southwestern border in 2004, compared to 865,850 the previous year. The number of persons from countries other than Mexico who were caught trying to cross the southwestern border totaled 65,814 in 2004, up from 39,215 in 2003.
Removal of Illegal Aliens
Noncriminal aliens apprehended while attempting illegal entry into the United States are offered voluntary departure. If they accept, they waive their right to a hearing and are supposed to leave the country under supervision. Aliens who are apprehended after entering the United States could also be allowed to depart voluntarily. In both cases, an immigration judge or a DHS Field Office Director grants permission to depart. The Office of Immigration Statistics reported that most voluntary departures (99%) involve aliens apprehended and quickly removed by the Border Patrol (2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, September 2004).
| Year | Total | Attempted entry without proper documents or through fraud or misrepresentation | Criminal | Failed to maintain status | Previously removed ineligible for reentry | Present without authorization* | Security | Smuggling or aiding illegal entry | Other | Unknown |
| 1991 | 33,189 | 3,058 | 14,475 | 1,135 | 735 | 13,347 | 7 | 28 | 191 | 213 |
| 1992 | 43,671 | 3,630 | 20,098 | 1,076 | 1,008 | 17,403 | 31 | 177 | 57 | 191 |
| 1993 | 42,542 | 2,968 | 22,470 | 783 | 913 | 15,018 | 54 | 208 | 95 | 33 |
| 1994 | 45,674 | 3,482 | 24,581 | 716 | 1,052 | 15,500 | 57 | 218 | 51 | 17 |
| 1995 | 50,924 | 5,822 | 25,684 | 611 | 1,432 | 17,069 | 34 | 196 | 63 | 13 |
| 1996 | 69,680 | 15,412 | 27,655 | 708 | 2,005 | 23,522 | 36 | 275 | 49 | 18 |
| 1997 | 114,432 | 35,737 | 34,113 | 1,031 | 3,302 | 39,297 | 30 | 385 | 522 | 15 |
| 1998 | 173,146 | 79,290 | 35,946 | 986 | 7,103 | 48,477 | 15 | 497 | 816 | 16 |
| 1999 | 180,902 | 91,858 | 41,995 | 789 | 9,287 | 34,898 | 10 | 404 | 1,651 | 10 |
| 2000 | 185,987 | 89,893 | 41,076 | 729 | 11,653 | 40,254 | 13 | 490 | 1,874 | 5 |
| 2001 | 177,739 | 76,212 | 40,112 | 714 | 10,668 | 47,889 | 12 | 507 | 1,619 | 6 |
| 2002 | 150,084 | 41,295 | 37,723 | 1,226 | 12,809 | 55,322 | 11 | 572 | 1,101 | 25 |
| 2003 | 186,151 | 52,014 | 39,600 | 1,240 | 17,630 | 73,609 | 12 | 597 | 1,442 | 7 |
| *Includes those aliens charged under the statutes previous to April 1, 1997 as "entered without inspection." | ||||||||||
| Note: The administrative reason for formal removal is the legal basis for removal. Some aliens who are criminals may be removed under a different administrative reason (or charge) for the convenience of the government. Removals include those actions known as deportation and exclusion prior to the revision of law that was effective April 1, 1997. | ||||||||||
Prior to the passage of Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility in 1996, the INS used the term "exclusion" to mean denial of an alien's entry into the United States. "Deportation" referred to the formal removal of an alien from the United States after being found in violation of immigration laws. IIRIRA consolidated the two procedures into one category called "removals."
Table 5.5 compares removals by reason for fiscal years 1991 through 2003. The increasing number of removals—33,189 total in 1991 compared to 186,151 in 2003—reflects not only growth in the number of immigrants but changes in immigration laws and enforcement activities. According to data in the 2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 497,000 arriving aliens initially were determined to be inadmissible in FY 2003. Although approximately 181,000 of these were inadmissible for reasons that made them subject to expedited removal, 128,000 chose to withdraw their applications for admission. Of the remaining 53,000 who were scheduled for expedited removal, about 6,000 expressed a fear of being returned to their countries of origin and were referred to an asylum officer. Expedited removals totaled 23% of removals in 2003.
The INS contended that as many as 314,000 "absconders" who had been ordered deported by an immigration judge remained at large as of early 2002 ("Guidance for Absconder Apprehension Initiative," Washington, DC: Office of Deputy Attorney General, January 25, 2002). In January 2002 the Department of Justice launched the Absconder Apprehension Initiative, which was to begin with the deportation of about 1,000 immigrants from Middle Eastern countries who had been convicted of felonies in the United States but remained at large. After the campaign was announced, the INS predicted that it would take a minimum of a year just to enter the names of the absconders in the FBI database and that the agency was unlikely to be able to locate more than 10% of the absconders.
In 2003 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) took over responsibility for locating absconders. In a November 16, 2004, press release ("ICE Detention and Removal Sets Record for Fiscal Year 2004," http://www.ice.gov/graphics/news/newsreleases/articles/droFY04.htm), ICE announced that the removal of criminal and other illegal aliens from the United States reached record levels in FY 2004. A total of 157,281 aliens were removed. In addition, ICE recorded a sizable increase in apprehensions under a new program specifically targeting fugitive aliens.
"Removing criminal aliens and other illegal aliens from the United States is critical to the integrity of our immigration system and important to the safety of our communities," Michael J. Garcia, DHS Assistant Secretary for ICE, was quoted as saying in the 2004 press release. "The 9/11 Commission Report details how our immigration system was exploited by terrorists, and we know that other dangerous criminals have sought illegal entry by similar means. We are bringing to bear the full force of our authorities to locate and remove those in the country illegally."
On May 14, 2003, ICE initiated a Most Wanted list on its website (http://www.ice.gov/graphics/investigations/mostwanted.htm). The list included "Most Wanted Criminal Aliens" who had been convicted of mostly violent crimes and had evaded final removal orders. On February 18, 2005, for example, the list included ten individuals convicted of crimes against children, assault and weapons offenses, and manslaughter. There were also five individuals wanted for human smuggling, most of which involved deaths. A separate "Most Wanted Fugitives" list included eleven individuals wanted for customs violations such as drug smuggling, firearms smuggling, stolen vehicles, child pornography, and money laundering. The website lists included a photo of each individual and personal information. The website provided a telephone number that any member of the public could call with information about individuals on the lists.
Field Fugitive Operations Teams Seek Absconders
On February 25, 2003, the National Fugitive Operations Program was established with a mission to identify, locate, apprehend, and remove fugitive aliens. The Absconder Initiative under this program established eighteen Field Fugitive Operations Teams around the country to perform the work.
In "Outnumbered in a Hunt for Aliens" for the Washington Times (July 20, 2004), Jerry Seper reported on the activities of one field team operating in the Los Angeles area. In a pre-dawn raid the team arrested "three Mexican nationals and a Guatemalan, all convicted criminals, and an Israeli national sought by the U.S. government as a potential terrorist threat." Seper noted that in the city of Los Angeles more than 90% of outstanding homicide warrants and 65% of fugitive felony warrants were for illegal aliens.
Seper's article reported that the eighteen squads nationwide were seeking to arrest 80,000 criminal aliens—including killers, rapists, drug dealers, and child molesters—and at least 320,000 absconders. Barely 200 agents were searching for nearly a half-million criminal aliens and absconders hiding in communities from Seattle and Los Angeles to Miami and New York City.
Operation Predator
Operation Predator, an initiative targeting criminals who sexually exploit children, began in July 2003. As of March 2005 Operation Predator had resulted in more than 5,000 arrests nationwide ("Operation Predator," http://www.ice.gov/graphics/news/factsheets/operationpredator.htm, March 9, 2005). Approximately 85% of those arrested were foreign-national sexual predators whose crimes made them deportable. Between July 2003 and March 2005 more than 2,100 child predators were deported.
JOINING FORCES TO LOCATE
CRIMINAL ALIENS
Charlie LeDuff reported for the New York Times ("100 Members of Immigrant Gang Held," March 15, 2005) that federal immigration authorities had arrested more than one hundred members of a violent Central American street gang in a nationwide crackdown. The gang, known as "Mara Salvatrucha" or MS-13, originated in Los Angeles and spread across the continent. Gang members were involved in narcotics, gun trafficking, murder, and prostitution. Many of the gang members were illegal aliens, including some who had been deported and returned, and some deportees who never left. The article quoted the opinion of Officer Frank Flores, a gang expert with the Los Angeles Police Department, that members of MS-13 "pose as much a threat to the well-being of ordinary citizens as any foreign terrorist group."
A longstanding problem faced by immigration officials is lack of support from local law enforcement. The Los Angeles Police Department, for example, has a policy that prohibits its officers from informing federal immigration officials about illegal aliens they discover in the normal course of their duties. By letting the immigrant community see that local law officers will not report them, police departments hope to gain the trust of illegal aliens so they will seek assistance when needed and report crimes. Such written or unwritten "sanctuary laws" have been in place in a number of major cities. Several cities prohibit their employees from even asking about a person's immigration status. The arrests of MS-13 gang members appeared to mark a new cooperation between federal, state, and local enforcement agencies.
Supporting the concept of "sanctuary laws," the National Council of La Raza (a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization focused on reducing poverty and discrimination and improving opportunities for Hispanic Americans) charges that allowing local police agencies to enforce federal immigration laws results in racial profiling, police misconduct, and civil rights violations. The council also thinks local police involvement with immigration enforcement undercuts effective law enforcement and hampers antiterrorism efforts.
ALIEN SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING
Aliens often pay smugglers to help them enter the United States illegally. In cases of trafficking the smugglers then use the aliens for forced labor or commercial sexual exploitation. ICE makes a distinction between alien smuggling and human trafficking. Alien smuggling produces short-term profits, while trafficking garners profits over both the long and short term.
A Growing Problem
According to an ICE press release, Agent Thomas Homan asserted in a statement before the House Judiciary Committee's Immigration, Border Security, and Claims Subcommittee on June 24, 2003, that the international trade in men, women, and children is a growing and lucrative business, generating an estimated $9.5 billion each year (http://www.ice.gov/graphics/news/newsreleases/articles/humanTraf062403.htm, June 24, 2003). The international smuggling trade is highly organized, consisting of a sophisticated network of persons who set up smuggling transactions, forge documents, transport aliens, and handle aliens at the destination.
The State Department estimated that 600,000 to 800,000 persons are victims of global trafficking each year ("Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons," http://www.state.gov/g/tip/). Likewise, according to 2004 U.S. Department of Justice estimates, 14,500 to 17,500 people are trafficked into the United States annually. About 40% (5,000–7,000) come from East Asia and the Pacific and 31% (3,500–5,500) come from Latin America. (See Figure 5.6.) Table 5.6 summarizes the Justice Department's trafficking cases for fiscal years 2001 through 2003. During that time a total of 56 defendants were charged and 28 were convicted of trafficking. Twenty-three (82%) of the convictions were for sex-related trafficking charges.
| TVPA prosecutions | FY01 | FY02 | FY03 |
| Cases filed | |||
| Total | 5 | 7 | 9 |
| Sex (subset of total) | 2 | 5 | 7 |
| Defendants charged | |||
| Total | 11 | 21 | 24 |
| Sex (subset of total) | 6 | 13 | 20 |
| Convictions | |||
| Total | 5 | 6 | 17 |
| Sex (subset of total) | 3 | 6 | 14 |
On February 21, 2003, the Justice Department announced that a federal jury delivered a guilty verdict in the human trafficking case against Kil Soo Lee ("Garment Factory Owner Convicted in Largest Ever Human Trafficking Case Prosecuted by the Department of Justice," http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/February/03_crt_108.htm). According to the announcement, from March 1999 through November 2000 Lee and his underlings used threats, starvation, confinement, and beatings to hold over two hundred Vietnamese and Chinese garment workers in servitude in Lee's factory in American Samoa. The women had paid $5,000 to $8,000 (the equivalent of five to ten years' salary in their home countries), what they believed was a legitimate fee for a new job that would lead to a better way of life.
A Dangerous Journey
In order to avoid detection, persons who smuggle illegal aliens into the United States often use transporting methods that are not safe. Aliens who cross the U.S.–Mexico or U.S.–Canada borders might travel in enclosed, packed trucks with little ventilation. Others, who travel by sea for thousands of miles from such countries as the People's Republic of China and India, might be stowed on cargo ships and subjected to extreme conditions, including lack of comfort facilities and stifling heat.
In the deadliest illegal border-crossing in more than fifteen years, nineteen men, women, and children died of suffocation, heat exposure, and thirst while locked inside an unventilated trailer in May 2003. The victims were among at least seventy-four illegal aliens from Mexico and Central America abandoned at a truck stop about one hundred miles southwest of Houston. The driver of the truck that brought the aliens across the U.S.–Mexico border was Tyrone M. Williams, a Jamaican citizen and resident of New York state. Williams had received $7,500 to smuggle the group across the border and deliver them to Houston. Indicted on 58 counts of conspiracy, and harboring and transporting illegal immigrants, Williams became the first person to face possible execution for human smuggling deaths under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. While fourteen people were indicted, including ring-leaders of the Brownsville, Texas, smuggling ring, prosecutors said Williams was the only one facing the death penalty because he alone had the power to release the immigrants from the airless tractor-trailer.
After a series of appeals based on Williams's charges of discrimination, the trial began March 8, 2005, in federal district court in Houston. Williams testified that he turned off the air conditioning in the truck so that he could say that he was hauling an empty trailer when he went through a Border Patrol checkpoint. He also contended that he did not hear the passengers pounding on the sides of the trailer and screaming for help. A passenger in the cab, Fatima Holloway, testified that Mr. Williams ignored the sounds of the desperate passengers. On March 23, 2005, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on thirty-eight counts of transporting illegal aliens. However, they were deadlocked on twenty potential death penalty charges of conspiracy and harboring, resulting in a mistrial on those counts (trial coverage from the New York Times, Houston Chronicle, Christian Science Monitor, and National Public Radio, March2005).
Some illegal aliens have drowned while trying to swim across the Rio Grande, which forms the border between Texas and Mexico. Others have fallen prey to border bandits who stole from them and injured or killed them. Some illegal aliens who brought in drugs as payment for their entry into the United States put themselves in harm's way because of the dangerous nature of their undertakings.
Between October 2002 and July 2003, 123 illegal aliens died in Arizona from the heat, accidents, and other causes (Anabelle Garay, "Immigrant Death Toll in Ariz. Near Record," Newsday, July 24, 2003). William Aceves, a professor of international and human rights law at the California Western School of Law, estimated that between 1994 and 2003 more than 2,200 migrants died while trying to cross the southwestern border through remote passages (Summary of Migrant Civil Rights Issues Along the Southwest Border, Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, April 2003).
Tucson's Arizona Daily Star newspaper established a searchable database (http://regulus.azstarnet.com/borderdeaths/search.php) of deaths occurring on the U.S.–Mexico border. The database not only counts the death toll but can be used by relatives searching for missing family members who left to cross the border and were never heard from again. The Coalición de Derechos Humanos/Alianza Indigena sin Fronteras, a Tucson human rights organization, also maintains a list of migrant border deaths including name (if known), sex, age, date discovered, location where discovered, and cause of death. Between October 1, 2003, and September 30, 2004, the Coaliciónadded233 people to its list. Approximately 47% (110 bodies) were unknown—found with no identification papers. Many were only bones. Attesting to the risks of dealing with some of the guides who led illegal aliens across the border for a fee, nineteen of the dead suffered blunt trauma injuries and one had a gunshot wound.
MEXICO'S UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
UNITED STATES
In no other place in the world does a nation as wealthy as the United States share a border with a nation as poor as Mexico. Huge disparities exist between the rich and poor people of Mexico, so it is understandable that Mexico's poor are attracted to the United States.
An Open Border
Before the twentieth century, Mexicans moved easily back and forth across completely open borders to work in the mines, on the ranches, and on the railroad. While fewer than 1,000 Mexicans immigrated between 1891 and 1900, almost 50,000 came during the period 1901 to 1910. The flow from Mexico soared to almost 220,000 between 1911 and 1921 and reached nearly 460,000 between 1921 and 1930. (See Table 1.1 in Chapter 1.)
This increase in Mexican immigration occurred even as overall immigration declined because of the growing tension in Europe that led to World War I (1914–18). It was fueled by the growing need for labor as America prepared to supply its allies and sent many thousands of its young men off to Europe to fight. While legal immigration rose after the war, a large amount of illegal immigration also occurred. Some historians estimated that during the 1920s there might have been more illegal Mexican aliens than legal immigrants. The need for Mexican labor was so great that in 1918 the commissioner-general of immigration exempted Mexicans from meeting most immigration conditions, such as head taxes (small amounts paid to come into the country) and literacy requirements.
The First Illegal Alien "Problem"
The increase in the number of illegal aliens from Mexico led to the creation of the U.S. Border Patrol in 1924. The United States had maintained a small force of mounted guards to deter alien smuggling, but this force was inadequate to stop large numbers of illegal aliens. The efforts of the Border Patrol contributed to a sharp increase in the number of aliens deported during the 1920s and 1930s.
In 1929 administrative control along the Mexican border was significantly tightened as the Great Depression led many Americans to blame the nation's unemployment on the illegal aliens. Consequently, thousands of Mexicans—both legal immigrants and illegal aliens—were repatriated (sent back to Mexico). According to the 1940 U.S. Census Report, the Mexican-born population in the United States declined from 639,000 in 1930 to 377,000 in 1940.
The Bracero Program (1942 to 1964)
World War II (1941–45) brought the country out of the Great Depression. Industry expanded and drew rural laborers into the cities. Other workers were drafted and went off to war. Once more, the United States needed laborers, especially farm workers, and the nation again turned to Mexico. The Bracero Program was a negotiated treaty between Mexico and the United States, permitting the entry of Mexican farm workers on a temporary basis under contract to U.S. employers. (The term bracero literally meant a pair of arms, or brazos; in this case, it signified a laborer.) The entire program lasted 22 years and involved approximately 4.8 million Mexican workers (Handbook of Texas Online, http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/BB/omb1.html).
The Bracero Program, however, did not end illegal immigration but further contributed to its increase. Many Mexicans became accustomed to working in the United States and earning higher wages than they could get in Mexico. They told friends and relatives that while conditions were not always satisfactory, the pay was better than in Mexico.
MISSING MONEY.
Between 1942 and 1949 American employers deducted 10% from the braceros weekly wages for a savings plan. The U.S. government transferred the money to banks in Mexico. It was estimated that, with interest, the aggregate savings accounts should have yielded $500 million or more. However, when the braceros went back to their country, no money could be found. In April 2001 a group of former braceros filed a class-action lawsuit seeking reparations for the money deducted from their salaries (Senorino Ramirez Cruz, et al., v. United States of America [C-01-0892]). In August 2002, Federal District Judge Charles R. Brever dismissed the lawsuit on the grounds that the government-owned Mexican banks could not be sued and the statute of limitations permitting claims against the U.S. government had expired. His ruling stated that he did "not doubt that many braceros never received Savings Fund withholdings to which they were entitled."
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
In December 1993 the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA; PL 103-182) was passed to eliminate trade and investment barriers among the United States, Canada, and Mexico over a fifteen-year period. NAFTA was intended to promote economic growth in each country so that, in the long run, the number of illegal immigrants seeking to enter the United States for work would diminish. One of NAFTA's provisions facilitated temporary entry on a reciprocal basis among the three countries. It established procedures for Canadian and Mexican citizens who were professional business-people to temporarily enter the United States to render services for pay. President Clinton claimed that more jobs on both sides of the southwest border meant more income for Mexican nationals, which would help reduce the number of undocumented aliens entering the United States.
K. Larry Storrs reported in Mexico–U.S. Relations: Issues for the 107th Congress (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, May 4, 2001) that total U.S. trade with Mexico grew from $100 billion to $248 billion between 1994 and 2000. However, due partly to the devaluation of the peso (the unit of Mexican currency) in 1994, the U.S. trade balance with Mexico had gone from a surplus of $1.3 billion in 1994 to a deficit of $24.2 billion in 2000. According to the American Farm Bureau Federation, however, by 2001 the United States had an agricultural trade surplus with Mexico of $2.1 billion.
A Guide for the Illegal Migrant
In the January 9, 2005, article, "A Guide for the Illegal Migrant," in the New York Times, James C. McKinley Jr. reported that the Mexican government had published and distributed a thirty-one page guide to assist illegal migrants in entering the United States. Members of the U.S. Congress protested what they saw as "blatantly encourage[ing] people to break United States law." Mexican officials compared the pamphlet to providing information about AIDS to illegal drug users. They argued that the document was intended to save lives by warning Mexican people of the dangers of illegal border crossing. The New York Times reproduced translated excerpts from the guide. While outlining the legal methods of gaining entry into the United States and noting the hazards of illegal entry, the guide listed the migrant's rights once inside the United States and offered tips on how to avoid being discovered after successful illegal entry. In a January 5, 2005, story entitled "Mexico Issues Illustrated Migrant Guide," the Associated Press reported that 1.5 million copies of the guide had been distributed in December 2004. Despite U.S. protests, Mexico's Secretariat of Foreign Relations announced on January 22, 2005, that Mexico would reprint the guide
| 7/25/04 Los Angeles | 9/24/04 New York | 10/29/04 Dallas | 11/19/04 Chicago | 12/3/04 Fresno | 12/10/04 Raleigh | 1/28/05 Atlanta | Total | Matrícula ID | No U.S. ID | |
| As an ID card in the U.S. | 63 | 73 | 72 | 70 | 48 | 68 | 77 | 68 | 100 | 83 |
| To cash checks in the U.S. | 33 | 26 | 37 | 29 | 21 | 28 | 29 | 31 | 41 | 38 |
| To mail money to Mexico from the U.S. | 25 | 28 | 32 | 25 | 16 | 18 | 25 | 25 | 34 | 30 |
| To open a bank account in the U.S. | 41 | 46 | 43 | 39 | 21 | 32 | 40 | 39 | 48 | 47 |
| To get a driver's license in the U.S. | 18 | 22 | 22 | 15 | 11 | 31 | 24 | 19 | 24 | 22 |
| To travel to Mexico from the U.S. | 47 | 28 | 39 | 44 | 63 | 44 | 36 | 43 | 34 | 29 |
and continue distribution (Natalia Gomez, "Mexican Government to Reprint Migrant Guide," El Universal, January 22, 2005).
ATTITUDES OF MEXICAN
MIGRANTS SURVEYED
For its Survey of Mexican Migrants: Attitudes about Immigration and Major Demographic Characteristics (Washington, DC, 2005), the Pew Hispanic Center interviewed nearly 5,000 Mexican migrants who were applying for a matrícula consular, an identity document issued by Mexican consulates in the United States. The surveys were conducted at the consulates in Los Angeles and Fresno, California; New York City; Chicago, Illinois; Atlanta, Georgia; Dallas, Texas; and Raleigh, North Carolina. The majority of individuals surveyed had no U.S. government-issued identification (80% of those who had lived in the United States two years or less; 75% of those who had lived in the country five years or less).
The matrícula consular was a laminated photo ID card bearing the person's name and home address in the United States, which was issued by Mexican officials without inquiring about the individual's immigration status in the United States. The cards included a number of antiforgery techniques used in ID cards issued by the U.S. government. The Mexican government began issuing these cards March 6, 2003, and as of February 2005 some 2.8 million matrícula consulars had been disbursed.
Obtaining a U.S. Driver's License
While it is not accepted as proof of legal status in the United States, the matrícula consular is accepted as identification by many law enforcement officials and local governments. The U.S. Treasury Department ruled in 2003 that the card could be used to open bank accounts, an option previously unavailable to aliens without proof of legal status. Of the migrants surveyed, 39% had used the card to open a U.S. bank account. The Pew study noted that, according to the National Immigration Law Center, as of January 2005 ten states accepted the matrícula consular as ID for persons seeking driver's licenses. Nineteen percent of all individuals surveyed reported they had used the card to obtain a U.S. driver's license, despite the fact that, of the cities in which the survey was conducted, only Dallas was in a state that issued driver's licenses based on a matrícula consular. From 11% to 31% of respondents in the other cities said they had used it to get a driver's license. (See Table 5.7.)
The Pew survey noted that applying for a matrícula consular did not mean that an individual was an unauthorized migrant (illegal alien). However, both permanent and temporary legal immigrants would have other forms of ID, such as a valid Mexican passport; permanent legal immigrants also would have a green card and be eligible for a Social Security card and driver's license in all states.
Where Do Mexican Immigrants Settle in the
United States?
Mexican migrants, both legal and illegal, were once found primarily in the South and border states where agricultural employment was most available. Since 1990 more Mexican migrants have moved into other areas of the country in search of job opportunities. Figure 5.7 provides a visual image of where Mexican-born migrants lived in greatest numbers according to the 2000 census. Some researchers have suggested that illegal aliens did not respond to the census and therefore they were not counted in the census figures. However, many census enumerators, who went in person to addresses that had not responded to the census by mail, told a different story. They related that in face-to-face interviews, illegal aliens frequently identified themselves. Some said they thought it was an honor to be counted in the U.S. census. Often they stated that they wanted to be sure their children were listed in the census, regardless of whether they were born in the United States.
Profile of Mexican Migrants
According to the Pew survey's findings, 48% of Mexican migrants interviewed were between the ages of nineteen and twenty-nine and 42% had been in the United States five years or less. Most (59%) wanted to remain in the United States as long as they could or for the rest of their lives. The Pew survey noted an increase of women (40%) in what had been a male-dominated flow of immigrants in the past. In addition, the group was better educated than the average population of Mexico (where only 7% of the adult population had completed high school) and more came from cities than agricultural areas. Thirty-six percent of those surveyed had completed lower secondary school (equivalent to U.S. grades 7–9) or vocational school, and 22% had completed high school. The largest share (27%) said they earned between $200 and $299 per week in the United States. Of all individuals surveyed, 54% said they spoke little or no English.
Furthermore, 68% of respondents said they had children, while 35% reported they had children enrolled in U.S. schools. Eighty-two percent said they had relatives
| Los Angeles | New York | Dallas | Chicago | Fresno | Raleigh | Atlanta | Total | Matrícula ID | No U.S. ID | |
| Agriculture | 3 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 52 | 10 | 5 | 8 | 7 | 6 |
| Hospitality | 13 | 26 | 16 | 17 | 6 | 10 | 16 | 15 | 17 | 18 |
| Construction | 9 | 15 | 26 | 12 | 5 | 37 | 26 | 16 | 17 | 17 |
| Manufacturing | 19 | 11 | 13 | 23 | 5 | 17 | 19 | 16 | 17 | 16 |
| Janitorial and landscaping | 9 | 9 | 11 | 9 | 4 | 10 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 10 |
| Domestic service | 6 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Commerce/sales | 10 | 8 | 4 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Installation, maintenance and repair | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 |
| Transportation and warehousing | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | * | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
other than children or spouse living in the United States. Of those who had been in the United States six to ten years, more than half (52%) had no photo ID issued by a U.S. government agency, and 26% of those who had lived in the United States fifteen years or more did not have such an ID.
While 47% of the total group surveyed worked in hospitality, construction, or manufacturing industries, the share varied greatly by the city in which the survey was conducted. The percentage employed in the hospitality industry (hotels, restaurants, and bars) was highest in New York City (26%). Manufacturing claimed the greatest share in Chicago (23%). In Dallas (26%), Raleigh (37%), and Atlanta (26%) the greatest share worked in construction. (See Table 5.8.) Construction workers tended to be male, younger than the average for the survey group, and earned more money. Agricultural workers tended to be older, less educated, and a disproportionate share had lived in the United States more than fifteen years. Only 10% of respondents said they did not work, and these were predominantly females.
Public Agenda, a nonpartisan opinion research organization, also interviewed immigrants for a study released in 2005 (Now That I'm Here: What America's Immigrants Have to Say about Life in the U.S. Today, New York). One section of the study compared Mexican immigrants to immigrants from other countries. Mexican immigrants were almost three times more likely to lack English language skills when they came to the United States (71% compared to 26%); almost four times as likely to lack a high school diploma (35% compared to 9%); more than twice as likely to lack health insurance (40% compared to 17%); and more likely to have an annual household income of $25,000 or less (44% compared to 27%). (See Figure 5.8.)
When Public Agenda asked immigrants what things were better in the United States and what things were better in their home country, Mexican immigrants found the United States better in all categories to a greater degree than immigrants from other countries. Mexican immigrants differed most from all other immigrants on issues of health care and a place to raise children. Just 6% of Mexican immigrants thought their home country was better than the United States at making good health care available, while 22% of other immigrants preferred health care in their home countries. Similarly, 9% of Mexican immigrants thought their home country was a better place to raise children compared to 26% of immigrants from other countries. All immigrants agreed by a strong majority that the United States had a more honest government, a trustworthy legal system, and honored women's rights. (See Figure 5.9.)
DISASTERS CHALLENGED ILLEGAL ALIENS
An estimated five hundred people from ninety-one foreign countries were among the approximately three thousand people who died in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In New York City, some of these were undocumented workers employed in the World Trade Center. From the more than 7,000 claims filed with the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, which was administered by the Department of Justice, about 250 foreigners qualified for compensation, according to reporter Lisa J. Adams ("Kin Struggle for Proof of Foreign 9/11 Victims," Denver Post, September 24, 2004). Administrators estimated that about fifty of the 250 were undocumented. No doubt there were more illegal aliens lost in the disaster for whom no claims were filed. Although fund administrators took great pains to ensure that undocumented immigrants who came forward would not be reported to the INS, many families of illegal aliens decided it was not worth the risk. The stakes were high. The average settlement was about $1.3 million per claim (Kenneth R. Feinberg, Final Report of the Special Master for the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Volume 1, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice).
For families of illegal aliens who did wish to make a claim, seeking compensation or just a death certificate ranges from difficult to impossible. Illegal aliens often use fake names and shared housing so they have no rent receipts or utility bills in their names. Many work in jobs where they are paid in cash. Without a paycheck stub, Social Security number, tax records, money transfer receipts, or an employer who would verify the deceased as an employee, grieving families were unable to prove that their relatives were at the World Trade Center at the time of the terrorist attacks.
U.S. authorities required little more than a photo of the victim in his/her former New York workplace to issue a death certificate for missing immigrants. Yet, of approximately sixteen undocumented Mexican victims, only five families were able to prove the person died in the 9/11 attacks and qualify for compensation.
When hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne pounded the state of Florida in August and September 2004, thousands of people were left with damaged or destroyed homes. Power was out for weeks in some areas. Businesses, too, were damaged or destroyed, leaving employees with no paychecks. Among the victims were many foreign-born families, both legal and illegal, who formed the backbone of Florida's agriculture, construction, and service industries. Rob Williams of Florida Legal Services' Migrant Farmworker Justice Program estimated there were some 300,000 migrant agriculture workers in the state who lost $40 million in wages due to destroyed crops. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided a variety of financial aid to individuals and communities impacted by the disaster. Sandra Hernandez, reporting for the Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel ("Change in Law Hurting the Needy," October 8, 2004), noted that 1996 welfare reforms prohibited FEMA from providing cash assistance, including loans to rebuild homes and money to recoup lost wages, to "nonqualified" immigrants. This included undocumented workers and some legal immigrants such as asylum applicants or people with temporary protected status. Undocumented residents with children born in the United States could apply for FEMA benefits in the child's name. However, many were afraid to identify themselves to a government agency. The "nonqualified" immigrants were then left to voluntary agencies that provided assistance such as water, food, and temporary shelter, but little financial aid in the midst of life-altering disaster.
