Fair Labor Standards Act

Federal legislation enacted in 1938 by Congress, pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause, that mandated a minimum wage and forty-hour work week for employees of those businesses engaged in interstate commerce.

IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq., was passed in 1938, giving U.S. hourly workers a 40-hour workweek (unless the workers gets overtime pay) and setting a minimum wage. However, FLSA does not define "work" or "workweek," which has pushed definitional questions into the judicial system. A series of Supreme Court decisions in the 1940s that were favorable to employees caused Congress to pass the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 252(a), a 1949 amendment to FLSA. This act narrowed FLSA coverage by treating two activities as not compensable: walking on the employer's premises to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity of the employees, and activities that are "preliminary or postliminary" to that principal activity. Despite Department of Labor regulations on when the workday starts and ends, there have been controversies about whether the time it takes for workers to put on and take off special work gear, and to walk to and from the changing room is compensable work time. The U.S. SUPREME COURT, in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, ___ U.S.___, 126 S.Ct. 514, 163 L.Ed.2d 288 (2005), resolved most of these matters in favor of employees.

The case consolidated two disputes from Washington state and Maine. In the Washington case, a group of workers at an IBP, Inc. meat-packing plant filed a class action lawsuit. Production workers are required to wear hard-hats, hairnets, ear plugs, gloves, sleeve, aprons, leggings, and boots. Those workers who use knives must also wear heavier gear, including chain link metal aprons and plexiglass arm-guards. These workers were "on the clock" when the first piece of meat processed and the compensable workday ended with the last piece of meat processed. In 1998 the company began paying the workers an extra four minutes for clothes-changing time but the workers' lawsuit asked for additional pay for the time spent putting on and removing protective gear and walking between the locker room to the production floor before and after each shift. The Maine case involved a class action lawsuit by workers at a poultry processing plant operated by Barber Foods, Inc. These meat processing workers also wore heavy protective gear and were not paid for the time it took to put on and remove the gear. They also wanted to be paid for the time spent waiting to don and doff the protective gear.

The Washington federal district court ruled in favor of the IBP employees, finding that the donning and doffing of protective gear for these particular jobs were compensable under FLSA because they were "integral and indispensable to the work of the employees who wore such equipment." In addition, the time spent walking between the locker room and the production was also compensable because it occurred during the workday. Based on these conclusions the judge ruled that workers who used knives were entitled to pay for between 12 and 14 minutes of work, including about 4 minutes of walking time. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's ruling but employed different reasoning. The appeals court distinguished between workers who donned hardhats and safety goggles, who were not entitled to additional work time and pay, with the IBP workers who were required to wear elaborate and burdensome gear.

In the Maine lawsuit, the federal district court ruled that workers were entitled to be compensated for the time spent donning and doffing protective gear but not for the time walking to and from the production floor. In addition, the court ruled against the employees' request that they be paid for the time they spent waiting to pick up their gear and equipment at the beginning of their workday. The First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the consolidated case to resolve this split in the circuits.

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, upheld the Ninth Circuit's decision. However, the Court agreed with the First Circuit that the waiting time for picking up protective gear at the beginning of a shift was not compensable. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the Court, reviewed the history of the statutes, regulations, and court rulings that dealt with defining work and the parameters of the workday. A 1955 Supreme Court decision had ruled in favor of workers at a battery plant who had to change clothes and shower because of their work with caustic and toxic materials. The Court found that the employees had a right to be paid for the time it took to change clothes at the beginning and end of the shift, and for the time it took to clean up. The key to the decision was language in the Portal-to-Portal Act that principal work activities include all activities which are an "integral and indispensable part of the principal activities."

Justice Stevens concluded that the donning and doffing of protective gear in both plants were an integral and indispensable part of the work of meat processing. These activities signaled the start and end of the workday. Therefore, walking to and from the production was compensable time as well. As to the First Circuit ruling that waiting time was not compensable, Justice Stevens concurred. Under FLSA, waiting for the issuance of protective gear was a "preliminary" rather than a "principal" activity and should not be counted as part of the workday. Stevens noted that walking from the time clock near the factory entrance to a workstation was necessary for employees to begin work but the Portal-to-Portal Act ruled that it was not com-pensable under the FLSA. Therefore, the waiting in this case was "two steps removed from the productive activity on the assembly line" and was not integral and indispensable to a principal activity.