PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS, UNITED STATES

In both World Wars, despite questions about the validity of the respective Hague (1907) and Geneva (1929) Conventions, the United States generally treated prisoners of war according to the standards set by these agreements. Although the same issues of prisoner treatment occurred in both wars, the vastly expanded scale of the POW system in World War II left a much greater impact on the American war experience than had World War I.

world war i

When the United States entered World War I, officials disagreed as to whether the Army should house captured soldiers within America itself. Many advocated the plan as a way to offset labor shortages and assure the protection of returning troop ships from submarines. However, General Pershing's appeal to the government to fill labor shortages in France and Belgium persuaded the Army to keep captured German soldiers in Europe. By November 1918, about 48,000 German soldiers were in the custody of the American Expeditionary Force.

Although captured soldiers remained in Europe, the Army did hold approximately 6,000 naval prisoners, merchant seamen, and civilian internees at four locations within the United States: Forts Oglethorpe and McPherson in Georgia, Fort Douglas in Utah, and in Hot Springs, North Carolina. Of the 6,000 detainees, only 1,346 naval prisoners could be utilized for work not related to their own care, in accordance with the Hague Convention. Officials initially refused requests to employ prisoners outside the camps, but by the end of the war German POWs were working for government organizations such as the Forestry Service and the Department of Agriculture. Limited employment by private individuals and firms also took place, but prisoners' small numbers prevented the formation of any widespread programs.

world war ii

American entry into World War II necessitated a rapid expansion of the previous war's system. The Provost Marshal General (PMG), now responsible for enemy prisoners, decided to transport them to the United States to prevent escapes and to keep them out of harm's way. Following the transfer of 50,000 German POWs from the British in September 1942, the PMG secured the use of Civilian Conservation Corps camps to house the first arrivals, and continued constructing camps throughout the war. By mid-1945, the American POW camp system consisted of 155 base camps in 44 states, Alaska, and Hawaii. At its height, the system held 371,683 German, 50,571 Italian, and 5,413 Japanese POWs.

According to the 1929 Geneva Convention, American camp officials could require enlisted prisoners to work, if the work was not dangerous and did not directly aid the military. Officer POWs received monthly pay and were not required to work, while NCOs could only work as supervisors. As in World War I, enemy prisoners worked for the government, but they also worked for private employers on a larger scale, primarily in the agricultural and lumber industries. The generally amiable relationship between POW laborers and their employers was the most common form of contact between prisoners and the public, and it undoubtedly contributed to the labor program's success. By the end of the war, the prisoners contributed an estimated 34,219,185 man-days of labor to the American economy.

In addition to working, prisoners formed sports teams, created artwork, published newspapers, read, watched films, and attended classes. In German camps, educational systems incorporated the "reeducation" program of the Special Projects Division (SPD), whose goal was to present prisoners with a positive view of democracy. The project's leadership, which included a number of German POWs, conducted surveys, distributed films, and produced a pro-democracy newspaper, Der Ruf. The project's overall effectiveness was questionable, however, because the German intellectuals in the program were generally unrepresentative of the general prisoner population.

Most Americans' only knowledge of the POW camps came from news bulletins about short-lived escape attempts. Towards the end of the war, however, news of poor conditions for American POWs in Germany caused many to question the American system's lax treatment of Germans, and African-American communities resented the preferential treatment given to prisoners in stores and on public transportation. In November 1944, a growing wave of resentment convinced the House Military Affairs Committee to investigate whether German POWs were living too comfortably. The Committee concluded that the American camp system adhered to the Geneva Convention, and that most complaints about excessive comforts were based on hearsay. Government officials declared their intention to adhere to the Convention regardless of conditions in Germany, emphasizing the value of humane treatment in convincing more Axis troops to surrender.

Shortly after the Italian capitulation in September 1943, the U.S. government declared Italian prisoners to be "co-belligerents" and kept only the most ardent fascists under strict confinement. The others received great freedom, including permission to interact with Italian-American communities. Many joined Italian Service Units, which performed labor roles for the American military. The increasing visibility of Italian prisoners fostered indignation among some Americans, including soldiers who resented interactions between Italians and American women. In response, the government reminded the public of the prisoners' "co-belligerent" status, while simultaneously reducing the extent of Italians' contact with the public.

Ideological and racial differences complicated the American relationships with Japanese POWs. Captures were less frequent in the Pacific, as many Japanese soldiers fought to the death, committed suicide, or were killed by their captors. Once in American camps, however, the Japanese received treatment on par with that of other prisoners. Contact with the public was much more limited for Japanese prisoners, because of smaller numbers, and presumably because of greater public hostility towards all Japanese individuals, as seen in the demand for internment of Japanese-Americans.

postwar

After the war, although many POWs wanted to stay, the U.S. government made repatriation mandatory. There were several delays in their departure, however, because of the persistent labor shortage. After several extensions of POW labor contracts, President Truman eventually set a deadline of June 1946 for the removal of all prisoners from the United States. The Allies utilized many prisoners for reconstruction in Western Europe, but protests among the public and the POWs brought about the American withdrawal from the program in early 1947.

The most important effect of the POW program in the Second World War was the ability of American civilians to come face-to-face with enemy soldiers. Although a number of Americans protested the prisoners' general level of comfort, those who dealt directly with German laborers or Italian "co-belligerents" usually gained a favorable impression of these "enemies." Likewise, German and Italian prisoners tended to have positive memories of their experiences, as is evident in the fact that many returned to live in the United States after the war.

bibliography

Keefer, Louis E. Italian Prisoners of War in America, 1942–1946: Captives or Allies? New York: Praeger, 1992.

Krammer, Arnold. Nazi Prisoners of War in America. New York: Stein and Day, 1979.

Lewis, George, and Mewha, John. History of Prisoner of War Utilization by the United States Army, 1776–1945. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army Pamphlet 20–213, June 1955.

Mackenzie, S.P. "The Treatment of Prisoners of War in World War II." The Journal of Modern History 66:3 (September 1994), 487–520.

Robin, Ron. The Barbed Wire College: Reeducating German POWs in the United States During World War II. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Gregory Kupsky

See also:Enemy, Images of.