TRW Inc.

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TRW Inc.

1900 Richmond Road
Cleveland, Ohio 44124
U.S.A.

Public Company
Incorporated: 1901 as Thompson Products Co.
Employees: 93,186
Sales: $6.036 billion
Market Value: $2.957 billion
Stock Index: New York

The merging of one of the world’s largest auto parts makers and one of the world’s leaders in aerospace technology might seem an unlikely combination. But for TRW that mix of the mundane with the high-tech has proven the path to success. The company has achieved the kind of prosperous, stable business that has eluded other conglomerates.

TRW’s conglomerate structure is deeply rooted in the company’s history. In the early 1950’s the Cleveland-based Thompson Products was looking for an acquisition. J. David Wright, the company’s general manager, and Horace Shepard, a vice president, thought the auto valve and steering component maker needed more technical sophistication. Thompson, founded in 1901, had made a name for itself in automotive and aircraft engine parts and had become well known by sponsoring the famed Thompson Trophy Race, aeronautical equivalent of auto racing’s Indianapolis 500. But in recent years the company was facing a decline in manned aircraft and saw opportunities in aerospace and electronics.

To break into the young high-tech industry, Wright and Shepard tried to buy Hughes Aircraft Co. Hughes was willing to listen to bids but scoffed at the Thompson offer, which was thought to be ten times too low.

Just a few months later, two of Hughes Aircraft’s top scientist-executives, Simon Ramo and Dean Woolridge, decided to leave Hughes to form a new electronic systems company, and Thompson put up $500,000 to bankroll the venture. Not long afterward, Ramo-Woolridge Corporation was established in Los Angeles and quickly gained solid standing in the advanced technology business, being awarded the systems engineering and technical direction contracts for such important missile programs as Atlas, Minuteman, Titan, and Thor.

By 1958 Thompson Products had invested $20 million –20% of its net worth at the time—for a 49% interest in Ramo-Woolridge, and the two operations were merged as ThompsonRamo-Woolridge. Though united on paper, the company maintained separate corporate headquarters, with Woolridge president in Los Angeles and Wright chairman in Cleveland. Ramo and Shepard, a former chief of production procurement for the Air Force, also had an active role in management.

Merger could hardly have started less auspiciously. In the midst of a recession, the Cleveland-based group was hit with a 14% drop in automotive business and a 34% drop in manned aircraft business. When business improved for the Cleveland division, LA got into trouble. Its venture into semiconductors collapsed in 1961, and the McNamara era was beginning at the Pentagon.

The West coast scientists who had only known costplus-fixed-fee contracts needed help. They had to learn how to go from spending money to making it. This education was hampered by hard feelings between the two groups. The electronics end wasn’t living up to its promise of being the business of the future. In first four years following merger, profit margins that had been at the 4%-plus level in the mid-1950’s dropped to an average of barely 2%.

With the company facing such mundane tasks as costcutting, Woolridge, who reportedly never really wanted to be a businessman anyway, resigned in 1962. As Woolridge was getting settled in at his new job as a professor at Caltech, Shepard was promoted to president and Ramo named vice-chairman. With Cleveland now in control of the company, the LA scientists were quickly reassured when the new management team instituted a number of reforms to get the company back on its feet, including writing off $3 million in inventory.

In 1963, Shepard and Wright began pruning unprofitable divisions. They sold most of the unprofitable Bumkor-Ramo computer division to Martin Marietta. The company retained partial ownership in Bumkor-Ramo but no longer played a large role in the company’s plans. Shepard and Wright continued hammering out the company’s plans for long-term growth, seeking specifically to raise profit margins. To this end, in 1964 they sold the microwave division and the division which made hi-fidelity components, intercoms, and language laboratories.

To shore up the company’s auto parts division, they bought Ross Gear & Tool, a maker of mechanical and power steering units, and Marlin-Rockwell, a ball bearings manufacturer. The 7% profit margin of the new acquisitions, which had combined profit of $5.7 million on sales of $76.5 million, helped boost TRW’s overall margin to 4% in 1964, up a percentage point from the year earlier.

In 1965, in another look toward the future, Thompson-Ramo-Woolridge adopted a shorter, less cumbersome name, the now household initials TRW. Also that year the company’s investment in aerospace and electronics was becoming increasingly clear. In the previous decade, sales in space and electronics shot up from $14 million to $200 million. But despite that dramatic growth, the company’s earnings still came mostly from its oldest business, autoparts. New and replacement parts accounted for 34% of TRW’s $553 million in sales and 40% of its earnings. Chief among those products were its steering linkages, valves, and braking devices that it sells to GM, Ford, and Chrysler.

Things improved for TRW in 1966. An auto parts boom was helping the company’s profitability. The Clevelandbased automotive group had a return of 6% on sales of $350 million. The equipment group, also in Cleveland, had an increase of sales to $200 million in aerospace and ordinance technology but lower profit margins because of start-up costs for unexpected demand in commercial aircraft. The Los Angeles-based TRW System had $250 million in sales and a 3% profit margin building and designing spacecraft and doing research. Totals were up to $870 million in sales for TRW, producing $36 million in profit for 4.2% return. Even with the upturn in sales, the company was relying less on government contracts, down to about 44% from 70% ten years earlier.

With the company’s financial picture on the upturn, the wrangling between Los Angeles and Cleveland declined. As Business Week reported, the discord was “under control, if not cured.”

The company continued its tightening of operations in 1966. It bought United Car with $122 million in sales and sold its one consumer business, a hi-fi manufacturer.

Nevertheless, TRW had grown into a conglomerate, a term disliked by company management. In 1969 TRW operated six groups that, in turn, administered 55 divisions. The company derived 32% of its revenues from aerospace products and systems and computer software, 28% from vehicle components for autos and trucks, 23% from electronic components and communication, and 17% from industrial products ranging from mechnical fasteners to automated controls.

To manage the increasingly far-flung company, TRW maintained strict management control over all operations. By encouraging communication between all levels of management and holding monthly manager meetings, TRW avoided the problems that had plagued Gulf & Western, which had grown into a rambling giant.

Another of TRW’s successful management styles caught Fortune’s eye in 1966. The magazine covered in depth the happenings of a TRW management meeting in Vermont, where 49 of the company’s top executives had gathered annually since 1952 at an old farmhouse to think about the company’s future.

The next year TRW continued beefing up its auto parts business, acquiring Globe Industries, a Dayton-based maker of miniature AC and DC electric motors. At the same time, TRW’s electronics group had grown to more than 20 plants in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. The company continued to evade problems that had plagued other conglomerates, posting a slight pre-tax gain of 16.4%, above the industry average of 13.3%.

1969 saw the naming of a new president of TRW, Ruben F. Mettler. One of his first big projects was a contract for a laboratory that NASA would send on the Viking probe to Mars. TRW won the challenge to provide one black box weighing 33 pounds with complex instruments capable of making biological and chemical tests to detect the most primitive forms of life. The NASA contract was only worth $50 million, not a big financial risk for a multibillion dollar company like TRW, but the job was important for the company’s prestige.

The auto parts business, in the meantime, was once again proving to be immune to cyclical trends in car output. The market for new parts was in a slump, but it was made up for by the accompanying increase in demand for replacement cars as consumers kept their cars on the roads longer. TRW also announced a move into business credit reporting, challenging Dun and Bradstreet.

The company’s sound financial condition was unmistakable. For the five years preceding 1970, the company had average earning jumps of 27% annually and an average of 23% increase annually in sales. But company officials conceded that the company couldn’t keep growing at that rate forever. It had acquired 38 companies through 1968, a pace it wouldn’t be able to maintain indefinitely. The company looked for future growth to run about 10%.

The company’s skillful management again became apparent in 1971, when TRW was forced to make cuts because of aerospace recession. Its TRW Systems division had to cut the number of employees by 15%. Managers were not spared cuts either; 18% of the professional staff was laid off. The company’s open management style enabled TRW to build a strong enough relationship with its employees that two-thirds of them were non-union, perhaps preventing labor squabbles that had appeared in other companies.

TRW made a risky venture in 1976, entering the tricky market of electronic point-of-sale machines. Those machines had boosted profits for retailers, but not for manufacturers. Its proposed 2001 system aimed at the general market and cost $4,000 per unit, similar to competitors. TRW’s move into POS’s was largely a defensive tactic. The electronic credit authorization business it had pioneered in the 1960’s was coming under increasing competition. Then NCR, the overall leader in POS machines, launched a POS system incorporating credit checking in 1975. TRW attempted to enter the market with an established customer base by acquiring the service contracts for the 65,000 customers Singer had built up during its short, ill-fated move into the POS market. TRW remained cautious, however, only delivering 200 to 300 machines in 1976, mostly to the May Co. Altogether that year non-food retailers ordered 24,500 POS terminals worth $94 million, and the market was picking up.

In 1976 TRW achieved the moment of glory it had long awaited with Viking’s historic landing on Mars. The company took out full-page newspaper ads proclaiming “That lab is our baby.” Appropriately, Mettler, 52, who had pushed for TRW to compete for the Viking contract, was named to succeed Horace A. Shepard as chairman and chief executive officer when Shepard retired the next year.

Aerospace ventures continued to play an important role in the company’s finances. In 1977 TRW was still the chief engineer for U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles. Aerospace and government electronic revenues were providing a cool $60 million in profits on revenue of $440 million. The electronics division had $300 million in sales. The data communications unit was also doing well with over $150 million in sales. It had established a retail credit bureau, a business credit system, and was an international maker of data equipment. But auto and commercial parts were still accounting for twice as much in sales and five times as much in earnings.

In 1980 TRW and Fujitsu Ltd., Japan’s largest computer maker, formed a joint venture that aimed to grab a large share of the U.S. market. TRW had a 3,000 person service organization, reportedly the largest independent network in the U.S. for data process maintenance, with a special team to develop software. Each company invested $100 million, with Fujitsu keeping a 51% share and TRW 45%. TRW initiated the venture, seeking a foreign partner to perform maintenance work for its POS’s. Fujitsu, which gets 68% of its revenue from data processing, was eager to expand overseas to increase its economy of scale to compete with IBM back home. Fujitsu named a majority of the directors of the new company so it could qualify for Japanese export and financing tax breaks. But TRW took charge of running it. One of new company’s first moves was to buy TRW’s ailing POS and ATM maker division. The company, hoping in the beginning to capture a large segment of the small and medium size computer market, predicted sales of $500 million to $1 billion by the decade’s end.

Despite TRW’s careful planning, the POS and Fujitsu deals both proved unsuccessful. The competition from established POS makers, particularly IBM and NCR, was too great. Nonetheless, TRW remained a strong, highly visible company. Forbes in 1983 called it “a paragon” for other conglomerates. It had by then grown to $5 billion in sales spread across 47 different businesses, and had 300 locations in 25 countries. It had also grown to be the number one producer of valves for automobiles and aircraft plus a wide range of other products. With a 16% return on stockholders’ equity as proof, Forbes called TRW one of the best managed, most successful American companies. The company has had only four chief executive officers in fifty years.

In 1985 TRW reaffirmed its allegiance to its oldest division by completing two joint overseas operations in auto parts. One was in South Korea and one in Malaysia, both to produce steering and suspension components.

TRW’s highly defined business strategy and excellent management have earned it the reputation for being the best run of the conglomerates. If the company continues its past tradition, and there are no signs to the contrary, TRW should strengthen its already considerable position in aerospace research and technology and the automotive and commercial parts industry.

Principal Subsidiaries

ESL Inc.; TRW Automotive Products Inc.; TRW International Finance Corp.; SMP Inc.; TRW Electronic Products Inc.; TRW International Sales Corp. The company also lists subsidiaries in the following countries: Brazil, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and West Germany.

Further Reading

The Little Brown Hen That Could: The Growth Story of TRW Inc. by Ruben F. Mettler, New York, Newcomen Society, 1982.

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