International Organization

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International Organization

I. THE PROCESS AND THE INSTITUTIONInis L. Claude, Jr.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

II. ADMINISTRATION FINANCINGWalter R. Sharp

BIBLIOGRAPHY

III. FINANCINGRowland Egger

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. THE PROCESS AND THE INSTITUTION

International organization is the process by which states establish and develop formal, continuing institutional structures for the conduct of certain aspects of their relationships with each other. It represents a reaction to the extreme decentralization of the traditional system of international relations and an effort by statesmen to adapt the mechanics of that system to the requirements posed by the constantly increasing complexity of the interdependence of states. Particular international organizations may be regarded as manifestations of the organizing process on the international level.

The history of international organization

The process of international organization had its origins in the nineteenth century, largely in Europe. Innovations associated with the rise of industrialism and the introduction of new methods of transport and communication stimulated the creation of special-purpose agencies, usually called public international unions, designed to facilitate the collaboration of governments in dealing with economic, social, and technical problems. Notable among these were the International Telegraphic Union (1865) and the Universal Postal Union (1874), which survived to become specialized agencies of the United Nations system (the former under the title International Telecommunication Union) after World War II. In the political field, an effort to institutionalize the dominant role of the great powers of Europe was undertaken at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. While the resultant Concert of Europe did not assume the character of a standing political organization, the same pattern functioned until World War I as the framework for a system of occasional great-power conferences which lent some substance to the idea that the European family of states constituted an organized entity. This concept was broadened by the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, which admitted small states as well as great powers, and extra-European as well as European states, to participation in collective political deliberations. Near the end of the nineteenth century, the establishment of the Pan American Union and the initiation of a series of inter-American conferences reinforced the Monroe Doctrine and Simón Bolívar’s pronouncements by giving institutional expression to the idea that the states of the Western Hemisphere constituted a distinct subgroup within the larger multi-state system.

These nineteenth-century beginnings provided, in large measure, the basis for the phenomenal development of international organization since World War I. Certain distinctions which emerged during this period—between political and nonpolitical agencies, between the status of great powers and that of small states, between regional and geographically undefined organizations—were to prove significant in the later course of international organization. Basic patterns of institutional structure and procedure were evolved. The trend toward broadening the conception of international organization to include entities beyond the confines of the European state system was initiated. Most importantly, the dual motivations of international institution building—(a) the urge to promote coordinated responses by states to the problems of peaceful intercourse in an era of growing economic, social, and technical interdependence, and(b)the recognition of the necessity for moderating conflict in the political and military spheres—became operative in this period.

The establishment of the League of Nations and its affiliate, the International Labour Organisation, at the end of World War I represented the first attempt to combine into one general organization the disparate elements of organizational development which had emerged during the previous century. The League was the first general international organization in several senses: (a) it pulled together the threads of the great-power council, the general conference of statesmen, and the technically oriented international bureau; (b) it was a multipurpose organization, although its primary focus was onthe political and security problems of war and peace; and (c) it was, in principle, a world-wide institution, even though it retained much of the nineteenth-century emphasis upon the centrality of Europe in international affairs.

After World War ii, the League was superseded by the United Nations, a general organization which derived its major features from the nineteenth-century heritage and the lessons of experience, both positive and negative, provided by the League. The United Nations was conceived as the central component of a varied and decentralized system of international institutions that would include both autonomous specialized agencies, following the pattern first set by the public international unions, and such regional organizations as existed or might be created by limited groups of states. The organizational design formulated in the United Nations Charter called for the active coordination of the work of the specialized agencies by the central institution, primarily through the agency of its Economic and Social Council, and the utilization and control of regional agencies, largely through the Security Council.

In actuality, the organizational system of the post-World War II era has involved the operation of approximately a dozen specialized agencies, many of them newly created, coordinated with varying degrees of effectiveness by the United Nations. The post-1945 system has also involved the proliferation of regional organizations of every sort, most of them functioning quite independently, without any genuine tie to the central organization. The term “United Nations system” may, therefore, properly be used to refer to the United Nations and the specialized agencies, but it does not embrace the considerable number of regional organizations which have developed independently.

The total network of international institutions also comprises more than one hundred intergovernmental agencies outside the scope of the United Nations system, dealing with a vast range of problems and providing a variety of mechanisms for the conduct of relations among states. These are supplemented by approximately 1,500 nongovern-mental organizations which promote international consultation and activity in specialized fields at the unofficial level (Yearbook of International Organizations 1962-1963).

The conceptual basis

The conception of international relations underlying international organization is frequently described as idealistic, in the sense that it minimizes the element of conflict and emphasizes the potentialities of harmony and cooperation in the relationships of states. International organizations are characterized, by supporters and critics alike, as arrangements for cooperation among states. Most accurately, international organization can be said to rest upon a dualistic conception of international relations, one which acknowledges both conflictual and cooperative relationships as basic features of the multistate system. In principle, international organization represents an attempt to minimize conflict and maximize collaboration among participating states, treating conflict as an evil to be controlled and cooperation as a good to be promoted. In these terms, international organization both denies the inevitability of war and other manifestations of hostility among nations and expresses a commitment to the harmonization of international relations.

In fact, a more sophisticated analysis of international organization reveals a much more complex approach to the conflictual and cooperative aspects of international affairs than that described above. Some international agencies are primarily concerned with problems of conflict, while others emphasize the promotion of collaboration: within the United Nations, for instance, the Security Council is illustrative of the former type and the Economic and Social Council of the latter. Moreover, conflicting interests of states intrude upon programs of cooperation, making it necessary for cooperation-oriented agencies to deal with problems of conflict, and the common interests of states provide the means by which conflict-oriented agencies undertake to cope with tendencies toward international disorder. Thus, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a regional agency inspired by the East–West conflict after World War II, but it relies upon cooperation among its members to enable it to meet the dangers posed by that conflict. Similarly, the concept of collective security envisages cooperative action by most members of a general international organization as the essential means for deterring or defeating aggression.

It is significant that both the League of Nations and the United Nations were established in the aftermath of major world wars and were conceived primarily as means for preventing the recurrence of such catastrophic struggles; the Charter of the United Nations begins with the expression of de-termination “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.” General inter-national organization in the twentieth century is a reaction to the grim reality of violent conflict among states and a response to the danger of future conflict. In the United Nations system, preoccupation with the conflictual aspect of international relations is so great that the official ideology requires the formal justification of virtually every cooperative project, however useful it may promise to be in itself, in terms of its putative contribution to the avoidance of war. Article 55 of the United Nations Charter calls for collaborative activity in the economic, social, health, cultural, educational, and human rights fields, “with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations. . . .” Article 76 lists as the first objective of the United Nations trusteeship system the furtherance of international peace and security Moreover, the functional theory of international organization, which explicitly stresses the development of agencies devoted to cooperative solution of problems in the economic and social realm, is ultimately concerned with the issue of political and military struggle; functionalism treats the promotion of welfare as an indirect approach to the prevention of warfare [seeInternational integration, article onfunctionalism and functional integration]. On the whole, international organization has reflected greater concern with the probability of conflict than with the possibility of cooperation.

In the final analysis, governmental leaders of member states impose their conceptions of international relations upon international organization and determine the ends toward which and the means by which international agencies operate. While international institutions tend to some limited degree to develop corporate viewpoints and purposes, usually through professional staff members who identify themselves with the organizations which they serve, these institutions are essentially instruments of their member states. Hence, international organization reflects the variety of viewpoints and purposes which prevails among governments. In the United Nations, a fundamental issue is whether the world organization should serve primarily as a battlefield or a peace conference, an arena for conflict or a chamber for the settlement of disputes. Some statesmen are primarily interested in the waging of political battles and others concentrate more on the mitigation of conflict. Moreover, some leaders give priority to the stimulation of effective international cooperation and treat the organization as a workshop for economic and social collaboration rather than as an agency concerned with conflict. Whether the United Nations emphasizes the conflictual or the cooperative aspects of international relations is determined less by the formal statement of the organization’s nature and purpose contained in its charter than by the day-to-day outcome of the political process of the organization, in which members vie with each other for control over the utilization of its mechanism. International organization does not introduce a distinctive conception of international relations but gives expression to whatever viewpoints may be dominant in the international political arena.

This analysis indicates that international organization is essentially a process of developing a new structural and procedural framework for the interplay of national governments within the context of the multistate system. It represents an attempt by statesmen to improve the operation of that system by enhancing the institutional equipment available for the conduct of relations among states and by promoting the general acceptance of standards of state behavior compatible with the minimum requirements of an orderly system. Insofar as international organization represents a reformist movement within the multistate system, it expresses the awareness of national leaders that international order is requisite to the promotion and protection of the most basic interests of their states. The quest for order through international organization does not involve repudiation of national interests or subordination of national interests to an overriding internationalism, but at most it involves the redefinition of national interests in conformity with the demands of increasing interdependence and the commitment of statesmen to the pursuit of those interests within the revised framework provided by international organization. It should occasion no surprise that governments undertake to use international agencies as instruments of their national policies. Such agencies are created and maintained by governments for instrumental purposes, and their usefulness depends upon the disposition of statesmen to resort to them for the promotion of values deemed compatible with national interests. International organization reflects the view that world order is not more importantthannational interests, but that it is important to national interests [seeSystems analysis, article oninternational systems].

The character of international organization

Internationalism

In keeping with this emphasis upon the national values of member states, international organizations have generally functioned as loose associations, heavily dependent upon the voluntary acceptance by states of the obligations of membership, upon the development of consensus among governments as to programs and policies, and upon techniques of persuasion and political influence rather than command and coercion. In limited areas, international agencies have been endowed with legislative authority and enforcement procedures, but their capacity to function is based essentially upon processes of political accommodation. Usefulness to states, not power over states, is the secret of such strength as an international institution may acquire or possess.

The symbol of the dependence of international organization upon the will of states is theveto—the formally acknowledged competence of a state to frustrate majority decision and block action deemed incompatible with its interests. This constitutional capacity has been progressively relinquished by states, in favor of decision making by simpler or qualified majorities. In the United Nations, this trend has reached the point of confining the veto power to the Security Council, within which only the five major powers holding permanent seats are authorized to veto certain decisions of a nonprocedural character. Even this limited veto power has been eroded in practice, so that its negative effect upon majority will is seldom definitive. Despite this apparent diminution of the veto in international institutions, individual states—particularly the major powers—retain a basic capacity, grounded in political reality more than in constitutional documents, to inhibit the effective functioning of international agencies. If the concept of the veto is broadened beyond the negative vote to include all available manifestations of nonsupport and opposition, it becomes clear that all international agencies, regardless of their constitutional provisions, are ultimately dependent upon the capacity to promote substantial consensus among their members. Indeed, the veto rule is, in positive terms, the rule of unanimity; the latter suggests the fundamentally consensual character of international institutions.

While international organization has sometimes been criticized as involving too radical and idealistic a transformation of international relations, the tendency since World War II has been to compare it unfavorably with a hypothetical world government. Noting the limited capabilities of international agencies for controlling the behavior of states, advocates of world government have insisted that nothing short of the replacement of the multistate system by a global federation, involving the creation of a central institution endowed with authoritative and coercive powers comparable to those of national governments, will suffice to prevent catastrophic war. This point of view has gained widespread acceptance, with the result that the observation that “the United Nations is not, of course, a world government” has become a standard introduction to discussions of the inadequacy of international organization. Critical evaluation of international institutions has tended to measure them against the standard of governmental institutions and to attribute significant value to them only to the degree that they conform to that standard.

Supranationalism

From the point of view of approaching world government, the high point in the evolution of international organization since World War II is the development of the European Community, which began with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, and subsequently expanded its functional scope with the establishment of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community by the same group of states. Certain features of these institutions, including the conferment of significant policy-making and executive authority upon commissions composed of members acting independently of their governments on behalf of the community as a whole, and the capacity of community organs to deal directly and authoritatively with individuals and business enterprises within member states, have led to their characterization as supranational agencies.

The concept of supranationalism has not been precisely defined, but it is clearly intended to designate governmentlike qualities. Supranational institutions are regarded as falling between the poles of federal government and international organization and are defined in terms of their approximation of the former and their deviation from the latter. The adoption of this new designation for the institutions of the European Community suggests a difference in kind from conventional international organizations. The crucial differentiation implied in the concept of supranationalism concerns the relationship between a supranational agency and the governments of member states. In contrast to an international organization, a supranational body is thought to be superior to its member states and relatively independent of their consent and support in its operations. Supranationalism, in short, symbolizes the proposition that certain international organizations have achieved substantial emancipation from the control of national governments and acquired an autonomous role in international affairs [seeInternational integration, article onglobal integration].

The institutions of the European Community have developed remarkable innovations in international organization, and they show promise of leading toward the development of a full-fledged federal arrangement among their member states. Nevertheless, it appears that the quality of supranationalism is not so meaningful in practice as it is impressive in theory. The achievements of the Community have depended upon the successful development of consensus among the governments of member states, not upon the evasion of the necessity for such consensus; the effectiveness of the institutions has rested not upon the elimination of the veto in theory but upon the achievement of unanimity in practice. The evidence provided by the European experience does not suggest that supranationalism offers international institutions a realistic escape from their dependence upon governments. It does indicate that, under appropriate circumstances, the innovations associated with supranationalism may facilitate the development and implementation of the willingness of governments to move ahead in ambitious programs of common action [seeInternational integration, article onregional integration].

For better or for worse, the development of the United Nations system has not pointed toward the evolution of a global federal system or even toward the quasi-federalism of supranational institutions. The expanding membership of the organization has testified to the proliferation of new states and to the increasing dominance within the United Nations of the view that it should be a universal institution which mirrors the complex realities of the multistate system. This expansion of the organization has completed the process of eliminating the European parochialism of international institutions, making formal acknowledgment of the global character of the international system. The rise to primacy within the United Nations of the General Assembly, the organ in which all member states enjoy equality of formal status and voting capacity, is in part attributable to the fact that this body comprises an unprecedentedly comprehensive collection of spokesmen for the units of the multistate system.

Far from undermining the position of national states as the primary actors on the international scene, international organization since World War II has in fact served to strengthen their position by enhancing their viability and effectiveness. States newly formed from colonial empires have been particularly reliant upon membership in the United Nations to provide symbolic confirmation of their emergence to independent status and to give them a political base for promoting the causes which they deem most essential to the consolidation of their position: the definitive elimination of the colonial system, the concentration of international agencies upon the provision of technical and developmental aid to the economically underdeveloped countries, and the prevention of major war. By providing postindependence assistance of various kinds, a diplomatic training ground, and the institutional context within which new states may individually and collectively bring their influence to bear upon international affairs, the United Nations and its specialized agencies have contributed to the working of the multistate system in the difficult period of the drastic alteration of its dimensions and the intensification of its heterogeneity.

The prevention of war

The multistate system has undergone radical change since World War II, not only in the sense that decolonization has effected the quantitative and qualitative transformation of its membership but also in the sense that a series of revolutions in the technology of military power, combined with a fundamental political and ideological cleavage between the states best equipped to exploit the new technology, has radically altered the problem of security and given new urgency to the prevention of military conflict. Under these circumstances, the crucial test of international organization has to do with its relevance to the task of preventing the destruction of the multistate system.

Collective security

Prior to the era of general international organization, the modern state system relied upon the autonomous manipulation of power relationships by its independent units, both singly and in competitive alliances, for the achievement of the stability of the system and the security of its members. This arrangement, known as the balance-of-power system, was not subjected to attempts at significant revision until the formation of the League of Nations. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 introduced plans for disarmament agreements and institutionalized procedures for pacific settlement of disputes as alternative approaches to peace and security. The founders of the League gave institutional meaning to these approaches by incorporating them in the basic covenant of the new organization. As their major contribution to the restructuring of international relations, they added the concept of collective security [seeCollective security]. In practice, however, members of the League were reluctant to accept the obligations and risks which an operative system of collective security implied for them. Except for a half-hearted and abortive attempt to invoke the scheme in order to frustrate Italian aggression against Ethiopia in 1935, they virtually discarded this approach to the problems of war and peace.

Despite the failure of the League to translate the concept of collective security into a working system, the ideal of establishing such a system caught hold. When statesmen and scholars contemplated the problem of launching a new organizational enterprise after World War II, they appeared almost to take it for granted that a world organization should adopt collective security as the central approach to the maintenance of international peace. The Charter of the United Nations, as formulated at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, endorsed the principle of collective security but repudiated its general applicability by giving the major powers the constitutional power to veto the actions of the Security Council. The formulators of the charter, in fact, rejected the notion that this approach to the ordering of international relations was relevant to the critical problems of war and peace that might arise after World War II. The issue of the feasibility of effectuating collective security against the opposition of a great power has been reopened from time to time, but political realism has prevailed, and instead of expanding the coverage of the coercive system envisaged in the charter, members of the United Nations have in practice abandoned all efforts to establish that system. It is thoroughly in keeping with the history of attitudes toward collective security that the United Nations should have endorsed the principle in general terms, denied the possibility of its application in the most crucial cases, shifted toward the position that the restriction upon its implementation should be lifted, and finally discarded any meaningful commitment to give effect to the concept.

Defensive alliances

In the period since World War II, the struggle between the massive blocs led by the Soviet Union and the United States, commonly designated as the cold war, has stimulated the use of international organizations for purposes quite different from that of implementing collective security. The primary response to the threat of war resulting from the aggressive policy of a great power has been the adaptation of the forms and procedures of international organization to serve the purposes of defensive alliances. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the prime example of the combining of a conventional alliance with the institutional devices developed by the modern process of international organization. The formation of NATO in reaction to the expansionist tendencies of the Soviet Union represented, in fact, the following of the advice implicitly tendered in the United Nations Charter to states confronted with the danger of aggression by a great power; the charter’s renunciation of the intent or expectation that the United Nations should provide security in such a situation is followed, in article 51, by acknowledgment of the propriety of arrangements for collective self-defense. Insofar as international agencies have a realistic role to play in deterring or defeating military ventures by major powers, it is evident that this role devolves upon regional or selective-membership agencies, composed of states perceiving a common threat to their security and resolved to combine their strength in support of a common defensive policy—not upon general organizations such as the United Nations [seeAlliances].

Preventive diplomacy

While the pragmatic division of labor among international institutions assigns the basic function of military defense to agencies of the NATO variety and not to a global organization attempting to effectuate the principle of collective security, this assignment leaves a significant group of functions to the United Nations. From its beginning, this organization has provided a political forum and a setting for diplomacy—public and private, formal and informal—and has exhibited flexibility in the provision of mechanisms and procedures for assisting states to reach agreed settlements of disputes. An essentially new function, albeit an outgrowth of the organization’s development of instrumentalities for pacific settlement, emerged in 1956 with the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and, more definitively, in 1960 with the launching of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). This function was given the title “preventive diplomacy” by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. It deserves to be noted as the major innovation produced by the United Nations in the realm of approaches to the maintenance of peace through the functioning of international agencies. Preventive diplomacy represents the organization’s tentative answer to the question of what major function in the political and security realm it may be able to substitute for the unattainable ideal of providing collective security.

Preventive diplomacy, developed pragmatically in response to the Middle Eastern crisis of 1956 and the Congo crisis of 1960, was ably articulated in theoretical terms by Secretary-General Hammarskjold (Hammarskjold 1960). It involves the intervention of the United Nations in areas of conflict outside of, or peripheral to, the cold war struggle, for the purpose of forestalling the competitive intrusion of the rival power blocs into those areas. As in the cases of UNEF and ONUC, this intervention is carried out by military forces placed at the disposal of and under the direction of the organization by states other than the great powers, and, so far as possible, disassociated from the rival blocs. The mission of the forces, which are dispatched to the scene with the consent of the parties most directly involved, is not to combat an aggressor but to stabilize the local situation so as to prevent the area’s becoming a new zone of cold war competition. A basic requirement of this kind of operation is the consent of the major powers, who, recognizing a common interest in the avoidance of a military showdown, are confident that the United Nations will not favor any one of them in its conduct of the operation. This requirement suggests the fundamental limitations of preventive diplomacy. It is a function which can be carried out by international organization on behalf of competitive great powers only to the extent that political and other circumstances make it acceptable to those powers. Preventive diplomacy is a modest concept in that it assigns international organization only the role of assisting rival powers in the avoidance of unwanted confrontations, not that of exercising coercive control over disturbers of the international peace. Nevertheless, it represents the most significant role presently available to general international organization in the stabilization of an international situation dominated by great-power struggles [seeDiplomacy].

Operationalism and politics

The espousal by the United Nations of the function of preventive diplomacy was only one aspect of a general trend toward the expansion of the operational responsibilities and capabilities of international institutions. The development of the United Nations and its specialized agencies has taken these institutions beyond the minimal function of providing facilities for multilateral diplomatic interchange, to the actual administration of programs and execution of operations in both the economic and the political realms. Many of these programs have been initiated in response to the demand for international assistance to underdeveloped countries in their quest for economic advance. This expansion of the executive function and capacity, in the case of the United Nations in particular, has accompanied the evolution of the secretary-generalship into a post of leadership and policy direction. The status of the secretary-general as a kind of chief executive of the organization has been achieved as the product of a steady evolution, but the precariousness of this result is indicated by the opposition which it has sporadically evoked.

These developments have given rise to controversy over the issue of the political direction and control of the programs sponsored and administered by international agencies. States are not realistically divisible into those which support and those which oppose international organization or those which accept and those which reject the principle of expanding the executive capacity of international agencies. The policies of states with respect to international institutions are dependent upon conceptions of national interests and expectations as to whether or not the activities of those institutions will be compatible with and conducive to the protection and promotion of national interests. In short, states are actually divisible into those which have and those which lack confidence that they and their political allies can exercise effective control over the functioning of particular international agencies or the operation of given programs. No state is committed to the support or the rejection of international operations as a matter of principle, without regard to the nature of their policy direction and control. In the final analysis, member states support or oppose specific international activities in proportion to their success or failure in influencing the nature of the policy which these activities serve.

The struggle of states for control over the policy and activities of the organization has been particularly intense in the United Nations. Such issues as the admission of new members, the integrity of the veto power, the expansion of the realm of competence of the General Assembly, and the financing and general policy direction of the Congo operation have illustrated this point. There has also been a trend toward the organization of member states into distinct blocs and the development of shifting patterns of alignment of states and groups of states in the debates and votes of the General Assembly.

All these developments indicate the emergence of a distinctive and significant political process within the United Nations. This phenomenon is disturbing to idealists who have looked to international organization for the abolition of international politics and the establishment of the rule of law in all its purity on a global scale. From a more realistic point of view, it suggests the coming of age of international organization; the intensity of the political contest is a measure of the significance attached to the institution.

The study of international organization

The development of the politics of international organization as a part of the larger sphere of international politics has been paralleled by the evolution of a political emphasis in the scholarly study of international organization. In its earliest phases, this study was generally characterized by a legal emphasis which was frequently accompanied by a strong value commitment to the amelioration of international politics. Scholarship in this field was largely a quest for structural and legal reforms applicable to the international system. Since World War II, specialists in international organization have tended to be less dominated by aversion to international politics, less oriented toward legal analysis, and more cognizant of the political aspects of the interplay of states within the framework of international agencies. Numerous studies have been made of the policies and attitudes of particular states toward and within the United Nations and other international institutions, and pioneer research has been undertaken on the development of bloc affiliations, voting patterns, and other aspects of the political processes within international agencies.

Research of this type has been largely focused on the United Nations and the regional institutions of western Europe, leaving a need for systematic political analysis of other institutions, global and regional, in order to develop an understanding of the full range of the international organizational system. As researchers provide analyses of the political processes within and the political impacts of an increasing number of international agencies, it may become possible to develop the field of comparative international organization as an area of study which may contribute to an understanding of international politics in the broadest sense.

Trends in international organization research since World War II suggest the possibility that the study of international institutions, of the foreign policies of particular states, and of the international political system as a whole may be integrated in a way conducive to the more sophisticated analysis of the general nature of the interaction of states in a multistate context which is itself undergoing fundamental transformations.

Inis L. Claude, Jr.

[See alsoInternational integration; International law; International politics; Trustee-ship. Guides to other relevant material may be found underInternational relations; War.]

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II. ADMINISTRATION FINANCING

International administration embraces the performance of tasks by the staffs of agencies established by and responsible to a number of national governments. It consists of a body of practices and procedures in part virtually identical with those of public administration at the national level, in part presenting characteristics peculiar to cross-cultural relations. Not a distinct discipline, international administration as a field of study has drawn variously from the materials and techniques of domestic public administration, international law and organization, diplomacy, and comparative politics.

Historical development

International administration is of comparatively recent origin. Its emergence stems partly from the commissions set up in Europe during the nineteenth century to regulate the use of international rivers, such as the Rhine (in 1804), the Danube (in 1856), and, later, others, and partly from various technical bureaus known as public administrative unions, established for informational and coordinative purposes in such areas as postal and telegraph services, patents, copyrights, and public health, from the 1870s onward. Typically, the pattern of these small, functional agencies included a general conference or assembly, a supervisory board or council, and a permanent office, staffed either by personnel on loan from the host government or by direct multinational recruitment. The headquarters of these organizations were all located in Europe, chiefly at Geneva, Berne, and Paris. The only extra-European example, prior to the present century, was the Pan American Union (PAU), created in 1890 in Washington and then known as the Commercial Bureau of the American Republics.

International administration received a major impetus with the establishment in 1920 of the League of Nations and its affiliate, the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The year-round work of the League, as a multipurpose organization with important political functions, was handled by a central secretariat at Geneva—an organ whose personnel reached about 700 at its peak, in the early 1930s. Within its more circumscribed sphere, the ILO developed an office staff of about 600. All told, the administrative bureaucracies of pre-World War II international agencies, including the PAU and various independent technical bureaus, probably did not exceed 1,500 established posts at any given time.

World War II and its aftermath were marked by a striking proliferation of intergovernmental instrumentalities, notably the United Nations (UN) and such related functional agencies as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Concurrently, in 1946 the League of Nations was liquidated, and its assets and certain of its legal responsibilities were transferred to the UN; the ILO survived, under expanded constitutional terms of reference adopted in 1944.

In addition to the foregoing global agencies, a substantial number of new organizations at the regional level came into being in the noncommunist world during the 1940s and 1950s—all with an administrative apparatus of one sort or another. In the collective-defense field these regional institutions include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the Middle East, and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), with headquarters at Bangkok. In western Europe a significant movement toward international “integration,” which began shortly after the close of World War II, led to the creation of (1) the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), succeeded in 1960 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), with the addition of the United States, Canada, and a little later, Japan, as members; (2) the Council of Europe at Strasbourg; and (3) the so-called European communities, consisting of the Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC)—popularly known as the Common Market, and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). These three communities, in contrast to the previously typical pattern of international organization, are characterized by a limited swpranationalism, with authority to control certain aspects of the economic and technical policies of the six member nations (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg—constituting what is often called “Little Europe”), thus giving rise to unprecedented forms of administrative action at the international level.

Dimensions in the 1960s

The functional sweep of international administration in the 1960s, while still restricted in comparison with that of major national bureaucracies, had acquired dimensions far wider than those before World War II. This expansion can be shown quantitatively by com-paring personnel and budgets. For the UN family of agencies, in the fiscal year 1962/1963 the aggregate number of persons on the payroll approximated 20,000 (not counting the uniformed personnel of the “peace-keeping” forces then maintained by the UN in the Middle East and the Congo). This is roughly fifteen times the number employed by the League and ILO a generation earlier. In addition, some 11,000 civilians were employed by the leading regional agencies, distributed as follows: NATO, 2,250; OECD, 1,200; the three European communities, 6,830; PAU, 750. In budgetary terms, the high point of aggregate League and ILO annual expenditure was only about $13 million, whereas the UN system in 1963 spent nearly $500 million. (This sum covers not only “regular” budget activities but various special voluntary programs and the cost of maintaining peace-keeping units in the field.)

Another significant difference between international administration today and prior to World War II resides in the far greater geographical dispersion of the former’s activities. A generation ago nearly all the employees of the League, the ILO, and the PAU were stationed at the central headquarters of their respective organizations; today at least half of the 20,000 civilians working for the UN family of organizations are on field assignments of varying duration, some of them staffing a network of field offices and others participating in field projects of the “technical assistance” variety —virtually throughout the world, except for the Soviet bloc and Communist China. For the two major technical cooperation programs operated by the UN system, over 4,000 experts were engaged in field undertakings during the year 1963. (Because of the nonavailability of detailed data, the present account does not deal with the kind of “international” administration involved in such special relationships as exist between the Soviet Union and its eastern European “satellites.”)

Functions of international bureaucracies

The combined staffs of present-day international agencies may be said to constitute a “microcosm” of the world community in the making or of the regional communities now emerging. The functions performed by these bureaucracies fall broadly into two categories: housekeeping and substantive.

The main housekeeping functions are the processing of personnel and budget actions, the handling of procurement, accounts, and audit, and in particular the management of international meetings (preparation of agenda and supporting documentation, physical arrangements, recording and reporting, etc.). These actions are not intrinsically different from similar actions within a national bureaucracy save in two respects—the necessity of interlinguistic communication and the utilization of funds in different national currencies. Translators, interpreters, and language editors play an indispensable part in the life of an international secretariat; nearly one-fourth of the UN staff in New York, for example, consists of personnel serving as “groundkeepers” for meetings and as processors of records and reports.

The substantive roles of international officials, in roughly ascending order of discretionary action, include the following: (1) the gathering and dissemination of information—the clearinghouse function; (2) the conduct of research; (3) the registration of treaties (UN and PAU only); (4) the planning, formulation, and coordination of operational programs; (5) the implementation of such programs in the field; (6) the staffing and management of field missions in the domain of peace keeping and peaceful settlement, including truce supervision and border-policing arrangements; (7) assistance in negotiating group decisions and agreements among governments; and finally, upon occasion, (8) the assumption of responsibility for mediating diplomatic controversies. To this list should be added, in the case of the supranational European communities, the exercise of authority to impose fines, orders, or taxes on governments and industrial firms and, for NATO, the conduct of military staff and planning operations and the handling of various logistical and communications problems.

Increasingly, especially in the major agencies, the present-day activity of international bureaucracies tends to range far beyond the traditional “ministerial” duties characteristic of earlier organizations. This enlarged role derives partly from a liberal interpretation of the provisions of constituent instruments (as in the European communities, NATO, and to some extent the UN) and partly from the explicit or tacit delegation of discretionary authority to administrative heads when there seems no other way of moving from diplomatic deadlock to effective crisis action (as, notably, in the UN during recent years), or where, by the very nature of the situation, continuous executive action is required for an indefinite period of time (as, for example, with UN operations in the Congo).

Even so, it should be noted that, except to some extent in the new European communities, international civil servants are obliged to operate in a consensual environment. In contrast to the officials of national governments, they lack powers of coercion and there is no judicial or police authority to sanction their decisions. Whatever impact they manage to make depends essentially on their skill in negotiation, persuasion, the provision of advice, and the contriving of generally acceptable solutions to problems. They do not directly administer public services, nor in any juristic sense do they deal directly with individuals or private groups inside member countries, although, in the context of multilateral technical assistance, international experts do develop close, informal relations with local people, thereby circumventing the legal barriers of “domestic jurisdiction.”

Special problems

International administration is confronted with a number of special problems that exist either not at all or only in minor degree within national administrations.

Manpower

The first and possibly the most important of these problems is concerned with the selection and status of staff. Staff recruitment is complicated by the necessity of observing the principle of wide geographic distribution, which, particularly in world-wide organizations, may conflict in practice with the criteria of “competence and efficiency.” The existence of low educational standards, along with an acute shortage of specialized personnel, in most of the developing countries makes it difficult for them to provide suitably equipped candidates for posts in agency secretariats. The result, according to many observers, is an unavoidable lowering of performance standards at the international level, since all countries, for prestige and other reasons, insist on having their staff “quotas.” (To date the quota distribution for the UN Secretariat has been based on national budgetary contributions, but a strong movement has recently got under way to have this changed to allow more weight to the population factor.) The seriousness of the problem may in time be alleviated through the development by the UN of adequate in-service training programs, along with the improvement of trained manpower resources in the less advanced countries. A second special feature of personnel management evoking difficulties relates to the process of evaluating individual candidates with widely different cultural backgrounds. In this connection performance tests may be, and are, effectively utilized to recruit such categories of personnel as clerks, stenographers, accountants, junior statisticians, translators, interpreters, and editors; but for persons expected to perform general intellectual work, reliable “culture-free” tests do not yet appear to be available: non-Westerners are probably not testable by adaptations of tests standardized on Western populations, “because so little is known about the thought patterns and mental processes of individuals from other cultures” (Torre 1963,p. 88). There are still numerous geographical areas where the “objective” type of examination is relatively unknown. When the results of the essay type have to be translated from one language into an-other, it may turn out to be more a test of the examiner than of the candidate. Nor has the interview technique been used very imaginatively, untrained interviewers, for the most part, being resorted to because of the substantial costs of maintaining round-the-world teams of skilled personnel technicians. Research is urgently needed on the kinds of personal qualities that are essential for successful adaptation to cross-cultural work situations and on practicable methods of discovering such qualities at the recruitment stage.

A further problem is how to achieve, in multinational staffs exposed to a nationalistic environment, the independence, impartiality, and loyalty that ideally should characterize their behavior. This problem has been dramatically pointed up by the Communist claim (voiced by Khrushchev in the 1960 UN General Assembly) that there can be no “neutral men”—in the ideological sense. International civil servants are legally forbidden to seek or receive instructions from their governments or other external authorities, but this does not prevent them from having to deal with extraneous political pressures of one kind or another. There is no simple solution to this problem. Suffice it to say that the vast majority of UN employees clearly are loyal and dedicated civil servants. To protect them against unfair or arbitrary employment treatment provoked by outside pressures, there have been established independent administrative tribunals, to which they have the right of appeal under certain conditions (Friedmann & Fatouros 1957).

Organization

A second set of problems arises from the loose, decentralized organizational pattern of the UN system. In effect, the UN proper and the so-called specialized agencies are tied together only on a kind of partnership basis, through voluntary interagency agreements and a network of more or less informal interstaff working arrangements. Since the functional boundaries of the different agencies lack precision and to some extent actually overlap, it has become necessary to devise methods and procedures with a view to an orderly coordination of their activity. This is an extremely involved and never-ending process, for which there is no absolute parallel in national government organization.

Another difficulty deriving from organizational pluralism is that the action directives, not infrequently vague or ambiguous, that flow from the congeries of representative organs (assemblies, councils, commissions, boards) within the UN sometimes put administrative officials in situations where available human and budgetary resources are inadequate to implement properly the melange of “legislative” mandates given to hard-pressed staffs. Efforts to mitigate such predicaments by fuller advance consultation and program planning by intergovernmental organs have thus far been only moderately effective.

To a lesser extent, similar organizational problems appear to confront the recently established European communities in their relations with one another, e.g., the Common Market in its relations with the Coal and Steel Community. Here, however, the trend seems to be toward a progressive consolidation of the organs and services of these communities into what may eventually emerge as a unified economic and possibly political framework for Little Europe.

Communication

A third category of significant differentials between international and national administration concerns communication. Not only does the physical space factor play a more important role internationally than within the context of national bureaucracies (excepting world-wide national foreign-service establishments), but the psychological barriers to effective communication in staff work situations are much greater, both at headquarters and in field relationships. Communication difficulties originate in part from the multilingual composition of staff groups, especially when it is necessary for staff members to employ a language not their own in involved negotiations or in the drafting of complex documents reflecting group decisions. Over and beyond the language factor, semantic misunderstandings may often lead to confusion.

Inherent in this context is the need for adjustment of the divergent traditions, procedures, and concepts of administration with which incoming personnel may be identified. Illustrations of such differences include methods of handling correspondence, the role of the “front office,” the relation of budgetary and personnel to substantive (program) units, the career status of employees, the use of informal task forces as an administrative device, and the attitude of male employees toward female supervisors. There is some reason for believing that different nationality groups have differing capacities to make such adjustments at the international level. Accordingly, an important aspect of the task of administrative leadership is to devise experimentally ways of recognizing cultural differences in work assignments and procedures. Tendencies toward national “cliquishness” call for the conscious development of positive incentives to teamwork on the part of management. In certain international secretariats, staff morale and operating standards have been stimulated by such policies; in others, where the top leadership has failed to enlist the unstinted effort of the rank and file, an indifferent, unimaginative kind of performance has often resulted.

Current research and future needs

The literature relating to international administration has tended, to date, to be historical, legalistic, or broadly descriptive in character. Much of the writing on the subject has been incidental to a primary concern in either international law or organization. Since the epoch of the League of Nations, a limited number of treatises by former practitioners (e.g., Lie 1954; Loveday 1956; Ranshofen-Wertheimer 1945) have appeared. These works present in more or less organized fashion reflections on the authors’ professional experiences and in certain cases provide insightful evaluations of past practices. There has been only one significant attempt by a trained participant-observer to “capture and record” the process of decision making inside an organization (Ascher 1951). Scholarly general surveys of the evolution of individual international agencies (e.g., Laves & Thomson 1957) have appeared in recent years, but their treatment of administration is typically limited to a single chapter or to scattered cursory comments.

A new development within the past decade has been the emergence of a few studies of international administration “in depth” (Berkov 1957; Click 1957; Sharp 1961), dealing with headquarters–field relationships in the conduct of operational programs and attempting to draw conclusions on how to adjust centrifugal and centripetal forces within such programs. In addition to documentary analysis, the authors of these studies have utilized interviewing and observation techniques both at headquarters and in the field.

The totality of empirical research directly focused on international administration remains decidedly spotty and largely noncumulative. Individual studies have tended to be carried out without regard for the findings of other studies, if only because of the glaring subject-matter gaps in what is still the pioneer stage of systematic research in this field. No special models for empirical verification may yet be said to have been produced. Indeed, it is a fair question whether international administration should be studied with a view to its acquiring a discipline of its own, apart from public administration in general or from international organization. As noted earlier, the field is marked by a number of significant differences from the study of national administration, but are these differences of kind or merely of degree? On this point there is considerable divergence of opinion.

Need for comparative research

Probably the most fruitful approach to the systematic exploration of international administrative behavior would be to design a series of studies for the purpose of evaluating the impact of one or more factors peculiar to administration at the international level—by comparing agencies, processes, or case situations. From such inquiries it should become possible to discover the conditions under which recurring patterns of behavior may be anticipated. Stated differently, the patient pursuit of the comparative method should provide findings from which empirical theories of international administration that are not culture-bound might emerge.

The subject-matter areas for such research are legion, so marked has been the neglect of the field by scholars. By way of illustration, a number of such areas are listed below, under three broad headings: personnel, organization and procedure, and substantive roles of international bureaucracies.

The area of personnel would include studies of (1) samples of staff recruitment in cognate agencies in terms of social origins, educational backgrounds, motivation of applicants, and subsequent levels of performance; (2) the impact of “geographic distribution” on communication, standards of performance, staff morale, etc., in a technical agency, such as the Universal Postal Union, as compared with an essentially political organization, such as the UN; (3) the role of “informal” staff groupings in the communication process of related agencies; (4) the role perceptions held by professional personnel in an intergovernmental as compared with a supranational organization (e.g., the ILO and the ECSC; (5) the impact of differing styles of administrative leadership on staff morale in cognate agencies (e.g., the ILO and WHO), or in the same agency over time (e.g., the UN under Lie and then under Hammarskjöld).

Organization and procedure studies would involve evaluations of (1) the use of informal committee and working-party techniques as devices for adjusting differing concepts and patterns of administration in similar agencies; (2) the roles of differently structured “front offices” in the international administration of cognate agencies; (3) the effectiveness of agency field-reporting systems in relation to form, frequency, and routing of reports and utilization of reports as feedback; (4) the headquarters–field communications process in similar agencies, in order to discover, by means of the intensive examination of procedures and case situations, the causes of and remedies for misunderstandings, blockages, and crossed lines; (5) the regional structures of related UN agencies, with the object of determining whether there is any significant correlation between the degree of decentralization and program effectiveness in different culture areas; (6) the economic and social program-coordinative devices evolved by the UN family of organizations since their establishment; (7) the overhead costs of field-program conduct in UN agencies in relation to program size, geographic spread, and degree of devolution of program execution to field units.

The last general area of study, that of the substantive roles of international bureaucracies, would concern itself with (1) methods of attaining policy consensus in the secretariat of an intergovernmental agency, such as the OECD, in comparison with a partially supranational body, such as the EEC;(2) case studies of substantive decision making relating to different types of situations in the same agency and the same type of situation in similar agencies; (3) comparative studies of project programming for technical assistance, as illustrated by the World Bank, the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, and the UN Special Fund; (4) sample studies of the impact of UN field-program operations on local community attitudes toward the UN system and on related policies of the recipient governments; (5) analyses of the kinds of influence exerted by professional staffs on an agency’s substantive policies (e.g., program formulation, the resolution of crises, etc.) in relation to the functional character of the agency and the degree of consensus in its policy-control organs; (6) inquiries designed to determine the conditions of constructive policy role-playing by the bureaucracies of different types of organizations.

For the most part the suggestions listed above represent areas or problems concerning which there is at present little systematic knowledge. In order to explore some of them meaningfully, political scientists and public administration experts would most likely need to enlist the collaboration of psychiatrists, social psychologists, and other experts in group dynamics. In certain cases (e.g., the impact of international programs on grass-roots attitudes in non-Western countries) the cultural anthropologist might provide useful insights.

For maximum objectivity, much of the behavioral research in the field of international administration should be conducted under multinational auspices. Otherwise there will always lurk the danger of cultural bias. This possibility, to be sure, is much more real in regard to the culturally heterogeneous global agencies, where East and West, North and South all meet, than in the more homogeneous regional institutions in the Western hemisphere or in the North Atlantic community. There are, of course, certain practical difficulties in making arrangements for multinational research teams, particularly in view of the relatively backward state of the social sciences in most non-Western countries.

A second condition for the effective investigation of the kinds of problems outlined above is the close cooperation of officials with the outside research scholar or team. Since most senior officials tend to be very busy, it is important that the investigators not let themselves become minor nuisances to harassed practitioners. In addition, the outside investigators must give satisfactory assurances that the anonymity of their informants will be carefully respected. But these conditions are not insuperable obstacles; ordinarily they can be met, with the exercise of patience and discretion.

The outlook

Indications are not lacking that international administration will continue to proliferate in the foreseeable future. Its dimensions give promise of expanding, both at the global and the regional level. If and as the United Nations further develops its peace-keeping activities, not only may it become desirable to attach a military-planning unit to its headquarters (where a military adviser to the secretary-general was recently installed), thereby calling for personnel conversant with military technology, but the realization of any concrete plan for international arms control would require administrative arrangements of some kind for inspection purposes, as well as, possibly, the creation of a permanent international peace force. The staffing of such arrangements would bring the engineer and the scientist more directly into the world’s bureaucratic apparatus than ever before.

Concurrently or perhaps sooner, the projection of international cooperation into the realm of outer space presumably will add to the substantive role of certain categories of UN personnel, who will not only aid in the formulation of legal regulations to govern the peaceful use of outer space but also handle inspection and monitoring operations.

A third possibility is that the scope of multilateral economic and social programs will further expand over the coming years. The establishment of a UN-sponsored capital-assistance program is by no means out of the question, either in conjunction with the present Special Fund, or else through a separate arrangement. In this domain, also, the lending roles of the existing world financial institutions (the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, the International Development Association) bid fair to grow, while the International Monetary Fund may be called upon to elaborate and administer a new and stronger type of world monetary mechanism.

Globally, the development of the foregoing functional activities will scarcely add up to any sort of world government. Regardless of whether such a goal should be deemed by the West to be politically desirable, its likelihood would appear to be too remote to affect the basic patterns of international cooperation in the near future. But even under a world state, while administration would become either “unitary” or “federal” in the legal sense, it would still remain multicultural in composition. The complexities of behavioral relations now con-fronting international agencies would by no means disappear. The interflow of personnel, hierarchically as well as laterally, through governmental administrations might well increase, but there would still remain serious problems of intercultural adjustment.

Regionally, a wide spread of international institutions would seem to be in the offing. Signs already discernible in all the major areas—Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America—suggest such an evolution. The contours of some of these new arrangements are now only barely visible, and it is impossible to predict just how the over-all regional picture will look by, say, the 1980s. In any event, the picture is not likely to be a tidy one: the institutional gamut will probably run from a congeries of loose, limited-purpose groupings (such as the Organization of African Unity, inaugurated in 1963) through free-trade associations and customs unions to more strongly knit supranationalistic organizations. Should any considerable devolution of control from Moscow take place within the present Soviet orbit, it is not inconceivable that some sort of “confederal” institutionalized relationship might replace the existing Communist-party control apparatus.

As international administration grows in variety and in depth, there is cause for hope that the resources of the social sciences may become steadily more adequate to the task of analyzing and illuminating its key problems, as well as providing valuable operational prescriptions to policy makers.

Walter R. Sharp

[See alsoAdministration; Bureaucracy; Civil service; Diplomacy; Loyalty. Other relevant material may be found inPublic administration.]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ascher, Charles S. 1951Program-making in UNESCO, 1946-1951: A Study in the Processes of International Administration. Chicago: Public Administration Service.

Asher, Robert E. et al. 1957The United Nations and Promotion of the General Welfare. Washington: Brookings Institution. ? An authoritative, scholarly analysis of policy and administration.

Bailey, Sydney D. (1962) 1964The Secretariat of the United Nations. 2d ed., rev. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. ? Chief emphasis is on the political aspects of the Secretariat’s operation.

Berkov, Robert 1957The World Health Organization: A Study in Decentralized International Administration.Geneva: Droz.

Friedmann, Wolfgang G.; and Fatouros, A. A. 1957 The United Nations Administrative Tribunal. International Organization 11:13-29.

Click, Philip M. 1957 The Administration of Technical Assistance: Growth in the Americas. Univ. of Chicago Press. ? An excellent comparison of United States and United Nations programs.

Haas, ErnstB. 1964 Beyond the Nation-state: Functionalism and International Organization. Stanford Univ. Press.

Hill, Martin (1945) 1946 The Economic and Financial Organization of the League of Nations: A Survey of Twenty-five Years’ Experience. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. ? A brief, sympathetic description by a former League official.

Hill, Norman L. 1931 International Administration.New York: McGraw-Hill. ? The first general textbook; legalistic in approach.

International Organization. ? Published since 1947 by the World Peace Foundation. Contains informative articles on current developments, as well as selected bibliographies.

Laves, Walter H. C.; and Thomson, Charles A. 1957 UNESCO: Purpose, Progress, Prospects. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. ? The most comprehensive treatment of UNESCO in English.

Lie, Trygve 1954 In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years With the United Nations. New York: Macmillan. ? A moderately revealing memoir by the first secretary-general of the United Nations.

Lindberg, Leon 1965 Decision Making and Integration in the European Community. International Organization 19:56-81.

Loveday, Alexander 1956Reflections on InternationalAdministration. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ? Based on many years’ experience as a senior League of Nations official.

Ranshofen-Wertheimer, Egon F. 1945 The International Secretariat: A Great Experiment in International Administration. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. ? The definitive treatment of the League of Nations Secretariat by a former staff member.

Sayre, Francis B. 1919 Experiments in International Administration. New York and London: Harper. ? Case studies of selected early international agencies.

Schenkman, Jacob 1955 International Civil Aviation Organization. Geneva: Droz. ? Valuable for its chapter on the regional organization of the ICAO.

Schwebel, Stephen M. 1952 The Secretary-General of the United Nations: His Political Powers and Practice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. ? A critical analysis of the evolution of the United Nations secretary-generalship during the term of Trygve Lie.

Sewell, James P. 1966 Functionalism and World Politics: A Study Based on United Nations Programs Financing Economic Development. Princeton Univ. Press. ? Compares the operational impact of the IBRD, IFC, IDA, and the UN Special Fund in a “functionalist” context.

Sharp, Walter R. 1958 The Study of International Administration. World Politics 11:103-117. ? Includes suggestions for research.

Sharp, Walter R. 1961 Field Administration in the United Nations System: The Conduct of International Economic and Social Programs. New York: Praeger.

Torre, Mottram (editor) 1963 The Selection of Personnel for International Service. Geneva and New York: World Federation for Mental Health.

Young, Tien-cheng 1958International Civil Service: Principles and Problems. Brussels: International Institute of Administrative Sciences.

III. FINANCING

There are many hundreds of international organizations more or less active at the present time. Some of these are governmental organizations, composed exclusively of state members; some are private and have no states among their members; many are mixed, with both states and private organizations or individuals as members. The financing patterns and practices of these organizations are quite diverse, regardless of the nature of their membership. However, except for the very few organizations that either provide specific services for which fees are collected—such as the registration of trademarks—or subsist on the earnings of capital—as does the International Bank—almost all the associations have one overshadowing financial problem in common: how to collect assessments or pledges in the absence of effective sanctions. In the best of circumstances collecting a bill without effective enforcement measures is difficult. It is much more difficult to collect a bill for expenses incurred in pursuit of organizational policies to which some members are actively opposed, a frequent occurrence in international organizations. Both these difficulties occur with some acuteness in the United Nations and the specialized agencies. This article will, therefore, concentrate on the financing of the fifteen governmental organizations that make up the United Nations complex.

Methods of financing

Even in a spectrum limited to the United Nations organizations, the financing picture is almost incredibly complicated. It is possible to distinguish at least eight varieties of program and budget operations of the United Nations organizations that pose entirely different financing problems: (1) regular budgets financed through assessments upon members according to agreed contribution formulas; (2) emergency operations financed through assessments upon members according to the agreed formulas; (3) recurrent operations financed by special arrangements concerning contributions with members who are primary parties at interest; (4) recurrent operations financed by voluntary contributions of members; (5) recurrent operations financed by voluntary contributions from members, nonmembers, and private individuals; (6) ad hoc operations of variable duration financed from voluntary contributions; (7) regular budgets financed through organizational earnings; (8) investment budgets financed through the use of capital or the sale of organizational or organizationally guaranteed securities.

Assessments

The “regular” budgets of the United Nations organizations financed by assessments are eleven in number. Their total value in 1963, as reported by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, was about $189 million. The largest was that of the United Nations itself, $87 million; the smallest was the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, $421,000. These budgets are prepared by the responsible executive officers or authorities of the several organizations and adopted by their legislative bodies. The budgets are subject to review of their program and expenditure proposals by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, which, in accordance with the UN Charter, reports to the General Assembly through Committee V; the views of the General Assembly on the budgets are communicated to the organizations and to the member states. Although without binding effect, these views are very influential in the councils of the specialized agencies. The contributions formulas utilized by the organizations tend generally to follow that of the United Nations itself, which is based upon comparative ability of each member to pay, as measured by its gross national product, with certain adjustments and modifications. However, some of the organizations introduce other factors especially related to their purposes. The International Civil Aviation Organization, for example, weights its contribution formula 75 per cent on ability to pay and 25 per cent on the relative volume of the ton-kilometers of international air transport flown by air lines of the member states, as an index of the interest in and importance of civil aviation among the contracting governments. Although payment is slow, virtually all the assessments for the regular budgets are eventually collected. The United Nations, for example, normally collects about 80 per cent of the annual assessment by the end of the year for which it is levied, about 95 per cent of the assessment by the closing months of the following year, and about 99 per cent by the end of the second year.

The most dramatic examples of emergency financing are provided by the United Nations Emergency Force established after the Suez incident in 1956 and the United Nations operation in the Congo, which began in 1960. In 1956 the United States offered to contribute $10 million toward the cost of the emergency force if other countries would contribute an equal amount—that is, to increase its share under the formula from 33? per cent to 50 per cent, of a total assessment of $20 million. This offer was accepted by the General Assembly and established the assessment formula whereby the General Assembly spread costs of the emergency force over 1957, 1958, and 1959. In 1960 the assessment formula was changed to relieve the members least able to pay, while several of the richer members waived drawbacks to which they were entitled by reason of special services or commodities supplied the emergency force. All of the Iron Curtain countries ignored the assessments; Yugoslavia was the only communist state to support the undertaking. As a result of the refusal of the Iron Curtain countries to pay, and the delinquency of others, total arrears and defaults amounted to about one-third of total assessments. The Congo operation was of a different magnitude. In 1960 the General Assembly spread $48.5 million on the basis of the 1960 formula. In 1962 it spread $100 million for the Congo operation, against an estimated cost of $135 million, as “expenses of the Organization,” without reference to its levying authority under article 17 of the charter, nor did it define the levy as a “binding legal obligation” The ambiguity of the resolution led to the advisory opinion by the World Court, on July 20, 1962, upholding the levy as a legal obligation binding on the members. The default of the communist bloc, France, South Africa, and others, and the arrearages of many of the smaller states, led to the UN bond issue of $200 million in 1962. The financing of emergency operations remains one of the largest and most perilous of the unresolved issues confronting the United Nations.

Perhaps the clearest illustration of the financing of special benefit operations by an international agency is the joint-support program operated by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). For example, 18 nations cooperate, under the supervision of ICAO, in maintaining radio and weather stations in the northern Atlantic. The 9 floating ocean stations are supplied with ships by 7 of the contracting states, and 11 others, whose aircraft fly northern Atlantic routes, make cash contributions. Each contribution is individually negotiated, but its value in money or kind is generally proportionate to the contributor’s use of the northern Atlantic air lanes.

Voluntary contributions

The Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, inaugurated in 1950, and the Special Fund, launched in 1959, provide the best examples of international “voluntary” programs financed from contributions of members. The Expanded Program of Technical Assistance began with $20 million, contributed by 54 members; its annual budget in 1963 was more than $45 million, subscribed by about 100 governments. The Special Fund finances actual preparatory and preinvestment costs for major economic and social development projects; its annual expenditures on such operations have reached $60 million.

The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is not only the oldest program financed by members, nonmembers, and private individuals but is perhaps the most successful international philanthropic undertaking in history. It started in 1947 with $15 million, contributed by the United States government. By 1963 its annual budget from governments, including nonmembers of the UN, was more than $23 million, and an additional $8 million was realized from private contributions and the sale of UNICEF greeting cards. The International Refugee Program, which began as a purely intergovernmental organization, has likewise secured important resources in recent years from private sources.

The United Nations Korean Relief Agency (UNKRA), which has been liquidated, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and the United Nations Development Fund for the Congo provide examples of ad hoc operations financed from voluntary contributions. UNKRA began its work in 1951 with a budget of about $500,000. It reached the peak of its operations in the years 1953, 1954, and 1955, with expenditures of $58 million, $47 million, and $32 million respectively.

From 1951 through 1960 it spent a total of $149 million contributed by 40 governments, of which 70 per cent was contributed by the United States and 20 per cent by the United Kingdom. UNRWA was established in 1949, following the partition of Palestine. By the end of 1962 it had spent about $434 million, of which about 70 per cent was supplied by the United States, while the United Kingdom, France, and Canada contributed an additional 25 per cent. The United Nations Fund for the Congo set a goal of $100 million for economic and social development in the new republic; by 1963 less than half this amount had been subscribed, of which the U.S. contribution was more than 75 per cent.

Self-financing

The administrative budgets of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Finance Corporation are examples of regular budgets financed through organizational earnings. These earnings are derived from interest and other charges on loans, advances, and investments made from capital subscribed by member states or surcharges on loans guaranteed by the bank. No recurrent assessments on members are involved in meeting these budgets.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development derives the funds for its investments from the use of capital subscribed by member states and from the sale of the securities of members with the bank’s guarantee to public and private investors. The International Finance Corporation also participates in the financing of development enterprises through the use of capital funds and through the sale of paper representing a combination of equity and loan investment. The ability of these organizations to make loans and investments is a function of their own liquidity, of the availability of funds in the private money markets, and, most important, the prestige of the lending institutions.

Political problems

Profound difficulties arise in fixing the levels of activity and financial support of international organizations. With respect to regular activities financed by agreed annual assessments, these difficulties arise from (a) the insistence of the United States on restricting its contribution to not more than one-third of the total assessment and(b) the probably very substantial underassessment of the Soviet Union and its satellites (in 1964 the U.S.S.R. paid 14.97 per cent of the regular UN budget, while the United States paid 32.02 per cent). These facts produce two consequences: first, since most of the other members have very limited possibilities of increasing their contributions, the activities of the organizations are held to a low level; second, to the extent that activities are expanded, a heavy burden is thrown upon the members least able to pay. Although the sanction of withdrawal of voting rights (which has never been invoked by the UN but has been used by some of the specialized agencies) is sufficient to secure eventual compliance, payment is slow and the burden upon working capital funds is heavy.

The crisis in UN finances, however, has actually been produced by emergency peace-keeping operations, for which many of its members accept no financial responsibility and to most of which the Soviet bloc, along with a varying but substantial group of associates, is actively opposed. Moreover, under the UN Charter the sanction procedures involving the suspension of voting privileges are facultative, not mandatory. The General Assembly is understandably reluctant to invoke sanctions against a major power. But until the problem of financing peace-keeping expenditures is satisfactorily resolved—and no solution other than enforceable assessments seems realistic—the United Nations will continue to teeter on the edge of bankruptcy.

The problem arising with respect to activities financed by voluntary contributions is likewise the low ceiling created by United States policy in limiting its percentage contribution, coupled with the outright refusal of the communist bloc to contribute at all. The UN’s Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, therefore, continues to be a token operation in comparison with the national programs of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Colombo Plan nations, and the U.S.S.R.

The only types of international budgets that do not encounter continuing difficulties in obtaining support are those which finance activities with a definable cash-in-hand value for the participants, such as the ICAO northern Atlantic weather stations, or the administrative budgets financed from earnings on capital, such as those of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and International Finance Corporation. Although extensive attention has been given in academic circles to the development of independent revenue sources for activities without strong economic appeal—all the way from imposing a 3 per cent sales tax to giving Antarctica to the UN as a dowry—no viable proposals have so far materialized. Indeed, the idea of independent financing commands little support—and considerable outright opposition—in political circles of many nations. The prospect is that multilateral international cooperation will, as a consequence of financial limitations, continue to function at a low level of achievement. In view of developing political trends toward nonalignment and the resulting circumscription of bilateral cooperation, the outlook is for a steady decline in all international financial cooperation.

Rowland Egger

[See alsoBudgeting; Political Financing.]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Clark, Grenville; and Sohn, Louis B. (1958) 1960 World Peace Through World Law. 2d ed., rev. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.

Commission To Study The Organization Of Peace 1957 Strengthening the United Nations. New York: Harper.

Gross, Leo 1963 Expenses of the United Nations for Peace-keeping Operations: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice. International Organization 17:1–35.

Hogg, John Fergus Son 1962 Peace-keeping Costs and Charter Obligations: Implications of the International Court of Justice Decision (July 20, 1962) on Certain Expenses of the United Nations. Columbia Law Review 62:1230–1263.

International Court Of Justice 1962 Pleadings: Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2 of the Charter) — Advisory Opinion of July 20, 1962. The Hague: The Court.

League Of Nations, Secretariat, Information Section (1923) 1928 The League of Nations: Financial Administration and Apportionment of Expenses, by Sir Herbert Ames (financial director). Rev. ed. Geneva: The League.

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Singer, J. David 1961 Financing International Organization: The United Nations Budget Process. The Hague: Nijhoff.

Stoessinger, John G. 1961 Financing the United Nations. International Conciliation 535:1–72.

Stoessinger, John G. et al. 1964 Financing the United Nations System. Washington: Brookings Institution.

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United Nations General Assembly 1962a Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1963 and Information Annexes. New York: United Nations.

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U.S. Dept. Of State 1962 Information on the Operations and Financing of the United Nations. Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate; Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives. Washington: Government Printing Office.

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