SUÁREZ, FRANCISCO

Philosopher and theologian; b. Granada, Spain, Jan. 5, 1548; d. Lisbon, Portugal, Sept. 25, 1617. At the age of 14, he was sent to Salamanca to study Canon Law; there he joined the Society of Jesus in 1564. He continued his philosophical and theological studies until 1571 and was ordained in 1572. From 1571 to 1574 he taught philosophy at Ávila and Segovia; and from 1574 to 1580, theology at Ávila, Segovia, and Valladolid. He then taught for five years in the Roman College. After returning to Spain because of bad health, he continued teaching at Alcalá (1585–93) and Salamanca (1593–97). In 1597, he received the doctorate at Evora and, at the invitation of Philip II, accepted the chair of theology at the University of Coimbra, where he remained until 1615, adding to his teaching career the activities of a writer and consultant, especially in moral and canonical matters. At the request of Paul V, he wrote a tract, De defensione fidei (1613), against James I of England, and De immunitate ecclesiastica contra Venetos (1615). His piety, which was intense yet tranquil, is manifest in his writings. St. John Eudes called him a very pious theologian. On his deathbed he exclaimed, "I would never have thought it was so sweet to die."

Works. Suárez was the most prolific of modern theologians. The Venetian edition (1747) of his works filled 23 volumes, while the Parisian edition (1856) numbered 28. From the beginning the publication of his treatises (continued after his death by Balthasar Alvarez) was recognized to be an important event. There were also editions printed in Lyons, Mainz, Cologne, and Geneva. In less than a century, 18 editions of his Disputationes metaphysicae appeared.

Suárez's works, while they were the fruit of his teaching, were not simply his university classroom lectures in Coimbra. He undertook ample commentaries on the Summa of St. Thomas (1590–95, 1602–03). Later he wrote other treatises, more ample and not limited to mere commentary: Varia opuscula theologica (1599), De religione (v.1, 2 in 1608; v.3 in 1624; v.4 in 1625), De legibus (1612), De gratia (v.1, 3 in 1619; v.2 in 1651), and De angelis (1620). Realizing that he could not explain all theology in the same extensive manner, he began to prepare the rest in more succinct form: De Deo uno et trino (1606), De fide, spe et caritate (1621), and De ultimo fine (1628).

In 1859 Malou published six of his theological opuscula, and in 1948 the University of Coimbra published a two-volume work, Conselhos y pareceres. A few other unedited works have not been published, but considerable work was done in the 1950s and 1960s toward publication of his letters. His commentaries on Aristotle have never been found.

Doctrine. Suárez was the principal exponent of the doctrinal thought of the Jesuits, and was called Doctor Eximius by Paul V, Alexander VII, and Benedict XIV, and Pius XII. He followed the methodical tradition begun by Francisco de Vitoria in Salamanca. His knowledge of the Fathers was thorough; no contemporary writer had so firm a control of former philosophical and theological thought. Suárez's work was distinguished by the range of the subject matter, its scientific depth, and the clarity of exposition. His procedure was analytic, but it is not lacking in synthetic comprehension. He was an effectual organizer of tracts, such as those on Mariology, grace, religion, law, and metaphysics. The internal unity of his theology and philosophy resulted in an impression of novelty in his day, but a good part of Suárez's contribution has since become part of the common fund of theology. Although he deviated in no small degree from the current of Thomistic thought, the fact that he was fundamentally Thomistic was recognized by Cardinal Z. González and M. Grabmann.

The doctrines characteristic of Suárez are not only those of his own originating, but also that he accepted in substance from earlier scholastic tradition and enriched with his own insights. His essential originality appears in his method. Somewhat unreasonably, it has been branded as eclecticism because he did not adhere unconditionally to any of the existing systems. Instead, he examined them critically before proposing his own.

Theology. Suárez's doctrine on the Trinity is based on analogy, the application of human concepts to the study of the divinity with the help of a nonreciprocal virtual distinction between the absolute and relative. For this reason he does not admit the universal validity (embracing all being) of the principle of triple identity (viz., A is B; B is C; therefore A is C ) in the sense of real identity. He thus resolves (though in a negative way) the fundamental difficulty in the mystery of the Trinity.

Analogy helps him to penetrate the notions of procession, relation, and person, which are the principles of distinction in the Godhead. Notice should be taken of his elaboration on the question of the formal principle (principium quo ) of the processions, God's knowledge and will; and of his insights regarding the intellectual generation of the Word. With regard to the procession of the Holy Spirit he does not admit that active spiration forms part of the unique spirating principle (principium quod ). Divine relation as subsistent, and, as such, constitutive of the Divine Persons, denotes infinite perfection—not absolute, but relative (because the relation is esse ad ), not simpliciter simplex but simplex non simpliciter. With this Suárez distinguishes in the Trinity relative perfections, existences, and subsistences formally distinct from the absolute existence and subsistence that belong to the divinity as such. He presents the Holy Spirit's indwelling as demanded by the friendship implied by sanctifying grace.

In the celebrated discussion concerning the motive of the Incarnation, the involved position of Suárez, thanks to the distinction between the order of intention and the order of execution, maintains everything positive in the opposing Thomistic and Scotist tendencies. He explains the hypostatic union by the lack in the humanity of Christ of the mode of subsistence constitutive of the created person, which is replaced by the substantial union with the divine Word.

The teaching on the supernatural order and grace is, without doubt, the most fully elaborated part of Suárez's speculative theology. He vigorously defended the absolute transcendence of the order of grace as supernatural and brought greater precision to the question. To explain the existence of the supernatural, he admitted an obediential potency that is not only passive but active. For him original justice is essentially constituted by sanctifying grace, which forms the radical basis for the preternatural gifts; in his last explanation of these gifts, however, he postulates a special providence. Suárez greatly limited the effects of original sin in the transcendent order without admitting that the peccatum naturae in no way affected human nature considered in its essential constituents and in the providence that connaturally corresponds to it. The true nature and extent of fallen man's weakness in observing the moral law received a treatment at Suárez's hands that is yet to be surpassed; in general he initiated an increased appreciation of the moral cause.

Suárez used the criterion of pre-Tridentine theologians for establishing the entitative supernatural quality of all salutary acts, and also affirmed the supernaturalness of the formal object of every act in this order. Contrition, as the immediate disposition for justification, is produced, according to Suárez, not by the same sanctifying grace, but by a previous actual grace. The opposition between sanctifying grace and sin is one of contrariety, not contradiction, and although the expulsion of sin is demanded by grace as a secondary formal effect, their coexistence is not absolutely repugnant. Suárez defended the increase of supernatural virtues by reason of any act however remiss, as in general he accentuated the difference between supernatural and natural habits.

Suárez also developed the theology of merit. In particular, he insisted on positing commutative justice in God, analogous, of course, to the same virtue in man and based on a free divine institution. Merit for good acts essentially requires no other orientation to man's last end or other imperative of charity than that which the super-natural work brings with it.

The supernaturalness of the intuitive vision of God was expressly underscored by Suárez; he denied it to be connatural in any created nature. His thought on this vision was conditioned by his philosophical doctrine about knowledge in general. As a vital act of the creature, this vision is a formal assimilation of the divine essence, intentional but real, the terminus of an action shared by the created intellect and by God present in Himself with the light of glory as His instrument.

Although Suárez did not personally intervene in the public disputations de Auxiliis, throughout the controversy he was the adviser of the Jesuit theologians (see con gregatio de auxiliis). His writings are the choicest pieces of the dossier composed for the Jesuit side. The best and most definitive foundation for the basic principles of molinism is due to him: liberty as active indifference, simultaneous concurrence and knowledge of future conditionals (scientia media ), and the accentuation of the voluntary element in the grace efficacious for the predefinition of a salutary act. It has been recently made clear that Suárez did not at first accept scientia media nor efficacious grace explained in this manner; later he became its most ardent defender and systematized Molina's ideas in the formula gratia congrua, which in a general sense is the common opinion of Molinist theologians. With Robert Bellarmine he taught formal predefinition in the strictest sense together with its corollary, formal predestination to glory ante praevisa merita, a position that is usually called congruism.

Suárez's influence in moral theology has been considerable; Alphonsus Liguori cites him as one of his principal authors. Suárez was one of the theologians who developed the probabilist system begun by Medina. For Suárez, mortal sin consisted essentially in man's loving a creature virtually more than God. Venial sin, on the other hand, is a sort of delay on the road to our ultimate end; thus does he interpret St. Thomas's praeter legem. Suárez's thick volumes on the virtue of religion presented a novelty in scholastic theology, for they embraced questions pertaining to the spiritual life in all its manifestations, both interior and exterior; the religious life and states of perfection; the Society of Jesus and the Exercises of St. Ignatius. In these volumes one should note his profound analysis of contemplation and sinless moral imperfection.

Philosophy. His Disputationes metaphysicae, used in Protestant universities of the 17th century and recently the object of renewed interest, was the first systematic treatment of this science not based exclusively on the texts of Aristotle. This and the De anima are his main philosophical treatises, although other works, such as De angelis, contain material of interest to philosophers. Suárez's philosophy was a personal interpretation of perennial philosophy; he drew on the common heritage of epistemological, cosmological, anthropological, and metaphysical doctrines, and at the same time developed a new concept of being as the object of metaphysics. Negatively, his system may be characterized by his rejection of the realist application of the teaching on potency and act to being, of Scotist formalism, and of nominalist conceptualism. Positively, it is based on an idea of being that sees it as having a confused unity and as enjoying nonmutual distinction from its different manifestations; it is transcendent and implied in all instances of determinate being. His teaching is based also on the analogy of intrinsic attribution, an analogy founded on the necessity of being's plenitude in Being per essentiam, and its derivation to all other beings by casual participation, with full dependence on Being itself. Thus the first division of being is that of Being by essence and being by total participation; from these notions are deduced their differentiating properties. Other conclusions also follow; e.g., existence is identified with essence as the latter's actuality or realization; individuation and multiplication of an essence are effected by its limitation, making recourse to matter for this individuation unnecessary. As a result, Suárez attributes proper existence to primary matter and to accidents.

Suárez's theory of physical mode is characteristic of his metaphysics; it is a purely modal entity, a simple, ultimate, and formal determination of a subjective indifference. This provides his philosophical explanation of subsistence, of union, of action as identified with passion, and of ubication. Efficient causality also holds a special place in his metaphysics; its actuation is extrinsic to the agent and as such is that of active potency, not passive. This permits him to say that liberty is the active indifference of the will without the need of determination by the practical judgment or of physical premotion.

Suárez devoted special attention to the category of relation. Real relation denotes a reality—not only in the sense of esse in but also in the sense of esse ad. It is not truly distinct from its foundation. Suárez holds the socalled transcendental relation to be a true real relation, and characterizes as relations secundum dici those predicates that are absolute in themselves but that cannot be expressed by man except as relations.

According to Suárez, knowledge is based on immediate intellectual apprehension of the material singular. The impressed species (not a formal, but a virtual image of the object) is not required for the knowledge of universals, but rather for the spirituality and perfect immanence of knowledge. Intellectual knowledge is a reproduction or formal likeness of the object, and knowing is itself a vital assimilation of the object. Thus the mental word is not really distinct from the act of knowing; nor is it the medium in quo, but rather the medium quo. Nevertheless, Suárez introduces a modal distinction between the producing of the word and the word itself, on the basis that every action is so distinct from its term. Universal concepts have objective reality by reason of their foundation, but their universal form consists alone in precisive and abstract knowledge.

Disputations 29 and 30 of Suárez's metaphysics, together with the tracts de Auxiliis, form his natural theology. God's existence is effectively proved by contingency and the principle of causality, the argument from physical motion being rejected. The divine attributes are proved by means of the notion of necessary being or of being by essence. Among the attributes one should note that divine ubiquity results from God's immensity, and is therefore not formally an action, though this is presupposed as its foundation. Suárez's attempt to reconcile God's freedom with His simplicity and immutability is interesting. Divine freedom does not imply a distinct intrinsic determination or contingency in the entity of an infinite being, but only in its termination in this or that object. Immediate divine concurrence in every creatural act is not previous to, but simultaneous with, the act itself; this is necessitated by the contingency of created being and its full and immediate domination by the first cause. The concurrence with the free action of the creature is indifferent in actu primo, but is identified with the action of the creature in actu secundo.

Law. Suárez's influence in the field of law, in general, and in international law, in particular, has recently been evaluated by the studies of J. Brown Scott, H. Rommen, and C. Barcia Trelles, and is now generally recognized. He was esteemed as a canonist, and even today, despite the changes in ecclesiastical legislation, is still consulted by canonists.

In his systematic exposition of juridical doctrine, especially the concept of law and its consequences, Suárez stresses the voluntary element, without disassociating it from the intellectual. This voluntarism has nothing to do with the irrational arbitrariness in legal matters that sometimes goes by the same name. Although he was not the originator of the theory of penal law, he explained it as imposing a true obligation according to the rational will of the legislator. He also made a profound study of the juridical value of custom.

His political theory is without doubt the most personal part of his juridical doctrine, judging from the depth with which he explained and enlarged the Christian principles concerning civil society. The end of civil society, required by its very nature, is the common good in some way disassociated from the good of the individual. The virtue proper to civil authority is general or legal justice. Tyranny is unjust because it is contrary to the common good. A perfect civil society admits connaturally lesser corporations for particular ends and must grant them those prerogatives required for their proper function. When the state intervenes it must keep in mind the principle of subsidiarity. With Robert Bellarmine, Suárez has been regarded as the representative of the traditional doctrine on the immediate origin of civil society and its authority (essentially different from the family society with its dominative authority) in the free consent of the families or members of society. This presupposes its natural necessity and its ultimate foundation in God. Civil society as a perfect society is supreme in its own order, but by reason of the supernatural end of the Church civil society is subordinate to her through her so-called indirect power, which Suárez elaborated in his polemic against James I of England.

Finally, international law claims Suárez as its founder along with De Vitoria. This is based on Suárez's doctrine on the law of peoples and his grandiose idea of the natural community of nations. The human race, though naturally divided into different nations or states, maintains a certain quasi-political and moral unity; the signs of this are the precept of love for all and the mutual needs of all the classes. Therefore, though perfectly independent, they do not cease being members of a certain community of nations. The mutual relations of these nations are governed by the ius gentium or law of peoples, developed by Suárez, as a law between natural law properly so-called and fully positive law. The law of peoples, intimately based on nature, is constituted by an aggregate of practices established more by tradition and custom than by exact treaties. Today it is called international law.

Bibliography: See the bibliographical indices published in 1948, the 4th centenary of Suárez birth, in the special volumes of Razón y Fe, Estudios eclesiásticos, and Pensamiento. Miscelánea Comillas 9 (1948). r. de scorraille, François Suárez de la Compagnie de Jésus, 2 v. (Paris 1912–13). p. monnot et al., Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, ed. a. vacant et al., 15 v. (Paris 1903–50; Tables Générales 1951–) 14.2:2638–2728. k. werner, Franz Suárez und die Scholastik der letzten Jahrhunderte, 2 v. (Regensburg 1889). k. six et al., P. Franz Suárez: Gedankenblätter zu seinem 300 jährigen Todestag (Innsbruck 1917). m. grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben (Munich 1926). p. descoqs, "Quéstions de métaphysique: Le Suarézisme," Archives de philosophie 2 (1924) 187–218; "Thomisme et Suarézisme," ibid. 4 (1926) 434–544. h. rommen, Die Staatslehre des Franz Suárez (München-Gladbach 1927). k. eschweiler, "Die Philosophie der spanischen Spätscholastik auf den deutschen Universitäten des XVIII. Jahrhunderts," Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kulturgeschichte Spaniens 1 (1928) 251–325. j. b. scott, "Suárez and the International Community," Francisco Suárez: Addresses in Commemoration of His Contribution to International Law and Politics, ed. h. wright (Washington 1933). f. stegmÜller, Zur Gnadenlehre des jungen Suárez (Freiburg 1933). c. barcia trelles, Internacionalistas españoles del siglo XVI: Francisco Suárez (1546–1617 ) (Valladolid 1934). c. c. riedl, "Suárez and the Organization of Learning," Jesuit Thinkers of the Renaissance, ed. g. smith (Milwaukee 1939). h. guthrie, "The Metaphysics of Francis Suárez," Thought 16 (1941) 297–311. j. hellin, La analogía del ser y el conocimiento de Dios en Suárez (Madrid 1947). j. m. alejandro, La gnoseología del Doctor Eximio (Suárez ) y la acusación nominalista (Comillas 1948).

[j. dalmau]