Zabarella, Jacopo (Giacomo)
ZABARELLA, JACOPO (GIACOMO)
(b. Padua, Italy, 5 September 1533;
d. Padua, 15 October 1589), natural philosophy, scientific method, classification of the sciences. For the original article on Zabarella see DSB, vol. 14.
Zabarella is considered the prime representative of Italian Renaissance Aristotelianism. His use of Aristotle and other authorities was both eclectic and critical, and his style of writing decidedly systematic. Zabarella sought to build a coherent body of Aristotelian logic and natural philosophy, which generated his interest in the classification of the disciplines and the relationships between various areas of academic learning. He was an orthodox Aristotelian who defended the scientific status of theoretical natural philosophy against the pressures emanating from the practical disciplines, that is, the art of medicine and anatomy. The debate goes on about his influence on Galileo Galilei and the birth of modern science.
Arts and Sciences. The hierarchical ordering of different disciplines was a widely debated topic in Renaissance philosophy. The hierarchical nature of the division between different disciplines was also emphasized by Zabarella. The continual discussion of the methodology of arts and sciences in the sixteenth century may be seen as an attempt to defend the scientific status either of the recently discovered autonomous sciences, such as natural philosophy, or of the empirically based productive arts. The methodological writings are, therefore, not merely further elaborations of an old Aristotelian tradition, but also expressions of opinion in a lively argumentation on the changing relationships between various arts and sciences in sixteenth-century Italian universities.
The Aristotelian distinction between arts (artes) and sciences (scientiae) serves as the starting point for Zabarella’s philosophical system. In the opening of his Opera logica, Zabarella draws a distinction between the eternal world of nature and the contingent human world. From this distinction he proceeds to two corresponding kinds of knowledge and to two distinct methods of defining them. Zabarella maintained that sciences are concerned with the eternal world of nature and are thus contemplative disciplines, whereas the arts refer to the contingent world of human beings and are thus productive and noncontemplative. In the proper sense of the term, the sciences, as pertaining to demonstrative knowledge, are limited to those disciplines that deal with the necessary and eternal or with what can be deduced from necessary principles. In productive disciplines (i.e., arts) it is not necessary to define the objects under production as strictly as in the contemplative sciences, because the productive arts do not aim at knowledge. The ultimate purpose of the contemplative science is the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, while in the productive arts the end result is an actual product.
Zabarella also analyzed the relationships and hierarchy among the theoretical sciences themselves. To him, the contemplative or speculative sciences in an Aristotelian manner were only three in number: divine science, also called metaphysics; mathematics; and natural philosophy. Zabarella presents these contemplative sciences as the only defenders of true knowledge. He emphasized in many instances that each speculative science should demonstrate its own principles and not borrow them from metaphysics. Zabarella’s approach to the study of nature remained causal and qualitative in the traditional Aristotelian vein rather than mathematical. Therefore, he gave little attention to the possible uses of mathematics as a tool for understanding the physical world.
Logic and Methods. As Charles B. Schmitt remarked in his article, “Zabarella, Jacopo” in the Dictionary of Scientific Biography (vol. 14, 1970), most interpreters have pinpointed Zabarella’s lasting contribution to his work on logic and the scientific method. As an instrumental discipline, logic makes for a useful tool of inquiry for all the arts and sciences. Logic is a rational discipline that is not philosophy in itself, but springs from philosophy and is devoted to philosophical ends. For Zabarella, methods also served to differentiate the sciences from the arts. The term can be understood in two ways, either in a wide sense as a method of presenting existing knowledge, which he prefers to call an order (ordo) of presentation, or in a narrow sense as a method of discovering knowledge, for which he reserves the word method(methodus) in its proper understanding. According to Zabarella, ordo is an instrumental habitus that prepares teachers to lay out the parts of each discipline in such a way that the discipline may be taught as well and easily as possible. There are two demonstrative methods in the narrow sense of the word, composition and resolution, which have argumentative force instead of arranging the contents of a whole discipline. For Zabarella the so-called regressus method used in natural philosophy is a model for combining the methods of composition and resolution. The idea of this combinatory process is found in the Aristotelian tradition from Averroes on, and it was revived among the Italian Aristotelians and medical authors.
It is this very distinction between the method of inquiry and the order of teaching that led Zabarella to a bitter controversy with his Paduan colleague, Francesco Piccolomini. They agreed that ethical inquiry must proceed by deduction from an understanding of the end. In Zabarella’s view, however, all the disciplines whose end is action should be explained in this same way. While Piccolomini admitted that this order of teaching applied to ethics and other practical disciplines, he excluded theoretical subjects from such an order of understanding. The fundamental question embedded in this dispute is the following: Is the order of teaching a particular discipline necessary or contingent? Zabarella argued for the former. Both in discovery and in teaching, one should follow the synthetic order in the sciences and the analytic order in the arts. By making a sharp distinction between the method of discovery and the order of teaching, however, Piccolomini instead embraced a contingent view of the pedagogical method. Hoping to teach others, Piccolomini saw his duty as that of starting out from first principles. In such a case it is better to begin with the simpler matters and progress toward the end or goal.
Through their rival claims about the orders of presentation, Zabarella and Piccolomini also revealed very different perceptions of academic and civil order and very different ways of conceiving and pursuing the office of philosopher within that order. Zabarella wholeheartedly endorsed the purely contemplative nature of philosophy and the superiority of the contemplative life. He was also frequently dismissive of the disciplines he regarded as active or operative, such as law, medicine, ethics, politics, and mechanics. Piccolomini’s position was sharply opposed. For him, philosophy is, indeed, crucial for the spiritual perfection of man. However, in the form of scientia civilis(i.e., the theoretical part of ethics and politics), it is also the key to the this-wordly perfection that could be attained in the just administration of the Venetian republic.
The Perfection of Philosophy. In the Aristotelian tradition, which addresses the relationship between the theoretical or speculative sciences, the most influential section is the beginning of Aristotle’s treatise On the Soul(De anima). In Zabarella’s view it is obvious that the science of the soul is the most noble part of natural philosophy, because it shows the first cause and the sum of everything that is in animals and in plants. The science of the soul is more exquisite and certain than any other part of natural philosophy. Zabarella’s position can be interpreted as an attempt to raise the status of an independent natural philosophy by emphasizing the nobility of the science of the soul. What in the Middle Ages had perhaps been considered to be part of metaphysics was now the most valuable part of natural philosophy. Zabarella himself left the question of the immortality of the soul to the theologians, since Aristotle, as a natural philosopher, had not been explicit about it.
In De naturalis scientiae constitutione, the first treatise in his collected works on natural philosophy (De rebus naturalibus, 1590), Zabarella deals in detail with the questions of the order and perfection of the natural sciences. He claims, for example, that the book on minerals is necessary because natural philosophy would otherwise be incomplete. In the Aristotelian corpus on natural philosophy, the book on minerals follows the book On Meteorology. Whether Aristotle himself wrote on minerals is questionable, but at least he recognized the importance of the subject. However, both Theophrastus and Albertus Magnus later wrote on this significant subject. Thus, Zabarella did not consider Aristotle’s works as a complete corpus to which nothing could be added. In De methodis, Zabarella states that Aristotle wrote on subjects of his own choice, but that it would be an exaggeration to claim he was incapable of making mistakes. Aristotle was not infallible, and it would be erroneous to insist he knew the truth of everything he wrote. However, he remained an outstanding scholar for Zabarella, who would turn the study of logic into a discipline.
In the last chapter of De naturalis scientiae constitutione, Zabarella discusses the question of the perfection of the natural sciences. He states that whereas Aristotle’s philosophy of nature may be perfect in structure and form, it is incomplete in terms of its reference to natural beings. There is much Aristotle did not discuss at all and, indeed, much that was outside his cognizance. Zabarella therefore emphasizes that Aristotle’s philosophy of nature is complete at least in theory, comparing Aristotle’s works on natural philosophy to the geometry and arithmetic of Euclid. There are many theorems that can be demonstrated from his works, even if he did not himself actually write the theorems. For Zabarella, this is no reason to judge Euclid’s geometry or arithmetic defective or incomplete. If Euclid had wished, he could have demonstrated all the particular cases, but his book would have become so enormous that it surely would have daunted the reader. Zabarella suggests that this is exactly why Euclid titled his book The Elements: From this foundation all the other theorems can be demonstrated. Similarly, Zabarella finds that Aristotle’s natural philosophy can be called perfect, because it deals with all the knowledge that is possible for human intellect to obtain, either in practice or at least in theory.
Natural Philosophy and Medicine. Among the Paduan Aristotelians, Zabarella probably wrote most thoroughly about the relationship between the philosophy of nature and medical art. While in subject matter these disciplines were close to one another, in their essence and methodology they were far apart. In spite of medicine’s prominent place among the arts, Zabarella sharply denied its scientific status. Neither the art of medicine nor its singular parts can be regarded as science. For him it was enough to admit that it is the noblest of all arts. No matter how valuable and precise medicine may be, it could never be a science because it is practiced not for the sake of knowledge, but for an end product: that is, the maintenance or restoration of health.
Zabarella recognizes two different ways in which a physician can know the parts of a human body. First, he may learn them through perceptive knowledge and anatomical observations, thereby assimilating the matter of his discipline without understanding its rationale. A physician can also become familiar with parts of the human body through the philosophy of nature: He may learn the reasons that lie behind what he actually sees. In De rebus naturalibus, Zabarella points out that the art of medicine adopts the physiological part from the philosophy of nature. What a natural philosopher writes about animals, a medical writer should apply to human beings.
Zabarella’s conclusion about the relationship between the art of medicine and natural philosophy is that the latter must consider the universal qualities of health and sickness, while the former concentrates on finding remedies for particular diseases. Where the philosopher ends, the physician begins (ubi desinit philosophus, ibi incipit medicus). From the universal consideration of sickness and health, the physician descends to the treatment of all particular diseases and to the knowledge of their causes. While discussing the principles of medical art, Zabarella compares anatomical principles with principles derived from natural philosophy. In his view, only the philosophy of nature, not anatomy, can provide a solid basis for medical practitioners.
Aftermath. After the 1960s Zabarella’s name was linked to modern science. As early as 1940 in “The Development of Scientific Method at the School of Fatima” (and again in 1961 in The School of Padua and the Emergence of Modern Science), John Herman Randall published his famous idea on “the School of Padua” as the precursor of modern science. Following Ernst Cassirer, Randall referred to the Renaissance discussions of the regressus method up to Zabarella as a preparation for Galileo Galilei’s new method of natural science. However, the Aristotelian terminology and doctrines shared by Zabarella and Galileo seem for the most part to have been commonplace in late medieval and Renaissance thought. Galileo may have known Zabarella’s writings, but a far more important source for Galileo were the Jesuit scholars, above all Paolo della Valle, working at the Collegio Romano at Rome.
Moreover, the scientific ideal that Zabarella presents is profoundly different from the modern view of a scientist making new discoveries. According to Zabarella, science can be new only in a restricted sense; the work of a scientist is more like correcting the mistakes and filling the gaps in a ready-made Aristotelian world system. Therefore, Zabarella cannot be considered a precursor of modern experimental science. In spite of its empirical basis, Zabarella’s natural philosophy is not concerned with anything akin to experiment. Indeed, if experiments were to be developed, they would find their place in the productive arts rather than in natural philosophy. Zabarella did not use experiments in order to verify or falsify theories in the modern sense. He did make observations of natural things, but just to exemplify and illustrate the demonstrative reasoning used in theoretical natural philosophy.
Instead of overemphasizing the connection between Zabarella and Galileo, it should be noted that Zabarella’s thought had a lasting impact on Protestant Aristotelians in Germany and the Low Countries during the late sixteenth century and the first part of the seventeenth century. His clear and systematic interpretation of Aristotle’s logic and natural philosophy was used as a basis for numerous Aristotelian textbooks printed in Germany. Also, in the British Isles the Scholastic revival of the early seventeenth century owed much to Zabarella’s writings. His commentaries have been consulted with profit by even some modern scholars of Aristotle.
The author knows of no publication as of 2007 that has a complete bibliography of Zabarella’s work. One could perhaps refer to Charles H. Lohr (1988): Latin Aristotle Commentaries II: Renaissance Authors, Florence: Leo S. Olschki. On Zabarella’s publications and manuscripts, see pages 497–503.
WORKS BY ZABARELLA
De methodis liber quatuor; Liber de regressu. Edited by Cesare Vasoli. Bologna, Italy: Clueb, 1985.
Berti, Enrico. “Metafisica e diallectica nel ‘Commento’ di Giacomo Zabarella agli ‘Analitici posteriori.’” Giornale di metafisica, new series, 14 (1992): 225–244.
Bouillon, Dominique. “Un discours inédit de Iacopo Zabarella préliminaire à l’exposition de la ‘Physique’ d’Aristote (Padoue 1568).” Atti e Memorie dell’Accadema Galileiana di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti in Padova 111, part 3 (1998–1999): 119–127.
Copenhaver, Brian P., and Charles B. Schmitt. Renaissance Philosophy. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Grendler, Paul F. The Universities of the Italian Renaissance. Baltimore, MD, and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002.
Jardine, Nicholas. “Epistemology of the Sciences.” In The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, edited by Charles B. Schmitt. Cambridge, U.K., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
———. “Keeping Order in the School of Padua: Jacopo Zabarella and Francesco Piccolomini on the Offices of Philosophy.” In Method and Order in Renaissance Philosophy of Nature: The Aristotle Commentary Tradition, edited by Daniel DiLiscia, Eckhard Kessler, and Charlotte Methuen. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 1997.
Kessler, Eckhard. “The Intellective Soul.” In The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, edited by C. B. Schmitt. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
———. “Zabarella, Jacopo (1533–1589).” In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward Craig. Vol. 9. London and New York: Routledge, 1998.
Laird, W. R. The “Scientiae Mediae” in Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle’s “Posterior Analytics.” PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1983.
———. “Zabarella, Jacopo (1533–1589).” In Encyclopedia of the Scientific Revolution: From Copernicus to Newton, edited by Wilbur Applebaum. New York and London: Garland, 2000.
Lines, David A. Aristotle’s Ethics in the Italian Renaissance (ca. 1300–1650): The Universities and the Problem of Moral Education. Leiden, The Netherlands, and Boston: Brill, 2002.
Michael, Emily. “The Nature and Influence of Late Renaissanc Paduan Psychology.” History of Universities 12 (1993): 65–94.
Mikkeli, Heikki. An Aristotelian Response to Renaissance Humanism: Jacopo Zabarella on the Nature of Arts and Sciences. Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1992.
———. “The Foundation of an Autonomous Natural Philosophy: Zabarella on the Classification of Arts and Sciences.” In Method and Order in Renaissance Philosophy of Nature: The Aristotle Commentary Tradition, edited by Daniel DiLiscia, Eckhard Kessler, and Charlotte Methuen. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 1997.
———. “Jacopo Zabarella (1533–1589): Ordnung und Methode der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis.” In Philosophen der Renaissance, edited by Paul Richard Blum. Darmstadt, Germany: Primus Verlag, 1999
———. “Giacomo Zabarella.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zabarella.
Poppi, Antonino. “La struttura del discorso morale nell’opera di Iacopo Zabarella.” In L’etica del rinascimento tra Platone e Aristotele, by Antonino Poppi. Naples, Italy: La Città del Sole, 1997.
———. Ricerche sulla teologia e la scienza nella Scuola padovana del Cinque e Seicento. Soveria Mannelli, Italy: Rubbettino Editore, 2001.
Randall, John H., Jr. “The Development of the Scientific Method at the School of Padua.” Journal of the History of Ideas 1 (1940): 177–206.
———. The School of Padua and the Emergence of Modern Science. Padua, Italy: Editrice Antenore, 1961.
Risse, Wilhelm. “Zabarellas Methodenlehre.” In Aristotelismo veneto e scienza moderna, edited by Luigi Oliveri. Padua, Italy: Editrice Antenore, 1983.
Rossi, Paolo. “Aristotelici e ‘moderni’: Le ipotesi e la natura.” In Aristotelismo veneto e scienza moderna, edited by Luigi Olivieri. Padua, Italy: Editrice Antenore, 1983.
Schmitt, Charles B. “Zabarella, Jacopo.” In Dictionary of Scientific Biography, edited by Charles Coulston Gillispie. Vol. 14. New York: Scribner, 1970.
———. Aristotle and the Renaissance. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1983.
South, James B. “Zabarella and the Intentionality of Sensation.” Rivista di storia della filosofia 57 (2002): 5–25.
Wallace, William A. Galileo’s Logic of Discovery and Proof: The Background, Content, and Use of His Appropriated Treatises on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. Dordrecht, The Netherlands; Boston: Kluwer, 1992
. ———. “Zabarella, Jacopo.” In Encyclopedia of the Renaissance, edited by Paul F. Grendler. Vol. 6. New York: Scribner's, 1999.
(b. Padua, Italy, 5 September 1533; d. Padua, 15 October 1589)
natural philosophy, scientific method.
Zabarella was born into an old and noble Paduan family, the son of Giulio Zabarella, from whom, as firstborn son, he inherited the title of palatine count. After humanistic education he entered the University of Padua, where he studied logic with Bernardino Tomitano and natural philosophy with Marcantonio de’Passeri, among others, receiving a degree in 1553. In 1564 he succeeded Tomitano in the first chair of logic and four years later moved to the more prestigious and more lucrative chair of natural philosophy, a position he held for the remainder of his life.
Zabarella must be considered one of the major figures of the revival of Aristotelian philosophy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He is a prime representative of a specifically Italian form of Aristotelianism in which the teaching of philosophy was closely tied to the needs of medical education. Consequently, his writings epitomize a “naturalistic” approach to philosophy rather than the more theological and metaphysical orientation that had developed in the universities of northern Europe during the later Middle Ages. Both Zabarella’s published writings and his teaching focused upon an interpretation of Aristotle’s works on logic and natural philosophy. Especially in the latter subject he displayed a strongly empirical approach to understanding the physical and biological world. Observation and experience played an important role in his attempt to comprehend nature, although a very rudimentary “experimental method” was developed in his works. Like most philosophers of the period, Zabarella was more concerned to understand the organic, biological world of natural change than the more abstract realm of what later came to be called “physical science.” Consequently, he gave little attention to the possible uses of mathematics as a tool for understanding the physical world.
According to most interpreters, Zabarella’s lasting contribution lies in his work on logic and scientific method. It was also in this field that he gained an enormous and authoritative reputation during his lifetime and in the first half of the seventeenth century. Although he wrote on many aspects of logic, it was to methodological questions that he devoted his major effort and on which he wrote most penetratingly. Following an interpretation of Aristotle that goes back to the Greek commentators, Zabarella insisted that logic is not, strictly speaking, a part of philosophy itself but, rather, is an instrumental discipline (instrumentum) that furnishes a useful tool of inquiry for the arts and sciences. Expanding on and clarifying Aristotle’s doctrine of scientific method, as found in the Posterior Anal ytics, he distinguished “demonstrative method” (methodus demonstrativa) from “resolutive method” (methodus resolutiva).Both of these are syllogistic in form. The former proceeds from causes to effects, and the latter from effects to causes.
These notions are analyzed in great detail in Zabarella’s De methodis, one of the works in his Opera logica (1578).The same collection contains his De regressu, which attempts to work out a specific form of demonstration to be applied to the investigation of natural science. In it Zabarella explains his notion of “regress” (regressus), a concept that for many years had been discussed in writings on logic and natural philosophy by his Italian Aristotelian predecessors. “Regress” uses both demonstrative and resolutive methods. It is a technique by which one proceeds from a particular effect to its cause and then returns to a consideration of the effect, thereby having gained a fuller understanding of it and its relation to its cause. The procedure involves several distinct steps, including a careful intellectual analysis (examen mentale) of the situation and a final attempt to relate cause to effect in a fuller manner than was possible at the beginning of the analysis.
Although it has been suggested that Zabarella and the methodological tradition of Italian Aristo-telianism that he represented were a major influence on the development of Galileo’s scientific methodology, concrete evidence has not been adduced to establish a direct connection. In fact, the Aristotelian terminology and doctrines that Zabarella and Galileo share (for instance, Zabarella, methodus resolutiva; Galileo, metodo resolutivo) seem for the most part to have been commonplaces of late medieval and Renaissance thought, in mathematics and medicine as well as in logic and natural philosophy. Moreover, Zabarella’s application of these methods was unwaveringly cast in a syllogistic form, whereas Galileo repeatedly rejected the use of the syllogism in scientific investigation. It must also be noted that-quite contrary to Galileo-Zabarella in no way suggested a systematic application of mathematics to the study of the natural world. On the other hand, it seems evident that the clarity of Zabarella’s thought, the precision of his distinctions, and his sharp focus on problems of natural science contributed materially to the progressive clarification of the place of the sciences in the cultural complex of the seventeenth century.
In addition to his logical works, Zabarella wrote commentaries on several treatises of Aristotle (including Posterior A nalytics, De anima, De generatione et corruptione, Meteorology, and several books of the Physics).An important and influential collection of short treatises on various topics of natural philosophy is in his De rebus naturalihus (1590). In it he treats many specific problems (including the motion of heavy and light bodies, reaction, the regions of the air, mixture, and elementary qualities), often showing the acuteness of the logical works, although he often relies on traditional solutions to the problems. This collection contains a typical late sixteenth century approach to natural phuilosophy. Little attention is paid to the peculiarly medieval natural philosophy that had been dominant from the early fourteenth century until the early sixteenth century (such as the Merton and Paris schools), but much is devoted to a study of the Greek text of Aristole and a consideration of the opinoions of his Greek expositors Zabarella was an excellent Greek scholar and devoted much effort to presenting what eh conidered to be the ture meaning of Aristole’s text. He also drew extensively upon such Greek commentators as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Olympiodorus Philoponus,and Simplicius Besides relying on earlier authorities Zabarella occasionally displayeed a strongly empirical bent that allowed him to utilize his personal experiences to reject traditional views. Throughout his writing the approach ot natural philosophical problems is qualitative and bears little simiarity to eithre that developed at Oxford and Paris during the four teenth century ro to that employed by Galileo and othre in the seventeenth century
The important collections of Zabarella’s writings especially the Opera logicaand the De rebus anturalibrrs began ot extert influence throughout Europe soon after the initile publication. This lasted at last until the middle of the seventeenth century when the dominan position of the Aristotelian tradition finally began to wane. Besides Italy Zabarella was particularly influentlal in Germany where is works were frequently reprinted and in the British Isles where frequently reprinted and in the British Isles Where the Scholastic revival of the early seventeeth century owed much to his writing The full impact of Zabarella and the extent of his influence on later philosophy and science have yet to be worked out in detail.
I. Origial Works. The most important of Zabarel la’s logical writing are in the Opera logica (Venice 1578; repr Hildesheim, 1966 at least 14 later eds.) and In duos Aritotelis libros posterioum analysis commentelis (Vencie 1582; repr Frankfurt 1966; several later eds) De rebus naturalian (Venice 1590 repr. Frankfurt , 1966 at least 8 later eds) contains 30 short works on naturla philosophy Among the commentaries obn Aristotle are In libros Aristoteils physicorum commentarii (Venice 1601; Frankfurt 1602) the latter ed. also containing commentaries on De generation et corruption and Metreology and In tres Aristotelies libros de anima commentari (Venica 1605; Franffurt 1606, 1691). For a more exhaustive listing of printed works adn of MSS see Edwards’ disseration (below) See also M. Dal Pra, “Una oratio programmatica di G. Zabarella,” in Rivisa critica di storia della filosofia21 (1966), 286–290.
II. Secondary Literature. The most comprehensive studies of Zabarella are William F. Edwards “The Logic of lacopo Zabarella (1533-1589) “Ph.D diss. Columbia University 1906; summary in Dissertation Abstracts21 (1961) 2754-2746(with an extensive bibliography of Zabarell’a works and secondary literature published before 1960) adn Antonino Poppi La dottrina della scienza in Giacomo Zabarella (Padua 1972). Other useful general treatments are Edwards article in Enciclopedia filosofica 2nd ed. VI (Florence ticle in Enciclopedia filosofica,2nd, ed VI (Florence 1967) 1187-1 189; Eugenio Garin Storia della filosofia italiana(Turin, 1966), 548–558; and Giuseppe Saitta, II pensiero italiano nell’ unianesimo e net Rinascirento2nd, ed., II (Florence 1960), 400–423.
Works more specifically oriented toward Zabarella’s logic or methodolgy inculde F. Botti “La teoia del regresses in Giacomo Zabarella “in saggi e ricerche su Aristotele …Zabarella … (Padua, 1972), 49–70 E; Cassirer,des Erkenntnisprobletn 2nd, ed.m I (Berlin 1911) 136–143; A Corsano “Per la storia del pensiero del tardo Rinascimento. X;Lo strumentalismo logic di I Zaberella,” in Giornale critico delta filosofia italiana41 (1962) 507–517 A Crescini Le origini del metodo analitico: lt Cinqyecento (Udine 1965), 168–188; W. F. Edwards “The Averroism of tacopo Zabarella” in Atti del XH Congresso ill intrenazionale di filosofiaIX (Florence 1960) 91–107 N. W. Gilbert Renaissance Concepts of Methods (New York 1960) 176–176; and “Galileo adn the School of Padua,” in Journal of the History of Philosophy1 (1963) 223–321 P. Rangnico, “Una polemica di logica nell’ Univresity di Padova nelle scuole di B. Petrella e G. Zabarella, in Atti del Istituto reneto di science lettere ed arti 6th ser;4 (1886) 463–502; and “La polemica tra Francesco Piccolomini e Giacomo Zabarella nell Universite di Padova” ibid;1217-1252: J.H. Randall, The School of’ Padua and the Emregence of Modern Science (Padua 1961) 15–68 W. Risse, Die Logik de 1- Neuzeit; I (Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt, 1964) 287–290; C. B. Schmitt,“Experience and Exprement; A Comparison of Zabarella View With Galileo’s in De motu;” in Studies in the Renaissance16 (1969) 80–138 and C. Vasoli, Strrdi srrlla cultura cultura del Rinasciniento (Manduria.1968), 308–342.
Charles B. Schmitt
Renaissance philosopher; b. Padua, Sept. 7, 1533; d. there, Oct. 25, 1589. A count of the Holy Roman Empire and a citizen of the Venetian Republic, he was professor of logic and natural philosophy at Padua from 1564 until his death. His is the terminal and most lucid development of Renaissance aristotelianism, especially in logic. Influenced in part by humanism and by the Latin averroism stemming from john of jandun, Zabarella wrote rigorous commentaries on Aristotle's text and separate systematic treatises on his philosophy. His commentaries on the Posterior Analytics, Physics, and De Anima have been used by modern classicists, especially W. D. Ross, in editing and interpreting Aristotle. His collected logical treatises, the Opera logica (Venice 1578, 2d ed. 1586), contain, noteworthily, two books on the nature of logic and four on philosophic or scientific methodology, the De methodis. The latter criticizes the untidy neo–Galenian theory of methods, reducing them to two, the analytic, or resolutive, and the synthetic, or compositive. Also noteworthy is his treatise De regressu, a sort of theory of verification in physical science. His collected natural treatises, the De rebus naturalibus (Venice 1590), include the earlier De naturalis scientiae constitutione (1586) and, also of note, two books on primary matter; four on the discovery of the first mover; one on the agent sense (a problem bequeathed the Italians by John of Jandun); one each on the human mind, the intelligible species, and the agent mind; and one on methodology, the De ordine intelligendi. Zabarella's natural philosophy is of considerable historical interest, but his theories of logic and method are, in addition, of permanent systematic importance. Zabarella's transmontane impact was greater than his immediate influence upon his fellow Italians. galileo cites him only twice, once in general approval, once to oppose him on primary matter. Despite the Lyons edition of his logic in 1587, his influence in France seems negligible. But in Germany, thanks to the fourth edition of his logic (Basel 1594) and the fact that reforming theologians had been students of his at Padua, he was cited among the moderns as of at least equal authority with P. melanchthon, and was rivaled only by the Portuguese Jesuit P. da fonseca. He influenced J. Jungius (1587–1657), Leibniz's professor of logic, and was avidly studied by G. W. leibniz himself, A. G. Baumgarten (1714–62), and others.
See Also: renaissance philosophy.
Bibliography: Works. De natura logicae, Eng. d. d. runes, ed., Classics in Logic (New York 1962). Literature. w. f. edwards, Enciclopedia filosofica, 4 v. (Venice–Rome 1957) 4:1811–13; The Logic of Iacopo Zabarella (Doctoral Diss. Columbia U. 1961); "The Averroism of Iacopo Zabarella" Atti del XII Congresso Internazionale de Filosofia 9 (1960) 91–107. j. j. glanville, "Zabarella and Poinsot on the Object and Nature of Logic," in Readings in Logic, ed. r. houde (Dubuque 1958). n. w. gilbert, Renaissance Concepts of Method (New York 1960).
[j. j. glanville]