Common Law

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Common Law

Two systems of law have emerged throughout history: the common law of England and the civil law of the Roman Empire. Common law evolved from judicial decisions over time based on tradition, custom, and precedent in historical England. Civil law is derived from written legal codes in which disputes were settled by reference to edicts, broad principles, and legislation. Most of the nations of Europe, Latin America, and East Asia are governed by one of these two systems of justice. Although the two legal systems are different in many respects, they converged in the latter years of the twentieth century due to afailure of courts to keep pace with social developments and an increased reliance on statutory law in many societies.

history of common law

Common law originally developed as a result of the unification of England and the institutional stability provided by William the Conqueror (c. 1027–1087) after 1066. Prior to 1066, the Anglo-Saxon peoples were governed mainly by local customs and rules that varied from village to village and were often enforced arbitrarily by informal public assemblies. The clergy who controlled much of European society at the time preferred the civil-law tradition and endeavored to preserve it through the training of scholars and judges in Roman law principles.

The seeds of the common-law system were first planted by laymen and judges appointed by Edward I (1239–1307). Their mission was to promote the common law as an alternative to the law system controlled by the clergy. Laymen established societies called "inns of court," where they devoted their lives to the study of the common law. Judges were selected from these societies by the king to administer the law and make judgments based on precedents provided by past decisions. A unique aspect of common law was that it was based on the law of the courts as expressed by judges in the form of judicial decisions rather than on general principles or edicts enunciated by the Church. These judicial decisions, if issued by the highest court in the jurisdiction , were binding on all other courts in the jurisdiction. A weakness of early common law, however, was that the only remedy available was monetary damages.

During the twelfth century, Henry II (1133–1189) institutionalized the common law by creating a powerful unified court system based on it. The establishment of the new court system diminished the significance of the canonical courts and the Church's preference for the civil-law system, invoking anger and dissent within the Church. Thomas Becket (1118–1170), the archbishop of Canterbury, was an outspoken critic of the king's policies against the Church. In 1163, Becket sought the complete exemption of the Church from all civil jurisdiction, allowing undivided control of its clergy. The king, however, called a meeting of the clergy at Westminster and demanded that they renounce all claim to exemption from civil jurisdiction and acknowledge the equality of all subjects before the law. Becket was later assassinated by the king's followers.

In 1215 King John (1167–1216) elevated the importance of the common law at Runningmead when he signed the Magna Carta. The Magna Carta freed the Church, localized the court system, and codified the basic principles of the common law. A few decades later, Henry de Bracton (1210–1268), an English judge and writer on English law, wrote the famous treatise De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae (On the laws and customs of England), in which he asserted the supremacy of the common law over the king. Sir Edward Coke (1552–1634), an English jurist , later became the great champion of the common law against encroachments by the king and declared null and void royal proclamations that were contrary to the law.

By the sixteenth century, common law had come to supplant civil law as the predominant legal system in England. Judges and lawyers repudiated the civil-law system as outdated and inapplicable to the English polity. Although the common law was still somewhat unwieldy in terms of procedural rules, it had opened the door substantively to a host of new rights and protections that were not applicable under the civil-law tradition. For example, litigants discovered that they could petition the king for further redress if monetary damages were not sufficient to right a wrong committed against them (i.e., eviction in the case of a squatter occupying one's land). It was out of this pursuit of additional remedies that courts of chancery and equity emerged.

Over the next few centuries, the common-law system continued to develop and expand geographically throughout the world. In 1774, when the representatives of the various American colonies met in Philadelphia, they declared the common law of England to be part of the basic rights and liberties to which the colonies were entitled. In 1848, the state of New York enacted a code of civil procedure that merged law and equity into one jurisdiction. Subsequently, the Field code reforms—named for the codes' drafter, David Dudley Field (1805–1894)—were adopted by the U.S. federal government, most of the states, and the United Kingdom. These codes placed the administration of law and equity suits in the same courts.

Today, every state in the United States, except Louisiana, uses the commonlaw system. Most state statutes require that the common law, equity, and statutes in effect in England in 1603 should be included in the law of the jurisdiction. The common-law system also constitutes the basis of the legal systems of Canada (except for Quebec), Australia, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, and South Africa, among other nations. Each of these common-law jurisdictions recognizes the importance of the adversarial system and the fundamental principles of law that have been adopted over the centuries by way of custom and case law.

history of civil law

Civil law, in contrast to common law, developed out of Romano-Germanic law—the law of continental Europe—based on an admixture of Roman, Germanic, ecclesiastical, feudal, commercial, and customary law . The beginnings of the civil-law tradition can be traced to the Twelve Tables written in 449 b.c.e. The Twelve Tables laid the foundation for Roman law, which would develop over the centuries and become one of the most advanced systems of law in human history. It included a number of important legal concepts, including the notion of private international law, and the distinctions between contract and tort , and property and possession. In the sixth century the Emperor Justinian (c. 483–565) codified much of Roman law in the Corpus Juris Civilis. The Corpus Juris Civilis is regarded as one of the most influential legal texts ever written and has been on the reading lists of law schools in countries using civil law for nearly 1,500 years.

After the fall of the Roman Empire, the Church oversaw the development and preservation of the civil-law tradition through the Middle Ages. Roman law later was supplanted by Germanic laws, but it was revived during the eleventh century as part of a much broader renewal of interest in classical culture in Europe.

Following the rise of the nation-state system in Europe, natural or civil codes were established in several countries, including France, Spain, Germany, and several Latin American and East Asian countries. The purpose behind the civil codes was to create a unified system of laws or statutes derived from basic principles and on which judicial decisions could be based. Perhaps the most widely known civil code is the Napoleonic Code established in France in 1804, which also serves as the basis for the civil-law systems of Quebec and Louisiana today. The German civil code provides the legal foundation for the civil-law systems of the former Soviet-bloc countries, as well as Japan, South Korea, China, and Taiwan. Most of Latin America also uses the civil-law system, shaped by the civil codes of its former colonial masters in Europe.

fast facts

Louisiana is the only U.S. state that operates under the Napoleonic Code, or civilian law system.

field's code reforms

Frustrated by a cumbersome common-law system that forced attorneys to rely on an increasingly complex body of judicial opinions, New York jurist David Dudley Field (1805–1894) spent much of his professional career spearheading judicial reform. Beginning in 1839, Field began the laborious process of codifying the body of New York law into written form, merging law and equity proceedings into a single jurisdiction and dramatically increasing the accessibility of a systematized and consistent body of law for attorneys, magistrates, and clients.

While his efforts met with some initial resistance, Field's code reforms were eventually adopted by the federal government, many state governments, and even several foreign countries. After completing his work on the domestic codes, Field went on to draft an outline of an international code in 1872, which considered the peacetime relationships among nations. A second edition of his international code included a section on wars among nations.

common law versus civil law: defining characteristics

One of the key elements that distinguishes common law from civil law is the role of precedent. Precedent is the principle in law of looking to past judicial decisions to assist in the application of the law to a given set of facts. There are two types of precedent: (1) binding precedent and (2) persuasive precedent. Binding, or mandatory, precedent is rooted in the doctrine of stare decisis ("let that stand which has been stated"), which expresses the notion that prior court decisions must be followed as precedents according to case law. In a common-law system, lower courts must follow prior judicial decisions from a higher court in the same jurisdiction. A Supreme Court or high court, however, is not bound by lower-court precedents and may overrule or modify its own judicial decisions. The principle of stare decisis is not recognized in most civil-law jurisdictions, however, on the grounds that it interferes with the right and duty of judges to interpret and apply the law as it is written in the codes or statutes.

The second type of precedent is persuasive, or advisory, in nature and is based on the notion that lower courts should adhere to a higher court's decision unless there is a strong reason to ignore, overturn, or modify the decision. Unlike the role of precedent in the same jurisdiction under the common law, in which former decisions control the court unconditionally, the role of precedent in separate jurisdictions does not control the court's decision. Under the common-law systems of most U.S. states, courts often ignore their own decisions or the decisions of higher courts in separate jurisdictions because such decisions are only persuasive. This second type of precedent is more compatible with civil law. Nonetheless, courts are still expected to adhere to their own precedents in the absence of strong justification to ensure predictability in the law.

Purported Certainty. Another important characteristic of the common law is its purported certainty. There is no place—at least in theory—for a lawyer's opinion or the private interpretations of judges under the common law. Because the common law—again, in principle—controls the arbitrary discretion of judges, it is supposed to produce certainty with regard to one's rights and duties under the law. New rules may be adopted from time to time and judicial decisions may be overturned, but these new rules or decisions will become binding precedents, thus restoring certainty to the law. Thus, an individual coming before the court will be assured of the same decision in the same type of case. The principle of stare decisis in judicial decision-making has guided the development of the common law over the centuries in an effort to foster predictability of the law.

Civil law also claims to strictly regulate judicial discretion: It posits the ideal role of the judge to be that of "the mouth of the law," speaking only what is required by the statutes or law codes. Nevertheless, civil law depends on flexibility in interpreting the law to a much greater degree than does common law.

Different schools of judicial interpretation exist in most civil-law countries, and the law tends to be a product of these competing schools. Judicial disregard of precedent may be considered to be a strong point of the civil-law system, even if it makes the law less certain, because it allows for alternative interpretations of the law that may be more compatible with the facts and circumstances of a particular case. One of the results of this more flexible approach in applying the law is that judicial opinions tend to be more concise, as courts discuss only the relevant legislation that applies rather than detailing how a decision was reached. However, the civil-law systems of Europe, as one might expect, are still subject to the vagaries and uncertainties that come with judge-made law in which precedents have little influence.

Statutory Codification. A third distinguishing feature of common law is that it remains relevant alongside of statutory codification. Statutory codification is the process by which a statute is passed with the intention of restating the common-law position in a single document. However, statutes may leave out a number of things that are provided for in the common law. If a statute seeking to codify the common-law tort of negligence excludes the right to seek certain damages (i.e., loss of earnings and emotional distress) provided for under common-law negligence, a person may still pursue those excluded damages under common law. These damages need not be set forth in statute as long as they already exist under the common law. In most common-law jurisdictions, lawmakers understand that statutes are to be drafted in light of the common-law tradition, and so they may omit a number of things, knowing that preexisting case law or custom serves as backstop to statutory law.

the convergence of common law and civil law

The evolution of the common law has been a process of discovery as well as a stabilizing force for civilization. Early common law, unlike civil law, was inflexible, procedurally unwieldy, and provided for only monetary damages. Over time, however, common law has become more reliable and predictable than civil law, as adherence to the principle of stare decisis has yielded a consistent record of case law for judges and lawyers to follow. Until recently, the common-law and civil-law systems differed sharply due to the different emphasis each placed on basic notions such as judicial discretion and certainty in the law. However, given the rapid changes in culture, politics, media, and communications in the last century, the common-law courts have found it more difficult to keep pace with social developments.


Increasingly, the courts have turned to statutory law to fill gaps in the common law created by social developments. For example, there is no tort of wrongful death under the common law. Wrongful death, which permits a spouse or child to sue for damages on behalf of the deceased, is purely a statutory cause of action. Thus, in the absence of a wrongful death statute, a person cannot look to the common law for relief under this cause of action. Courts generally are supposed to interpret such statutes strictly according to their terms, and, in doing so, to regard the legislature's intent as controlling.

In sum, the convergence of common law and civil law has been an important development in legal history. Common-law judges have come to recognize the need for the expansion of statutory law in many fields, including commercial, administrative, and criminal law. The effect of this convergence has been to reduce the reliance on precedent and judicial supremacy in favor of more democratically driven law within the common-law system. Although common-law judges still look to precedents provided by past decisions to resolve the vast majority of disputes, legal scholars no longer see the common law and the civil law as mutually exclusive.

See also: Civil Law.

bibliography

Hogue, Arthur. Origins of the Common Law. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1986.

Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr. The Common Law, Lecture (1881). Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1991.

Merryman, John. The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Plucknett, Theodore. Concise History of the Common Law. 5th ed. Aspen, CO: Aspen Publishers, 1956.

Klint Alexander

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