Khrushchev, Nikita

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Nikita Khrushchev

Excerpt from "Communiqué to President Kennedy Accepting an End to the Missile Crisis, October 28, 1962"

Originally published in The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: National Security Archive Documents Reader, 1992

"I very well understand your anxiety and the anxiety of the United States people in connection with the fact that the weapons which you describe as "offensive" are, in fact, grim weapons. Both you and I understand what kind of weapon they are."

O n Wednesday, October 24, 1962, the first day of the U.S. naval quarantine, or blockade, designed to prevent Soviet ships carrying military equipment from reaching the island of Cuba, the U.S. military was at alert level DEFCON 2 (DEFense CONdition 2). DEFCON 2 is the last level before DEFCON 1, which means a nuclear war is imminent or has begun. At no other time in U.S. history had the level been at DEFCON 2. Then by midday, the Soviet ships apparently had stopped in the water and not challenged the U.S. ships forming the quarantine ring. On Thursday, October 25, the Soviet vessels carrying military equipment indeed turned around and headed back to the Soviet Union. However, this did not end the crisis. It was only a momentary breather because missiles with nuclear warheads already on site on the island remained.

By Friday, October 26, Attorney General Robert Kennedy (1925–1968), at the request of his brother, President John F. Kennedy (1917–1963; served 1961–63), was having "backdoor" meetings with the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin (1919–). That evening, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971) sent President Kennedy a letter

offering to remove the missiles already located on the island if President Kennedy would assure him that the United States would not invade Cuba. That same evening, Dobrynin and Attorney General Kennedy met, and Dobrynin hinted that the United States should remove the U.S. missiles located in Turkey. On Saturday morning, Khrushchev sent President Kennedy yet another letter demanding those missiles in Turkey be removed if the Soviets agreed to remove the missiles in Cuba.

Before President Kennedy could reply to either of Khrushchev's letters, more rapid-fire events turned Saturday, October 27, into "Black Saturday." It was so named because many thought it was the day the world came closest to annihilation. Two incidents occurred involving U.S. U-2 reconnaissance (spy-photography) aircraft. In the first instance, a U-2 flying over Alaska drifted into Soviet airspace. The Soviets took the incident as a test of their defense system. The second incident occurred over Cuba, where a U-2 was shot down and the pilot killed. By the afternoon, the U.S. military and various members of Congress were pressing President Kennedy hard for an immediate invasion of Cuba.

Ignoring much of the uproar and staying intensely focused, Attorney General Kennedy came up with a simple compromise. He told the president to ignore the second letter from Khrushchev and accept the terms of the first—promising Khrushchev the United States would not invade Cuba and would halt the quarantine if he removed the missiles. This was the public part of the agreement. Then, privately, Dobrynin got his assurance that the missiles in Turkey would be removed. The next morning, Sunday, October 28, Khrushchev sent a message to President Kennedy agreeing to remove the missiles from Cuba. The following is an excerpt from Khrushchev's October 28 message.

Things to remember while reading the excerpt from "Communiqué to President Kennedy Accepting an End to the Missile Crisis, October 28, 1962":

  • President Kennedy was under intense U.S. military and congressional pressure to invade Cuba.
  • Sergei Khrushchev (1935–), son of Nikita Khrushchev, writes in his book Nikita Khrushchev: Creation of a Super-power, "When Father argued at a meeting of the Soviet leadership in favor of withdrawing the missiles, he made this unprecedented statement: 'We have to help Kennedy withstand pressure from the hawks [supporters of war]. They are demanding an immediate military invasion.'" Khrushchev knew an invasion would lead to nuclear war.
  • Nikita Khrushchev agreed to a U.S. president's "promise" not to invade Cuba again. According to Sergei Khrushchev, this would have been "inconceivable" only a few years earlier.

Excerpt from "Communiqué to President Kennedy Accepting an End to the Missile Crisis, October 28, 1962"

Esteemed Mr. President: I have received your message of October 27, 1962. I express my satisfaction and gratitude for the sense of proportion and understanding of the responsibility borne by you at present for the preservation of peace throughout the world which you have shown. I very well understand your anxiety and the anxiety of the United States people in connection with the fact that the weapons which you describe as "offensive" are, in fact, grim weapons. Both you and I understand what kind of weapon they are.

In order to complete with greater speed the liquidation of the conflict dangerous to the cause of peace, to give confidence to all people longing for peace, and to calm the American people, who, I am certain, want peace as much as the people of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, in addition to previously issued instructions on the cessation of further work at building sites for the weapons, has issued a new order on the dismantling of the weapons which you describe as "offensive," and their crating and return to the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, I would like to repeat once more what I had already written to you in my preceding letters—that the Soviet Government has placed at the disposal of the Cuban Government economic aid, as well as arms, inasmuch as Cuba and the Cuban

people have constantly been under the continuous danger of an invasion [from the United States].…

We stationed them there in order that no attack should be made against Cuba and that no rash action should be permitted to take place.

I regard with respect and trust your statement in your message of October 27, 1962, that no attack will be made on Cuba—that no invasion will take place—not only by the United States, but also by other countries of the Western Hemisphere, as your message pointed out. Then the motives which promoted us to give aid of this nature to Cuba cease. They are no longer applicable, hence we have instructed our officers—and these means, as I have already stated, are in the hands of Soviet officers—to take necessary measures for stopping the building of the said projects and their dismantling and return to the Soviet Union.…

I note with satisfaction that you have responded to my wish that the said dangerous situation should be liquidated and also that conditions should be created for a more thoughtful appraisal of theinternational situation which is fraught with great dangers in our age of thermonuclear weapons, rocket technology … global rockets, and other lethal weapons. All people are interested in insuring peace. Therefore, we who are invested with trust and great responsibility must not permit an exacerbation of the situation and must liquidate the breeding grounds where a dangerous situation has been created fraught with serious consequences for the cause of peace. If we succeed along with you and with the aid of other people of good will in liquidating this tense situation, we must also concern ourselves to see that other dangerous conflicts do not arise which might lead to a world thermonuclear catastrophe.…

Mr. President, I trust your statement. However, on the other hand, there are responsible people who would like to carry out an invasionof Cuba at this time, and in such a way to spark off a war. If we take practical steps and announce the dismantling and evacuation of the appropriate means from Cuba, then, doing that, we wish to establish at the same time the confidence of the Cuban people that we are with them and are not divesting ourselves of the responsibility of granting help to them.

We are convinced that the people of all countries, like yourself, Mr. President, will understand me correctly. We do not issue threats. We desire only peace. Our country is now on the upsurge. Our people are enjoying the fruits of their peaceful labor.…

We value peace, perhaps even more than other people, because we experienced the terrible war against Hitler. However, our people

will not flinch in the face of any ordeal. Our people trust their government, and we assure our people and the world public that the Soviet government will not allow itself to be provoked.

Should the provocateurs unleash a war, they would not escape the grave consequences of such a war. However, we are confident that reason will triumph. War will not be unleashed and the peace and security of people will be insured.…

With respect for you, Khrushchev. October 28, 1962.

What happened next …

With the agreement, both sides immediately breathed easier. The U.S. military alert level went to DEFCON 5, the lowest level of military concern. Khrushchev proceeded to bring the missiles back to the Soviet Union. Both sides claimed victory. President Kennedy had achieved the goal of moving the missiles out of Cuba. Khrushchev had gotten a promise of protection for communist Cuba. As of 2003, the United States had never invaded Cuba. Both Khrushchev and Kennedy claimed victory that a nuclear war was avoided.

The primary consequence of the Cuban Missile Crisis was that the American public now believed that the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities equalled those of the United States. Citizens would not listen to numbers that showed the United States with far more missiles. As far as Americans were concerned, each country could totally annihilate the other—or, for that matter, all life on earth. It was the last of the Cold War "missile bluff" diplomacies.

Both sides had so frightened the other during the Cuban Missile Crisis that the first serious negotiations in controlling nuclear weaponry began in August 1963. The United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain—which also had nuclear capabilities—signed the Limited Test-Ban Treaty to ban nuclear testing underwater, in the atmosphere, and in outer space.

Did you know …

  • For the first time in Cold War history, the two superpower leaders negotiated not with mutual public threats and propaganda but in reasoned secret personal correspondence.
  • Knowing mutual dialogue and a new trust had averted a disaster for the world, President Kennedy asked the news media to tone down their shouts of victory as Khrushchev withdrew the missiles from Cuba.
  • In June 1963, a direct hot line was set up between the Kremlin (Soviet government headquarters) in Moscow and the White House in Washington, D.C., to reduce the chance of nuclear war through miscalculation or misunderstanding.

Consider the following …

  • The Cuban Missile Crisis is rarely thought of in terms of positive outcomes. Find and list at least five good results or consequences (for either the Americans or the Soviets or both) stemming from the Cuban Missile Crisis.
  • One of the reasons Khrushchev brought Soviet missiles to Cuba was to protect Cuba from invasion. Could this have been accomplished with less drastic tactics? What might be another underlying reason Khrushchev wanted missiles in Cuba?
  • Do you think the Soviets really intended to fire the missiles at the United States? Why or why not?

For More Information

Books

Chrisp, Peter. Cuban Missile Crisis. Milwaukee, WI: World Almanac Library, 2002.

Finkelstein, Norman H. Thirteen Days/Ninety Miles: The Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: J. Messner, 1994.

Frankland, Mark. Khrushchev. New York: Stein and Day, 1979.

Huchthausen, Peter A., and Alexander Hoyt. October Fury. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, 2002.

Khrushchev, Nikita S. Edited by Strobe Talbott. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970.

Khrushchev, Sergei. Nikita Khrushchev: Creation of a Superpower. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000.

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