Khrushchev, Nikita
Nikita Khrushchev
Excerpt from "Khrushchev's Secret Speech on the Berlin Crisis, August 1961"
Excerpted from Cold War International History Project Virtual Archive (Web site)
"If [Kennedy] starts a war then he would probably become the last president of the United States of America."
I n this excerpt from "Khrushchev's Secret Speech on the Berlin Crisis, August 1961," Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971) spoke to his Communist Party leaders. These leaders included Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko (1909–1989); the leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania; and most importantly, Walter Ulbricht (1893–1973) of East Germany. He was responding to the radio and television address of U.S. president John F. Kennedy (1917–1963; served 1961–63) on July 25,1961. Kennedy was speaking to American citizens about Berlin and Khrushchev. Much of Khrushchev's speech revolved around his conversation with U.S. envoy John J. McCloy (1895–1989), a disarmament expert who happened to be in Moscow at the time of Kennedy's speech. First, Khrushchev stressed that the Soviets must continue to push for a German peace treaty that would permanently separate East and West Germany, giving independent country status to both. (The United States would agree only to a reunited Germany.)
The excerpt begins with Khrushchev considering whether or not the United States will go to war over German
reunification and over West Berlin, where the Western powers maintained a military presence. Khrushchev spoke of the possibility of nuclear war and his belief that pursuing a German peace treaty was worth the risk of war. He also gave his impression of the young president. He described Kennedy as a "rather unknown quantity … a light-weight," hardly capable of influencing the U.S. government.
Khrushchev vowed to meet the Western powers on a strong and equal basis if war came. He also defended Soviet involvement in East Germany as a vital buffer between the Soviet Union and the West.
Things to remember while reading the excerpt from "Khrushchev's Secret Speech on the Berlin Crisis, August 1961":
- It was imperative that Khrushchev maintain a very hard line in front of his fellow communist leaders.
- Khrushchev believed the young Kennedy did not measure up to past U.S. statesmen and was confident that he could frighten and overwhelm the new president.
- The original translated version of Khrushchev's speech that follows includes text in brackets generally meant to clarify certain passages; in some instances, the original Russian word or phrase is included as well.
Excerpt from "Khrushchev's Secret Speech on the Berlin Crisis, August 1961"
[There was always an understanding … that the West] would intimidate us, call out all spirits against us to test our courage, our acumen and our will.… As for me and my colleagues in the state and party leadership, we think that the adversary [the United States] proved to be less staunch [zhestokii] than we had estimated.… We expected there would be more blustering and … so far the worst spurt of intimidation was in the Kennedy speech [on 25 July 1961].… Kennedy spoke [to frighten us] and then got scared himself [referring to Kennedy strengthening U.S. civil defense].…
Immediately after Kennedy delivered his speech I spoke with[U.S. envoy John J. McCloy]. We had a long conversation, talking about disarmament instead of talking, as we needed to, about Germany and conclusion of a peace treaty on West Berlin. So I suggested: come to my place [Black Sea resort in Pitsunda] tomorrow and we will continue our conversation.…
I said [to McCloy]: "I don't understand what sort of disarmament we can talk about, when Kennedy in his speech declared war on us and set down his conditions. What can I say? Please tell your president that we accept his ultimatum and his terms and will respond in kind.…"
He then said … [that] Kennedy did not mean it, he meant to negotiate. I responded: "Mr. McCloy, but you said you did not read Kennedy's speech?" He faltered [zamialsia], for clearly he knew about the content of the speech.…
"You want to frighten us," I went on [to McCloy]. "You convinced yourself, that Khrushchev will never go to war … so youscare us [expecting] us to retreat. True, we will not declare war, but we will not withdraw either, if you push it on us. We will respond to your war in kind.…"
I told him to let Kennedy know … that if he starts a war then he would probably become the last president of the United States of America.…
[Khrushchev said he had met Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, who came to Moscow ostensibly at his own initiative, but in fact at Kennedy's prodding.]
[Khrushchev reports that he told Fanfani:] We have means [to retaliate]. Kennedy himself acknowledged, that there is equality of forces, i.e. the Soviet Union has as many hydrogen and atomic weapons as they have. I agree with that, [although] we did not crunch numbers. [But, if you recognize that] let us speak about equal opportunities. Instead they [Western leaders] behave as if they were a father dealing with a toddler: if it doesn't come their way [the Soviets do not agree on a peace treaty with a united Germany], they threaten to pull our ears.… We already passed that age, we wear long trousers, not short ones.…
I told Fanfani yesterday: "I don't believe, though, there will be war. What am I counting on? I believe in your [Western leaders'] common sense. Do you know who will argue most against war? [West German chancellor Konrad] Adenauer. [Because, if the war starts] there will not be a single stone left in place in Germany.…"
[British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan visited Moscow in 1959 and told Khrushchev that war was impossible. Khrushchev presumes that Western leaders continue to act on that conviction.] Macmillan could not have lost his mind since then. He considered war impossible then and, suddenly, now he changes his mind? No, no. The outcome of modern war will be decided by atomic weapons.…
Can we clash? Possibly.… I told Fanfani, that [the American state] is a barely governed state.… Kennedy himself hardly influences the direction and development of policies [politiki] in the American state.… The American Senate and other [state] organizations are very similar to our Veche of Novgorod .… One party there defeated the other when it tore off half of the beards of another party.… They shouted, yelled, pulled each other's beards, and in such a way resolved the question who was right.…
Hence anything is possible in the United States. War is also possible. They can unleash it. There are more stable situations in England,France, Italy, Germany. I would even say that, when our "friend" [U.S. secretary of state John Foster] Dulles was alive, they had more stability [in the United States]. I told McCloy about it.…
I told McCloy, that if they deploy one division in Germany, we will respond with two divisions, if they declare mobilization, we will do the same. If they mobilize such and such numbers, we will put out 150–200 divisions, as many as necessary. We are considering now … to deploy tanks defensively along the entire border [between the GDR (German Democratic Republic, East Germany) and the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany, West Germany)]. In short, we have to seal every weak spot they might look for.…
[Khrushchev admitted the GDR cost the Soviets much more than they needed for their own defense.] Each division there costs us many times more, than if it had been located [on the Soviet territory]. Some might say, why do we need the GDR, we are strong, we have armaments and all, and we will stand on our borders. This would have really been a narrow nationalist vision [a point of view considering only the Soviet Union].…
Summing up, our Central Committee and government believe, that now preparations are proceeding better, but there will be a thaw, and, more importantly, a cooling down.… We have to work out our tactics now and perhaps it is already the right time.
What happened next …
After Kennedy's speech and Khrushchev's reply, thousands and thousands of East Germans crossed into West Berlin. They sensed something was about to happen. Then, in the early morning hours of August 13, 1961, Khrushchev made his move on Berlin. It was not with tanks, guns, or missiles but jackhammers and rolls of barbed wire. He ordered the construction of the Berlin Wall.
Did you know …
- In part of Khrushchev's talk not excerpted here, he sounded as if the Soviets also used domino theory thinking. He
stated that if Germany were united, East Germany would disappear and be absorbed under the Western powers. Then Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union would be next to fall, like dominos, to the Western powers. Dean G. Acheson (1893–1971), secretary of state under President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972; served 1945–53), had earlier expressed the same domino concern in connection with the likelihood of countries in Western Europe, the Middle East, or Africa falling to communism.
- Even though East Germany had the highest standard of living of Eastern European countries, East Germans continued to vote with their feet—and headed west through Berlin.
Consider the following …
- Look back to the introduction to this entire chapter and the introduction to the first excerpt. Find the overriding reason that the Soviets wanted a German peace treaty recognizing both separate countries of East and West Germany.
- For all his blustering, Khrushchev says he does not really believe there will be a war. Why?
- What impression of President Kennedy did Khrushchev have during his talk?
For More Information
Books
Frankland, Mark. Khrushchev. New York: Stein and Day, 1979.
Khrushchev, Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970.
Khrushchev, Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. Boston: Little, Brown, 1974.
Khrushchev, Sergei. Nikita Khrushchev: Creation of a Superpower. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000.
Web Site
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. "Khrushchev's Secret Speech on the Berlin Crisis, August 1961." Cold War International History Project Virtual Archive. http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=library.document&topic_id=1409&id=680 (accessed on September 17, 2003).
