Welfare State
Welfare State
The welfare state is the institutional outcome of the assumption by a society of legal and therefore formal and explicit responsibility for the basic well-being of all of its members. Such a state emerges when a society or its decision-making groups become convinced that the welfare of the individual (beyond such provisions as may be made “to preserve order and provide for the common defense”) is too important to be left to custom or to informal arrangements and private understandings and is therefore a concern of government. In a complex society such assistance may be given to the individual directly or, just as often, to the economic interest most immediately affecting his welfare. The rubric is a relatively recent one not to be found in the traditional political lexicons, so that the point at which a state, in expanding social services to its citizens, earns this label is imprecise and controversial. The terms “basic security” or “well-being” have been and will be construed variously, and the interpretation of welfare is in flux—especially in the United States. In short, an account of the welfare state must struggle with a large legacy of ambiguity.
Every society, preliterate no less than literate, makes some provision for those of its members who find themselves in distress. In the case of aborigines such provision is almost exclusively assumed by so-called primary groups: the family or other kinship groups, or neighbors rallying spontaneously to aid the victims of calamity. Among primitive peoples, aid to the needy may be a by-product of other institutional arrangements, but it is often related to well-defined ideals of generosity and charity. Thus, among the Eskimos, although the hunter enjoys an absolute right to the game he kills, it is taken for granted that he will share it with his needy neighbors. Among the Australian aborigines, on the other hand, sharing the quarry is not left to the discretion of the hunter but is governed by rigid kinship rules which give elder relatives an inviolable claim to a portion of the kill. In a study of the east African Baganda, John Roscoe said that “no one ever went hungry …because everyone was welcome to share a meal with his equals,” and he observed, possibly with some exaggeration, that among nonliterate peoples existing on the subsistence margin “it is generally the rule that when there is not enough, all hunger alike; when there is plenty, all participate” (quoted in Herskovits [1940] 1952, p. 31).
As society becomes more complex, responsibility for helping the distressed may be assumed by the ruling authority, if only as when the government of Rome pacified the rabble with “bread and circuses,” or by ecclesiastical agencies, as in the case of the Roman Catholic church during the Middle Ages, or by guilds, fraternities, and similar associations. For many centuries, the church in Europe, heeding the words of Jesus and the earlier words of Amos in praise of charity and kindness to the poor, assumed a major responsibility for the relief of human suffering. It established hospitals, orphanages, and (to a lesser extent) poorhouses, sometimes made outright gifts and loans, and even sheltered travelers. The work of such orders as the Alexian Brothers, who buried the poor, the Order of St. Lazarus, whose members cared for lepers, and the Knights Hospitalers, who supervised hospitals, was typical. In England, the dispossession of the monasteries and the breakup of the manors forced the state to assume the burden. Thus, a law of 1572 provided for collectors and overseers to compel heretofore voluntary payments for poor relief. Subsequently, the famous Elizabethan “Old Poor Law” of 1601 definitely accepted the principle of state responsibility for care of the needy, frugal though the provision may have been. Also, it levied a specific tax for poor relief and established categories of need. Even so, throughout this period the real burden of responsibility continued to fall on the family and the village community until the industrial revolution and the developments associated with it drastically transformed the prevailing pattern throughout Europe and America. England in the last decades of the eighteenth and the start of the nineteenth century provides the classic example.
The industrial revolution
Industrialization and the shift of population from the countryside to the city, hastened in England by the enclosure acts, greatly weakened primary groups. Many functions such as food preparation, recreation, and education, once exclusively performed by the family, were increasingly taken over in industrialized urban areas by other agencies. Today, in the city, almost everything used by the family is made outside the home. It has become increasingly difficult for elders and children to contribute to the support of the family group, as was the case in a rural agrarian society. At the same time the growth of a secular outlook has undermined traditional notions governing separation and divorce and has resulted in the breakup of an increasingly larger proportion of marriages. Accordingly, the enduring patriarchal family of tradition, often embracing three generations and assorted collateral kin, has become a two- and more often a single-generation group, when it has not broken up altogether. During the very period when the number of aged has rapidly multiplied, the family has become less and less available for their maintenance, not to mention the problem of care of the handicapped and of the casualties of broken homes. Meanwhile, the same period that has witnessed a declining role for the family has also seen the increased mobility and impersonality of city life loosening the once-close ties binding neighbors together.
Quite apart from its impact on primary groups and their role in providing for those handicapped by old age or other physical disability, the industrial revolution brought into new prominence the class of so-called “able-bodied poor.” Whether in the Soviet Union and Communist China today or in England and America in the nineteenth century, capital accumulation on a scale necessary to generate rapid and continuing industrialization can be achieved only at the expense of the level of living of the average worker-consumer. If worker-consumers are incapable of effective resistance, either politically through the exercise of meaningful suffrage or economically through strong labor unions, the sheer pace of industrialization is bound to produce widespread poverty. Such recourses were not available in England or America in any realistic sense for much of the nineteenth century—hardly more than they are available today in the USSR and in China. To be sure, poverty among the “sturdy poor” was hardly strange to the Elizabethan, but the industrial revolution expanded their number and concentrated them in cities, where they were largely excluded from opportunities to supplement their income.
At the same time the industrial system exacerbated the kind of dependency that results from enforced idleness. Quite apart from cyclical unemployment, the supply of labor in industrialized America and Europe, except during periods of war and war preparation, has generally exceeded the demand, thereby not only depressing the wages of those who work but also creating forced idleness and dependency. When to this and the “frictional” unemployment attendant on the operations of any complex economy has been added the mass unemployment generated by fluctuations of the business cycle (cyclical unemployment), the problem of care for the needy has taken on new and impressive dimensions. Unlike earlier societies in which distress was brought about by crop failures and other unavoidable disasters, or by chronic shortage of resources, distress was now caused by institutional arrangements that conspired to keep people from using their creative energies and conjoined depressed wages with a rising level of expectations. It was in such fertile soil that the welfare state germinated.
However, rationalizations were promptly devised that condoned unemployment and poverty and argued against intervention by government. The unemployed were held to be lazy and shiftless, traits considered inborn and to be overcome only by the spur of need or the bribe of generous profits. The poor were improvident and unenterprising; poverty was a punishment for sloth and incompetence. Tampering with the verdict of the free market on the compensation that individuals receive by providing them with income when they are ill, or old, or unemployed would sabotage the only mechanism available for proportioning reward to merit. Truly productive and enterprising people would be penalized in order to provide for drones, and the inevitable outcome would be reduced productivity and less for all. If the syllogisms of economists failed to drive these points home, it was always possible to invoke the authority of theologians to show that poverty was a punishment for wickedness and wealth a reward for virtue and hence, as Max Weber has said, to provide “the comforting assurance that the unequal distribution of the goods of this world was a special dispensation of Divine Providence, which in these differences, as in particular grace, pursued secret ends unknown to men” ([1904-1905] 1930, p. 177). When to this was added the weight of Malthus and the new demography and, later, the teachings of social Darwinism, the case seemed overwhelming— at least to prosperous merchants and manufacturers—that the poor must be left to private charity if not to their own devices.
Such views were expressed with varying degrees of eloquence by a large number of writers, from Daniel Defoe (Giving Alms No Charity, and Employing the Poor, a Grievance to the Nation, 1704), Bernard Mandeville (Fable of the Bees: Or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits, 1714), and Arthur Young (Farmer’s Tour Through the East of England, 1771), through Spencer (1850) and Dicey (1905), down to Calvin Coolidge. Despite such misgivings, however, there was general agreement that public aid must be given. But it must be meager and it must be dispensed in a manner so humiliating to the recipient that, if able-bodied, he would accept work no matter how odious the conditions. And conditions in the nineteenth century, even after the passage of numerous factory acts, were indeed odious. For those unable to find employment, workhouses had been established in England as early as 1576, and these were retained, along with alms-houses for the infirm and the practice of apprenticing and indenturing needy children, under the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601. Such workhouses and almshouses, as Dickens’ Oliver Twist reminds us, were grim beyond description, resembling jails more than havens of mercy. The severity of such provisions was slightly relaxed during a period when the English feared that French revolutionary ideas might leap the Channel, and in 1795 the so-called Speenhamland system actually provided for minimum subsistence by giving workers whose pay fell below a subsistence level an allowance from the public treasury with an added allowance for each child. But the “New Poor Law” of 1834, which sought to reduce the mounting outlay for poor relief and prevent the spread of pauperism, revived the old austerities. Its harsh philosophy, an outcome of the wedding of Benthamite utilitarianism and Manchester economics, dominated English and American policy until the twentieth century.
Birth of the welfare state
The philosophy of the welfare state is a wholly different one. Poverty and dependence are no longer regarded as evidence of personal failure. Quite apart from the physically disabled, workers who are underpaid and unemployed or intermittently employed are considered to be impoverished through no fault of their own. Where the supply of labor nearly always exceeds the demand and opportunity is unevenly distributed, it is held that the free market fails in a vast number of cases to proportion reward to merit. As the wealth created by modern industry increases it is contended that there is enough to assure everyone, including the physically and mentally handicapped, of adequate support without unfairly penalizing or impairing the initiative of the talented and enterprising. An income large enough to provide the basic necessities of life in adequate measure is regarded as the right of every member of society. If anyone’s income falls short, it should be supplemented not as an act of charity but as an act of social justice.
It is conceded that shiftlessness and irresponsibility are common, but these are said to call, in great measure, for the approach of the physician who cures an illness and not the judge and jailer who punish a crime. Indeed, crime itself, like poverty, is regarded in the welfare state largely as a remediable outcome of personal and social disorganization rather than as an ineradicable manifestation of original sin. Finally, advocates of the welfare state contend that the price of widespread deprivation in an era of rising expectations is social instability on a scale unknown to preindustrial societies, where poverty was inescapable and therefore taken for granted; and they argue that such expectations can be frustrated, if at all, only by jettisoning democracy itself.
Such is the general orientation of what has also been called the social service state. However, the welfare state was not transferred fully delineated from the blueprints of social architects to the soil of England, continental Europe, and the United States. Its career varies with each country.
In England it was born of efforts to curb the abuses of the factory system and to improve penal institutions and outdoor relief. But efforts to humanize the factory system and to liberalize the provisions of the Poor Law of 1834 seemed increasingly like mere tinkering with particular grievances. A new age of humanitarianism was dawning, more sensitive to human suffering than its predecessors. Enfranchised and increasingly well-organized workers clamored for substantive reform. Historic surveys such as Charles Booth’s Life and Labour of the People in London (see Booth et al. 1889-1891) and B. S. Rowntree’s Poverty: A Study of Town Life (1901) documented the presence of dire poverty on a vast scale in the “workshop of the world.” Finally, in 1905, prodded by widespread unemployment, Britain undertook a comprehensive examination of the administration of its poor laws. The Royal Commission on Poor Laws and Relief of Distress set up to make the investigation is famous for the report of its minority, led by Beatrice Webb. Among other things, this report proposed the abolition of Britain’s archaic poor laws and the substitution of a comprehensive program of social insurance (Webb & Webb 1909). This recommendation, along with his own impression of the new German program of social insurance, contributed to David Lloyd George’s historic decision to sponsor the program of unemployment and health insurance subsequently contained in the National Insurance Act of 1911. This legislation, prepared in large part by William H. Beveridge, chief architect of the welfare state in the English-speaking world, embarked Great Britain on the program which has since been expanded to provide insurance for all its people “from the cradle to the grave.” The famous Beveridge report of 1942 and the National Health Service and National Insurance acts of 1946 were milestones on the way. Today, in Australia and New Zealand as well as in Great Britain, a basic program of social security is taken for granted by all parties, and, apart from details, is no longer subject to debate.
The evils of industrialism were felt more tardily in Germany and the remedies applied more promptly. A national system of social insurance was instituted by Bismarck as early as the 1880s. Intent on combating the appeal of Marxian socialism, perceiving that a healthy, contented working class would make for a stronger Germany, and anxious that German workers identify themselves with the state, the Iron Chancellor, appropriating the ideas of economists like Adolf Wagner and Gustav von Schmoller, introduced the compulsory feature into social insurance and applied it to the whole German nation. The program was expanded after World War I to include unemployment as well as old age and heajth insurance. Austria, the Scandinavian countries, the Low Countries, and, finally, France and Italy all followed suit.
By the 1930s only the United States, among the nations involved in the industrial revolution, was without a comprehensive program of social security. Its great wealth, its polyglot population, its expanding frontier which provided a built-in safety valve, and a governmental system of checks and balances that discourages decisive social action except during periods of emergency all conspired to defer basic reform. It required the great depression, which forced millions of willing workers into prolonged idleness and posed the glaring paradox of mass deprivation in the midst of potential abundance, to goad the country into action.
The resulting program, developed over a period of years, has been directed in the United States, as elsewhere, at the major causes of insecurity: (a) inadequate income for those who work; (b) disabilities resulting from accident, sickness, youth, old age, widowhood, and motherhood; and (c) unemployment.
Program of the welfare state
Raising worker income. Improvement of income may be brought about either by increasing the amount of goods produced or by a more equitable distribution of the available supply of goods. Given glaring inequalities of income, the first concern of the welfare state in its initial phase has been to achieve distributive justice. Government action may accomplish this (1) by expanding the number of public services; (2) by a progressive tax system and a variety of taxes levied on employers for the benefit of their employees; (3) by facilitating the growth of a strong labor movement enabling workers to bargain on equal terms with their employers and a consumer movement enabling buyers to bargain more effectively with sellers; (4) by means of minimum-wage legislation.
Expansion of public services. Obviously, real income is increased when society provides free services such as education, recreation, and housing to those who would otherwise not have access to them. In some circumstances free commodities (for example, surplus crops, free school lunches) and even free land may be provided (for example, the U.S. Homestead Act of 1862). It must be emphasized that where a direct transfer of real values is involved, the philosophy of the welfare state construes distributive justice not merely as dictating such a transfer but as requiring it without reference to the income of the recipients and as the fulfillment of a social obligation. Means tests are anathema to the welfare state. The United States is the only industrialized country which fails to include one of the most basic services, namely, medical care, among those provided for on this basis. As our cities fall victim to the arteriosclerosis produced by overuse of the automobile, the welfare state may find it economical as well as humane to include free public transportation. Conceivably even free architectural services may one day be added to the list as the only way to encourage the use of good design in our buildings and dwellings and thereby to rescue cities from ubiquitous ugliness.
Progressive tax systems. One of the earlier devices for effecting a redistribution of income was the use of a progressive tax system, made possible in the United States by the adoption in 1913 of the sixteenth amendment to the constitution. To be sure, the extent to which income and inheritance taxes have operated in this country to effect a change in the distribution of incomes has been a subject of much debate. There are some who contend, as did P. J. Strayer, that “current practices are so bad as to seriously weaken the income tax as a means of income redistribution” and that “as now applied the individual income tax is not as effective an instrument of income redistribution as generally believed” (1955, pp. 430-431).
Although adoption of a progressive tax is in principle a major modification of the traditional system of property rights, clearly it must have rigorous and consistent application to be meaningful. Such application is most closely approximated in the Scandinavian countries and Great Britain, less so in the United States, and even less so in Italy—which may well be a significant factor in the popularity of communism south of the Alps.[see Taxation.]
Labor and consumer legislation. Legislation encouraging collective bargaining as a factor in influencing the distribution of income consisted initially of removing the legal bans and disabilities imposed on labor unions during the period of Hochkapitalismus and, later, as in the United States, of requiring employers (engaged in interstate commerce) to bargain collectively with employees through unions of their own choosing. Such a requirement was embodied in American labor’s Magna Charta, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. The American consumer movement, although it has received some legislative encouragement, lags far behind consumer organizations elsewhere. This may help to account for the inability of welfare advocates in the United States to protect consumers more effectively from food and drug adulteration, mislabeling, deceptive packaging, and the like.[see Labor union.]
Minimum-wage legislation. Perhaps the most drastic departure from traditional economic practice has been the adoption of minimum-wage legislation. Certainly, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, since amended to include virtually all American workers and to raise the hourly minimum, took the United States a long way in the direction of the welfare state.[see Wages,article on Wage and hour legislation.]
The productivity debate. When all such devices have been enumerated it must be made clear that the limiting factor in any redistribution of incomes is the point at which initiative and enterprise are discouraged with resulting loss in productivity. The point at which such discouragement occurs is a subject of vigorous debate between partisans and opponents of the welfare state. That there is such a point, varying with each historical situation, will readily be granted; but advocates of the welfare state will argue that there is no constant called “human nature” by reference to which the issue can be settled. They will add that in the United States, where in the boom year of 1947 the top one-tenth of the population received a larger share of the national income (33 per cent) than the lowest six-tenths, the point is still far from having been reached.
The issue is relevant because it directs attention to productivity as a variable in determining adequate compensation. Advocates of the welfare state have come to give far more attention than heretofore to the question of productive potentiality, calling attention, for example (as critics of the welfare state rarely do), to the glaring gap between the productive potentialities of the American economy and the size of its gross national product. They have increasingly stressed the need for measures to expand production, since the social implications of such measures are likely to be far less explosive than a redistribution of incomes.[see Productivity.]
Aid to the disabled . The measures taken to provide more adequately for those who work are only partly applicable to those who are unable to work by virtue of physical disability. The disabled fall into two major groups: those who are too handicapped ever to have earned a livelihood, such as children, the mentally disturbed and defective, the blind; and those who, although disabled, have had a record of earned income.
The welfare state provides direct grants for the adequate care and support of the first group and, where appropriate, stresses rehabilitation—as earlier programs did not. Categories of need are carefully distinguished and programs of help systematically differentiated according to category— a striking contrast to the days when the mentally disturbed were thrown together with the old, the sick, the blind and lame, and even mothers and young children, in the same institution. In the United States, aid to the disabled is accomplished imperfectly through a combination of federal, state, and local aid, federal participation on a large scale having first been made possible by the Social Security Act of 1935. That act, like the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, is one of the four cornerstones of the evolving welfare state in the United States.
The second group, those disabled people with a record of earnings, must face the double threat of the loss of earning power and the cost of care, in the event of old age, accident (occupational or other), and illness. Compulsory social insurance has become the classical means for meeting their needs. This device applies the principle that society must set aside, and require its members to set aside during the periods when they are gainfully employed, small sums of money to provide against expected or unexpected future disability. Payments and benefits usually vary, at least up to a point, with the amount of earnings of the insured. In some cases the provision is for the cost of care (as with the victims of illness or industrial accident), in others for the loss of earnings (as in the case of federal help to the aged in the United States). A mature welfare state would provide for both.
The first application of the principle of compulsory social insurance in the United States was in connection with industrial accidents, the frequency of which may be suggested by the fact that American workmen in peaceful employment suffered more casualties during World War i than were suffered by the American Expeditionary Force. Initially regarded as part of the risk a workman assumes when he accepts employment, the cost of industrial accident insurance is now generally regarded as part of the cost of production and charged against employers. The cost of old-age and health insurance is generally distributed between employer and employee (many categories of self-employed are also now included), although in some instances contributions are made by the government as well.[see Aging, Medical care, article on Economic aspects..]
Unemployment and the welfare state. The welfare state concerns itself not only with securing an equitable income for those who are employed and with caring for those who are incapable of employment: it also addresses itself to the problem of those who are able to work but prevented from doing so by forces over which they have no control. In such cases it is customary to distinguish between frictional unemployment and cyclical unemployment. When cyclical unemployment becomes acute it is generally called mass unemployment.
Frictional unemployment was defined by William Beveridge as “unemployment caused by the individuals who make up the labour supply not being completely interchangeable and mobile units, so that, though there is an unsatisfied demand for labour, the unemployed workers are not of the right sort or in the right place to meet that demand” ([1944] 1945, pp. 408-409). Workers may be displaced by a labor-saving device or a device they are not trained to use, because of climatic conditions or seasonal fluctuations in the market (seasonal unemployment), because of a disagreement with the employer concerning the conditions of work, because of the failure of the enterprise in which they are employed, or because they are in transit from one job to another. They are victims of frictional unemployment. Such unemployment, although it can be reduced to a bare minimum, as U.S. wartime experience has shown, is unavoidable and may involve about 2 per cent of the work force. In a populous society like that of the United States, with a work force of over 70 million, this can involve a great many people.
In the prewelfare period the victims of frictional unemployment were largely left to their own devices or forced to seek public or private charity. Today, in every economically developed country, since Bismarck introduced “socialism from above” in Germany, the problem of frictional unemployment is in the main met by compulsory unemployment insurance. In the United States such insurance was largely unavailable until it was incorporated into the Social Security Act of 1935.
However, as has often been pointed out, while unemployment payments may solve the problem of want, the problem of enforced idleness with all of its demoralizing consequences remains. Measures must therefore be taken to facilitate the re-employment of displaced workers by retraining them for work suited to their abilities, by providing adequate counseling services, and by setting up unemployment offices. All these are part of the armory of the welfare state.
Traditionally, frictional unemployment has been regarded as unemployment of short duration. Recently, increasing attention has been given to “hardcore” or “prosperity” unemployment, sometimes described as prolonged frictional unemployment and more technically called “structural.” Structural unemployment involves workers who are made jobless not as a result of recessions or depressions but by large-scale changes in technology, shifts in consumer taste, and the development of new products. It may also refer to changes in the composition of the labor force: large-scale additions of younger workers, resulting from continuing population growth; of older workers, resulting from an extension of the life span; of female workers; or of previously excluded members of minority groups. Such structural unemployment is not associated with fluctuations in the business cycle and is therefore called “secular.” However, to the extent that it is not only more prolonged but potentially much more widespread than frictional unemployment, structural unemployment must be regarded as a form of mass unemployment, so that, like cyclical unemployment, it must ultimately exhaust the resources of even the most generous unemployment insurance system.
Beyond this, advocates of the philosophy underlying the welfare state contend that the etiology of structural unemployment is more akin to cyclical than to frictional unemployment. Frictional unemployment is largely unavoidable and we can only palliate its consequences. On the other hand, the structurally unemployed are out of work for the same reason that the cyclically unemployed are without work: not because they are intrinsically unemployable but because there is not enough effective demand for their services; the economy does not function at a sufficiently high level to utilize all its manpower. Thus, Walter W. Heller, former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers to the President, in hearings before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, declared:
Some have attributed the growth of unemployment in recent years to changing characteristics of the labor force rather than to deficiencies in total demand. According to this view, the new unemployment is concentrated among workers who are intrinsically unemployable by reason of sex, age, location, occupation, or skill…. The facts clearly refute this explanation of the rise of unemployment over the last 8 years…. There is no evidence that hard-core unemployment has been growing as a percent of the labor force. (U.S. Congress …1961)
The difference cited by Heller is crucial, for, if he is correct, it must follow that the welfare state cannot afford to limit itself to concern with the effects of structural unemployment but, as with cyclical or mass unemployment, must address itself to causes.
For these reasons and because neither direct relief, nor insurance benefits, nor any welfare program thus far cited can cope with the effects of mass unemployment, whether it be secular (structural) or cyclical, advocates of the welfare state have taken the position that, in the words of Beveridge’s now famous Full Employment in a Free Society,“It must be a function of the State … to protect its citizens against mass unemployment, as definitely as it is now the function of the State to defend the citizens against attack from abroad and against robbery and violence at home” ([1944] 1945, p. 29). Among American economists, Alvin H. Hansen, in his Economic Policy and Full Employment, has taken the lead, declaring that if “the right to free land was the watchword of economic opportunity a hundred years ago, so the right to useful, remunerative, and regular employment is the symbol of economic opportunity today” and adding that “the full-employment program today …involves elemental human rights … so long as 80 to 90 percent of the population cannot earn a livelihood except by getting a job” (1947, p. 16).
It was such reasoning that inspired the white paper on employment policy produced in 1944 by Britain’s wartime coalition government and, in the United States, the historic Employment Act of 1946 (Public Law 304, 79th Congress). That act, the fourth cornerstone in the welfare edifice of the United States, goes well beyond the British white paper, stating:
[It is] the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means …to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power [and] to coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources for the purpose of creating and maintaining, in a manner calculated to foster and promote free competitive enterprise and the general welfare, conditions under which there will be afforded useful employment opportunities, including self-employment, for those able, willing, and seeking to work. (Declaration of Policy, sec. 2)
While the legislation sets up no actual machinery for combating unemployment and a great deal of exegetic skill has been expended on the words “maximum employment, production, and purchasing power,” the measure, inspired by postwar fears of a return to mass unemployment, is a remarkable commitment—all the more so in that Senate Republicans, led by Robert A. Taft, joined Democrats in making it. Traditionally, mass unemployment has been regarded as akin to a natural disaster to be waited out in storm cellars as one sits out a tornado. The Employment Act of 1946 assumes that mass unemployment can be averted and declares this to be the responsibility of government.
The logic of this commitment has led almost inescapably to an acceptance of fiscal and monetary policy as essential to economic recovery and hence as integral to any basic welfare program. Thus, over the edifice of the welfare state there hovers the presence of John Maynard Keynes, whose General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) has been the Bible of the great majority of depression and postdepression economists and policy makers. To be sure, Bibles, whether in the version of St. James or St. John (or St. Karl) are subject to revision in the Western world. But Keynes’s bold rejection of the classical thesis that depressions are self-correcting if wages are allowed to sink; his perception of the relation of wage rates to effective demand; his recognition of the role of fiscal policy, in particular deficit spending, in correcting economic contraction; and above all, his theory of secular stagnation, which calls attention to the tendency of a developed capitalist economy to find equilibrium at a level of underemployment in the absence of adequate fiscal policy—all this endures and has become part of the Western philosophy of the welfare state.
New directions
Such are the outlines of the welfare philosophy inspired by the crudities of primitive capitalism and the agonies of the interbellum depression. But that philosophy is not a fixed one, and in the mid-1960s new emphases were already discernible.
In the first place, the welfare state in its present outline bears the mark of its origins in the needs of the poor and oppressed. Especially in the United States, the reforms that ushered in the welfare state were a product of the 1930s and therefore concentrated on the pressing and urgent problems. The energies of reformers were absorbed in finding remedies for mass deprivation and mass unemployment. Security against want is still an unrealized goal in America. In the richest nation in all history the annual income of almost twenty million families falls below the $4,000 that the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated in 1959 as necessary for an urban family of four to maintain an adequate standard of living.
However, the “War on Poverty” launched by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, although it has yet to score impressive victories, employs imaginative stratagems, such as Project Head Start, VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America—a domestic version of the Peace Corps), community action programs. Increasingly, proposals are heard for cash subsidies in the form of a “negative” or “reverse” income tax. A blue-ribbon national commission has urged that the federal government become the employer of last resort for the hardcore jobless and guarantee a minimum annual income for every American family.
As welfare programs, new and old, mitigate the more extreme forms of suffering, architects of the welfare state are increasingly thinking in terms of the acute problems directly threatening society as a whole—the prosperous as well as the poor, whites as well as Negroes, the native born as well as the immigrant. Uniquely in human history, Americans have been evacuating their cities not because there is an invader at the gates but because they are less and less viable as communities in which to work and raise families. And, as William H. Whyte, Jr., has pointed out, even if our cities were less afflicted with blight, congestion, and the other maladies lately christened “metropolitan problems,” large numbers of families in the middle-income group now ineligible for public housing cannot afford new housing in urban areas. The urban problem, the minority crisis in the United States, automation, the challenge posed by the accelerating growth rate of the Soviet Union and the rising expectations of underdeveloped nations, all present problems which directly concern modern society as a whole. To the extent that the welfare state concerns itself with them it will lose its class orientation, and social welfare will come more and more to mean that general welfare from which it has been distinguished in the past.
A second, not unrelated change of emphasis in the philosophy of the welfare state is also discernible, at any rate as far as the United States is concerned. It is clear to advocates of the welfare state that economic security can now be made available to all Americans without a socially explosive redistribution of wealth. The technology and natural resources for producing such abundance are available, and economists are now (as they were not in the 1930s) in sufficient command of their science to use fiscal and monetary policies so as to achieve optimum production. The problem is a political one involving the will to do what can be done. Once this will is exercised, a different kind of problem will increasingly confront the welfare state. It concerns not the quantity of goods but the kind of goods we produce. Ultimately it concerns the quality of life in the good society. As recently posed by John Kenneth Galbraith, it involves the order of priorities by reference to which we allocate our human and physical resources.
It is Galbraith’s contention in The Affluent Society (1958) that the prevailing pattern of resource allocation in the United States is biased so that basic needs are grossly neglected and that this bias is not decreed by the so-called sovereign consumer. The American economy is geared, it is said, to the satisfaction of artificially induced consumer wants, such as oversized automobiles restyled annually at a cost of about $1 billion; attire, also restyled annually, which by the decree of a cabal of manufacturers can be made antiquated almost overnight; newly styled household appliances that are no better than the ones they replace unless the older models have been underengineered; countless gadgets, from electric can openers to push-button car windows; and an array of deodorants, skin softeners, hair growers, and wrinkle removers that even a race of Sybarites would scorn. In 1959, $11 billion worth of advertising, not to mention the cost of other forms of high-pressure salesmanship, was spent to persuade consumers that they should have these things.
Meanwhile, basic needs in many areas have been neglected in the name of economy. In the mid-1960s, education required an investment of more than $5 billion; medical care was short one million new hospital beds; public health needed measures for purification of air and water and restoration of sewage disposal systems. There were also basic needs for support of the arts and humanities; for at least a token investment of, say, $40 million in educational television stations, which a congressional committee declared Americans could not afford—while they were spending about $300 million on chewing gum; for additional funds for basic research in the biological sciences; and so on.
In the 1930s Keynes, preoccupied with increasing production, could write that he saw no reason to suppose that the existing system “seriously misemploys the factors of production.” It seems likely that the welfare philosophy of tomorrow (if not of today) will charge that, on this score, Keynes falls short. Such a philosophy, if it is also democratic, will categorically reject the idea that a few elected officials may compel others to spend their incomes in one way rather than another; it will simply insist that conditions be provided which enable consumers when they make purchases, and citizens when they vote taxes, to make more rational decisions. Such conditions would no doubt include a commission on national goals having access to the most expert opinion and empowered to hold hearings and sponsor conferences at all levels, national, regional, and local. It would also be empowered to use the formidable resources of television (including prime time) on a grand scale to acquaint citizens en masse with the condition of their schools, hospitals, housing, parks, streams, etc., and with the economic as well as the social cost of neglecting them, not to mention the cost of overburdening and underpaying teachers, probation officers, hospital attendants, and others. Additional conditions might include better controls over advertising and, in the political sphere, a reorganization of the legislative branches of the government at all levels, which might prevent small, strategically placed committees from obstructing the will of large legislative majorities.
Clearly, these are concerns far removed from the humiliations of the almshouse and the degradations of the early factory system, against which the welfare state in its first phases was an institutionalized protest. That is to say, these conditions are removed from the exclusive preoccupation with minimal security that has largely dominated the welfare state. But they appeal to the same kind of social conscience and enlist the same sense of social justice.
The welfare state, whether as thus prefigured or in its present form, invites widely differing appraisals, especially in the United States. Its critics regard it as the omnicompetent state, pre-empting the private efforts through which individuals achieve moral stature by helping each other; sapping initiative; coddling the inferior; and ultimately regimenting everyone. The Soviet Union provides security and all the social services for its citizens; it is also a barracks state. So runs the argument.
Apologists for the welfare state in the free world, less optimistic about the possibilities of achieving Utopia than nineteenth-century reformers and more alert to the hazards of statism since the rise of modern totalitarianism, insist that the welfare state not only leaves ample room for self-help and for what businessmen in the United States call “welfare capitalism”: it ultimately encourages creative initiative and promotes freedom by banishing fear, by minimizing suffering, and by reducing class and other antagonisms. They argue also that the welfare state is quite compatible with an economic system in which free enterprise plays a central role, although they may differ among themselves concerning whether the welfare state should limit itself to compensating for the imbalances and minimizing the frictions to which a free economy is inevitably subject, or seek positively to advance general prosperity and happiness.
Meanwhile history has rendered a verdict concerning the tendencies of the welfare state, partial (in a double sense) though historical verdicts always are. That verdict may be found by looking to the Soviet Union and its regimented people. But it may also be found by turning to the Scandinavian countries, to Great Britain, to West Germany, to Australia and New Zealand, and to the United States. It would be difficult to charge that the peoples of these countries are regimented or that private enterprise does not enjoy a flourishing life of its own even in the most “socialistic” of them. In any event, there are no signs, outside of marginal groups mostly centered in the United States, of a disposition to curb the welfare state. It rides the wave of the future.
Harry K. Girvetz
[See alsoCapitalism; Leisure; Philanthropy; Planning, Social, article onwelfare planning; Poverty; Public policy; Regulation of industry; Socialism; and the biographies ofBentham; Beveridge; Brandeis; Hansen; Keynes; Webb, Sidney andBeatrice.]
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