Pearson, Karl
PEARSON, KARL
(b. London, England, 27 March 1857; d. Coldharbour, Surrey, England, 27 April 1936),
applied mathematics, biometry, statistics, philosophy and social role of science, eugenics. For the original article on Pearson see DSB, vol. 10.
Pearson largely founded statistics as a mathematical field, and Churchill Eisenhart’s excellent entry on Pearson for the original Dictionary of Scientific Biography reasserts his importance as a giant of the field. Eisenhart was in a way defending Pearson against the critique of Ronald Aylmer Fisher and his followers, for whom Pearson, having made the way crooked, was not even a worthy precursor. Pearson and Fisher were embattled for almost two decades, from the late 1910s to Pearson’s death in 1936 and beyond. The historical memory of statisticians was shaped in part by this controversy and in particular by a somewhat technical disagreement over the number of degrees of freedom that are appropriate for a chi-square test. Fisher convinced many that Pearson, by getting it wrong, revealed profound mathematical incapacities. With this dispute clearly in mind, Eisenhart develops at some length a more charitable view of Pearson’s contribution, and Stephen Stigler (1999) has shown more recently that Pearson’s formulation reflected a subtly different understanding of a tricky problem rather than a mere mathematical howler.
Indeed, an important difference of perspective lay behind the battles between these founding statisticians. While Pearson was a visionary in his claims for the historical and social significance of this new mathematical science, his methods were somewhat makeshift, while Fisher’s mathematical approach was more systematic and coherent. Perhaps the most fundamental difference of approach between the two men is that Fisher was committed to an alliance of statistics and experimentation, while Pearson, who emphasized curve-fitting, did not distinguish systematically between observation and experiment. Pearson regarded Fisher’s mature work as the misguided deployment of mathematical virtuosity to conjure bold conclusions from scanty data, and Fisher, who saw Pearson mainly as an obstacle to statistics rather than a new point of departure, preferred to trace his own lineage to others such as William Sealey Gosset, who had learned statistics in Pearson’s biometric laboratory. Fisher’s insistence on his own originality was largely accepted by the next generation of statisticians. Under other circumstances, Fisher’s highly original and mathematically elegant program of statistical inference, which, like Pearson's, focused on biological measures, might have been viewed as the fulfillment of Pearson’s vision rather than its rejection.
Pearson’s Road to Statistics Pearson began working in earnest on statistics in about 1892, and scholars have been greatly interested in how he got there. Pearson himself was acutely conscious of what he owed to Francis Galton’s work on statistics, evolution, and eugenics (a field of study concerned with improving hereditary qualities of a race or breed), and his four-volume Life, Letters, and Labours of Francis Galton attests massively to this sense of obligation. But he had been somewhat skeptical of Galton’s attempt to subject biology and the human sciences to quantitative reason when he reported on Natural Inheritance to his “Men and Women’s Club” in 1889. His faith that statistics was the proper method for the study of evolution owed, in the first instance, to discussions and then collaboration with his biological colleague at University College London, Walter Frank Raphael Weldon. Eileen Magnello (1996) particularly emphasizes Weldon’s responsibility for
Pearson’s change of direction, and discusses at length the role of his quantitative ambitions in their shared program for the statistical study of evolution. Weldon, however, had himself found in Galton’s work a convincing alternative to the morphological perspective within which he had been trained, and a key aspect of Weldon’s role was indeed to persuade Pearson of Galton’s fundamental importance. Weldon and Galton communicated frequently about Pearson’s mathematical program, and while they were enthusiastic they also worried that his scheme of quantitative description tended to suppress the biology.
Stigler (1986) has called attention to Pearson’s interactions in the early 1890s with the economist and utilitarian philosopher Francis Ysidro Edgeworth, who had been writing on statistical mathematics since 1883. In his 1892 Newmarch Lectures, which Pearson may have attended, Edgeworth included a discussion of graphical methods of statistics. This work informed Pearson’s own important lectures on graphical statistics, delivered at Gresham College from 1891 to 1894. In fact, in the years just before 1890, Pearson was already growing more and more committed to graphical geometry, which he was then teaching to engineering students at University College London. He saw graphs as a means not only to represent scientific problems but also to solve them and he spoke euphorically of the dawn of a new mathematical epoch. Whereas René Descartes (1596–1650), with his analytic geometry, had made algebra the proper foundation for geometry, now Pearson imagined that a graphical form of geometry could become the master science, providing visually satisfying solutions even to problems of algebra. This program of graphical description lived on through the 1890s and beyond in a statistical method based first of all on fitting curves to data and of comparing these curves with other data (though often algebraically rather than visually). His chi-square test of goodness of fit, introduced in 1900, was a way of assessing probabilistically the fit of data points to a frequency distribution. He used this test, for example, to determine if some newly discovered skulls could be from the same population (or race) as others that had been excavated nearby, or if the death rate of a vaccinated population diverged significantly from that of an unvaccinated one.
Pearson’s statistical enthusiasm was about science and not primarily a matter of mathematics. He was thrilled to discover, through his exchanges with Weldon, that he possessed the tools to work out a new, quantitative basis for Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, which he already had come to regard as the great scientific advance of the nineteenth century. The statistical journal Pearson and Weldon began to publish in 1901 was titled, significantly, Biometrika, and in the first decade of the twentieth century these biometricians were virtually the only prominent scientific supporters of Darwinian evolution by natural selection. Given the proto-eugenic aspect of Pearson’s essays on the “woman’s question” beginning in the mid-1880s, it is plausible that Pearson’s program of statistical biology had from the outset an important eugenic aspect. In alliance with Galton, whose studies of evolution had been motivated by eugenic ambitions since the time of his first paper on heredity in 1865, Pearson took up eugenics in earnest at the beginning of the new century. Within a decade, it would become an international movement of sociobiological politics. Not all of Pearson’s statistical work was biometrical, and much even of the biometry was not directly linked to eugenics. Conversely, eugenic study was often distinct from Pearsonian statistics, and Pearson himself presided over an important project of nonstatistical eugenic study within the eugenics laboratory that Galton had established earlier. Still, as Donald MacKenzie argued in 1981, eugenic ambitions pervaded the new statistics. From craniometry to public health to education and intelligence testing, they were never far below the surface. Pearson’s somewhat alarmist public lectures on the eugenic threat of national deterioration were unfailingly expressed in the statistical idiom of differential fertility and high heritability.
The Controversialist While Pearson was especially devoted to biometry, statistics for him was a field of applied mathematics that stood above every particular scientific discipline. The task of building up his new field involved both the development of appropriate technical tools and the training of people, and Pearson worked at both. Almost from the beginning, he set about creating a standard technical language for statistics, fixing or coining such terms as normal law and standard deviation. He worked out a formula, actually a family of formulas, for the coefficient of correlation, which Galton had estimated loosely using graphical methods, and he undertook to systematize the analysis of frequency distributions. He fit curves using a method of moments, which meant choosing the parameters of a distribution formula to match the average (first moment), the standard deviation (second moment), and so on, of the data points. Pearson’s goal was to work out methods of statistics that could be applied to any field whatsoever and that would raise the standard of statistical practice throughout the sciences.
It was a Herculean task—of cleaning stables more often than killing lions—since every field had its own distinctive problems and since many did not welcome the imperious if well-meaning interventions of this acerbic outsider. In some cases, as in the emerging science of heredity, there was sharp resistance to the effort to conceive the field as fundamentally statistical. For William Bateson and other pioneers of genetics, science meant experimentation laboratories and experimental interventions, designed to reveal underlying causes acting at the level of individuals. Pearson and Weldon, by contrast, conceived the study of heredity as fundamental to Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, and they announced in the introduction to the first volume of Biometrika that evolution is a science of mass phenomena to be investigated through the study of populations rather than of individuals. Although modern scholarship has made it clear that Pearson never rejected the possible reality of Mendelian genes, and even took on occasion a positive interest in them, the Weldon-Pearson program involved a refashioning of biology that many biologists found unacceptable.
Others, however, welcomed statistics, and even viewed the biometric program with great favor. The American biologist Raymond Pearl, who was interested in population dynamics, traveled from Baltimore, Maryland, to spend a term in Pearson’s laboratory. The Danish botanist Wilhelm Johannsen also came to London to meet the biometricians, though Pearson rebuffed him, and he regarded statistics as at least equal in importance to Mendelism for the study of heredity. The botanist Hugo de Vries, from the Netherlands, was a great admirer of Adolphe Quetelet and of statistics. Still, Pearson fought with all of them, including his student Pearl. Pearson’s problem was not that they rejected statistics, but that they failed to practice statistics at the level of his expectations or in accordance with his dogmas. In later life, Pearson liked to think of himself as struggling heroically against a conception of science that was indifferent or hostile to statistics, but in fact statistics was springing up in science everywhere. Most of Pearson’s battles were provoked not by a rejection of statistics, but by rival statistical practices, dissenters from the church biometric. Many of his opponents were far less skilled in mathematics than Pearson, but some, including Fisher, were capable or even superb mathematicians. Probably Pearson’s most distinguished statistical pupils were George Udny Yule and Major Greenwood, and for a time they were very tight personally as well as scientifically, but later he fought with each of them. His dispute with Yule over measures of association culminated in a 150-page rebuttal and in Yule’s expulsion for a time from the community over which Pearson, in effect, presided.
Other controversies included a sharp exchange and what seem to have been bad or nonexistent personal relations with Pearson’s colleague at University College, the psychologist Charles Spearman, who used correlations among school tests to define a unitary measure of intelligence. Spearman is known to history as an important statistical psychologist, but Pearson thought his methods inadequate and was forthright about saying so. Many of Pearson’s disputes involved medicine, and again this was a case of denouncing what he saw as incorrect statistical methods rather than pushing the need for statistics where it was not being used. Often in these cases his discontent reflected also a conviction that the environmental causes emphasized by physicians were less important than hereditary ones. One of the best known of these environmental claims concerned the presumed effects of parental alcoholism on the health and ability of the child. Pearson (with Ethel Elderton, a worker in his laboratory), procured and analyzed data from two institutions for children to show statistically that the apparent effects of alcohol on the offspring were all nonexistent or small. Such effects as appeared in the statistics, they proposed, might well be due to hereditary correlations with other mental characteristics of the parents. In this case, the economist John Maynard Keynes joined in to defend the temperance reformers against Pearson’s eugenic doubts. Pearson crossed swords with the public health official Arthur Newsholme over the causes of infant mortality, which he preferred to attribute to hereditary weakness rather than to an unhealthy environment, and with the pathologist Almoth Wright over the effectiveness of antityphoid inoculation. In most of these cases Pearson objected that the doctors were taking superficial associations at face value rather than employing the more advanced methods that might allow a deeper understanding of the effective causes.
Statistics and the Social Role of Science Deeper understanding, at least in the form of causal knowledge, is what Pearson the positivist is supposed to have rejected, and indeed he often argued that science can only describe rather than explain or that causation is merely the limit of correlation. But he used such rhetoric opportunistically, and his philosophy did not keep him from trying to cut through meaningless correlations or from giving explanations in terms of entities that are wholly inaccessible to the senses. The most striking of these is the “ether squirts” whose hydrodynamics, Pearson suggested in The Grammar of Science, might explain the phenomena of physics and chemistry. Pearson’s philosophy owed less to the Austrian positivist Ernst Mach than to post-Kantian idealists such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte. The phenomenal world, he supposed, is not an external reality, but is created by the human mind. Yet if the mind can spin our visible world out of itself, it can also conceive, and in this sense create, genes and ether squirts.
Pearson typically invoked philosophical considerations to challenge the supposed limits of knowledge rather than to assert them. Science, he insisted, is a method, applicable to any topic whatsoever. It applies just as well to social life as to the motions of the planets. Although in his maturity he spoke of statistics as paradigmatic of scientific method, he did not undertake to codify that method. Instead, he presented science as a moral virtue. For Pearson, scientific method meant honest, disinterested investigation, so that opinion could be grounded in facts rather than in prejudice or self-interest. Science makes us citizens, he continued, by teaching us to accept as valid for ourselves only what is valid for everyone. It is tantamount to socialism, a naturalistic basis for knowledge that must sever any tie between religion and rationality. Science involves, in several senses, renunciation: of beliefs grounded in prejudice or selfish interest; of the quest for higher meanings; and of the possibility of direct sensuous contact with a world outside us. However, these sacrifices, which are simultaneously moral and epistemological, can provide the foundation of an efficient social life based on genuine knowledge.
As a young man, Pearson was fascinated by history, especially of the German Reformation, and of what could be gleaned from it about the historical situation of his own time. The crucial factors of history, he thought, were property and relations of sex, represented in modern times by movements of workers and of women, and he expected that the era of selfish capitalism would soon give way to a new socialism. The bigotry and ignorance of the German religious reformer Martin Luther (1483–1546), he argued, had made the rise of individualistic capitalism as painful and inefficient as it could have been, and he looked to science rather than class violence to ease the birth of modern collectivism. He took the lead in forming a “Men and Women’s Club” to investigate the historical conditions and modern possibilities of relations between the sexes, and he became for a time an important intellectual authority for the women’s movement. His growing concern with statistics and biological evolution were linked to his sense of large historical changes calling for new forms of science. Pearson was concerned equally with the content of the science and with the character and roles of the scientist. His ambition to recover some features of the medieval university, especially the intense personal relationship of master to student, crystallized in the form of biometric and eugenic laboratories, where textbooks were eschewed in favor of closely supervised research. He wanted to avoid reducing statistics, or science generally, to something formulaic, stressing instead that the progress of science depends on cultivated individuality. But it was no easy matter to fuse individuality with impersonal objectivity or to ground wisdom in quantitative methods, and Pearson, whose habit was always to set himself against the conventions of his time, spoke often with regret in later life over the reduction of science to a mere profession.
SUPPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Magnello, Eileen. “Karl Pearson’s Gresham Lectures: W. F. R. Weldon, Speciation, and the Origins of Pearsonian Statistics.” British Journal for the History of Science 29 (1996): 43–63
———. “Karl Pearson’s Mathematization of Inheritance: From Ancestral Heredity to Mendelian Genetics (1895–1909).” Annals of Science 55 (1998): 35–94
———. “The Non-Correlation of Biometrics and Eugenics: Rival Forms of Laboratory Work in Karl Pearson’s Career at
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———. Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.
———. Karl Pearson: The Scientific Life in a Statistical Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.
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Theodore M. Porter
