Realism
REALISM
Realism, in the language of modern and contemporary philosophy, is a general theory concerning the relationship between the mind of man and what is commonly called reality. Because of this, a doctrine affirming or denying realism pertains to the branch of philosophy known as epistemology, which treats of the subject of knowledge. Although philosophers are not in agreement as to whether epistemology is a philosophical discipline distinct from metaphysics, the nature of the subject under discussion permits one to abstract from this question. In any event, the epistemologist must ultimately square his conclusions about knowledge with his metaphysics of being.
Realism vs. Idealism. In its broadest terms, realism asserts that the ultimate factor or principle in being is not the mind of man, but rather what exists in reality beyond the mind or "outside" the mind. The word "outside" is not here taken in a spatial sense, as though the mind were located within the human brain and reality were situated outside it. Although this may be true in a qualified sense, spatial localization has little to do with the meaning the Western philosophical tradition has given to extramental reality. Nor must realism be taken to imply that the contents understood by the mind are real and the mind itself is not. Realism, in its many forms, does not deny the reality of mind in order to assert the reality of what is not mind. On the contrary, realism maintains that the term of the act of knowing is not to be identified with that very act. Knowledge is always about something that is not itself knowledge. Hence realism attributes an independent existence to the term of knowledge. In a word, realism maintains that there is a world and that the function of the mind consists primarily in coming to terms with that world in order to understand it as it is in itself.
In its most general notion, realism is opposed to idealism. Idealism, prescinding from differences existing between idealist philosophers, maintains that the ultimate principle from which philosophy takes its point of departure is mind, whether mind is differentiated into individual intelligences or is itself an undifferentiated principle. Idealism therefore asserts that reality issues forth from intelligence or from spirit, and is ultimately nothing more than a dimension of that same spirit. The idealist begins with the "I" thinking reality, whereas the realist affirms that thinking or knowing depends upon the reality known or thought.
Absolute Realism vs. Nominalism. Historically, such differences did not arise as a result of the modern idealist-realist controversy but as a result of a controversy that centered around the status of universals. The dispute originated in Greek philosophy, and its underlying presupposition is the evident truth that man possesses universal concepts or networks of meaning that are applicable indifferently to many subjects of judgment. What, precisely, is the status of "man" as predicated of John and of Paul? The answer of plato gave birth to what the philosophical tradition of the West calls absolute realism (Soph. 242–264B; Parm. ). Reasoning from the data at hand, Plato concluded that both John and Paul participate in a common meaning designated by the word "man." But since no individual man exhausts the meaning of man, this intelligibility or form cannot be identified with either John or Paul. Plato's problem hinged upon his having to discover the status of a predicate that is participated among many subjects. He concluded that meanings or forms (ideas) have an absolute status quite apart from the things that participate in them. He thus postulated two orders of reality: an order of absolutely real being that corresponds to the judgment of identity, "A is A "; and an order of second-rate reality that imperfectly shares in the being of the forms and that corresponds to the judgment of participation, "A is B. " In the latter judgment the predicate is not identified completely with the subject. What is most important for an understanding of Plato's absolute realism in his contention that the universal concept in all its universality is being, and that the role of the mind is reduced to ascertaining this being.
Plato's doctrine entered into early medieval philosophy through the writings of boethius and through the Isagoge of porphyry; here it was opposed by nominalism, which asserted a position in flat contradiction to that of Plato. Nominalism in its earlier phase is associated with abelard, and in its later stages with william of ockham. Whereas Plato had attended to the evident reality of meanings in things, nominalists looked to the evident reality of singularly existing things. Outside the mind there simply are no universal realities. The universal, by definition, is a community of meaning predicable of many singulars. But a community of meaning can never be found in actual existence. Man never encounters the universal. Arguing thus, and urged on by their insistence that only the singular is real, nominalists concluded by denying any reality whatsoever to the universal. The universal was reduced to the spoken or written or imagined word, which itself is singular. Thus all meaning disappeared from the universe. The more sophisticated nominalism of the 20th century, associated with logical positivism, states that universals are convenient tools with which man organizes the continuum of sensation. But all nominalists, both medieval and modern, agree that universal meaning has no extramental or metaphysical status whatsoever.
Conceptualism and Scotism. conceptualism is a position between that of absolute realism and nominalism. While granting that the mind does in fact possess universal ideas, conceptualism maintains that there is no basis outside the mind for this universality. The universal serves as an instrument for grouping singular objects. Conceptualism thus bears an affinity to both nominalism and to logical positivism.
A late medieval attempt to close the gap between Platonic absolute realism and the nominalistic insistence upon the ultimate reality of the singular was that of John duns scotus. While agreeing with Plato that the form or idea has an extramental or metaphysical status, Scotus took account of the irreducibility of the singular to the universal. The form of man, let us say, must receive the additional form of "thisness" (haecceitas ) or of individuality that seals reality and binds existent meaning to this concrete singular reality. The difficulty in Scotus's position would seem to reside in the impossibility of conceiving a form that is a form and at the same time individual.
Aristotle's Moderate Realism. The realism of Aristotle, as distinguished from that of Plato, is usually called moderate realism. The Aristotelian critique of Platonic realism can be divided methodologically into two moments, one experimental and the other metaphysical (Cat. 2–10; Meta. 1017–18; Part. animal. 642b–644b). In the order of experience man does not discover universals as he discovers things. Slavery is not experienced, but rather slaves. It follows that Plato's theory of participation is useless in man's search for the universal.
Induction and Abstraction. For Aristotle, the universal emerges in the mind as the result of an accumulation of experience that serves to form an induction. When the experience in question is sufficient, the universal is produced by an intellectual power or faculty known in the scholastic tradition as the agent intellect. The universal, being the product of an act of mind, is made by the mind; therefore its metaphysical status as a universal is owed strictly to the intellect. But the mind is able to form the universal, and thus predicate it of the singular, because within reality itself there is a basis or foundation for the universal. This foundation is the energizing principle that organizes each thing, giving it consistency and direction or finality. Aristotle called this principle the form. Form in extramental reality is always individualized by matter, which functions as a passive limitation upon form. Granted that forms are repeated throughout nature, the basis for the universal is reality itself, and reality as form or as act.
Ultimately what separates Aristotelian from Platonic realism is Aristotle's insistence that human knowledge is basically abstractive, and that abstraction depends upon a series of confrontations or experiences with reality through the medium of the senses. For Plato knowledge is basically intuitive, and hence proceeds from the general to the particular, at least ideally.
Objections to Plato. Aristotle's metaphysical objection to Platonic realism rests upon Aristotle's conviction that nature is essentially active or dynamic (Meta. 1013a–1017a). Even if there were Platonic ideas, these could not explain a changing universe. What does not initiate activity does not itself have being. The Aristotelian form not only structures a thing; it is its internal energy or actuality. Since Plato's ideas do not do anything, they are incapable of serving as a basis for such explanation. The Platonic form is, however, a model or an exemplary cause; as such, it does have meaning in a world of art where the carpenter, for example, fashions a chair from the preexistent idea of chair that he entertained (see exemplary causality). In the world of art and technology, the idea precedes the reality; in this order Plato's theory of participation applies with perfect justice. But the world of nature would seem to correspond more closely to the Aristotelian position.
Inherent Difficulties. Aristotle's realism nonetheless contains a number of difficulties that were pointed out by both nominalists and realists during the famous medieval controversy. The chief difficulty in Aristotelian moderate realism is one of explaining how the selfsame form can exist in two orders of reality, in extramental being as actuality and in the mind as universality. The difficulty is rooted in Aristotle's theory of being. For Aristotle, being is ultimately reducible to substance, itself a composition of an active principle (form) and a passive principle (matter). Being must serve to answer the question "what is a thing"; and this "what" (quiddity) or essence is ultimately the form as related to matter. But if being is substance, and especially substance as form, there is no difference between the being of a man and that man himself (Meta. 1003b 28). How then is it possible that man "be" (i.e., exist) in the mind, if being is defined as identical with substance?
Aquinas's Moderate Realism. The metaphysics of St. thomas aquinas is probably the most ambitious attempt within Western philosophy to preserve the doctrine of moderate realism by surmounting difficulties of this type. While conserving in its fullness Aristotle's notion of substance as composed of matter and form, as well as the Aristotelian theory of abstraction, St. Thomas Aquinas made important emendations in the Aristotelian doctrine relating to being. His principal contribution in this area was the clear and explicit distinction he introduced between essence and existence (see essence and existence).
Since essence (and therefore form) is not identically its own existence, nothing prohibits the selfsame form from existing in different individuals. The form remains identically the same within any given species, while it is existentially diverse because of its different acts of existing. Thus the form that exists singularly in the order of being can come to exist within the human intelligence as universal. The latter special mode of existence is known within Thomism as intentional existence [see Y. R. Simon, Introduction à l'ontologie du connaître (Paris 1934)].
Within a Thomistic context, intentionality must not be thought of simply as an act of being. Intentional existence does not make a thing exist; rather it makes a thing be known. The knower is thus literally the thing known; yet the union between them is not physical. Neither knower nor thing known loses its proper identity in the world of being. The act of knowledge is thus conceived to be a relational act; the term of the relation is the reality grasped in knowledge.
Critical Realism. The moderate realism of Aristotle and the medievals was challenged first by the nominalism of Ockham and others, and then in the Renaissance by René descartes. The position of Descartes may be identified as a critical realism, an attempt to justify realism on grounds that belong strictly to the intelligence. Strongly influenced by the success of mathematics in reducing the complex to the simple, Descartes professed a systematic and universal doubt about everything he had hitherto accepted as true, and then proposed to remove that doubt through the application of mathematical methods. Fixing upon the irreducible certitude of the "I" or ego, the existence of which cannot be doubted, Descartes wished to proceed from the ego to the world, rather than from the world to the ego. This marked a radical departure from the Thomistic and Aristotelian contention that man's knowledge of self, as revealed in his consciousness, is a consequence of the knowledge he already possesses of the world.
Descartes established his realism by direct appeal to divinity; for him, the idea of God, whose existence is guaranteed by an identification of His perfection with the concept of existence or being, combines with the fact of experience to prove the existence of the world. All men reason spontaneously to the being of the world from the sensations they possess. The only adequate cause of these sensations is the things represented by them. God's veracity guarantees the validity of the reasoning process, because God would not permit the whole human race to be deceived.
Critical Idealism. The critical realism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries was an attempt to improve the Cartesian thesis by transcending its weakness. Nevertheless, Descartes's realistic intentions were soon absorbed into the idealism of the classical German philosophers of the 18th and 19th centuries. Immanuel Kant affirmed the extramental reality of the world, but he denied that there was any necessary relationship between such reality and the laws of the mind. He admitted that the human intelligence is forced to think in terms of the law of causality, which declares an inexorable link between propositions and ideas. But, for him, causality itself is not found in reality; rather, the real is made up of discrete elements that are not related by causal necessity. Nature contains no laws within itself. Law, being universal and necessary, comes from reason and is thus prior to experience. Kant, of course, did speak of a "thing-in-itself" beyond experience. But this escapes the order of judgment, which is restricted, according to him, to the phenomena of experience; the mind ought therefore not to affirm or deny the existence of the "thing-in-itself." Kant's critical idealism, itself containing a minimum of realism, was thereupon expanded into the absolute idealism of J. G. fichte and G. W. F. Hegel, which denied the "thing-in-itself" as superfluous.
The realist objections to the Kantian position can be stated under two headings. (1) Kant's sharp opposition between the phenomena, or the events of experience that are always singular, and the noumena, or laws of the mind that are always universal, is itself an opposition between two mental concepts. The universal is not opposed to the singular, except logically; rather the universal is discovered by the mind in the singular. Realism thus denies the basis upon which Kant built his system by denying an existential opposition between singularity and the universality. Universality is grounded in form or actuality; this is always individuated in matter, before the mind abstracts its formal intelligibility and sees it as a complexity of meaning common to many things. (2) The Kantian insistence that human knowledge is restricted to phenomena introduces a distinction between "things-in-themselves" and "things-in-man's-sensibility" that is purely assumed and in no sense evident.
Nonscholastic Realism. Contemporary nonscholastic realism has taken many forms, most of which reflect the influence of Kant and his insistence that law belongs to the mind and not to things. Thus H. bergson and W. james reduce the mind to a tool that is capable of working out human problems but is incapable of coming to grips with reality itself. Reality must be grasped, according to Bergson, by an intuition that bypasses the logical structure of the intelligence. A similar philosophy has been developed by George santayana. Asserting the reality of the idea as of an essence given whole and entire to the human intelligence, Santayana asserts that the reality of the existent is accepted on a purely animal faith. It follows that the less existence an idea or an essence has, or the less it is involved in the world, the more real it becomes. Santayana's explanation through animal faith, while differing in many respects from the phenomenology of F. brentano, E. husserl, and M. scheler, has in common with this doctrine a realism of essence that prescinds from a realism of existence. From a scholastic point of view the realist philosophies proffered by G. E. Moore, B. russell, A. N. whitehead, S. alexander, and N. hartmann also force an excessive separation between essence and that of existence.
Modern existentialism has attempted to surmount the traditional opposition between realism and idealism by its insistence upon the truth that man always encounters himself within a world. This situation of "being-in-a-world" belongs to the very constitution of man, who, for M. heidegger, is a project or a "being-towards-and-ina-world." It is impossible to conceive of man and of the world in isolation; man and world essentially involve one another.
The criticism leveled against realism by these thinkers is prompted by the basic realist contention that the world is not man. Existentialists deny the supposed opposition, and thus claim to have transcended the dispute between idealism and realism. The strength of the existentialist position would seem to reside in its insistence that man is meaningless apart from the world, a thesis that seems, however, to strengthen rather than weaken the realist position. The ambiguity in the existentialist transcendence of both realism and idealism is located in the concept of world. If this means a related, meaningful whole, actually intelligible or known, then the existentialist notion of world corresponds roughly to the realist. But if world is taken to exclude actual intelligibility, then the existentialist position can be reduced to an idealism, and thus it in no sense transcends the dispute between realism and idealism.
See Also: knowledge, theories of; aesthetics.
Bibliography: f. d. wilhelmsen, Man's Knowledge of Reality (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1956). f. van steenberghen, Epistemology, tr. m. j. flynn (New York 1949). j. maritain, Distinguish to Unite: The Degrees of Knowledge, tr. g. b. phelan (New York 1959). b. j. f. lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (New York 1957). l. m. rÉgis, St. Thomas and Epistemology (Milwaukee 1946). e. h. gilson, Le Réalisme méthodique (Paris 1936); Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance (Paris 1939). i. m. bocheŃski, Contemporary European Philosophy, tr. d. nicholl and k. aschenbrenner (Berkeley 1956). f. h. parker, "Realistic Epistemology," The Return to Reason, ed. j. d. wild (Chicago 1953). m. m. gorce, Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, ed. a. vacant et al., 15 v. (Paris 1903–50) 13.2:1833–1910. a. colombo and v. mathieu, Enciclopedia filosofica, 4 v. (Venice-Rome 1957) 3:1889–1901. r. eisler, Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe, 3 v. (4th ed. Berlin 1927–30) 2:622–25.
[f. d. wilhelmsen]
