Morality

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MORALITY

The quality attributable to human action by reason of its conformity or lack of conformity to standards or rules according to which it should be regulated. This supposes on the one hand that human actions are voluntary and responsible, and on the other, that there are standards and rules by which human conduct should be measured, a position not admitted by all contemporary philosophers. Existentialists, for example, dislike all universal norms and principles. The atheists among them have disposed of traditional morality by saying that anything a man chooses to do freely is morally permissible. Other contemporary philosophers, for different reasons, have a flexible, or even absent, attitude with regard to norms. Catholic writers agree that there are proper and binding norms of conduct, and therefore that morality in the strict sense is found in man's rational choices and is indeed the paramount aspect of human acts. They distinguish the physical from the moral aspect of an act, saying that the former refers to its physiological existence and that the latter is the relation of the act, and of the whole man, to the value of man. Since this is his supreme good, the morality of a human act is the relation of the act to the supreme good of its agent.

Ethical Positions and Norms. A presupposed philosophy and/or theology will affect what kind of moral norms, if any, are to be considered. Moral theology or Christian ethics will differ from moral philosophy or philosophical ethics according to the sources of knowing such norms; and each will differ according to the different philosophy or theology upon which each is based (for some of this variety, see moral theology [contempo rary trends]).

All Catholic moralists and, in fact, all professedly Christian and theistic moralists should agree fundamentally that man's ultimate end is somehow connected with his Creator. In other words, that moral goodness means conformity in some way with the nature or will of God. Divergences occur in determining more proximate norms for learning what is or is not in conformity with man's ultimate end. For Catholics, a more proximate objective norm has been the nature of man as created by God, with all his relationships: to God, to fellow human beings, and to himself, as known by reason and by revelation interpreted by the living teaching authority of the Church. However, at present not all Catholic writers agree even on these points.

Many modern writers propose man's self-development as a norm, understanding such development to include a greater degree of knowledge, a balanced personality, and a comfortable degree of self-satisfaction and enjoyment. There is a great divergence in judging what these terms mean, in judging which acts or objects really contribute to such development, and even in judging what sort of norm or faculty may be used to discover which acts or objects will promote proper development. Self-development can well be a norm for judging the morality of actions even in accord with traditional Catholic thought, if measured by a full understanding of what is for the best welfare of the self in relation to the ultimate end.

Species of Morality. The distinction of the morality of actions into good, bad, or indifferent in kind, as well as the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic morality, has been widely neglected, especially with a blurring of the distinction between subjective and objective morality. While all Catholic moralists have always agreed and still agree that the most decisive element in human morality is in the person, some modern moralists refuse to consider a distinction between this morality in the agent and a morality attributed analogously to certain described actions.

Determinants. The position of such moralists has led them to deny that morality can ever be legitimately attributed to any acts objectively considered, unless such acts are described by such a prejudicial term as "murder," which implies unjust killing. Some such writers fail to realize that the older distinction between the object and the circumstances of a moral action did not necessarily mean that the object signified some kind of physical action without any circumstances. Even the term "killing" necessarily includes more content than just a physical act; in ordinary usage it denotes an act by which a living being is deprived of life. Even in times past, all Catholic moralists agreed that there was no absolute moral imperative against all killing, nor even against all killing of a human being; but in times past all did agree that the direct killing of an innocent human being was always immoral—at least apart from a certain command of the Creator who possesses ultimate dominion over all of creation.

The traditional use of the term "circumstances" as a determinant of morality beyond the object, referred to circumstances which could affect the morality of an action, other than those included in the definition of the object or act.

Objective and Subjective Morality. The modern objection that morality is never present apart from the intention of the agent misses the essential idea of the distinction between objective (or material) and subjective (or formal) morality. It is certainly true that morality is essentially in the act of the human will, but that does not mean that there cannot be a proper but derived use of the term with regard to objects and circumstances. When traditional Catholic moralists speak of an object or of an object with certain defined circumstances, as intrinsically or objectively evil in a moral sense, it is understood that this means that it would be morally wrong to intend such an action in such defined circumstances, regardless of further circumstances or intention.

Moral and Physical Evil. In considering the object of a human action, Catholic moralists have always recognized a difference in the meaning of moral evil and physical evil, although at times some have used the terms in a confused way. Evil, in general, was understood to mean the lack of something which should be present. To speak of physical evil was to speak merely of such a lack in the physical make-up of things; a lack of conformity to what some reality should normally be. Thus, a human being with only four fingers on one hand, or with six fingers, was said to be lacking conformity with what should normally be the number of fingers on a human hand, with no reference to morality. It was understood that ordinarily it would also be morally evil for one human being to inflict such a physical evil on another human being, although it was generally admitted that circumstances and intention could alter the matter. Thus, it was commonly agreed that amputation or excision of a part of the human body can be morally good in circumstances in which that part constitutes a threat to the whole human organism. For this reason, the loss of a finger was not considered a moral evil even in a remote sense, but only a physical evil, which it would be illicit to intend unless there were a good reason for doing so. On the other hand, the direct killing of an innocent human being was considered an objectively immoral action, whose only imaginable justification could be a direct command of the Creator who had the absolute dominion over human life.

Some modern moralists, including some Catholic theologians, avoid this sort of terminology. They prefer to use terms like "ontic," "premoral," "non-moral" evil to include, apparently, what traditional Catholic terminology classed as "objective" or "intrinsic" moral evil, but also to include what traditional terminology called "physical" evil. As mentioned above, there was some confusion between the terms "physical evil" and "objective moral evil" in some older manuals, especially in the treatment of the so-called principle of double effect at least in their examples. However, this does not prove that the distinction itself is useless.

Values and Disvalues. Instead of speaking of moral good and evil, many modern Catholic moralists prefer to follow what had previously been mainly non-Catholic philosophical terminology and speak rather of values to be achieved or preserved and of disvalues to be avoided. Practically speaking, the use of the terms "values" and "disvalues" in morality differs little if at all from the older terminology among Catholic moralists of good and evil in morality.

Again difficulties and divergences arise in determining the norm or norms for judging what is a value and what is a disvalue, as well as in determining whether there are any disvalues so great that they may never be directly chosen as a means of achieving certain positive values. All admit that many human choices involve both values and disvalues, good and evil.

Often overlooked are values in what might be called a religious or spiritual sense. These can include the value of self-denial and sacrifice (the Cross); the value of patient suffering; the value of helping others even at a seeming loss (disvalue?) to oneself; in general, the value of submission to God; and, finally, the value of achieving the real end of man's existence (union with God), even at the cost of losing the greatest of merely human values. Nevertheless, even some who neglect man's relation to God, still recognize some of these values as helps towards character development.

Moral Absolutes. What was explained above as objective moral evil is the basis of most moral absolutes. When the more traditional moralists state that an action is objectively morally evil, they mean that such an action would be morally wrong as a direct object of a human will in all imaginable circumstances in the ordinary course of affairs. Accordingly, although all killing involves some form of physical evil to a living being, it was and is not considered absolutely morally evil objectively, but needs further determination by at least some added circumstances. On the other hand, the killing of an innocent human being was and is considered a moral evil, even though the traditional principle of double effect would, under certain conditions, allow such a killing to be the unintended but foreseen event of a directly willed action. On the contrary, the direct killing of a cat would not be considered an objective moral evil, even though it is a physical evil for the cat. It could be a moral evil or a moral good for the killer depending on further circumstances as well as on the intent. To deny that there are any objective moral absolutes is tantamount to saying that it is impossible to describe any action in such a way that in no imaginable further circumstances in the ordinary course of affairs could such an action be justified, and any person who felt justified in doing such an action would be laboring under a misapprehension or false conscience.

Some who profess to deny the possibility of moral absolutes actually restrict such a judgment to personal morality and especially sexual morality, while insisting on absolutes in social matters. For example, the same writer may voice an opinion that premarital sex, masturbation, adultery, and homosexual acts can be morally good in some circumstances, but that the use of nuclear armaments or even nuclear power sources are absolutely immoral.

The Notion of Moral Obligation. The connection between moral obligation, and thus of morality, and the relationship of man to his Creator is often overlooked in modern discussions of morality. In an analysis of the meanings of "ought," "must," and similar words, some common-sense ideas are often neglected. An instance of such an idea is that notions of obligation are concerned with a sort of conditioned necessity, and do not always have a tie-in with morality. For example, to say that a bridge player who bids four spades must take ten tricks, has nothing directly to do with morality. It only suggests that if he does not take ten tricks, he has failed in that round of play. So also with the obligation of religious rules in most religious orders and congregations. To say that a religious must keep silence, means that if he/she does not keep proper silence, he/she is not fulfilling the perfection of that form of life, but it does not imply any sin. Most regulations in business enterprises are similar. If one wishes to remain a member of the organization in good standing, one must follow such regulations. To fail to do so does not imply immorality, but may endanger the person's position in the organization. The condition implied in moral obligations might be stated: if you wish to achieve the purpose for which you exist, you must do certain things and you must avoid doing certain other things.

Bibliography: h. allard, "Recent Work in Moral Theology: In Defense of Objective Morality," Clergy Review 61 (1976) 191–195. s. pagan, "No More Sin?" Catholic Mind 75 (January 1977) 29–40 (reprinted from Doctrine and Life 26 [1976] 375–388). t. gilby, ed., Principles of Morality in St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (60 v., London, New York 1965–1976) v.18. r. mccormick, "Notes on Moral Theology," Theological Studies 29 (1968) 679–741, esp. 707–718; 32 (1971) 66–122, esp.66.80; 34 (1973) 53–102, esp. 53–65; 36 (1975) 77–129, esp. 84–100; 37 (1976) 70–199, esp. 71–87; 38 (1977) 57–114, esp. 58–84; all of which give many further references. v. mcnamara, "Approaches to Christian Morality," Catholic Mind 75 (October 1977) 30–37 (reprinted from: "Approaching Christian Morality," Furrow 28 [1977] 213–220).