Foundationalism

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FOUNDATIONALISM

Foundationalism seeks to discover whether there exist ultimate bases and foundations of human knowledge, and if so, to discover what these are. Though the term is newly minted, it designates an ancient and honorable concern among nearly all of the major philosophers of the Western tradition. The earliest example is Aristotle's compelling logical argument in the Posterior Analytics that, insofar as knowledge is based on evidence, and that evidence in turn is articulated in premises, and those premises rest on still other premises—eventually we will need to reach premises that are not just "prior and better known" than the conclusions drawn from them, but that are themselves not dependent upon any prior knowledge, being instead those that are self-evident or evident simply in terms of themselves alone.

Problematic status. Despite the tradition of persistent and perennial search for foundations that has seemingly characterized all previous philosophy, the inventors of the new term "foundationalism" want the designation to be taken as a form of criticism and even opprobrium. What could be worse, they ask in effect, than that spectacle of futility and irrelevance that has been exhibited by Western philosophers in their obsessive preoccupation with the foundations of human knowledge. Instead, philosophers should open themselves to the dawning of that new day, ushered in by the likes of Richard Rorty and his associates among the so-called Post-Analysts, in which we shall no longer worry over the question of whether our knowledge be with or without adequate foundations.

It must not be thought, however, that this apparent bland dismissal of concern with the foundations of knowledge is philosophically frivolous. Richard Bernstein, for example, has made the very telling point that even on its face any such enterprise as that of trying to discover the absolute foundations of any and all human knowledge is bound to be a futile attempt to find some fancied Archimedean point, from which all knowledge might be levered and suspended. Still more to the point have been the sorts of arguments developed by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff. Oversimplifying their arguments somewhat, what they are apparently concerned to point out is that any ultimate or absolute foundational truths upon which all the rest of our human knowledge would need to be based presumably would have to be either of two kinds. Either they would have to be truths of a purely formal kind, such as we are familiar with from logic and mathematics, and which do indeed seem to require no other evidence of their truth than just those very truths themselves. Or, as an alternative, they might be truths of simple observation or perception. For what other evidence can one have of such simple truths as "I am wearing shoes," or "There is a tree outside my window," other than that I just do perceive these things to be the case?

Accordingly, having established this much, Plantinga and Wolterstorff immediately proceed to give the coup de grace to any remaining and still struggling Foundationalists. For so far from the purely formal truths of logic and language being able to provide us with a foundational knowledge upon which we might be able to base our remaining knowledge of the world, it turns out that any and all purely formal truths, being no more than mere logical or linguistic truths, are in principle totally incapable of providing us with the slightest knowledge of the world or the way things are. Hence they are quite irrelevant for purposes of any foundationalism. And no less embarrassing is the case regarding ordinary observational or perceptual truths. Not only are such truths unable to provide us with unshakable foundations for our human knowledge, but it would appear, particularly from recent researches in the logic of science, that any and all perceptions and supposed data of observation are entirely relative to the conceptual schemes or frameworks in terms of which our perceptions and observations take place. Hence we have only to change our operative frameworks, and what we perceive will no longer be the same at all. And with that, the hope that experience and observation might provide us with an ultimate foundation for our knowledge of the world and of reality simply goes out the window.

What, then, is the consequence of such a demise and destruction of any and all forms of foundationalism, so far as human knowledge is concerned? Presumably, the answer that the Post-Analysts would give is that henceforth it shall be pragmatism, and not realism, that must be the order of the day, so far as human knowledge is concerned. Catholic thinkers have surely been on the defensive with regards to this sort of epistemological nihilism. T. Russman's Prospectus for the Triumph of Realism, however, is a skillful rehabilitation of foundationalism along Aristotelian and Thomistic lines.

See Also: realism.

Bibliography: r. j. bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, (Philadelphia, Pa. 1983). a. plantinga and n. wolterstorff eds., Faith and Rationality (Notre Dame, Ind./London 1983). t. a. russman, A Prospectus for the Triumph of Realism (Macon, Ga. 1987).

[h. b. veatch]

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