Patients' Rights

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PATIENTS' RIGHTS

The constitutional status of patients' rights can be distilled into three general doctrinal propositions: First, there are constitutional constraints on state authority to force medical treatment on an unwilling person; second, when a person is in state custody (for whatever reason), the state is constitutionally obliged to provide at least minimally adequate health care; and third, the state is not otherwise constitutionally required to provide even a minimal level of health care to anyone. The Supreme Court has not been so solicitous, however, toward implementing the first and second propositions as it has been toward the third.

The Court long ago held, in jacobson v. massachusetts (1905) regarding smallpox vaccination, that an individual may be constitutionally subjected to involuntary medical treatment to protect community health. Beginning in the 1970s, in cases involving mental illness, the Court found that forced treatment implicated fourteenth amendment "liberty" interests and, accordingly, required the state to demonstrate, by "clear and convincing evidence," both the existence of mental illness and some measure of harm either to the affected individual or others that would follow without treatment. The principal decisions in this area were o'connor v. donaldson (1975) and Addington v. Texas (1979). The Court, however, has not been expansive in applying the "liberty" principle to require state respect for individuals' autonomous choice to refuse treatment even where the possibility of harm appears limited to themselves alone.

Two 1990 decisions exemplify this restrictive construction. In Washington v. Harper (1990) the Court ruled that a prisoner could be forced to take psychotropic medication without any judicial determination of his or her need for the medication or mental competency to refuse it. While the Court acknowledged the existence of a "significant liberty interest" and said that the state's purposes in forcibly administering the medication must be "therapeutic" rather than "punitive," the Court found that internal administrative determinations made by prison psychiatric professionals would be adequate to protect the prisoner ' s rights.

Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health (1990) considered the rights of patients to refuse medical treatment in an apparently different context; and yet, the result, in the Court's restricted construction of the liberty interest at stake, seems strikingly similar. In Cruzan, the patient was in a state hospital, having been without cognitive function (in a "persistent vegetative state") since an automobile accident seven years earlier. Hospital staff refused to discontinue medical treatment without judicial authorization, notwithstanding the request of the patient's parents, and the state court found that there was no "clear and convincing evidence" that patient herself would have wanted termination of treatment. The Supreme Court ruled that a competent adult had a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest against unconsented medical care, but that the state was free to erect stringent evidentiary standards in evaluating claims on behalf of incompetent patients.

There were special factors in these two cases that might have limited the Court's inclination to apply the liberty interest that it abstractly had endorsed. In Harper, the Court cited "legitimate needs of institutional confinement," including state "interests in prison safety and security," as a basis for withholding application of the prisoner's claimed right to refuse medication; there was, however, no specific factual finding that the prisoner's condition endangered prison safety or security. In Cruzan, the autonomy claim was advanced on behalf of an obviously incompetent patient; there was, however, evidence (which the state court refused to credit) that before her incapacitating accident, the patient had explicitly opposed such medical treatment. In accepting the restrictive evidentiary standard, the Supreme Court was apparently unconcerned with the practical likelihood that most people will not make clear prior indications of their wishes regarding medical treatment (notwithstanding the statutory recognition in many states of so-called "living wills"). The Court, moreover, referred favorably to the state's interest in prohibiting suicide, a reference that suggests that the state is free to impose stringent mental competency tests on individuals who, unlike Cruzan, have current capacity to articulate their resistance to treatment—tests so stringent as to undermine in practice the liberty interest to refuse medical treatment that the Court abstractly endorsed.

The Court may, however, be more hospitable to the practical implementation of patients' right to refuse treatment in future cases than it was in Harper or Cruzan. Indeed, there were strong dissents in both cases (three in Harper and four in Cruzan) urging respect for the refusal rights and although Justice sandra day o'connor concurred in the Court's opinion in Cruzan, she wrote separately to suggest that states may be constitutionally required to respect not only prior formal statements made by an individual, as in a "living will," but also the wishes of a surrogate decision maker who had been formally designated by the individual before incapacitating illness.

As in the current constitutional doctrine regarding a patient's right to refuse treatment, there is a disjunction in the Supreme Court's case law between the abstract formulation that the state must provide medical treatment to persons in its custody and the specific standards adopted to assure practical implementation of that right. The disjunction was visible on the face of the first opinion in which the Court announced that prisoners have a right to medical treatment: In Estelle v. Gamble (1976) the Court held that failure to provide necessary treatment could constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, but only if such failure amounted to a "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Similarly, in Youngberg v. Romeo (1982), the Court found that a resident of a state mental retardation institution had a constitutional right to receive "minimally adequate or reasonable training" programs; at the same time, however, the Court held that in determining the minimal standards for adequacy of reasonableness, judges must defer to medical and behavioral professionals. (Indeed, in Chief Justice william h. rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Cruzan, the force even of this minimally bestowed treatment right was subtly undermined with the observation that "the liberty interest" in Youngberg addressed only "safety and freedom from bodily restraint [and] did not deal with decisions to administer or withhold medical treatment.")

Whatever the uncertainties of its acknowledgment of the right to refuse medical treatment or the right to receive treatment while in state custody, the Court has been quite clear in rejecting the existence of any generally applicable constitutional right for the provision of medical services. The Court explicitly stated in Youngberg that there was no such right to "substantive services." In maher v. roe (1977) and harris v. mcrae (1980), moreover, the Court had held that neither state nor federal governments are constitutionally required to provide abortions for women who are indigent; although these cases were colored by the surrounding public controversy about whether abortion should be considered an ordinary medical procedure, the decisions are nonetheless consistent with the Court's long-standing resistance to finding any constitutional entitlements not only for medical care but for welfare benefits generally.

inCruzan none of the other Court members joined with Justice antonin scalia in his separate statement that "the Constitution has nothing to say" about the right to refuse medical treatment. Notwithstanding the pervasive role of state and federal governments in the provision and regulation of health care, however, the Constitution—as currently construed by the Supreme Court—says very little about patients' rights generally.

Robert A. Burt
(1992)

Bibliography

Annas, George J.; Law, Sylvia; Rosenblatte, Rand; and Wing, Kenneth 1990 American Health Law. Chapter VI, pages 561–666. Boston: Little, Brown.

Katz, Jay 1984 The Silent World of Doctor and Patient. New York: Free Press.

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