shame
shame In the beginning, there was no shame. Genesis tells us that Adam and Eve ‘were both naked, the man and his wife, and were not ashamed.’ Having eaten the forbidden fruit, however, they knew of their nakedness and sought to hide it. Shame thus came into existence, along with mortality, physical toil, and the pains of childbirth. In the Bible, shame is intrinsically connected with both the body and wrongdoing, or more precisely with self-consciousness of one's body and awareness of wrongdoing. Once they had disobeyed God, Adam and Eve became ashamed of their nakedness and took cover.
Similarly, in the ancient Greek world, shame was linked to the body etymologically and in Homer's tales also to nakedness and sexuality. The dread of being seen naked or making love, or being seen to witness love-making, to use examples from the Odyssey, might indicate that the idea of shame is tied to that of physical vulnerability. It also suggests that it is a fear of appearing other than one might like to in the eyes of others, mortal or divine. In a heroic culture, in which men like Odysseus and his son, Telemachus, are repeatedly referred to as ‘god-like’, this is more likely to be a fear of seeming base, stripped of dignity, and lacking in the requisite virtues of courage, wisdom, temperance, and so forth. It is the fear of revealing oneself as being closer to an animal than a god, of being no more than flesh and ruled by it, concomitant with the ignominious need to conceal oneself and crouch, rather than to be able to stand or walk tall — images associated by contrast with honour and pride.
In moral philosophy, feeling shame has generally been considered a natural disposition or sensation, and the fear of incurring it an universal motive for action or forbearance from antiquity onwards. It has also been taken as crucial evidence of the existence of an innate moral sense, most notably by Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746) and the Scottish school of moral philosophy.
Its management and careful manipulation has been deemed crucial in pedagogical practice and theory, especially in times when physical punishment was thought inefficacious or aberrant. In one of the most influential pedagogical treatises of all time, Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693), John Locke urged parents to desist from beating their children and encouraged them to use the softer, but more effective, ways of shame and its counterpart, commendation.
Following World War II, especially in the context of understanding Japanese society from a Western point of view, much was made of the distinction between so-called ‘shame’ and ‘guilt’ cultures, a distinction introduced by Ruth Benedict (The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, 1946). The former rely on ‘external sanctions for good behaviour’, the latter on ‘an internalized conviction of sin’. Although there seems to be a psychological difference between shame and guilt, to contrast cultures on that basis is at best misleading. Thus, while feelings of guilt tend to imply that someone other than oneself has been wronged in some way, one could feel ashamed of an action which did not involve anyone else. Beyond this, however, the two concepts and the feelings which they identify overlap to a large extent and are too complex to admit of a sharp contrast. At the cultural level, the matter is, if anything, more complex still; it is difficult to imagine a society in which fear of shame was a significant or leading motive for action or forbearance, without ‘an internalized conviction’ of wrongdoing and of breach of a socially accepted code of behaviour.
Similarly, in the ancient Greek world, shame was linked to the body etymologically and in Homer's tales also to nakedness and sexuality. The dread of being seen naked or making love, or being seen to witness love-making, to use examples from the Odyssey, might indicate that the idea of shame is tied to that of physical vulnerability. It also suggests that it is a fear of appearing other than one might like to in the eyes of others, mortal or divine. In a heroic culture, in which men like Odysseus and his son, Telemachus, are repeatedly referred to as ‘god-like’, this is more likely to be a fear of seeming base, stripped of dignity, and lacking in the requisite virtues of courage, wisdom, temperance, and so forth. It is the fear of revealing oneself as being closer to an animal than a god, of being no more than flesh and ruled by it, concomitant with the ignominious need to conceal oneself and crouch, rather than to be able to stand or walk tall — images associated by contrast with honour and pride.
In moral philosophy, feeling shame has generally been considered a natural disposition or sensation, and the fear of incurring it an universal motive for action or forbearance from antiquity onwards. It has also been taken as crucial evidence of the existence of an innate moral sense, most notably by Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746) and the Scottish school of moral philosophy.
Its management and careful manipulation has been deemed crucial in pedagogical practice and theory, especially in times when physical punishment was thought inefficacious or aberrant. In one of the most influential pedagogical treatises of all time, Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1693), John Locke urged parents to desist from beating their children and encouraged them to use the softer, but more effective, ways of shame and its counterpart, commendation.
Following World War II, especially in the context of understanding Japanese society from a Western point of view, much was made of the distinction between so-called ‘shame’ and ‘guilt’ cultures, a distinction introduced by Ruth Benedict (The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, 1946). The former rely on ‘external sanctions for good behaviour’, the latter on ‘an internalized conviction of sin’. Although there seems to be a psychological difference between shame and guilt, to contrast cultures on that basis is at best misleading. Thus, while feelings of guilt tend to imply that someone other than oneself has been wronged in some way, one could feel ashamed of an action which did not involve anyone else. Beyond this, however, the two concepts and the feelings which they identify overlap to a large extent and are too complex to admit of a sharp contrast. At the cultural level, the matter is, if anything, more complex still; it is difficult to imagine a society in which fear of shame was a significant or leading motive for action or forbearance, without ‘an internalized conviction’ of wrongdoing and of breach of a socially accepted code of behaviour.
Sylvana Tomaselli
Bibliography
Williams, B. (1993). Shame and necessity. University of California Press, Berkeley.
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