Somalia, Intervention in

When genocidal violence exploded in Rwanda in May 1994, the United States sounded a particularly strident, even obstructionist, voice of caution against intervention by any outside forces to stop the atrocities. Although the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) already had a small contingent on the ground at the time of the crisis, the United States quickly moved to oppose an expanded UN presence.

As events unfolded in Rwanda, American policy makers were strongly influenced by the specter of the Somalia "disaster" of less than a year earlier as they deliberated possible options. In December 1992 American forces entered Somalia as part of a UN mission to feed starving people in a nation wracked by internal chaos. With CNN broadcasting images of the soldiers coming ashore to rescue the at-risk population, this gesture of international goodwill seemed destined for success. Over the next year the mission expanded from humanitarian relief to include elements of "nation building," which translated into helping Somalia establish some sort of stable, workable, democratic polity that would ultimately prevent the need for future outside interventions. As a result of this expanded mandate (soon thereafter referred to as "mission creep"), American forces found themselves at odds with local warlords in the capital city of Mogadishu. This conflict culminated on October 3, 1993, with a firefight between U.S. Army Rangers, members of the elite Delta Force, and forces loyal to Somali leader Mohammed Aideed. After hours of intense fighting eighteen Americans lay dead and seventy-three wounded.

The loss of American lives was difficult and dramatic enough, but the Battle of Mogadishu earned its lasting legacy when triumphant Somalis dragged the body of an American helicopter pilot through the city streets. Covered in the news, complete with graphic video footage, the episode seared powerful images into the memories of most Americans—policy makers, politicians, the public, and military personnel alike. And while a majority of Americans continued to support an American presence there, Somalia sent shockwaves of caution and reflexive anti-interventionism through the Pentagon and the White House. Intervention in Africa then appeared to involve a maximum of risk with limited returns at best.

Within the military establishment, an angry belief developed that the administration of President Bill Clinton had failed to provide it with requested equipment; there was also irritation within the military at the United States' subsequent hasty withdrawal from Somalia following the Battle of Mogadishu. Both factors contributed to the administration's reluctance to commit U.S. forces to another UN mission, especially one in Africa. At the same time American domestic politics suggested that few, if any, constituencies supported risky U.S. involvement in Africa, no matter what the cause, following the debacle in Somalia. To put it simply, the president feared a decline in public support in opinion polls and losing more votes in a reelection bid than he would gain by authorizing any African intervention, even if just or successful.

Despite the episode in Somalia it is important to note that policy makers did not share a monolithic view of the appropriate and necessary response to the Rwandan crisis. The State Department's Africa Bureau, headed by George Moose, urged an expanded and more vigorous UN military presence. Deputy Assistant Secretary Prudence Bushnell and Central Africa Office Director Arlene Render "argued fiercely at interagency meetings within the executive branch for a stronger mandate and a troop increase for UNAMIR as well as for a number of diplomatic measures to isolate and stigmatize the rump regime" (Burkhalter, 1994/1995, p. 47). Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also reportedly opposed a bystander role for the United States. However, proponents of stronger action faced an uphill battle within the administration in the post-Somalia era, particularly with the Pentagon.

The Pentagon based much of its position on the crisis in Rwanda on an analogy with Somalia, arguing that an all-too fine line existed between sending in UN forces and eventually having to follow up with American soldiers. Pentagon officials were wary of the possible eventual need to bail out a floundering UNAMIR and, therefore, opposed even multilateral involvement at any level. This was an understandable concern, but one born of selective memory—the costly Battle of Mogadishu had been a U.S., not UN, operation. Proponents of intervention in any form were outranked in discussions within the Clinton administration. For a lower-level official such as Bushnell, a difficult argument became even more challenging because it involved having to go head-to-head with more senior officials from the Pentagon, including Undersecretary of Defense John Deutch who staunchly opposed intervention.

Compounding this was an apparent lack of interest or support among higher-level officials at the State Department. Peter Tarnoff, the undersecretary of state for political affairs and the overseer of the Africa bureau and other regional departments, "apparently had no interest in Rwanda," whereas Tim Wirth, undersecretary of state for global affairs, "seemingly played no role at all in the question of U.S. policy during the genocide, even though his brief included human rights" (Burkhalter 1994/1995, p. 47). Meanwhile, at the National Security Council, senior officials demonstrated their disinclination toward any sort of action. Throughout the administration policy makers viewed Rwanda through the prism of Somalia. As a consequence, they thought in terms of a failed state and quickly assumed that any intervention would have to be large-scale and costly, and would probably result in no measurable improvement.

The United States also operated under a significantly flawed understanding and interpretation of events. In large part the Clinton administration mistakenly identified and therefore addressed the Rwandan issue as a "peacekeeping" matter, as a more or less "traditional" civil war between two armed forces—not as large-scale genocidal violence directed against helpless civilians. Therefore, any proposed action to alleviate the situation in Rwanda fell under the rubric of peacekeeping and was far more likely to fall victim to flawed analogies born of the experience in Somalia. It also made more likely—and perhaps more understandable and defensible—extreme caution and trepidation at the thought of interposing any foreign force between the warring parties no matter what the reported loss of life was. As former U.S. envoy to Somalia, Robert Oakley, explained at the time of the Rwandan genocide, "Somalia showed just how difficult and dangerous the mission of saving a country can be. The international community is not disposed to deploying 20, 40, 60,000 military forces each time there is an internal crisis in a failed state."

This peacekeeping frame of mind and its outgrowth from the events that had transpired in Somalia became manifest with the public release on May 5, 1994 (concurrent with the genocide in Rwanda) of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25). PDD-25 marked a determined effort to redefine the conditions and contexts for U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Although President Clinton came into office trumpeting support and enthusiasm for multinational operations on issues ranging from nonproliferation to international crime, the events that occurred in Somalia chastened his administration. As a presidential candidate, Clinton had even spoken openly of the need to establish a UN rapid reaction force to intervene on humanitarian grounds.

Post-Somalia, Clinton's vision of assertive multilateralism dissipated, giving way to extreme caution and calculation, despite the fact that the mission in Somalia likely saved upwards of a quarter-million people. With new-found "prudence" and the haunting "precedent" of Somalia in the background, the Clinton administration formulated an official reassessment of U.S. support for UN peacekeeping initiatives. Termed "the first comprehensive U.S. policy on multilateral peace operations suited to the post–Cold War era," PDD-25 responded to some hard questions: when, where, and how to intervene. The document defined the U.S. national interest in terms of limited involvement and low cost. Furthermore, it declared that U.S. involvement in UN missions would occur only if it had a "direct bearing on U.S. national interests," which represented a fairly limited rather than expansive point of view, and one that would more than likely exclude places such as Somalia and Rwanda in the future.

At the press briefing introducing the directive, National Security Advisor Tony Lake stated that "the central conclusion of the study is that properly conceived and well-executed, peacekeeping can be a very important tool of American foreign policy." Shortly thereafter, though, Lake added a qualification echoing back to Somalia: He noted that although the United States can sometimes help other countries in times of need, "we can never build their nations for them."

PDD-25 addressed six major issues: (1) making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support; (2) reducing U.S. costs for UN peace operations; (3) clearly defining policy on the command and control of U.S. forces; (4) reforming and improving the UN's ability to manage peace operations; (5) reforming and improving U.S. ability to manage peace operations; and (6) improving cooperation between the Executive, the Congress, and the American public on peace operations. Among a variety of factors PDD-25 stressed that the United States would participate in a UN peace mission when the mission (1) responds to a threat to or breach of international peace and security; (2) advances U.S. interests (with unique and general risks weighed appropriately); (3) includes acceptable command and control arrangements; and (4) includes clearly defined objectives with realistic criteria for ending the operation (i.e., an exit strategy). At the policy unveiling Lake discussed each of these six imperatives and highlighted the notion that "peacekeeping is a part of our national security policy, but it is not the centerpiece. The primary purpose of our military force is to fight and win wars."

The public announcement of PDD-25 and comments like those made by a senior foreign policy official such as Lake did not bode well for American support of a strengthened UN response to the crisis in Rwanda, and certainly not for any intervention by American forces. The thrust of PDD-25 and its post-Somalia release during the crisis in Rwanda suggested that some policy makers mistakenly viewed any mission to Central Africa as a traditional peacekeeping expedition to maintain a cessation of hostilities between two fighting parties. In an operational sense the directive essentially rendered nearly impossible any significant initiatives to help Rwanda because next to none could realistically succeed or even be implemented without U.S. support.

PDD-25 was a potential catch-22 for the future deployment of UN forces: "The United States would refuse any new deployment of UN Blue Helmets unless all the necessary conditions (logistical, financial, troop deployments, etc.) were fulfilled—yet they could never be fulfilled without [italics in original] the active support of the superpower" (Destexhe, 1995, p. 50). Commenting on PDD-25 and its application to Rwanda, Richard Dowden of Britain's Independent newspaper referred to the policy statement as the result of a "poker mentality: Problem: Somalia. Response: Intervention. Result: Failure. Conclusion: No More Intervention" (Ronayne, 2001, p. 167). In Congress Representative David Obey (Democrat from Wisconsin) explained the policy as a fulfillment of the American public's desire for "zero degree of involvement and zero degree of risk and zero degree of pain and confusion" (Ronayne, 2001, p. 167). Born of Somalia, the PDD-25 mindset significantly influenced administration thinking and policy even prior to its public announcement and had striking implications for America's determination not to become involved in Rwanda during the spring of 1994.

SEE ALSO Rwanda; United States Foreign Policy Toward Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allard, Kenneth (1995). Somalia Operation: Lessons Learned. Washington, D.C: National Defense University Press. Available from http://www.theinteragency.org/index.cfm?state=resource.4#9.

Bowden, Mark (2000). Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War. New York: Penguin USA.

Burkhalter, Holly (1994/1995). "The Question of Genocide: The Clinton Administration and Rwanda." World Policy Journal 11(4):44–54.

Crocker, Chester A. (May/June 1995). "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong." Foreign Affairs 74(3).

Destexhe, Alain (1995). Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century. New York: New York University Press.

Leitenberg, Milton (November/December 1994). "Rwanda 1994: International Incompetence Produces Genocide." Peacekeeping & International Relations 23(6).

Power, Samantha (2002). A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. New York: Basic Books.

Ronayne, Peter (2001). Never Again? The United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide Since the Holocaust. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.

Sciolino, Elaine (1994). "For West, Rwanda is Not Worth the Political Candle." New York Times (April 15):A3.

U.S. Department of State (1994). "Presidential Decision Directive 25." Washington, D.C: Bureau of International Organizations, U.S. Department of State. Available from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd25.htm.

Peter Ronayne