Foreign Trade

Countries trade with one another to obtain goods and services that are of better quality than, less expensive than, or simply different from, those produced at home. Since independence, Latin American foreign trade conditions have been characterized first by free trade and unprecedented prosperity (1820–1930), then by protectionism (1930–1973), and increasingly since 1973 by trade liberalization. For many observers, foreign trade and external factors have played a central role in shaping the region's development. For others, these factors have played, at best, a supplementary, secondary role to dominant internal forces.

THE YEARS OF PROSPERITY (1820–1930)

The foreign trade of most Latin American countries increased gradually between 1820 and 1860 as colonial restrictions were abolished and political stability in the region increased. As the vital collective need for freedom of international exchange, global movement and flow of commodities, people and capital increasingly is both recognized and satisfied, Latin America becomes an integral, vibrant segment of the global production system. Exports and imports rose sharply during the so-called golden age from 1860 to 1910. The speed of trade expansion slowed down, however, between 1910 and 1930, as rich mineral deposits were exhausted and the best lands had been incorporated into agriculture. The period from 1820 to 1930, which is often described as one of free trade, laissez faire, or "outward orientation," also included instances of protectionism associated with import duties imposed because of low administrative collection costs. These occurred because the cost of collecting import duties/taxes is often low (less than 5%) in comparison to other taxes such as those on income (often as high as 30%) or on sales (ranging from 10% to 50%).

Most of the products exported from Latin America between 1820 and 1930 have been described as "primary," that is, originating in agriculture or mining. All were "composite" in that they embodied not only value from agriculture and mining but also value added by manufacturing and services, such as trade, transportation, finance, and insurance.

Latin American foreign trade expanded explosively after 1860 owing to a convergence of favorable supply-and-demand factors. As the industrial revolution transformed Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, there emerged a strong demand for raw materials. Furthermore, Britain abolished tariffs protecting its domestic agriculture. A simultaneous technological revolution, which brought the invention of the steam engine, propeller, and metal hull, precipitated an unprecedented reduction in maritime transportation costs. Consequently, agricultural or mineral products from distant Latin America could now compete with those from the Caribbean and the more industrialized countries. Furthermore, rapidly rising incomes pushed up the demand for food, other consumer products, and raw materials. Unable to meet rapidly rising demand internally, Europe and North America increasingly turned to Latin America for supplies of more, better, and less expensive agricultural products and raw materials.

As a consequence, by the middle of the nineteenth century Argentina had become a major exporter of meat and hides, Cuba of sugar, Brazil of coffee, Venezuela of cacao, Peru of guano, and Chile of copper and wheat, which went to California during the gold rush years. Supplies of agriculture- and mining-based exports increased as new land was incorporated into production in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile. Export growth was facilitated by successive waves of immigrants, especially from southern Europe, into these regions. In addition, recurrent export bonanzas attracted large investments, first by the British and subsequently by the Americans, in agriculture, mining, railroads, public utilities, and industry. They also made it easier for Latin American governments to borrow in the capital markets of Europe and the United States.

The impact of free and rapidly growing, foreign trade on Latin American incomes was considerable but uneven. According to estimates by Angus Maddison, by 1929 real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in U.S. dollars at 1965 factor cost (that is, calculated at the value of the dollar in 1965) had reached $908 in Argentina. This was almost double the income level of Japan ($485), about half that of the United States ($1,767), and more than 80 percent of the income in the United Kingdom ($1,105). Per capita incomes were, however, lower in other countries: In Brazil it was $175, in Chile $580, in Colombia $236, in Mexico $252, and in Peru $177.

By 1913, according to Maddison, exports of Latin American countries had reached levels close to or even higher than those in the rest of the world. Average Latin American per capita exports, expressed in U.S. dollars at then-current prices and exchange rates, were $31.90 (in Argentina it was $66.70; Brazil, $13.30; Chile, $41.20; Colombia, $6.80; Cuba, $66.70; Mexico, $9.90; Peru, $9.70; Uruguay, $61.60; and Venezuela, $10.90) as compared to an average for developed countries of $37.30 (France, $33.40; Germany, $35.90; Japan, $6.90; Netherlands, $67.00; United Kingdom, $56.00; and the United States, $24.50), $0.70 for China, and $2.60 for India. For Latin America, agriculture- and mining-based exports provided both an engine and a facilitator. The outflow of exports raised welfare by bringing a corresponding inflow of imports, immigrants, capital, institutions (e.g., broad-based educational), government (decentralization), finance (improved capital markets), transportation (railroads), and ideas. Latin America, Europe, and North America achieved an unprecedented degree of economic interdependence. Latin America supplied the agricultural and mineral primary commodities; Europe and the United States the industrial ones.

Latin American economies remained, however, highly dependent on one, or a few, export products. The following figures show the percentage of each country's total exports represented by individual products in 1929: Argentina (wheat, 29.2; maize, 17.6; frozen, chilled, and tinned meat, 12.8; linseed oil, 12.6), Brazil (coffee, 71.0), Chile (nitrates, 42.1; copper, 40.4), Colombia (coffee, 60.6; petroleum, 21.3), Cuba (sugar, 79.5), Mexico (silver, 20.6; other minerals, 47.0), Peru (petroleum, 29.7; copper, 22.4; wool, 21.0; sugar, 11.5; lead, 5.1), Uruguay (wool, 30.7; frozen, chilled, and tinned meat, 30.2; hides and skins, 12.7), and Venezuela (petroleum, 74.2; coffee, 17.2).

Between 1900 and 1930 agriculture-based products dominated exports from Colombia (coffee), Paraguay (quebracho, other timber), El Salvador (coffee), Brazil (coffee), Argentina (wheat, maize), Guatemala (coffee, bananas), Costa Rica (coffee, bananas), Cuba (sugar), Nicaragua (coffee, bananas), Uruguay (meat, wool), Ecuador (cacao), and Panama (bananas). Mining-based products dominated exports from Venezuela (copper, petroleum), Mexico (petroleum, silver), Chile (nitrates, copper), and Bolivia (tin). Peru exported both mineral (petroleum) and agricultural (cotton) products.

In the eyes of many, however, foreign trade was by no means an unmitigated blessing for the region before 1930. Demand and prices for primary exports fluctuated wildly, unleashing large shocks that Latin America could not always master. Because cyclical booms were followed regularly by precipitous declines, export revenues, exchange rates, capital inflows, trade-based tax revenues, and domestic income experienced unprecedented instability. Exhaustion of rich mineral deposits and fertile agricultural lands exposed the region's excessive dependence on primary commodities and its uncertain growth potential. Finally, some perceived that the benefits from trade accrued primarily to the workers and (foreign) capitalists of isolated production areas, without a lasting and positive impact on the majority of the population. Not even the worst prognosis, however, anticipated the calamitous collapse of foreign trade between 1929 and 1932 (see Table 1).

THE YEARS OF PROTECTIONISM (1930–1973)

The degree of recognition and satisfaction of the collective need for freedom of trade and movement of people and capital experiences a precipitous decline after 1930. The Great Depression of the 1930s reduced the demand for primary export products, caused a decline in the relative prices of primary exports with respect to industrial imports, and suddenly stopped capital flows from Europe and the United States to Latin America. According to figures compiled by Angus Maddison, between 1929 and 1932 the average export volume for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela fell by 35.8 percent, the average purchasing power of exports by 55.1 percent, the average import volume by 65.9 percent, and GDP by 18.5 percent. Chile suffered the most, with export volume declining by 71.2 percent, purchasing power of exports by 84.5 percent, import volume by 83.0 percent, and GDP by 26.5 percent. After initial adherence to old policy weapons and gold-standard rules, Latin America responded to the collapse of foreign trade with new approaches such as exchange controls, quantitative and bilateral trade restrictions, debt delinquency, and debt renegotiation with much larger write-offs than in the past.

The role of foreign trade was further reduced as a consequence of the protectionist, inward-oriented policies advocated after 1950 by Raúl Prebisch, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, and their structuralist theory of development. Import-substitution policies, which promoted domestic production of previously imported industrial commodities, frequently resulted in the neglect of exports. This exacerbated the isolation of Latin America from the rest of the world. According to Maddison, the average ratio of merchandise exports to GDP at current prices for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru declined from 22.1 percent in 1929 to 9.l percent in 1973. In contrast, the average ratio of merchandise exports to GDP for France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States increased from 15.8 percent to 19.2 percent during the same period.

Latin America's share of the value of world exports experienced a sharp decline, from 10.9 percent in 1950 to a meager 3.9 percent in 1992. Between 1950 and 1990, Argentina's share declined from 1.92 to 0.37 percent, Brazil's from 2.22 to 0.95 percent, Cuba's from 1.10 to 0.20 percent (in 1980), and Venezuela's from 1.91 to 0.53 percent. The decline in the relative importance of Latin America in world exports coincided with the widespread implementation of protectionist policies of import substitution. In contrast, between 1950 and 1990 the share of West Germany in the value of world exports increased from 3.29 to 12.39 percent and that of Japan from 1.37 to 8.69 percent. Similarly, Latin American imports as a percentage of world imports declined from 8.10 in 1950 to 2.82 in 1990. The introduction of neoliberal policies of trade liberalization, privatization, and stabilization, beginning with Chile in 1973, has contributed to a slight increase in the relative importance of Latin America in world imports and exports since 1989.

At least in part, the post-1930 decline in the relative importance of Latin America in world trade can be explained by its continued dependence on primary exports and the decline in their prices relative to industrial imports. As the figures presented in Table 2 reveal, the principal export commodities of most Latin American countries in 1985 were of agricultural and mineral origin. According to Richard Lynn Ground, Latin America's merchandise, or net barter, terms of trade fell from 100.0 in 1928 to 51.8 in 1933, reaching a level of 63.6 percent in 1987. (The merchandise, or net barter, terms of trade measure the relative movement of export prices against that of import prices. The merchandise terms of trade index is calculated as the ratio of a country's index of average export prices to its average import price index. Numbers above 100.0 are favorable, and those below 100.0 are unfavorable, relative to the base year.) After a sharp deterioration during the Great Depression, the merchandise terms of trade of Latin America recovered by 1950 (93.6 percent), declined in the 1960s (49.2 percent in 1965), rose again in the 1970s (76.7 percent in 1980), only to retreat in the 1980s (62.1 percent in 1986).

As a consequence of the Great Depression and the popularity of protectionist ideologies, most Latin American countries increased nominal tariffs after 1930. By the 1960-to-1965 period, average nominal tariffs had risen to 148.8 percent in Argentina, 85.0 percent in Brazil, 89.0 percent in Chile, and 139.0 percent (1972–1977) in Uruguay. Nominal tariffs on consumer goods were even higher, reaching 235.0 percent in Argentina (1960–1965) and 204.0 percent in Chile (1960–1965). The 1930-to-1973 period of protectionism and import-substitution industrialization has been gradually replaced by a new era of neoliberal trade liberalization.

Even though the 1930-to-1973 period is generally described as the age of import-substitution industrialization and inward-oriented, protectionist development, it also contained the seeds of trade liberalization efforts. Initially, such efforts were largely cornerstones of the region's integration schemes aimed at promoting import substitution by enlarging the size of the market. The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), which was launched in 1961, brought together Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, which were joined later by Bolivia and Venezuela. In 1980 LAFTA was transformed into the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), as a result of the Treaty of Montevideo. Sub regional groupings gave rise to the Central American Common Market (CACM) in 1960, the Andean Pact (ANCOM) in 1969, and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) in 1973. For the most part, these schemes lacked a clear commitment to free trade and made little progress.

THE YEARS OF LIBERALIZATION (1973–)

Beginning with Chile in 1973, the degree of recognition and satisfaction of the collective need for freedom of trade and movement of resources, which had collapsed following the Great Depression of the 1930s, increases to historically unprecedented levels in many countries of Latin America. As part of their far-reaching liberalization policies in this period, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay have reduced tariffs, simplified tariff structures, and dismantled nontariff measures. Import licenses, quantitative restrictions, import prohibitions, discretionary licensing, additional taxes, and surcharges have been abolished or significantly reduced in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile (where quantitative restrictions were prohibited by law), Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Peru. Substantial reductions in tariffs and simplification of the tariff structure have been introduced in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela. By the years 1978 to 1981, average nominal tariffs had been reduced to 34.4 percent in Argentina, 10.0 percent in Chile, 28.0 percent in Colombia, 16.8 percent in Costa Rica, and 11.5 percent in Mexico.

TRADE AGREEMENTS

Latin America has participated in such multilateral trade agreements as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was created by the Bretton Woods Conference after World War II to reduce barriers to international trade, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), which replaced GATT after its 1986–1994 Uruguay Round. Cuba and Venezuela have criticized the decision-making process of the WTO as being dominated by a few developed nations at the detriment of developing nations. Many complaints have been raised in the GATT and the WTO about unfair protectionist and environmental practices. Trade integration begun in the 1960s, and has accelerated since the first Summit of the Americas Conference in December 1994.

As mentioned previously, a regional trade integration association, the Asociacion Latinoamericana de Integracion, ALADI (Latin American Integration Association, LAIA), was created in 1980 with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela as members. Its central objective was the advancement of regional economic and social development through the establishment of a common market.

In addition to the multilateral and regional trade agreements, four major custom unions were created. The first customs union trade bloc, called the Andean Pact until 1996, was founded in 1969 by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru with the signing of the Cartagena Agreement. In 1996 it was renamed the Andean Community of Nations (Co-munidad Andina de Naciones, CAN). Venezuela joined in 1973 and announced its potential withdrawal in 1996.

The second Southern Common Market, Mercosur or Mercosul (Mercado Comun del Sur) customs union movement originated in July 1990, when Argentina and Brazil agreed to the elimination of tariff barriers between them by December 1994. This agreement, which was extended to Paraguay and Uruguay on March 26, 1991, called for free intra-Cone movement of products by December 1995. The collapse of the Argentine economy in 2001 and continued internal conflicts between Argentina and Uruguay, Brazil and Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil, and so forth, have slowed economic integration.

On December 13, 1960, in a conference in Managua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua established the Central American Common Market (CACM). Costa Rica joined the CACM in 1963. A phenomenal increase in trade between member nations had materialized by 1970. The organization was, however, paralyzed after the 1969 Football War between Honduras and El Salvador, which led to the latter's effective withdrawal, and by the political and social unrest in Central America in the 1970s and 1980s. A significant revival of the organization occurred in the 1990s. The fourth customs union/common market trade agreement is that of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) which was established in 1973 with Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and the Grenadines, Trinidad, and Tobago as members.

Among the free trade agreements, the most prominent is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which came into effect in January 1994, with Canada, Mexico, and the United States as members. Intra-NAFTA trade increased significantly as the majority of tariffs were eliminated upon the signing of the treaty and other tariffs were gradually phased out over a fifteen-year period. However, the per capita income gap between Mexico and the United States/Canada was not reduced, i.e., there was no economic convergence, and Mexican poverty rates were not substantially reduced. Furthermore, on January 1, 1995, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela established the G3 Free Trade Agreement. A planned withdrawal from this agreement was announced by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in May 2006. In addition, the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (called DR-CAFTA) between the United States, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic has been ratified by all member nations except Costa Rica, which will hold a referendum on it. An ongoing proposal for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which is opposed by Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, was discussed on November 16, 2003, by representatives of thirty-four nations at a meeting in Mexico. A large number of bilateral free trade agreements have been signed in recent years by Mexico (16), Costa Rica (9), Chile (at least 15), Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Venezuela and so forth. A union of South American and/or Central American nations is always contemplated. The widespread adoption of neoliberal philosophies of trade liberalization, privatization, and stabilization since 1973 has strengthened efforts to form or revive sub-regional trade blocks.

The value of Latin American exports reached $123 billion in 1990. The share of nonfuel primary composite commodities (food, live animals, beverages, tobacco, crude materials, and vegetable oils) in total exports had declined from 65.8 percent in 1970 to 41.2 percent in 1990. The growth of merchandise trade during the period 1970 to 1992 is presented in Table 3.

Exports of manufactures in 1990 were $40.6 billion, or 32.9 percent of total exports, up from 10.9 percent in 1970. Exports of machinery and transportation equipment, which were dominated by internal combustion piston engines and passenger motor vehicles, equaled $13.9 billion, or 11.2 percent of total exports, up from 2.3 percent in 1970. These originated mainly in Brazil and Mexico. Exports of basic manufactures were $14.6 billion, or 11.8 percent of total exports, up from 4.4 percent in 1970. The principal exports of basic manufactures consisted of iron and steel, which originated mainly in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. Other important exports were leather from Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil; textile yarn from Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Argentina; nonmetallic mineral manufactures from Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia; and paper and paperboard from Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. In 1990 exports of chemicals, principally from Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, reached $7.0 billion, or 5.7 percent of total exports, up from 2.7 percent in 1970. Brazil and Mexico were the major exporters of plastics.

Brazil accounted for 90 percent of all Latin American exports of footwear in 1990. Brazil and Colombia accounted for more than 60 percent of the region's exports of textile clothing, although Argentina, Barbados, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay also produced large volumes.

Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina accounted for more than 80 percent of the region's foreign exchange earnings from manufactured exports. Other countries have achieved in recent years a significant growth of their manufactured exports. Chemical elements and compounds have been exported from Trinidad and Tobago; plastics from Colombia, Uruguay, and Venezuela; other types of chemicals from Chile, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay; clothing and textile yarn from Peru; plumbing, heating, and lighting equipment from Chile and Venezuela; and iron and steel from Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.

High-technology products (i.e., products having high research-and-development costs relative to total production costs) have grown at the impressive long-term annual rate of 20 percent. By 1989, Latin America's exports of high-technology products (chemicals and pharmaceuticals; plastic materials; nonelectrical and electrical machinery; transport equipment; and professional, scientific, and controlling instruments) reached $17.6 billion, with Brazil and Mexico accounting for 90 percent of the total. By the late 1980s high-technology export products represented 50 percent of Latin America's manufacturing exports.

The post-1930 policies of protectionism and import-substitution industrialization drastically changed the relative income position of most Latin American countries. Whereas per capita income (real per capita GDP in dollars at 1965 factor cost) of the export-oriented Japanese economy increased nearly twelve fold between 1913 ($332) and 1985 ($3,952), and that of the United States more than tripled (from $1,358 to $4,569), that of Argentina less than doubled (from $790 to $1,417). Per capita income in Brazil (which increased almost tenfold between 1913 [$118] and 1985 [$1,114]), Chile ($1,137), and Venezuela ($1,199) has come close to that of Argentina. Trade liberalization schemes aim at accelerating the region's growth of income through closer integration into international trade.

As the statistics of Table 4 demonstrate, exports from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) to the world increased from $230 billion in 1995 to $578 billion in 2005. LAC exports to LAC countries as a percentage of exports to the world declined from 19.9 in 1995 to 16.7 in 2005. LAC exports to non-LAC countries increased from 80.1 in 1995 to 83.3 in 2005. The share of exports during the same years to the United States increased (from 80.1 to 83.3), to the European Union fell (from 16.9 to 13.8), to Japan fell (from 4.0 to 2.3), and to China increased (from 1.1 to 4.1). During the same years, as the statistics of Table 5 reveal, imports by LAC from the world increased from $260 billion to $533 billion. LAC imports from LAC countries as a percentage of imports from the world increased (from 18.1 to 20.1), and from non-LAC countries decreased (from 81.9 to 79.9; from the United States from 41.6 to 39.5, from the European Union from 19.1 to 15.0, and from Japan from 5.2 to 3.4; but imports from China increased from 1.3 to 4.3).

Tables 5 and 6 provide information with respect to the relative importance of primary (Table 5; agricultural, i.e., food and raw materials, and mining, i.e., ores and other minerals, fuels and nonferrous metals) and manufactured (Table 6; iron and steel, chemicals, other semi manufactures, machinery and transport equipment, i.e., automotive products, office and telecom equipment and other machinery and transport equipment, textiles, clothing and other consumer goods) products expressed as percentages of total exports from Latin America and the Caribbean for 1995 and 2000–2005. Primary products range between 49.9 (1995) and 58.8 percent and manufactured ones between 41.2 (2002) and 50.1 (1995) percent of total exports. Countries exporting mainly primary products include Barbados, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic. Countries exporting primarily manufactured products include Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.

There is a strong ongoing debate in Latin America and the rest of the world about the costs and benefits of free trade and globalization. Satisfying the collective need for free internal and external trade can increase technological (producing output with the least expensive inputs) and allocative (producing the best combination of outputs with the least expensive inputs) efficiencies. In most countries, however, the benefits have accrued primarily to highly productive export sectors, their privately- or state-owned corporations, powerful trade unions, and skilled labor. Furthermore, both internal and external trade liberalization can carry, and have carried, high short- and medium-term transition costs in the form of increased unemployment, inequality, poverty and misery. The degree to which free trade (satisfaction of the collective economic need for free exchange in all input and output markets) increases technological and allocative efficiency in each country, and also increases the welfare of all inhabitants, depends on the degree to which the other collective needs for safety, security and protection of life and private and public property, equitable treatment by government, political freedom, social harmony, and environmental protection—also are satisfied. In other words, it also depends, on the one hand, on the degree to which a nation has attained procedural democracy (through satisfaction of the collective need for political freedom); and on the other hand, civil society (through satisfaction of the other collective needs).

No Latin American nation has as yet successfully created the economic, social and political conditions which could turn free trade into a reliable instrument of attaining universal, sustainable prosperity. By itself, free trade has been unable to lead to universal prosperity in the Americas. And without it, universal prosperity has remained a mirage. Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina are, to varying degrees, against free trade. They are also forming their own trade bloc and distancing themselves from the rest of pro-free trade Latin American nations. Unless these aforementioned complementary collective needs are satisfied to similar degrees, free trade by itself cannot lead, and has not led, to technological and allocative efficiency, and a reduction in the historically high levels of relative inequality in total and labor incomes, as well as in educational, health, and other forms of capital endowments. The failure of Latin American countries to attain sustainable development, or deal effectively with its multiple problems of poverty, inequality, and underemployment, both during periods of relative free trade (1830–1930 and 1973-present) and protectionism (1930–1973), may be best understood in terms of the inability of their collective markets to attain high degrees of satisfaction of all these fundamentally complementary collective needs.

See alsoAgriculture; Andean Pact; Caribbean Common Market (CARIFTA and CARICOM); Central American Common Market (CACM); Chicago Boys; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC); Economic Development; Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA); Industrialization; International Monetary Fund (IMF); Labor Movements; Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA); Mining: Modern; Neoliberalism; North American Free Trade Agreement; Plantations; Prebisch, Raúl; World Bank.

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                         Markos J. Mamalakis