Public Relations

Public relations (PR) is an important element of a firm's promotional mix or strategy, whereby the firm communicates information to the public with a goal of influencing their attitudes and behavior. The primary purposes of promotion are to inform, persuade, and remind. Many PR activities may be regarded as persuasion-based because the communications are linking the firm with desirable attributes and images. Scholars and social historians often consider PR synonymous with "image management," or less positively with "spin" or "media manipulation."

Although marketing and sales activities commonly have an objective of selling a firm's products, PR efforts are typically focused on enhancing the image of the firm or the entire institution. PR involves a very broad range of activities; thus it can be challenging to find agreement about how the term is best defined. Nevertheless, Denny Griswold, founder of Public Relations News, a leading PR newsletter for publicists and professionals in the PR field, offers a widely accepted definition of PR: "The management function which evaluates public attitudes, identifies the policies and procedures of an individual or an organization with the public interest, and plans and executes a program of action to earn public understanding and acceptance" (Seitel 2001). PR can involve communication through both paid and unpaid means, with PR practitioners communicating on either a personal or non-personal basis with several publics including customers, competitors, the academic community, the government, regulatory authorities, trade associations, special interest groups, the investment community, suppliers and distributors, employees, and the press. PR practitioners perform several functions, including press relations, product publicity, corporate communication, lobbying, employee and investor relations, and crisis management.

Early PR Efforts by the Tobacco Industry

Ivy Lee and Edward Bernays are considered key pioneers of modern public relations. Lee was a former Wall Street reporter who became involved in publicity work in 1903 and formed a PR agency with George Parker in 1904. Lee's clients included the hard coal industry, the Rockefeller family (one of the wealthiest families in the United States, who owned the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company), and the American Tobacco Company. During the mid-1920s, George Washington Hill, president of American Tobacco, sought Lee to direct the firm's PR activities, which included guidance and critical comment about various advertising campaigns. One of Lee's assignments was to improve relations with those possessing candy and sugar interests. Relations had become strained due to an effective Lucky Strike advertising campaign that encouraged female consumers to "Reach for a Lucky instead of a sweet." Lee's firm was paid a retainer of $40,000 per year for its efforts, which was a considerable amount at the time.

In 1928, the American Tobacco Company also became a key client of Bernays (he previously worked for Liggett and Myers, the producers of Chesterfields), who was the mastermind of a PR strategy that encouraged women to start smoking cigarettes in public places. A promotional campaign was introduced at the 1929 Easter parade in New York City, in which ten young women, including Ruth Hale (a leading feminist), lit "torches of freedom" as a protest against women's inequality. This freedom march gained front-page exposure in newspapers.

Bernays was assigned the formidable task of altering consumers' perceptions about the color green because internal market research indicated that many women did not hold a favorable view of Lucky Strike's green packaging. In 1934, Bernays was noted for facilitating green as the fashion color of the year by coordinating both a "Green Ball" with New York's socialites and a "Green Fashions Fall Luncheon" with leading fashion editors. The color was omnipresent at both events and supplemented with press releases indicating that green was a symbol of hope, victory (over depression), solitude, and peace. Presentations were given by both a noted art academic on the subject of "green in the work of great artists" and a renowned psychologist on green's psychological connotations. A Color Fashion Bureau was established, and letters and announcements were sent to influential interior decorators, department store managers, home-furnishings buyers, art industry groups, and women's clubs to communicate that green was a color with several virtues. These events were organized by Bernays without other participants knowing the identity of his client.

Hill recognized the importance of PR. Lee and Bernays were simultaneously on the American Tobacco payroll at great expense for a considerable number of years. At first, neither Lee nor Bernays was aware of the duplicity and duplication of many of their efforts for the same company. Interestingly, once Lee and Bernays discovered their concurrent employment, Hill explained, "If I have both of you, my competitors can't get either of you" (Pollay 1990).

The Tobacco Industry Research Committee and the Tobacco Institute

During the early 1950s, scientific and popular articles began to more commonly associate lung cancer with smoking, and smokers became increasingly "health concerned." Several epidemiologic studies linked smoking with lung cancer in the early 1950s and Reader's Digest articles in 1952 and 1953 highlighted the relationship of smoking with cancer. Tobacco firms became increasingly uneasy about the negative publicity, which prompted the industry to hire Hill and Knowlton, a renowned PR firm, in 1953. Recommendations by Hill and Knowlton led to the formation of the New York–based Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) in 1954. On 4 January 1954, a full-page PR advertisement, using the headline "A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers," circulated in 448 newspapers in 258 U.S. cities reaching an estimated readership of more than 43 million, to announce that the TIRC was being established with a mandate of supporting scientific research related to the health effects of tobacco use. The advertisement cast doubt on unfavorable research findings and included the statements: "We [the tobacco industry] accept an interest in people's health as a basic responsibility, paramount to every other consideration in our business. We believe the products we make are not injurious to health. We always have and always will cooperate closely with those whose task it is to safeguard the public health" (Glantz et al.).

The TIRC, renamed the Council for Tobacco Research in 1964, continued to function with the purpose of maintaining uncertainty and "controversy" over the health effects of smoking by maintaining files on experts, carefully monitoring media stories, arranging meetings with key press editors and writers, generating favorable publicity through news releases, and providing grants for scientific research that was reportedly independent. The TIRC put forward arguments that more research was needed before a conclusive link could be made between smoking and cancer, placed an emphasis on people's genetic susceptibility to cancer, speculated which other factors were attributable to lung cancer, claimed that tests on mice were not applicable to humans, and attempted to discredit the existing studies that reached unfavorable conclusions.

The Washington-based Tobacco Institute was established in 1958 to take over lobbying and PR activities, representing its members on matters of common interest pertaining to litigation, politics, and public opinion. By the late 1980s, the annual budget of the Tobacco Institute was estimated to be more than $20 million. The tobacco industry increasingly focused its efforts toward resisting increases in excise taxes, restrictions on indoor smoking, and proposals to ban advertising. The tobacco industry also continued to deny that nicotine was addictive—on 14 April 1997, seven U.S. tobacco executives made an infamous testimony to this effect in U.S. Congress—even though internal research indicated otherwise. The Council for Tobacco Research and the Tobacco Institute were both abolished in accordance with the 1998 U.S. Master Settlement Agreement.

Tobacco PR Consultants Try to Create "Controversy" About Secondhand Smoke

T he tobacco industry continues to use science as a PR tool to resist or forestall proposed bylaws that prohibit smoking in indoor, public settings. Internal tobacco industry documents, which are publicly accessible through various court proceedings, reveal that tobacco firms and their PR consultants have aggressively discredited, undermined, and refuted scientific research findings relating to the health consequences of environmental tobacco smoke exposure. When assessing Philip Morris' PR activities, researchers Elisa Ong and Stanton Glantz said that the firm has "gone beyond 'creating doubt' and 'controversy' about the scientific evidence that demonstrates that active and passive smoking cause disease, to attempting to change the scientific standards of proof" (2001).

Key PR Tools

Tools commonly used by PR practitioners include new product publicity, product placement, Internet websites, and event or "issue" sponsorship. New product publicity involves efforts to generate positive media attention about specific products or services being introduced to the marketplace. During the 1950s, cigarette promotions frequently portrayed newly introduced filtered products as technological breakthroughs and made assertions that were meant to reassure smokers with health concerns. In 1958, for example, Philip Morris organized a press conference at New York's Plaza Hotel to unveil its new "high filtration" Parliament brand. At the conference, a Philip Morris executive described the new filter—coined "Hi-Fi"—as "hospital white" and explained that this was an event of "irrevocable significance." Meanwhile, test tubes bubbled in the hotel foyers and personnel, wearing long white laboratory coats, responded to questions.

In 1964, consumer health concerns were reawakened with the release of the first U.S. Surgeon General's report on smoking and health. The tobacco industry responded by launching several low (machine-measured) yield products, which were supported by promotions implying that they were healthier or less hazardous. During the 1970s, several line extensions of familiar products were introduced, making use of the "Light" product descriptor. In the 2000s, corporate websites of tobacco firms emphasize their efforts to introduce new products that purportedly deliver lower levels of toxins to the smoker, again portraying these products as technological breakthroughs.

PR practitioners may also garner publicity through product placement, which entails efforts to have product exposure during special events or in films, television programming, stage-theater, concerts, and computer games. Philip Morris, for example, had product placement arrangements for the motion pictures Superman II (1980) and License to Kill (1989), and allegedly spent $200,000 to have actor Martin Sheen smoke Marlboro throughout Apocalypse Now (1979). Internal tobacco industry documents also reveal that, in 1983, the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation agreed to pay $500,000 to actor Sylvester Stallone in exchange for him smoking the firm's brands in a minimum of five feature films. Cigarette product placement payments are prohibited in accordance with the 1998 U.S. Master Settlement Agreement, but many tobacco control groups and health practitioners remain concerned about how tobacco use is portrayed in television programming and film.

Using Internet websites, PR initiatives have attempted to "reposition" tobacco corporations such that they are perceived as responsible firms within a controversial industry. One employed strategy involves tobacco firms communicating their support of youth prevention campaigns and youth access laws. The Tobacco Institute's first prominent program related to youth access included distribution of both a booklet titled "Helping Youth Say No" and signs for posting at retail that stated, "It's the Law: We Do Not Sell Tobacco Products to Persons Under 18." The R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company initiated the "Right Decisions, Right Now" program in 1991, procuring actor Danny Glover as a spokesperson. "We Card" is an active industry-initiated program that was established in 1995 under the auspices of the Coalition for Responsible Tobacco Retailing. The self-described mandate of this coalition is to prevent underage tobacco sales in the United States by providing training and education opportunities to owners, managers, and front-line employees of retailers that sell tobacco. Member organizations of this coalition include tobacco firms, retailers, and law enforcement agencies. Philip Morris began publicizing its "Action Against Access" program in 1995 as a complement to "We Card," and in 1998, the firm formed a Youth Smoking Prevention department that has an annual budget of more than $100 million.

Internal tobacco industry documents reveal, however, that the purpose of these programs is to avert or delay regulatory measures and to improve public opinion about tobacco industry marketing practices. These industry-sponsored programs have been ineffective at diminishing youth tobacco use, largely because they portray smoking as an adult activity (thus, framing cigarettes as "forbidden fruit") and emphasize the influential role of peer pressure and parents as role models (meanwhile, omitting discussion about the role of industry marketing practices).

Finally, tobacco firms often become involved in event or "issue" sponsorships to improve the image of both the company and its products through being associated with useful works. Sponsorship objectives are typically distinguishable as either corporation related or product related. In addition to enhancing the company's image, common corporation-related objectives include: 1) increasing public awareness of the company and its services; 2) altering public perception; 3) being involved in the community and having local relevance; 4) building business relations and goodwill; and 5) enhancing employee relations and motivation. Tobacco industry representatives commonly maintain that their sponsorships allow events to be staged that might otherwise be denied, and view sponsorships as an opportunity to be regarded as good corporate citizens. With respect to "issues" sponsorship, Philip Morris ran prominent $100 million promotional campaigns during the late 1990s that communicated the philanthropic and social activism activities of the firm, relating to topics such as feeding the hungry and supporting domestic violence crisis centers. The campaigns did not specify, however, that the money spent toward promoting these efforts considerably exceeded what was actually contributed to those in need.

See Also Advertising; American Tobacco Company; British American Tobacco; Lobbying; Marketing; Philip Morris; Regulation of Tobacco Products in the United States; Sponsorship.

? TIMOTHY DEWHIRST

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cosco, Joe. "Tobacco Wars: The Battle Between Titans Heats Up." Public Relations Journal 44 (1988): 14–19, 38.

Drope, Jacqui, and Simon Chapman. "Tobacco Industry Efforts at Discrediting Scientific Knowledge of Environmental Tobacco Smoke: A Review of Internal Industry Documents." Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 55 (2001): 588–594.

Ewen, Stuart. Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of the Consumer Culture. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976.

Glantz, Stanton A., et al. The Cigarette Papers. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

Irwin, Richard L., and Makis K. Asimakopoulos. "An Approach to the Evaluation and Selection of Sport Sponsorship Proposals." Sport Marketing Quarterly 1 (1992): 43–51.

Lamb, Charles W., Jr., Joseph F. Hair, Jr., and Carl McDaniel. Marketing, 5th ed. Cincinnati, Ohio: South-Western College Publishing, 2000.

Landman, Anne, Pamela M. Ling, and Stanton A. Glantz. "Tobacco Industry Youth Smoking Prevention Programs: Protecting the Industry and Hurting Tobacco Control." American Journal of Public Health 92 (2002): 917–930.

Muggli, Monique E., et al. "The Smoke You Don't See: Uncovering Tobacco Industry Scientific Strategies Aimed Against Environmental Tobacco Smoke Policies." American Journal of Public Health 91 (2001): 1,419–1,423.

Ong, Elisa K., and Stanton A. Glantz. "Constructing 'Sound Science' and 'Good Epidemiology': Tobacco, Lawyers, and Public Relations Firms." American Journal of Public Health 91 (2001): 1749–1757.

Pollay, Richard W. "Propaganda, Puffing and the Public Interest." Public Relations Review 16 (1990): 39–54.

Pollay, Richard W., and Timothy Dewhirst. "The Dark Side of Marketing Seemingly 'Light' Cigarettes: Successful Images and Failed Fact." Tobacco Control 11 (2002): i18–i31.

Pratt, Cornelius B. "The 40-Year Tobacco Wars: Giving Public Relations a Black Eye?" Public Relations Quarterly 42 (1997–1998): 5–10.

Seitel, Fraser P. The Practice of Public Relations, 8th ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2001.

Tye, Larry. The Father of Spin: Edward L. Bernays and the Birth of Public Relations. New York: Crown, 1998.

Yach, Derek, and Stella A. Bialous. "Junking Science to Promote Tobacco." American Journal of Public Health 91 (2001): 1745–1748.