Midway, Battle of
Midway, Battle of (1942).Within a month of the Imperial Japanese Navy's surprise attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of Japan's Combined Fleet, realized that the Hawaii attack had not achieved its main purpose, the complete destruction of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, including aircraft carriers. On 14 January 1942, Yamamoto's staff recommended an attack on Midway, a defended American atoll 1,100 miles northwest of Pearl Harbor. Japanese planners assumed the U.S. Pacific Fleet would rush to the outpost's aid, whereupon the more powerful Combined Fleet would engage and destroy it. Such a victory could open the prospect of invading Hawaii, thus extending the Japanese defensive perimeter eastward. With the loss of their fleet and the bare essentials to their success against Japan, the Americans might accept a negotiated end to war.
Fearful that Hawaii was unobtainable and that, without it, possession of Midway would become a liability, the Naval General Staff in Tokyo fought the plan, presented on 2 April 1942; but by the 5th, Yamamoto had triumphed. Later, Yamamoto added a diversionary air raid on the small American air base at Dutch Harbor, Unalaska, and seizure of Attu and Kiska at the western end of the Aleutian chain. The main assault would be against Midway far south, with a naval air attack on 4 June and invasion 6 June. Late in May the Combined Fleet headed east.
In the meantime Adm. Chester Nimitz, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, heeded warnings of an imminent assault upon Midway from Lt. Comm. Joseph J. Rochefort, whose cryptanalysts, using MAGIC, had entered the Japanese Navy's radio communication system. Knowing the Aleutians were a feint, Nimitz concentrated his three carriers where needed, misinformed the Japanese as to their location, and until the last minute denied the enemy accurate information about them. At the same time, first his cryptanalysts and then his patrol planes from Midway kept Nimitz and his tactical commanders at sea—Rear Admirals Frank Jack Fletcher and Raymond A. Spruance—informed of the progress of the enemy fleet.
Early on 4 June, Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagumo, commanding four of Japan's most powerful carriers, launched his attack upon Midway. Simultaneously, Midway‐based U.S. aircraft attacked his ships, but none gained a hit and most were shot down. Then, in quick succession, a Japanese scout plane reported the presence of an American carrier; U.S. carrier‐based torpedo planes began to attack Nagumo's carriers (almost all were shot down without getting a single hit); the Japanese aircraft that had attacked Midway returned, needing to land on deck; and three U.S. dive‐bomber squadrons, one from the Yorktown and two from the Enterprise, arrived over the Japanese Fleet. The dive‐bombers destroyed three of Nagumo's carriers: the Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu. The Hiryu survived long enough for her planes to hit the Yorktown, then she too sank under air attack from Yorktown and Enterprise. Defeated, Yamamoto turned his fleet homeward. On 6 June, aircraft from the Enterprise and Hornet sank a Japanese cruiser, while the Japanese submarine I‐168 finished off the damaged Yorktown.
Japan had gained possession of two barren islands in the Aleutians. It had lost four irreplaceable carriers and many equally irreplaceable aviators. The United States had also lost aviators, but only one carrier. The Japanese Combined Fleet no longer had an appreciable edge over the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The United States had saved Midway and perhaps Hawaii, gaining the opportunity to go on the offensive two months hence at Guadalcanal. In Admiral Spruance, it had found one of the Pacific War's most effective tactical naval commanders. And in retrospect, Midway proved to be the turning point of the naval war in the Pacific. The United States now seized the offensive.
[See also Guadalcanal, Battle of (1942–1943), Navy, U.S. 1899–1945; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Sea Warfare; World War II, U.S. Naval Operations in: The Pacific.]
Fearful that Hawaii was unobtainable and that, without it, possession of Midway would become a liability, the Naval General Staff in Tokyo fought the plan, presented on 2 April 1942; but by the 5th, Yamamoto had triumphed. Later, Yamamoto added a diversionary air raid on the small American air base at Dutch Harbor, Unalaska, and seizure of Attu and Kiska at the western end of the Aleutian chain. The main assault would be against Midway far south, with a naval air attack on 4 June and invasion 6 June. Late in May the Combined Fleet headed east.
In the meantime Adm. Chester Nimitz, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, heeded warnings of an imminent assault upon Midway from Lt. Comm. Joseph J. Rochefort, whose cryptanalysts, using MAGIC, had entered the Japanese Navy's radio communication system. Knowing the Aleutians were a feint, Nimitz concentrated his three carriers where needed, misinformed the Japanese as to their location, and until the last minute denied the enemy accurate information about them. At the same time, first his cryptanalysts and then his patrol planes from Midway kept Nimitz and his tactical commanders at sea—Rear Admirals Frank Jack Fletcher and Raymond A. Spruance—informed of the progress of the enemy fleet.
Early on 4 June, Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagumo, commanding four of Japan's most powerful carriers, launched his attack upon Midway. Simultaneously, Midway‐based U.S. aircraft attacked his ships, but none gained a hit and most were shot down. Then, in quick succession, a Japanese scout plane reported the presence of an American carrier; U.S. carrier‐based torpedo planes began to attack Nagumo's carriers (almost all were shot down without getting a single hit); the Japanese aircraft that had attacked Midway returned, needing to land on deck; and three U.S. dive‐bomber squadrons, one from the Yorktown and two from the Enterprise, arrived over the Japanese Fleet. The dive‐bombers destroyed three of Nagumo's carriers: the Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu. The Hiryu survived long enough for her planes to hit the Yorktown, then she too sank under air attack from Yorktown and Enterprise. Defeated, Yamamoto turned his fleet homeward. On 6 June, aircraft from the Enterprise and Hornet sank a Japanese cruiser, while the Japanese submarine I‐168 finished off the damaged Yorktown.
Japan had gained possession of two barren islands in the Aleutians. It had lost four irreplaceable carriers and many equally irreplaceable aviators. The United States had also lost aviators, but only one carrier. The Japanese Combined Fleet no longer had an appreciable edge over the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The United States had saved Midway and perhaps Hawaii, gaining the opportunity to go on the offensive two months hence at Guadalcanal. In Admiral Spruance, it had found one of the Pacific War's most effective tactical naval commanders. And in retrospect, Midway proved to be the turning point of the naval war in the Pacific. The United States now seized the offensive.
[See also Guadalcanal, Battle of (1942–1943), Navy, U.S. 1899–1945; Pearl Harbor, Attack on; Sea Warfare; World War II, U.S. Naval Operations in: The Pacific.]
Bibliography
John B. Lundstrom , The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy, December 1941–June 1942, 1976.
Hiroyuki Agawa , The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, trans. John Bester, 1979.
George W. Prange,, Donald M. Goldstein,, and and Katherine V. Dillon , Miracle at Midway, 1982.
John J. Stephan , Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: Japan's Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor, 1984.
Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, eds. Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941–1945, trans. Masatake Chihaya, 1991.
Frank Uhlig, Jr.
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