ARISTOTLE

ARISTOTLE (384–322 bce), along with Plato, was the greatest philosopher of antiquity. His influence on Western philosophical and scientific culture has been enormous, and even in the twenty-first century in many fields of knowledge (metaphysics, logic, ethics, biology, and psychology) the name of Aristotle represents an important point of reference.

Life and Works

Aristotle was born in the city of Stagira in northern Greece and at the age of seventeen moved to Athens, where for about twenty years he attended the Academy, the school founded by Plato. There he obtained an extensive and liberal education, ranging from logic to natural philosophy, from metaphysics to astronomy. From 360 bce onward he held regular courses and seminars within the Academy. After the death of Plato in 348 bce, Aristotle left Athens and the Academy, traveling to Atarneus, Assus, and Mytilene and then to Pella, where he was the tutor of Alexander the Great, the future ruler of Greece, for about three years. During this period Aristotle concentrated his efforts on the study of biology and zoology and produced his scientific works. From 335 bce he was once again back in Athens, where he founded the Lyceum, a school that rivaled the institution established by Plato and headed at that time by Xenocrates. The composition or definitive arrangement of Aristotle's major scholarly works may be dated to this period of teaching at the Lyceum.

The writings of Aristotle are traditionally divided into two groups: those intended for publication, the so-called exoteric works (exoterikoi logoi ), and those written for internal use in the school and thus termed acroamatic (from akroasis, what is heard, thus heard in a lesson) or esoteric. The first group includes dialogues, such as the Protrepticus (an exhortation to philosophy), On Philosophy, and Eudemus, as well as doctrinal and polemical works, such as On the Good and On Ideas ; the second includes the major treatises written for his school, such as Metaphysics, Physics, On the Heaven, Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics, On the Soul, Rhetorics, Poetics, the works on biology and zoology (On the Parts of Animals, The History of Animals ), and the works of logic (Categories, Topics, Analytics ). By a quirk of fate only those works not intended for publication, that is, the acroamatic or esoteric texts, still exist, whereas none of the works published by Aristotle has survived. Knowledge of these relies upon quotations from later writers.

The Theology of the Young Aristotle

In the twentieth century there were a number of studies concerning the so-called theology of the young Aristotle. In the dialogue On Philosophy, Aristotle probably alluded to two divinities, one cosmic, represented by the heavens (alive and composed of ether), the other metacosmic, in all probability represented by the unmoved prime mover, "Thought of Thought." In any case it seems certain that he laid down a clear order of importance between the two divinities, making the metacosmic divinity, that is the prime mover, superior to the heavens, whose very movement depended upon the unmoved mover. In the Eudemus he developed a theory of the soul, even if it is unclear whether in this dialogue Aristotle supported a radical dualism between body and soul like that of Plato or presented the idea of the soul as a form and function of the body just as in the work On the Soul. The Protrepticus finally contained proof of the superiority of the contemplative or speculative life, that is to say the truly philosophical way of life. The latter was considered divine, because it reveals man as like God, who is Thought, that is pure contemplative activity. The Protrepticus also contained an important argument in support of the unavoidable nature of philosophy, because even the rejection of the same requires its use in argument and thus "playing philosophy."

Nature and Its Principles

The starting point of Aristotle's philosophical thinking can be identified in the rejection of the theory of the forms put forward by Plato. Even during the years he spent at the Academy, Aristotle distanced himself from the theories of his teacher. Moving from a systematic analysis of language, especially predicative language, Aristotle singled out the primary meaning of being, upon which everything else somehow depends. This first meaning is represented by the category of substance (ousia ), which in its purest form is identified with the particular individual. In order to be able to describe a particular reality as old (quality), as 170 centimeters tall (quantity), as in the Lyceum (place), as married to Xanthippe (relation) one must recognize the existence of an individual, in this case Socrates, all these attributes pertain to or are inherent in him. In its fullest meaning therefore being is not that of ideas, that is, of universals, but rather of substances, namely particular individuals or things (Socrates, a dog, the computer used to type these words).

The concept of substance expressed in the Categories is presumed in the analysis of the principles and causes of nature (physis ) developed in the first two books of the Physics. Here too Aristotle starts by rejecting the Platonic theory of forms, especially the claim that the causes of the existence of sense objects may be seen in forms. According to Aristotle the common condition of all natural reality consists of motion, namely in the fact that all natural beings are subject to processes of reproduction and decay, of alteration, modification, and movement, and that they contain within themselves the cause of this change. Platonic forms, which are unmoved and separate, cannot in fact be the causes of natural reality because they are not able to explain the essential characteristic of the latter, namely that they are subject to movement (kinesis) and change (metabolē).

In his study of the principles of motion, Aristotle begins by recognizing, in common with many of his predecessors, that they are represented by opposites (love and strife, thick and thin, night and day). Because they do not, however, intersect with each other, it is necessary to recognize a third principle. Furthermore in order to talk about becoming, something must become, and in particular there is a certain reality that remains constant during the process of becoming. Aristotle thus divides any natural event into three constituent parts: the start is characterized by the absence or lack (steresis ) of the form the object is to attain; the end in which the reality concerned takes on the form (eidos ) with which the process ends or is fulfilled; and a third element that remains unchanged during the process and provides its unitary aspect, that is, the subject or underlying substrate (hypokeimenon ). If the event to be described is the process of Socrates growing old, the steresis is Socrates when he is not old, the form is Socrates when he is old, and the underlying substrate or subject is Socrates himself.

It is important to understand that according to the Aristotelian concept the principles of becoming are not things but rather aspects of the things, points of view through which it is possible to analyze the mechanisms of change (Physics, I). A similar function is elaborated upon from the concepts of potentiality (dynamis ) and actuality (energeia, entelecheia ). These make natural processes intelligible and can be considered the realization of an already existing potentiality. Aristotle thus introduces the dimension of finalism and teleology into the analysis of the nature of becoming. Being and becoming of things may be analyzed from a causal perspective, because knowledge is the knowledge of cause (aitia ). According to Aristotle there are four kinds of cause: material cause, that is, the matter (hyle ) from which something is made; formal cause, that is, its form (eidos ) and its organizing principle; efficient cause, that is, the moving principle (to kinoun ); and final cause, that is, the purpose (telos) why something is what it is or an event takes place (Physics, II).

The kind of motion characteristic of natural realities also depends upon the elements of which they are composed. Those that belong to the sublunar world are made of four traditional elements (earth, air, fire, and water). That is to say they are subject to decay and naturally inclined to move in straight lines. Heavenly bodies, meaning the stars, are made of a fifth element, the well-known ether, which is the reason for their incorruptibility and the circular motion they have.

"First Philosophy"

Aristotle called physics "second philosophy" to distinguish it from "first philosophy," that is, from the branch of study that has been given the name "metaphysics" by Western tradition. "First philosophy" (prote philosophia ) can be distinguished from physics on two grounds: (a) the universality of its object, which is not a single aspect of being but rather the study of "being as such," and (b) on account of the value and elevated nature of this object, which is ontologically superior to the realities of the physical world. In modern philosophy these two have been given the names metaphysica generalis (or ontology) and metaphysica specialis (or theology). Thus a philosopher such as Martin Heidegger held Aristotle responsible for founding ontotheology, namely Western metaphysics. Studies have shown nonetheless Aristotle's first philosophy was neither one thing nor the other. Rather, it was essentially a theory of substance because substance is the most important of the meanings of being. Being can be spoken of with many meanings (to on pollachōs legetai ), but all relate to one principal meaning, that of substance (Metaphysics, IV). This idea has been called focal meaning, because it regards the meanings of being on the basis of the relationship with one unique principal meaning (pros hen Relation). The task of first philosophy is also to investigate what belongs to being as such, that is, its common attributes, such as unity and multiplicity, identity and diversity (medieval transcendentals). Furthermore it should also study the principle common to all demonstrations and therefore to all being: the principle of noncontradiction. This cannot be proved directly (because it is the basis of every proof), but it can be dialectically demonstrated that it is impossible to refute (Metaphysics, IV).

First philosophy is transformed into a theory of substance (Metaphysics, VII–IX), because substance is the first meaning of being. For Aristotle substance is the specific individual composed of form and matter. Yet still more substance is the form (eidos ) that determines the being-as-it-is of a particular matter. In this sense substance as form or essence is the cause of being of the individual (Metaphysics, VII). In contrast to the Platonic forms, the Aristotelian substances-forms are not universal but rather individual, that is, they belong individually to the things of which they are forms. Form is therefore the organizing principle of matter. In terms of definition the forms of individuals of the same species are identical, but in numerical terms each individual has its own form. In the case of living beings the form is the soul, which represents the organizing vital principle of the body (On the Soul, I–II). Contrary to Plato, Aristotle considers the soul inseparable from the body, even if he does concede the possibility that part of it, the famous active intellect (nous poietikos ), is independent of the body—arising in it from outside—and perhaps immortal (On the Soul, III). In any case the active intellect is not the unmoved prime mover, as Alexander of Aphrodisia thought.

The most famous idea of Aristotle is in Book XII of the Metaphysics and concerns the "immovable prime mover." This probably dates back to his youth and is not easy to reconcile with subsequent teachings. The observation of the eternity of motion and time caused Aristotle to postulate the existence of eternal principles, which are the cause of the eternal nature of physical motion. The latter finds its most elevated expression in the motion of the heavens. Aristotle observes that the cause of eternal motion must be an active and unmoved reality, otherwise it would itself require a principle and so on ad infinitum. Since the highest and most noble activity consists of thought (noēsis ), this principle must be identified with thought and in precise terms with the thought of the most elevated object, that is, itself. The principle of motion must be "thought of thought" (noēsis noēseōs ). Aristotle calls this being God (theos ) as well as living an eternal and perfect life like the gods. The traditional interpretation attributes final causality to the unmoved mover. He moves the first heaven, that is the heaven of fixed stars, in which he is loved. This is possible because the heavens (or the celestial spheres) are given a soul, which longs for and loves the immovable mover, and via their circular motion the heavens try to imitate the absolute immobility of the latter as far as possible. In the twentieth century there was a new interpretation, according to which the unmoved mover does not move as a final cause but rather as a cause of motion, that is, efficient. He moves in the same way as the soul, except that the unmoved mover is transcendent with regard to the heavens, whereas the soul is immanent to what moves.

In Book VI of the Metaphysics, Aristotle attempts to bring together the two perspectives of "first philosophy," namely its universality and the value of its object. He asserts that "first philosophy" is first because its object consists of unmoved substances and is thus also universal, and its task will be to investigate being as such and its characteristics.

Ethics and Politics: Happiness

Physics, "first philosophy," and mathematics are theoretical sciences; their aim is in essence a dispassionate knowledge of reality. For Aristotle beside theoretical exist practical disciplines, that is, directed toward action (praxis). These comprise the fields of ethics (relating to individual moral action) and politics (concerning the action of the community). The ultimate aim of action is, according to Aristotle, the attainment of happiness (eudaimonia ) (Nicomachean Ethics, I). For human beings the condition of happiness corresponds to the fulfillment of the highest form of life, that is, the one related to the highest function of the soul. The rational soul has two parts, the calculating part (logistikon ) and the scientific part (epistemonikon ). A particular virtue corresponds to each of these: respectively practical wisdom (phronesis ) and theoretical wisdom (sophia ). Both are dianoetic virtues, that is, they concern thought (dianoia ) (Nicomachean Ethics, VI). Because a part of the soul had to do with the emotions and passions, it is necessary to recognize corresponding virtues here. This means the famous ethical virtues of courage, temperance, and liberality. Each of these represents the golden mean between two extremes, excess and deficiency (Nicomachean Ethics, II). Of the two dianoetic virtues, sophia concerns those aspects of reality that cannot be other than they are, that is, what is essential: it represents a kind of theoretical reason. When they achieve the highest form of life, contemplation, human beings are similar to God, who is, however, greater, because he lives eternally in that single state that people may only attain for a limited time (Nicomachean Ethics, X).

Phronesis, on the other hand, deals with those things that can be other than they are, that is, contingent reality: in this sense it represents practical reasoning. According to Aristotle the supreme practical virtue, phronesis, consists in the ability to establish suitable means to achieve determined ends. However, the latter seem to be set outside the deliberative dimension of practical philosophy. The identification of ends depends upon an act of the will (boulesis ), which is independent of phronesis. For Aristotle indeed the determination of the ends of praxis by the will belongs to the realm of inclinations and desire, which are not subject to practical reasoning. This position has led some contemporary interpreters to charge Aristotelian ethics with making conservative assumptions, as it does not seem to possess rational criteria to legitimize the selection of the ends of action and risks basing the scope of ends on accepted prevalent values in a particular society. This discussion belongs to the so-called re-establishment of practical philosophy.

"Man is by nature a political animal" (Politics, III) is a statement that inicates that the social aspect is essential for the attainment of well-being. The two basic units of social life are the family and the state, that is the polis. The family consists of not only husband, wife, and children but also the slaves and the household generally (oikos ) and its property. To Aristotle women were naturally subordinate to men, children to their father, and slaves to their master. The purpose of the family was the preservation of the human species and property. The states have different kinds of constitutions, depending upon whether they are governed by an individual, a restricted group, or the entire citizen body. The first of these is a monarchy, the second an aristocracy, and the third a politeia, that is, the positive form of democracy. Each of these three kinds of constitutions also has a debased form, which occurs when those who govern do so in their own interest rather than that of the citizens as a whole. These are tyranny, oligarchy, and debased democracy, that is, rule by demagogues.

Bibliography

Works by Aristotle

Works. Vols. 1–23. London and Cambridge, Mass., 1938–.

The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. 2 vols., edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, N.J., 1984.

Studies

General surveys

Barnes, Jonathan, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle. Cambridge, U.K.,1995.

Berti, Enrico, ed. Aristotele. Rome and Bari, Italy, 1997.

Jaeger, Werner. Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development. Oxford, 1934.

Kraut, Richard. Aristotle. Oxford, 2002.

Lear, Jonathan. Aristotle, the Desire to Understand. Cambridge, U.K., 1988.

Lloyd, Geoffrey E. R. Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His Thought. London, 1968.

Young Aristotle

Berti, Enrico. La filosofia del primo Aristotele. 2d ed. Milan, 1997.

Bos, Abraham P. Cosmic and Meta-Cosmic Theology in Aristotle's Lost Dialogues. Leiden, 1989.

Chroust, Anton Hermann. Aristotle: New Light on His Life and on Some of His Lost Works. 2 vols. London, 1973.

Dumoulin, Bertrand. Recherches sur le premier Aristote. Paris, 1981.

Philosophy of nature

Lang, Helen S. The Order of Nature in Aristotle's Physics. Cambridge, U.K., 1998.

Sorabji, Richard. Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives in Aristotle's Theory. Ithaca, N.Y., 1980.

Sorabji, Richard. Matter, Space, and Motion. Ithaca, N.Y., 1988.

Wieland, Wolfang. Die aristotelische Physik. Göttingen, Germany, 1970.

Metaphysics, epistemology, and psychology

Aubenque, Pierre. Le problème de l'être chez Aristote. Paris, 1962.

David, Charles. Aristotle on Meaning and Essence. Oxford, 2000.

Frede, Michael, and Charles David, eds. Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda. Oxford, 2000.

Furth, Montgomery. Substance, Form, and Psyche. Cambridge, U.K., 1988.

Irwin, Terence. Aristotle's First Principles. Oxford, 1988.

Reale, Giovanni. The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Albany, N.Y., 1980.

Scaltsas, Theodor, Charles David, and Marie-Luise Gill, eds. Unity, Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Oxford, 1994.

Shields, Christopher. Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle. Oxford, 1999.

Spellman, Lynne. Substance and Separation in Aristotle. Cambridge, U.K., 1995.

Ethics and politics

Anagnostopoulos, Georgios. Aristotle on the Goals and Exactness of Ethics. Berkeley, Calif., 1994.

Annas, Julia. The Morality of Happiness. New York, 1993.

Broadie, Sarah. Ethics with Aristotle. New York, 1991.

Miller, Fred D. Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics. Oxford, 1995.

Nussbaum, Martha C. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy. Cambridge, U.K., 1986.

Sauvé Meyer, Susan. Aristotle on Moral Responsibility. Oxford, 1993.

Seymour Feldman (1987)

Franco Ferrari (2005)

Translated from Italian by Paul Ellis