Hanson Plc

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Hanson Plc

1 Grosvenor Place
London SW1X 7JH
United Kingdom
(071) 245-1245
Fax: (071) 235-3455

Public Company
Incorporated: 1950 as Wiles Group Limited
Employees: 70,000
Sales: £7.69 billion (US$11.15 billion)
Stock Exchanges: London New York Zurich Basel Geneva Paris
SICs: 6719 Offices of Holding Companies, Not Elsewhere Classified; 2111 Cigarettes; 2121 Cigars; 2131 Chewing and Smoking Tabacco and Snuff; 3271 Concrete Block and Brick; 2499 Wood Products, Not Elsewhere Classified

Hanson PLC (Hanson) is a British/American industrial conglomerate, or, as its founders prefer to describe it, an industrial management company whose manufacturing subsidiaries are located principally in the United Kingdom and the United States. Sales are divided almost equally between the U.S. and the U.K. companies, while the United States employs slightly more than half of the total work force. The group’s portfolio of operating companies has been built up by acquisition between 1965 and the 1990s and includes three broad groups: consumer, building, and industrial products. Its most recently acquired subsidiary is Beazer USA, Inc., the largest sand and gravel business in America.

In the United States the group’s activities, carried on by some 150 companies, are coordinated by its major subsidiary, Hanson Industries, and again fall into three categories: industrial products, which include chemicals, mobile hydraulic cranes, leather supplies, office furniture and supplies distribution, and Gold Fields Mining Corporation; building products, which include Kaiser Cement and a number of companies in the Hanson Lighting Group as well as Jacuzzi, market leader in whirlpool baths and spas; and consumer products such as vacuum cleaners, cookware, plastic housewares, and textiles. The group also has substantial interests in associate companies in the United States and Australia. In 1988, with market capitalization at £7.3 billion, Hanson was fifth in the rankings and thus achieved one of its stated goals, a place in the top ten U.K. companies before 1988.

The origins of Hanson go back to 1964. In March of that year a small City (London financial district) merchant bank, Dawnay Day, floated the Wiles Group on the stock exchange. The group was an animal byproducts, sack hire, and fertilizer business created by George Wiles and based in Hull, Yorkshire. In August of 1964 Wiles started to diversify through the acquisition of Oswald Tillotson Ltd., a company operating in the field of commercial vehicle sales and distribution. James Hanson and Gordon White were on the board of Oswald Tillotson Ltd. and held a controlling interest in the company.

James Edward Hanson and Vincent Gordon Lindsay White were both born in Yorkshire and, after war service, started their early careers in their respective family businesses. The Hanson family road-haulage business was 100 years old when it was nationalized in 1948. James Hanson then spent some years in Canada building up a transport business with his brother. In the late 1950s he joined Gordon White—a family friend, whose own family publishing-and-printing business, Welbecson, was acquired by Wiles in 1965—in a venture importing U.S. greeting cards. Thus, the partnership that has underpinned the development of Hanson was already formed when the two men joined first Tillotson and then Wiles.

Between 1965, when James Hanson became chairman of the Wiles Group, and 1969, when the company was renamed the Hanson Trust, further acquisitions were made to develop the group into an industrial holding and management company. Its principal objective was defined by James Hanson as “... to expand profitability while achieving careful expansion through acquisitions.” The purchase of Scottish Land Development in 1967 for £700,000 took Wiles into the hire and distribution of earth-moving and construction equipment and pumps. In 1968 the group paid £3.2 million for West of England Sack Holdings, which expanded its existing business in that field. In the same year it bought the Butterley Company for £4.7 million, an acquisition that took it into a new field of operations, the manufacture of bricks for house construction.

Hanson was by no means the only company then searching for under-performing and asset-rich companies to target as prospective acquisitions. In 1968 the conglomerate Slater Walker took a large shareholding in the Wiles Group. Hanson and White over the years consistently pointed out the difference between the takeovers made for financial reason—the fast track—and those, like Hanson’s, for industrial reasons: “We are the work horses.”

Between 1971 and 1973 Hanson expanded its brick-making activities with the acquisition of the National Star Brick & Tile Company for £2.1 million, British Steel Brickworks for £2.7 million, and NCB Brickworks for £2.2 million. It also bought a majority interest in a property development company, City and St. James. The changing scope of its activities led to a restructuring of its operations first in 1970, when it sold the commercial vehicle distribution operation, and then again in 1972, when the expansion of brick manufacturing warranted the creation of a separate division.

In 1973 the Bowater Corporation, eager to diversify out of the low profit-making newsprint and pulp activities and fresh from its merger with Ralli International (master-minded the previous year by Jim Slater), made an agreed bid for Hanson. But when the bid was referred to the government’s Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Bowater withdrew. This experience, combined with the prevailing uncertain economic climate in the United Kingdom, led Hanson and White to look further afield for development prospects, more particularly because White, “in disgust at socialism,” wished to leave Britain. In that year, therefore, White went to the United States. From the 1950s until the mid-1970s, merger activity in the United Kingdom was high and encouraged by governments, particularly the Labour government of Harold Wilson, which established the Industrial Reorganization Corporation specifically to promote mergers such as that of General Electric Company and Associated Electrical Industries Ltd. On the other hand, reference to the Monopolies Commission of mergers that might operate against the public interest sometimes brought a negative response. Even when the commission’s verdict was not unfavorable, changing conditions in the period of consideration could lead to the breaking-off of the engagement, as happened with Hanson and Bowater. The commission was generally neutral on the matter of industrial conglomerates, although it pointed to the risks of the creation of stock to finance the purchase and to the danger of a failure to increase efficiency after the merger. More damning criticisms of the merger movement and its results in the United States were made by a U.S. congressional report in June of 1971.

In the United Kingdom the asset-stripping activities of other companies tarnished the public image of the industrial conglomerate in the late 1970s. Hanson has insisted that it is an industrial management company. In the United States Hanson Industries was formed as a holding company in 1973, with White as executive chairman. His first major acquisition came the following year when, at a cost of $32 million, Hanson Industries bought Seacoast Products, a Florida-based company manufacturing animal foodstuffs, fish meal, and edible oils that remained part of Hanson until 1986.

In the 1970s, against the background of a turbulent world economy shaken by two large increases in world oil prices, Hanson’s growth on both sides of the Atlantic was steady rather than spectacular. In the United States in 1976, Hygrade Foods, the second-largest seller of hot dogs in ballparks, was acquired, along with other purchases in the food servicing and vending and textile industries. In the United Kingdom, Hanson acquired Rollalong, which manufactured mobile accommodation units. In addition, Hanson purchased two flour milling and cereal companies and acquired yarn and thread manufacturers.

All these acquisitions fell into what is now recognized as the Hanson patiern. Hanson looks for and buys companies manufacturing basic, low technology products. By introducing a system of centralized and strong financial controls combined with decentralized operating management, Hanson increases profitability both for shareholders and for the holding company, thus building up its resources for further acquisitions. Some acquisitions have required further financing with bank debt, and the Hanson gearing has risen sharply at various times in the 1980s, to be quickly reduced in part by disinvestment. The diversity of Hanson’s portfolio spreads the risk with the steady demand for food and other consumer products balancing the upswings and downturns in demand for building-industry supplies. The caution of the two founders is well-documented. James Hanson said, “I’ve always thought about the down-side risk on a take-over rather than the upside potential—we don’t gamble.” It was this approach, according to White, that led to the decision in 1974 not to buy 51 percent of Avis, the U.S. car rental business. White recalled, “I told him it could put us straight in the big league but that if it went wrong it would bust us.”

Hanson’s purchase, for £25 million, of Lindustries in the United Kingdom in 1979 was its largest to date and presaged a decade of even greater spending and growth, taking Hanson very definitely into the big league. In 1980 Hanson Industries acquired McDonough, which included footwear manufacturing and retailing and cement manufacturing interests, for an agreed bid of $180 million. In the following year, in what was to become a typical Hanson activity, it recouped $49 million by selling the concrete and cement business. In the United Kingdom there were two major acquisitions in 1982, the Berec Group, manufacturers of Ever Ready batteries, for £95 million and United Gas Industries, makers of gas meters and of gas and electric fires, for £19 million. In the following year Hanson bought United Drapery Stores (UDS) for £250 million and immediately recovered almost three-fifths of the purchase price by selling Richard Shops and some of the other UDS subsidiaries. Allders Stores, a department store chain, and Allders International, which owned and operated duty-free shops at U.K. airports and on ferries and cruise ships, remained part of Hanson until 1989 when it was sold for £210 million.

By 1984, with turnover up to over £2 million, Hanson was increasingly seen on both sides of the Atlantic as a predator, a reputation it enhanced in that year with the acquisition of the London Brick Company for £247 million, making Hanson the world’s largest brick manufacturer. At the same time in the United States it paid $535 million for U.S. Industries (USI), stepping in with a brisk offer to replace a management buyout. This acquisition gave Hanson interests in diverse fields ranging from clothes to lighting manufacture, and subsidiaries in office and domestic furniture-making as well as heavy engineering. By doubling the size of the U.S. operation, the USI acquisition put Hanson Industries among the top 150 companies trading in the United States. In the following year in the United Kingdom, the attempt to increase its interests in the engineering industry failed when Powell Duffryn successfully resisted Hanson’s takeover bid; in the United States Hanson Industries sold the food service management company Interstate United for more than three times the price it had paid in 1978.

1986 was marked by two major acquisitions. In the United States Hanson Industries won control of and paid $930 million for SCM Corporation, a typewriter, food, and chemical concern described by Fortune International as “sluggish.” The chemical division, which is the world’s second largest producer of titanium dioxide, has a successful sales and profits record under Hanson. In the two years after the acquisition of SCM, disposal of parts of the conglomerate raised more money for Hanson than it had paid for the purchase. On top of that, 52 percent of the typewriter business Smith Corona was sold by flotation on the New York Stock Exchange in 1989. The Smith Corona sale helped offset the price of SCM, but entangled Hanson in a legal battle lasting more than two years. Investors who bought shares in Smith Corona Corp. claimed that Hanson officials knew of the impending layoffs and falling sales the company announced shortly after the stocks were purchased, and disposed of the property with that knowledge. Hanson and White denied the accusations. Much of the purchase price of Hanson’s 1986 U.K. acquisition, the Imperial Group, bought for £2.5 billion after United Biscuits had failed to gain control of the group, was also covered by divestments. Hanson disposed of the Imperial diversifications—the Courage Brewery and off-license chains, Golden Wonder crisps, the hotels and restaurants, and the food interests where the brand names of Ross Young and Lea & Perrins brought a premium price—while retaining the original Imperial tobacco business.

The increasing importance of and value put upon brand names in a multinational business world was reflected in the purchase in 1987 by Hanson Industries of the U.S. conglomerate Kidde, an acquisition regarded at the time in New York as one for which White had, at US$1.7 billion, grossly overpaid; 18 months later Kidde’s return on capital was up by more than 8 percent, and the acquisition had come to be seen as an “excellent purchase.” With over 100 different businesses, including such diverse products as kitchenware and Jacuzzi whirlpool baths, the Kidde acquisition took Hanson Industries into the top 60 U.S. companies. The Hanson investment criteria required that an investment must contribute to profits within one year and pay for itself within four years.

By the beginning of 1989, financial journalists and Hanson watchers were openly speculating about when or where the next takeover would come. The previous year had, for the first time in the 1980s, passed without a Hanson acquisition while disposals had enriched its war chest, giving the company disposable cash of £12 billion. The 1980-1981 recession had been a powerful stimulus to corporate slimming. The increasing application of “hansonization”—the combination of tight financial control with subsidiary autonomy on operational management—had played a part in reducing the number of badly managed candidates for acquisition. Within Hanson, expenditure of more than £500 over budget in the United Kingdom and US$3,000 in the United States required head office authorization.

In August of 1989, when Minorco was obliged to admit defeat in its attempt to take over Consolidated Goldfields PLC, Hanson stepped in with a successful bid of £3.5 billion. Following its usual post-acquisition policy, Hanson closed down Goldfields’s London head office and sold its South African gold-mining interests and the U.S. aggregates business, Amey Roadstone Corporation, America (ARC).

Despite the worldwide recession in the early 1990s, Hanson continued to be “expansion-minded,” as the chairman phrased it in his 1990 letter to the company’s shareholders. In May of that year Hanson spent $240 million to buy a 2.8 percent stake (20 million shares) in Britain’s largest industrial company, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI). (ICI’s pension fund was one of the largest holders of Hanson stock.) Just two months later, Hanson Industries acquired Peabody Holding Co., America’s largest coal producer. After a brief fight over the coal giant with AMAX, Hanson paid US$ 1.25 billion for Peabody, which upset some U.S. coal officials who resented the foreign ownership. Beazer Pic., one of Britain’s largest home construction companies, found itself deeply in debt in a seriously depressed housing market; it also found itself to be a subsidiary of Hanson by the end of 1991.

A 1991 study of Hanson’s history of takeovers found that the company made most of its profits by improving the performance of the companies it acquired. The finding refuted accusations that Hanson made most of its money by buying and selling assets. The analysis of the period from 1986 to 1990 showed that, of Hanson’s total earnings of £4.16 billion, only 18 percent came from asset sales. During the same period, 55 percent of the company’s £821 million pre-tax profits gain came from the improved performance of Hanson businesses. Despite strong trends in the United States, none of the deals utilized junk bond financing.

But in 1991 external and internal forces came to bear on Hanson’s long history of growth through acquisition. The Persian Gulf war and worldwide recession slowed down mergers and acquisitions in the United Kingdom. There were fewer big deals made, but nearly the same number of smaller concerns changing hands. At the same time, Lords Hanson and White began slowly to pass leadership to Derek C. Bonham, who had been with Hanson 20 years, and David H. Clarke, a former director of Smith Corona. Bonham was appointed chief executive of Hanson in early 1992 and Clarke was the president of Hanson Industries, but Hanson and White—as executive chairmen of Hanson PLC and Hanson Industries, respectively—have maintained overall direction.

At that time Hanson PLC had more than $30 billion in assets, $13 billion in revenues, and 70,000 employees, but had neglected some of its core businesses, such as chemicals and coal mining. The company also faced a net deficit of about £1.5 billion, with loans of £9.5 billion and cash of £8 billion. Bonham and Clarke hoped to dispense with many of Hanson’s consumer-related companies and make long-term investments in the key businesses.

In April of 1992 Hanson sold Ever Ready Ltd. to Ralston Purina Co. for £132 million, generating a £108 million profit. One month later, Hanson and White confounded financial analysts by selling the conglomerate’s interest in ICI at a 17 percent pretax profit. The sales fueled speculation on which businesses would next join Hanson’s roster. Observers thought Trafalgar House PLC, Pilkington PLC and Allied-Lyons PLC in Britain, and Solvay & Cie of Belgium were candidates for takeover. In October of 1992 the conservative strategy seemed to have been thrown out the window. Hanson announced its hostile £780 million cash bid for Ranks Hovis McDougall (RHM), a move that was quickly repulsed by RHM’s board of directors.

Since 1964, Lord Hanson, who was knighted in 1976 and made a peer in 1983, and Lord White—knighted in 1979—have built up a company that is one of the largest in the United Kingdom and the United States. Their partnership, relying on Lord Gordon’s creativity and Lord Hanson’s administrative ability, by their own accounts is sustained by daily telephone calls and the assistance of small head office staffs of about 120 in the United States and 100 in the United Kingdom, and of senior managers, many of whom have been with Hanson for 20 years. Both believe in maximum delegation of responsibility, adhering to a view stated more than 50 years ago by John Crabtree, founder of Crabtree Electricals, since 1982 one of Hanson’s subsidiaries: ‘There are far too many Managing Directors and Presidents of companies who fancy themselves as experts in some minor phase of the business and who drive their subordinates to desperation by riding their personal hobbies.” Lord Hanson expressed his business philosophy in Dominic Lawson’s article in the Spectator in 1989: “Many companies here are not rewarding their shareholders sufficiently and are more concerned with management stability and welfare than they are with the welfare of shareholders, which is all that matters. We don’t run this business for ourselves.” The company gave second priority to customers, and third importance to employees. This philosophy is reflected in the fact that Hanson operating managers are not offered high basic salaries but are rewarded with performance-related bonuses. Without looking for synergy or economies of scale and without the creation of a Hanson corporate culture or loyalty to the parent company, Hanson has achieved the objectives of its founders.

Principal Subsidiaries

Imperial Tobacco Ltd; Lindustries Ltd.; Hanson Amalgamated Industries; ARC Ltd.; London Brick Company Ltd.; Butterley Brick Ltd.; Hanson Housewares (U.S.A.); Hanson Recreation and Leisure (U.S.A.); SCM Chemicals Inc. (U.S.A.); Hanson Office Products (U.S.A.); Weber Aircraft Inc. (U.S.A.); Hanson Lighting (U.S.A.); Kaiser Cement Corporation (U.S.A.); Peabody Holding Co. (U.S.A.); SCM Glidco Organics (U.S.A.); Grove Worldwide Co. (U.S.A.); Hanson Industrial Services; Beazer USA, Inc. (U.S.A.); Cavenham Forest Industries, Inc. (U.S.A.); Beazer Homes Ltd.; Jacuzzi, Inc. (U.S.A.).

Further Reading

Campbell-Smith, D., “Much More than a Predator,” The Financial Times, December 23, 1983; Fay, Stephen, “The Rise and Rise of Hanson and White,” Business, March 1986; Lawson, Dominic, “The Hard Man from Hud-dersfield,” Spectator, October 7, 1989; Bowen, David, “Secrets of a Big Game Hunter,” The Independent on Sunday, July 29, 1990; “Hanson Assumes Total Ownership of Peabody Holding Co.,” Coal, August 1990; “Hanson Likes the Look of ICI,” Economist, May 18, 1991; House, Richard, and Lenny Glynn, “Harbingers and Hopes,” Global Finance, June 1991; “Hanson Finds a True Friend in Need,” Management Today, August 1991; Norman, James R., “Don’t Rush Us,” Forbes, October 14, 1991; Reier, Sharon, “Europe’s CEO of the Year: Lord Hanson of Hanson pic,” Financial World, October 15, 1991; “Hanson Sells Its Stake in ICI to Goldman,” Wall Street Journal (Eastern), May 11, 1992; “Studying an ADR: Hanson PLC,” Canadian Shareowner, May/June 1992; Melcher, Richard A., “Can This Predator Change Its Stripes?,” Business Week, June 22, 1992; Powell, Scott, “Quality Credits: Hanson’s Sterling Efforts,” Euromoney (Credits Supplement), September 1992; “Hanson Offers $1.35 Billion for Bread Baker,” Wall Street Journal (Eastern), October 6, 1992; “Hanson: Hunter’s Return,” Economist, October 10, 1992.

—Judy Slinn

updated by April Dougal

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