Shultz, Richard H., Jr. 1947–
Shultz, Richard H., Jr. 1947–
Shultz, Richard H., Jr. 1947–
Born October 25, 1947. Education: Miami University, Ph.D., 1976; postdoctoral studies at University of Michigan.
Fletcher School, Tufts University, Medford, MA, professor of international politics, 1983—, director of international security studies program, 1988—. Director, Armed Groups Project, National Strategic Information Center. Senior guest lecturer, Columbia University, 1991, 1992; Olin Distinguished Professor of National Security Studies, U.S. Military Academy, 1994-95; Brigadier General H.L. Oppenheimer Chair of Warfighting Strategy, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997-98; senior lecturer, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 1998; senior fellow, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2000. Member of board of trustees, Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs; member of advisory board, U.S. Joint Special Operations Forces Institute, and for the president of the U.S. Naval War College, 1995-99; special operations policy advisory group member, U.S. Department of Defense; member of board, National Strategy Information Center, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and International Institute for Strategic Studies.
International Studies Association.
Navy Senior Research Fellow, U.S. Naval War College, 1990-91; Outstanding Civilian Service Medal, U.S. Army, 1995; Goldsmith Research Award, Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy, 1999. Research fellowships from the U.S. Institute of Peace, 1989; St. Andrew's University, 1993-98; U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1997-99; Stanford University's Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace; the Smith Richardson Foundation; the Earhart Foundation; and the Bradley Foundation. Consultant to various defense departments in the U.S. government.
Responding to the Terrorist Threat: Security and Crisis Management, Pergamon Press (New York, NY), 1980.
(With Roy Godson) Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy, Pergamon-Brassey's (Washington, DC), 1984.
The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices, and Regional Comparisons, Hoover Institution Press (Stanford, CA), 1988.
In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for Reconstruction and Nation-building in Panama following Just Cause, Air University Press (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL), 1993.
The Secret War against Hanoi: Kennedy's and Johnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam, HarperCollins (New York, NY), 1999.
(With Andrea J. Dew) Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat, Columbia University Press (New York, NY), 2006.
Contributor to books, including International Terrorism, Avery Publishing Group, School for International Affairs, Columbia University, 1980; Non-nuclear Conflict in the Nuclear Age, edited by Sam Sarkesian, Praeger, 1980; The 1980s: Decade of Confrontation?, National Security Affairs Institute, 1982; Strategic Response to Conflict in the 1980s, edited by William J. Taylor, Jr., Lexington Books, 1984; National Security Strategy: Choices and Limits, edited by Stephen Cimbala, Praeger, 1984; Vulnerabilities of Third World Marxist-Leninist Regimes: Implications for U.S. Policy, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985; Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World, edited by Erik Hoffman and Robbin Laird, Aldine Publishing, 1986; Low Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology, edited by David Dean, Air University Press, 1986; The Red Orchestra, edited by Uri Ra'anan and Charles M. Perry, Lexington Books, 1986; Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in U.S. Strategy, edited by Carnes Lord, National Defense University Press, 1989; International Security and Arms Control, Volume 2, edited by Edward Kolodziej and Patrick Morgan, Greenwood Press, 1989; Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s, edited by Roy Godson, Lexington Books, 1989; International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes and Controls, edited by Charles W. Kegley, St. Martin's, 1990; Legal and Moral Constraints on Low Intensity Conflict, edited by Alberto Coll, James Ord, and Stephen Rose, Naval War College Press, 1995; and Terrorism and Counterterrorism, edited by Russell D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer, McGraw-Hill, 2002.
Contributor to periodicals, including the Weekly Standard, Institute for National Security Studies, Washington Post, MERIA Journal, Terrorism and Political Violence, Journal of Strategic Studies, Comparative Strategy, Survival, Conflict, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Strategic Review, Parameters: Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Conflict Quarterly, International Security Review, Western Political Quarterly, Journal of Politics, International Studies Notes, Polity, Journal of Peace Research, Journal of International Affairs, and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. Member of editorial boards, including for Frank Cass Publications and for the journals Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Comparative Strategy, and Small Wars and Insurgencies; international advisory board member for series "Intelligence and National Security," Brassey's.
(With Richard A. Hunt) Lessons from an Unconventional War: Reassessing U.S. Strategies for Future Conflicts, Pergamon Press (New York, NY), 1982.
(With Frank R. Barnett and B. Hugh Tovar) Special Operations in U.S. Strategy, National Defense University Press in cooperation with National Strategy Information Center (Washington, DC), 1984.
(With Jeffrey Salmon and James P. O'Leary) Power, Principles & Interests: A Reader in World Politics, Ginn Press (Lexington, MA), 1985.
(With others) Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency: U.S.-Soviet Policy in the Third World, Lexington Books (Lexington, MA), 1989.
(With Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.) U.S. Defense Policy in an Era of Constrained Resources, Lexington Books (Lexington, MA), 1990.
(With Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.) The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, Air University Press (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL), 1992.
(With Roy Godson and Ted Greenwood) Security Studies for the 1990s, Brassey's (Washington, DC), 1993.
(With Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.) Naval Forward Presence and the National Military Strategy, Naval Institute Press (Annapolis, MD), 1993.
(With Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.) Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for U.S. Policy and Army Roles and Missions, Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, PA), 1994.
(With Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and W. Bradley Stock) Special Operations Forces: Roles and Missions in the Aftermath of the Cold War, U.S. Special Operations Command, 1995.
(With Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.) War in the Information Age: New Challenges for U.S. Security Policy, Brassey's (Washington, DC), 1997.
(With Roy Godson and George H. Quester) Security Studies for the 21st Century, Brassey's (Washington, DC), 1997.
(With Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.) The Role of Naval Forces in 21st Century Operations, Brassey's (Washington, DC), 2000.
Richard H. Shultz, Jr., is a recognized authority on international conflict, especially in such areas as covert warfare, religious and ethnic violence, low-intensity conflict, military strategy and intelligence, special operations forces, national security policy, the evolution of war, and the changing role of the American military abroad. His books have been highly praised for their extensive research, accessibility to general audiences, cogent explanations of complex military and security issues, and pointed themes advising the U.S. government on how to understand the errors of the past and present to improve its international policies.
Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy, which Shultz wrote with Roy Godson, is an examination of the propaganda efforts employed by the former Soviet Union, which the authors judge largely successful. Including interviews with former KGB disinformation specialists Ladislay Bittman and Stanislav Levchenko, the book explains the techniques used by the Soviets against the West and analyzes why, for the most part, they seemed to work well. Disinformation, the authors explain, is "non-attributed or falsely attributed communication, written or oral, containing intentionally false, incomplete, or misleading information (frequently combined with true information), which seeks to deceive, misinform, and/or mislead the target." By employing this weapon, the Soviets were able to minimize negative publicity about satellite nations such as Poland and Syria. Arnold Beichman, writing in the National Review, declared that the authors have created a "fascinating volume."
Having gained access to previously classified documents concerning the Vietnam War-era covert U.S. organization known as the Studies and Observation Group (SOG), Shultz published The Secret War against Hanoi: Kennedy's and Johnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam. The book, which includes information from sixty interviews with former SOG members, explains how the failures of the Pentagon to take the value of covert operations seriously very likely contributed to the United States losing the war. The SOG was created to harass the North Vietnamese and hamper their war efforts. Shultz discusses operations not only in Vietnam but also in neighboring Cambodia and Laos. The book, according to Rod Paschall in Joint Force Quarterly, "offers a range of operational and tactical details to engage the professional officer and serious reader of military history while offering the policymakers of today a rich menu of politico-military lessons. Shultz details intelligence operations, reconnaissance missions, cross-border raids, target identification actions, prisoner-snatching incursions, deception plans, and psychological and political warfare."
Despite being the "largest and most complex covert operation since World War II," according to a Parameters reviewer, SOG operations were "consistently hampered by micromanagement from the National Security Council, State Department, and Pentagon leadership." Still, SOG was able to organize a number of covert missions, ranging from commando raids and kidnappings to psychological warfare and spy infiltration. The U.S. government did not offer SOG sufficient support to overcome North Vietnamese advances, however, while North Vietnam took every action it could against SOG missions. Shultz also states that the North Vietnamese suggested to the Americans after the war that the United States could have won had its military blockaded the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which had been the main troop and supply route leading from the north to the south. This had been U.S. General William Westmoreland's recommendation to President Lyndon Johnson, but the president ignored the advice. Toward the end of his book, Shultz discusses current efforts in Special Operations and offers some comparisons and analysis in this area of American covert strategy. Richard Norton, writing in the Naval War College Review, observed that The Secret War against Hanoi "is a remarkably well told story of failure…. That it could have been otherwise makes the story all the more compelling."
Although a Publishers Weekly writer felt The Secret War against Hanoi offers an "alternately dry and informative analysis" because Shultz spends considerable time analyzing the bureaucracy behind the war rather than the action on the ground, many other crit- ics had high praise for the book. The Parameters reviewer asserted: "This volume is the first definitive and comprehensive account of the covert paramilitary and espionage campaign and contains many revealing disclosures." Norton declared it "a masterful summation and analysis of the longest U.S. covert campaign in wartime," and in Booklist Gilbert Taylor affirmed that "Shultz's work amounts to an essential addition to the oeuvre on 'Nam."
Shultz tackles the issue of terrorism in Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat, written with Andrea J. Dew. Like The Secret War against Hanoi, this work casts a critical eye on how the U.S. government has adapted to changing conditions in warfare. The United States has, without doubt, the strongest, most advanced military force when it comes to traditional warfare of the type that was practiced in World War II, states the author, but it is not well adapted to fight insurgents and terrorists with loyalties to tribes and religious beliefs, rather than formal political states. Although the work "is grounded in warfare theory, [it] … is easily accessible for generalist readers," maintained a Publishers Weekly reviewer. Shultz and Dew discuss clashes in such areas as Somalia, Chechnya, Iraq, and Afghanistan, noting how American military might has not been effective and advising U.S. leaders that to advance militarily they need to understand the cultures of these countries. By understanding the history and psychology of these peoples, Americans would be better able to devise effective strategies to overcome insurgents and terrorists, the authors suggest. For instance, the "authors make the point that these tribes, clans, and militias fight sometimes for no other reason than because that is what they do when confronted with foreign encroachments regardless of source," noted Will Holahan in Officer. Glenn Alexander Crowther further noted in Parameters that a "theme concurrent throughout the book is the propensity for militaries and policymakers in developed countries to underestimate the warfighting capacity inherent in these tribal/clan based societies." Calling the book "thoroughly researched and impressively referenced," Crowther concluded: "This book goes a long way in allowing the reader to get to know his opponent. We have only ourselves to blame if we are not ready the next time."
BIOGRAPHICAL AND CRITICAL SOURCES:
American Political Science Review, June 1, 1989, "Emerging Doctrines and Technologies: Implications for Global and Regional Political-Military Balances," p. 701; March 1, 1990, W. Raymond Duncan, review of The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices, and Regional Comparisons, p. 358.
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, September 1, 1985, Alan James, review of Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy, p. 182.
Armed Forces & Society: An Interdisciplinary Journal, March 22, 1990, "Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency: U.S.-Soviet Policy in the Third World," p. 465; January 1, 1999, Douglas J. Murray, review of Security Studies for the 21st Century, p. 333.
Booklist, December 15, 1999, Gilbert Taylor, review of The Secret War against Hanoi: Kennedy's and Johnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam, p. 754.
Choice: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries, December 1, 2006, A.B. Lowther, review of Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat, p. 717.
Christian Science Monitor, May 10, 1984, "The Soviets' Powerful Political Weapon," p. 16.
Commentary, December 1, 1984, Henrik Bering-Jensen, review of Dezinformatsia, p. 76.
Foreign Affairs, September 1, 1984, review of Dezinformatsia, p. 200; September 22, 1984, review of Dezinformatsia, p. 200; May 1, 2000, review of The Secret War against Hanoi, p. 167.
International History Review, March 1, 2008, Raymond Millen, review of Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, p. 224.
Joint Force Quarterly, December 22, 2000, Rod Paschall, review of The Secret War against Hanoi, p. 107.
Journal of International Affairs, March 22, 1989, Scott Monje, review of The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare, p. 490.
Journal of Peace Research, February 1, 1995, Dan Smith, review of Security Studies for the 1990s, p. 125; September 1, 1998, Dan Smith, review of Security Studies for the 21st Century, p. 652.
Journal of Politics, February 1, 1995, review of Security Studies for the 1990s, p. 305.
Library Journal, September 1, 1984, review of Dezinformatsia, p. 1677.
National Review, July 13, 1984, Arnold Beichman, review of Dezinformatsia, p. 44.
Naval War College Review, March 22, 2001, Richard Norton, review of The Secret War against Hanoi, p. 147.
New York Review of Books, May 25, 2000, Jonathan Mirsky, review of The Secret War against Hanoi, p. 54.
New York Times, January 12, 2000, review of The Secret War against Hanoi, p. 9.
Officer, January 1, 2007, "Know Your Enemy," p. 57.
Parameters, September 22, 2000, review of The Secret War against Hanoi, p. 156; June 22, 2007, Glenn Alexander Crowther, review of Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, p. 118.
Publishers Weekly, November 22, 1999, review of The Secret War against Hanoi, p. 50; May 15, 2006, review of Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, p. 57.
Reference & Research Book News, December 1, 1988, review of The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare, p. 31; March 1, 1994, review of Security Studies for the 1990s, p. 57; May 1, 1998, review of Security Studies for the 21st Century, p. 120.
Science Books & Films, September 1, 1985, review of Dezinformatsia, p. 6.
Slavic Review, September 22, 1990, Daniel Chirot, review of The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare, p. 461.
Society, January 1, 1985, Stephen Sloan, review of Dezinformatsia.
Studies in Comparative Communism, March 22, 1990, Lawrence B. Stollar, review of The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare, p. 89.
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, October 1, 1994, James E. Winkates, review of Security Studies for the 1990s.
Times Literary Supplement, September 29, 2000, Ernest R. May, review of The Secret War against Hanoi, p. 30.
Wall Street Journal Western Edition, November 28, 1984, William Kucewicz, review of Dezinformatsia, p. 28.
World Politics, October 1, 1995, David A. Baldwin, review of Security Studies for the 1990s, p. 117.
Carnegie Council,http://www.cceia.org/ (June 18, 2008), brief biography of author.
Fletcher School Web site,http://fletcher.tufts.edu/ (June 18, 2008), faculty profile of author.
H-Net: Humanities and Social Sciences Online,http://www.h-net.org/ (September, 1998), Daniel S. Gressang, review of Security Studies for the 21st Century.