Evolution
Evolution
I. THE CONCEPT OF EVOLUTIONR. C. Lewontin
II. PRIMATE EVOLUTIONElwyn L. Simons
III. HUMAN EVOLUTIONS. L. Washburn and Jane B. Lancaster
IV. CULTURAL EVOLUTIONElman R. Service
V. SOCIAL EVOLUTIONShmuel N. Eisenstadt
VI. EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIORShmuel N. Eisenstadt
I THE CONCEPT OF EVOLUTION
There are few concepts that appear in the history of ideas that are common to many realms of thought in social and natural science and to philosophy in general. Evolution is such a concept, and its origin as a doctrine was deeply embedded in the social and economic conditions of the industrial West. Like all such world views, it embodies many principles, not all of which are admitted in its various uses, so that even those concerned with organic evolution are unable to agree on the essence of the idea of evolution.
Toward a definition
There is a hierarchy of principles in the evolutionary world view: change, order, direction, progress, and perfectibility. Evolutionary theories are distinguished by how many of these are successively included as essential. Some evolutionists include only change and order, others add direction, and some few, like Teilhard de Chardin, believe in perfectibility as well.
Change. The idea of evolution, in its simplest form, is that the current state of a system is the result of a more or less continual change from its original state. The qualification that the change be continual, or at least frequent or regular, is an essential one and distinguishes evolutionary from static world views. For example, many opponents of organic evolution in the nineteenth century accepted the authenticity of fossils but regarded them as antediluvian, as evidence of one or several floods that caused a total replacement of the world’s fauna. Diluvianism, like the closely related vulcanism, which postulated a series of inundations of the earth by lava, was a theory of catastrophic and irregular change. There is no fundamental difference between a theory of special creation that populates the world once with unchanging beings and one that populates it several times. They are both theories of special intervention of unique forces in an otherwise normally static system. The distinction between such a world view and an evolutionary one is important for our understanding of the social and economic origins of evolutionism.
Closely related to the idea that change is a characteristic of a system is the principle of uniformitarianism, the principle that the forces causing change are themselves unchangeable general laws that govern the system. Thus, geological evolution is seen as the result of processes of mountain-building, sedimentation, and erosion that have gone on throughout the history of the earth, at least since the time when liquid water was present in appreciable quantities. In like manner the processes of natural selection and mutation that can be seen occurring in the organic world today are assumed to have been the operative forces in all the past history of life. Moreover, since such forces are operating at present, it must be concluded that evolution is still going on. A commitment to an evolutionary viewpoint represents a commitment to the instability of the present order as well as the past. In its simplest and irreducible form, evolutionism is the doctrine that change of state is an unvarying characteristic of natural systems and human institutions and that such change follows immutable laws.
Order. While all evolutionary thought assumes continual change, there is some problem of distinguishing “real” change from a stasis that has only the appearance of change. Let us imagine a deck of cards being shuffled over and over again. In one sense it is obvious that the state of the deck is undergoing continual change, since the cards are being rearranged. But is the deck evolving? For Bergson and Whitehead it is not, because only alternate states of chaos are succeeding each other. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. Out of this chaos some organization must appear to be true evolution, and the appearance of new organization, in the view of Whitehead and his followers, is the characteristic of an evolutionary process. In Science and the Modern World White-head says: “Evolution, on the materialistic theory, is reduced to the rôle of being another word for the description of changes of the external relations between portions of matter. There is nothing to evolve, because one set of external relations is as good as any other set of external relations. There can merely be change, purposeless and unprogressive”([1925] 1960, p. 157).
But how can we know order as against chaos, except that we have a preconception of order and purpose? To return to the analogy of the deck of cards, if after repeated shuffling, the deck turned out to be grouped by suits, we would certainly say that order had been created. An even higher degree of order would be ascribed to the deck if, in addition, the cards within the suits were arranged in ascending sequence. After all, in poker a royal flush wins and a mixed hand loses. Yet, on any objective criterion a royal flush has exactly the same probability as any given mixed hand, and a completely ordered deck is not less probable than any other given arrangement. The appearance of order is the correspondence between the arrangement of objects and a preconception.
The demand that an evolutionary process create order, or at least that there be a change from one order to a different order, shows clearly that evolution, in this sense, is neither a fact nor a theory, but a way of organizing knowledge.
In contrast to Whitehead, some modern evolutionists are willing to accept any rearrangement of the parts of a structure as evolution. Thus Dobzhansky (1937) defines organic evolution as “a change in the genetic composition of populations,” and he speaks for most students of organic evolution when he says that there are no differences between organisms that cannot be accounted for in this way. But a change in the genetic composition of populations is not different in essence from a reshuffling of cards in that it is for the most part only a change in the relative frequency of elements, all of which are already present. The question of order marks the separation between the completely positivistic evolutionism inherent in Dobzhansky’s definition and the creative evolutionism of Bergson and Teilhard. For, once it is proposed that order is the natural outcome of an evolutionary process, ideas of direction, progress, and perfectibility follow swiftly.
Direction. By direction in evolution we mean the concept that there is some natural linear order of states of the system and that an evolutionary process can be described as passing through successive states in this linear order. That is, evolution can be described by a line on a two-dimensional graph with time on one axis and some description of the system on the other. Moreover, this line is supposed to be always ascending or descending. But this description limits evolution to those attributes for which the human mind can make a sensible linear order. It must be possible to describe an evolutionary process as one in which something or other “tends to increase.” Thus, it is insufficient to describe the evolution of human culture in terms of a change from hunting and gathering to agriculture, from agriculture to industry. These modes of organization must somehow be placed on a graded scale as, for example, the degree of division of labor (Durkheim) or the degree of complexity (Spencer).
The attempt to find the proper scale on which such a directionality can be measured has been a preoccupation of nonpositivist evolutionists and is the chief point at issue among them. Complexity is the scale most appealed to in organic and social evolution. For organic evolution it is supposed that modern organisms have a more complex structure than primitive ones, just as mammals are thought to be more complex than bacteria. Coupled with this idea of increase in structural complexity is the theory that the information content of modern organisms is greater than for past forms. Evolution is, on this theory, a process of accumulation of information about the environment in the complex structure of organisms. Finally, the supposed accumulation of information is thought to be a reversal of the second law of thermodynamics, which prescribes an increase of entropy with time and thus an increase in the randomness of the universe. Evolutionists sometimes talk of the accumulation of “negentropy” in organic evolution, marking off life from the inorganic cosmos.
This view of organic evolution, which is supposed to apply not only to the structure of organisms but to the interrelations between organisms in the total biosphere, suffers from a number of serious difficulties. First, it would be difficult to show exactly in what sense mammals are more complex than bacteria. There is no doubt that there are many more kinds of tissues in mammals, but bacteria are capable of carrying out many synthetic reactions not possible for mammals. At the level of cell physiology and metabolism, bacteria– bringing a greater synthetic repertory–must be regarded as more complex. Moreover, even if we assume that modern organisms are more complex structurally than those of the Cambrian, no criterion of complexity can distinguish between mammals and bony fish, although there are 270 million years between the first appearance of each. Second, the relation between structural complexity and information about the environment is not perfectly clear. No one knows exactly how to measure the information contained in any organism. It might be done, as in the Shannon-Wiener solution, by regarding the genes as a code made up of three-letter words with a four-letter alphabet, corresponding to what is known about the molecular basis of heredity. If this is done, however, many invertebrates turn out to have more information than many vertebrates, and among bacteria there is a very great variation. The real difficulty is that the equation between complexity and information has been chiefly a metaphorical rather than an exact one.
Finally, the equation of information and complexity with a thermodynamic measure of entropy is based on a misunderstanding of the kinetic theory of gases. The second law of thermodynamics, in the early nineteenth century, represented the beginning of modern evolutionary cosmology. The term “entropy,” used for a property of the universe that always increases, has the same meaning, etymologically, as “evolution.” Originally, the increase in entropy only signified that different parts of a physical system became more and more alike in their energy content, so that less and less useful work could be obtained from an interaction between them. The kinetic theory of gases provided a picture of molecules moving and colliding, and thus explained the gross observation of heat and work. This, in turn, led to a new interpretation of the second law as guaranteeing that a collection of molecules in any region of space would eventually have the same distribution of kinetic energies as in any other region. Two confusions have arisen about the kinetic theory of gases that have had an important effect on evolutionary thinking. First, it is supposed that individual molecules will all have the same kinetic energy rather than that assemblages of molecules will have the same statistical distribution of energies. Second, there is a confusion of kinetic energy of molecules with general kinetic and potential energies, especially gravitational and electromagnetic potential. These two confusions give rise to an erroneously derived generalized second law stating that all the molecules in the universe will eventually be equally spaced out from each other. Given such a formless and orderless end, the evolution of life does indeed seem to go in the opposite direction.
The tendency to turn the second law of thermodynamics into a generalized evolutionary world view (with life as an exceptional countercurrent) has been further encouraged by confusion of thermodynamics with yet another evolutionary cosmology, the “expanding universe.” According to this cosmogony, the material universe came into being on the order of 10 thousand million years ago in a small region of space, the matter exploded outward, and the material cosmos will continue to expand forever from this original point in space. A consequence of a fixed amount of matter occupying a larger and larger volume is that matter is becoming more thinly spread globally but not necessarily locally. The theory of the expanding universe does not demand, for example, that the earth break up and its pieces spread apart.
In its own way the theory of the expanding universe is another example of the search for directionality in evolutionary systems. More recently, Bondi, Gold, Hoyle, and others have given currency to nondirectional theories of the cosmos. One is a steady-state theory that allows for expansion but holds density everywhere in dynamic equilibrium by continual creation of new matter. The other is an oscillation theory, which postulates a cyclic expansion and contraction of the material cosmos.
Homeostasis, introduced by Cannon as a principle of physiology and evolution, is related to complexity. Homeostasis is the property of a system to hold constant certain of its elements despite external disturbing forces. What is held constant are those qualities of the system that are necessary for its maintenance, such as body temperature in a mammal or ionic strength of the blood. This property of homeostasis is then extended by evolutionists to include communities of organisms occupying different but coordinated positions in the natural economy. Thus, the relation between numbers and efficiency of carnivores that prey on herbivores and herbivores that crop the grass is thought to be stabilized by the process of evolution, so that fluctuation in the abundance of any of these organisms is compensated by changes in the others. The result is a stable community structure. The notion of stability is appealing to modern evolutionists, who see evolution as self-fulfilling, as a stabilization of life in a capricious universe. For the nineteenth century it was quite another matter. Is Nature
“So careful of the type?” But no.
From scarped cliff and quarried stone
She cries, “A thousand types are gone:
I care for nothing, all shall go.”
Tennyson, In Memoriam, Part 56, Stanza 1
Perhaps the only evolutionist doctrine that contains no important element of direction is evolutionary geology, which is entirely a cyclic theory. Mountain-building revolutions are followed by erosion, the formation of featureless peneplains, the deposition of sediments in the seas, followed by new uplift and new mountain-building. Of course, it is supposed that the final cooling of the earth’s core will at last put an end to the cycle, but this cooling is the only vestige of directionality that is apparent. Geology remains, among the historical sciences, obdurately materialistic and positivist.
Progress . It is not always easy to differentiate evolutionist doctrines of simple direction from those with an element of progress. I distinguish them by the moral or, better, moralistic tone of progressivism, but moralism is sometimes well hidden. For example, the doctrine that homeostasis gives direction to evolution is sometimes arrived at because man is assumed a priori to be the measure of evolution, and it is fairly easy to make the case that man, the rational mammal, is most homeostatic. “L’Homme, seul parametre absolu de l’Évolution” is even more anthropocentric than it seems at first sight, for Teilhard de Chardin (1956) is referring not simply to the history of life but cosmic evolution! But this is simply Whitehead brought up to date, Whitehead who, in Modes of Thought, divides occurrences in nature into six types: “The first type is human existence, body and mind. The second type includes all sorts of animal life, insects, the vertebrates, and other genera… . The third type includes all vegetable life… . The sixth type is composed of the happenings on an infinitesimal scale, disclosed by the minute analysis of modern physics” (1938, p. 214). Man leads all the rest. The shibboleths of progressivism are the superiority of man in the cosmos, industrial man in the world economy, and liberal democratic man in world society.
Spencer makes extensive use of the term “progress,” but in a way that seems not to have a normative or moralistic overtone: “From the earliest traceable cosmical changes down to the latest results of civilization, we shall find that the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous is that in which progress essentially consists” ([1857] 1915, p. 10). In “Progress: Its Law and Cause,” Spencer shows that this transformation has occurred in music, poetry, society, government, manufacturing, commerce, language, and so on. He cautions against normative definition of progress. “Leaving out of sight concomitants and beneficial consequences, let us ask what progress is in itself” (ibid., p. 9). But this is a very curious question to ask, what progress is in itself, for does not progress, as opposed to simple change, imply a moral direction? What Spencer has done is to equate progress with change, to say that change, whatever its direction may turn out to be, is progressive by its very nature. We come again to that nineteenth-century belief that change is good, in Spencer’s words, “a beneficient necessity.”
Most modern students of natural evolution, both organic and social, have taken a step toward materialism in omitting the idea of progress from their systems. An exception is B. Rensch (1947), who distinguishes higher and lower forms of life and devotes a special category of evolutionary change, anagenesis, to evolution of higher from lower. While he includes under this rubric increases in stability, homeostasis, and complexity that are discussed here simply as directional rather than progressive, Rensch clearly regards man and especially human freedom as the highest and best product of evolution.
Perfectibility. With the exception of the philosopher Teilhard, modern evolutionism does not contain a utopian element. On the contrary, evolution is generally envisaged as an endless process with no particular perfect end or goal. There is some logical difficulty, however, in maintaining that evolution leads to greater homeostasis, greater cerebralization, greater adaptation, while ignoring the possibility of perfect homeostasis, complete cerebralization, or absolute adaptation. It is not at all obvious how homeostasis of individuals or communities can continue to increase forever. Nevertheless, this issue is generally ignored or, as in the case of Spencer, deliberately set aside. The single important exception is in evolutionary economics, especially various utopian socialisms. Marxism, especially as interpreted by Lenin and Trotsky, is a straightforward progressivist, perfectionist evolutionary theory. A stage of primitive capitalist accumulation through exploitation of the workers and colonies enriches the society. This is accompanied by the bourgeois revolution that leads to liberal bourgeois democracy. In turn comes the proletarian revolution, proletarian democracy, a breakdown of national interests in the face of class interests, and a final total leveling of the class structure. In this utopian scheme there will still be division of labor, but the “entropy” of the social order will be at a maximum. The parallel is with thermodynamic evolution, which is also a leveling theory and is in contrast with those views of organic evolution that depend upon an increase in differentiation, complexity, storage of information, and a decrease in entropy.
Evolution and history
There are close parallels between the methods and statements of evolutionist doctrines in the natural sciences and the methods and statements of historiography. Geology, cosmology, and organic evolution are historical sciences in that they are descriptions of, and attempts to explain, past events in the light of present occurrences. The problems of making laws or lawlike statements about the past and prediction of the future are the same whether the focus of interest is human history or the history of all organic life. Karl Popper, in The Poverty of Historicism (1957), asks the question, “Can there be a law of evolution?” and answers, “‘No,’ the search for the law of the ‘unvarying order’ in evolution cannot possibly fall within the scope of scientific method, whether in biology or in sociology… . The evolution of life on earth, or of human society, is a unique historical process” (pp. 107, 108).
The chief difficulty of the historical sciences is that they fail to meet what is widely accepted as the norm for a science, Popper’s criterion of falsifiability. For Popper, scientific laws are universal statements (“All swans are black, all planets move in ellipses,” etc.) and therefore are really prohibitions (“A white swan cannot be found, no planet moves in a circle,” etc.). Such prohibitions provide a program for testability, for if one wishes to test the universal law about swans, he does not look for black ones but white ones. If a white swan is found, the law is disproved. A white swan is a potential falsifier of the law, and any statement that has no potential falsifier (any existentially quantified statement falls in this category) is metaphysical and ought to be excluded from a science.
The trouble with historical sciences like organic evolution is that they are almost entirely made up of existential rather than universal statements. We may take modern Darwinism as an example. It asserts that the organisms now living have evolved from ancestral organisms of a different nature and offers the fossil record as direct evidence. Moreover, it asserts that the mechanism of this change is embodied in three principles: (1) different individuals in a species have different morphologies, physiologies, behaviors, that is, there is variation; (2) there is a correlation between the form of the parents and the offspring, that is, the variation is heritable; and (3) different variants have different rates of survival and reproduction in different environments.
Let us now examine these assertions in the light of Popper’s criterion. The evidence that evolution has in fact occurred is contained in the succession of fossils found in different geological strata. From the fossil record we can state with confidence that there are many kinds of animals and plants that, having once existed, no longer exist. But that statement of itself, far from being a universal statement, is an existential one; in fact it is a historical statement, exactly corresponding to the assertion that Napoleon once lived or that Martin Luther died on February 18, 1546, at Eisleben.
Can we push this observation further and say that all animals and plants in the fossil record are of a kind no longer represented? No, because that does not happen to be true. But can we at least make the much more interesting and important hypothesis that all kinds of animals and plants eventually will be supplanted by other forms? This also is not falsifiable and is really identical to the assertion that every man has his price. It says, in fact, that every species is mortal, that there exists a time in the future at which any given species will no longer exist. If statements about the universality of evolution are historicist rather than scientific, it still might be that the principles underlying the mechanism of evolution are falsifiable in explaining any particular case of evolution. But that is clearly not the case. The statement of natural selection is that there exists an environment–a combination of temperature, humidity, food, soil, competition of other forms–in which different variants will have different relative reproductive rates. But applied to the past or the future, such a statement has such vast explanatory and predictive power that it is empirically empty. To say that the dinosaurs became extinct because some change in environment caused their rate of reproduction to be lowered below the replacement point, or to say that certain amphibia gave rise to reptiles because some environment existed which favored heritable variation in that direction, is, by Popper’s criterion, to say nothing.
An example of this difficulty is the argument of the selectionist in explaining the observed differences among populations of present-day organisms. Why are the frequencies of blood types different in different human races? The selectionist says these have arisen by natural selection, and even if no differential survival can presently be discovered (as none can), things used to be different and, at one time, the different races lived in such different environments that they were differentially selected. Such an argument bears more than a little similarity to the claim of Hegel that one cannot act on principles deduced from history, because “each period is involved in such peculiar circumstances, exhibits a condition of things so strictly idiosyncratic, that its conduct must be regulated by considerations connected with itself, and itself alone.”
Both historical explanation and evolutionary sciences can be concerned only with offering sufficient explanations for past events and with prescribing possible future events on the basis of the observation of present processes.
Evolutionism–social and economic matrix
While there is no doubt that the publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859) led to an almost immediate explosion of evolutionary thought, it was only the percussion cap for a charge already set. Because a theory of organic evolution touched upon man’s origin and presented a materialistic challenge to his preordained primacy in the universe, it was bound to excite great interest. Nevertheless, the Origin of Species appeared in the middle of a period of rampant evolutionism and radical political and social change. It served as the issue over which the battle between stasis and change could be fought, a battle for the final supremacy of a world view that had been making steady gains since the beginning of the eighteenth century.
Darwin was the inheritor, not the creator, of the general preoccupation with evolutionism. This is made clear by Spencer in his Principles of Biology (1864–1867), when he argues that one of the chief evidences for organic evolution is that, after all, everything else evolves. It is now universally admitted by philologists, that languages, instead of being artificially or supernaturally formed, have been developed. And the histories of religion, of philosophy, of science, of the fine arts, of the industrial arts show that these have passed through stages. … If, then, the recognition of evolution as the law of many diverse orders of phenomena, has been spreading, may we not say that there thence arises the probability that evolution will be recognized as the law of the phenomena we are considering? ([1857] 1915, pp. 432–433)
The theory of organic evolution will be in its proper historical perspective if it is remembered that evolutionary cosmology had been founded in Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science of 1786 and in Laplace’s nebular hypothesis of 1796. At about the same time, Hutton was forming modern geology by his rejection of the catastrophic theories of the origin of geological formations and his introduction of the principle of uniformitarianism. Although the term “entropy” was not introduced until 1865 by Clausius, the second law of thermodynamics was formulated by Sadi Carnot thirty years earlier. By the time of the publication of the Origin of Species, the physical sciences were already thoroughly evolutionist in outlook. Moreover, the fact of the evolution of living forms, although not a mechanism for that evolution, was accepted widely in scientific and literary circles. Darwin’s grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, in the Temple of Nature (1803, p. 3) invokes the Muse to say “How rose from elemental strife, organic forms, and kindled into life.” And his Muse reports that even “imperious man, who rules the bestial crowd, … arose from rudiments of form and sense” (p. 28). Less romantic students of natural history like Buffon and especially Lamarck, had, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, fully developed theories of the transformation of species. Even Diderot in 1769 in Le rêve de d’Alembert asks: “Qui scait les races d’animaux qui nous ont precedes? Qui scait les races d’animaux qui succederont aux notres? Tout change, tout passe, il n’y a que le tout qui reste” ([1830] 1951, p. 56, my italics). Seventy years later we hear the echo in Tennyson: “The old order changeth, yielding place to new” (“Morte d’Arthur,” I. 408).
It is often thought obvious that scientific discovery influences the direction of social and economic change, or at least its rate. But what must be even more true is that social and economic world views must permeate science. No appeal to a Zeitgeist is implied by such a relationship, for the meaning of Zeitgeist is that science and other social activities respond equally to some spirit of the age whose source and power are unknown. To appeal to Zeitgeist is to reject any legitimate theory of historical causation. On the other hand, there is nothing mystical about the way in which notions of cause and effect, choice and chance, determinacy and freedom, spread from one science to another. Equally, it is entirely within the normal picture of historical causation that general social attitudes and economic relationships between social classes should have a profound effect upon the acceptability and apparent reasonableness of scientific hypotheses. Science is, after all, a social activity.
Prior to the eighteenth century, European social systems were characterized by a determinist world view. A man was born to his estate and occupied it by divine providence. Fixity and static stability were the mark of society, and radical changes in position could occur only as exceptional withdrawals or extensions of divine grace. Although Charles I was king of England Dei gratia, he could be deposed because, as Cromwell said, divine grace had been removed from him. The fact of his severed head was sufficient proof of that. Occasionally a man might rise from low estate to be the counselor of kings, but again only an extraordinary grace made this possible. Species were fixed as was the position of the earth in the universe. Galileo’s heresy was not that the earth was not at the center of the cosmos but that it moved. Men reason by analogy from the condition of their lives to the condition of the universe, and a static society could hardly believe in a dynamic cosmos.
In the eighteenth century a change became felt in the condition of society as the influence of the industrial revolution spread. Social mobility became more common, and classes of parvenus acquired political and social power.
“And it is a remarkable example of the confusion into which the present age has fallen” … says Sir Leicester, … “that Mrs. Rouncewell’s son has been invited to go into Parliament.”
Miss Volumnia utters a little sharp scream… . “Good gracious, what is the man?”
“He is called, I believe–an–Ironmaster.”
Charles Dickens, Bleak House, 1853
The phase of bourgeois revolution had begun and from it developed bourgeois revolutionary science. As change became the rule and characteristic of society, catastrophism lost ground in natural science, and a uniformitarian principle of change took its place. It is surely no coincidence that Josiah Wedgwood, who began as a potter’s apprentice and ended as one of the great eighteenth-century magnates, was Charles Darwin’s maternal grandfather. Darwin’s paternal grandfather, Erasmus, belonged to the circle of new Midland industralists: James Watt, James Keir, Matthew Boulton, and, of course, Wedgwood. Although from the middle class, Erasmus was a self-made man and his son, Robert (Charles’s father), emulated him by accepting 40 pounds of his father’s money and building it into a respectable fortune with no further aid.
The bourgeois revolution not only established change as the characteristic element of the cosmos but added direction and progress as well. A world in which a man could rise from humble origins must have seemed, to him at least, a good world. Change per se was a moral quality. In this light, Spencer’s assertion that change is progress is not surprising. Moreover, for those still rising or hopeful of improvement, there is a vested interest in the perpetuity of change, in a uniformitarian principle of replacement of the old by the new.
The bourgeois revolution reached its peak in England in the Reform Bill of 1832 based on Bentham’s principle of the “greatest happiness for the greatest number,” while on the Continent it took the more violent form of the revolutions of 1848. By the time Darwin published the Origin of Species, the ascent of the middle classes was complete and the supremacy of change and progress established in all the natural sciences except biology. The furor against Darwinism was only the last hopeless struggle of an already fatally wounded adversary. It is, of course, true that the principle of natural selection, converted by Spencer to the “survival of the fittest,” was used in the last half of the nineteenth century as a justification for laissez-faire practices. But it was only the borrowing of a metaphor to further justify a system already in full operation. It would be quite wrong to propose that Darwinism was an effective agent promoting unlimited economic competition.
Like all revolutions the bourgeois revolution gave way slowly to a period of consolidation, a period in which we still find ourselves. Once the new classes had gained power, it was clearly to their advantage to prevent the revolution from going further. The static hereditary society could hardly be reconstituted, but in its place a system of dynamic stability was erected. Change and social mobility are still accepted as characteristic of society, but it is a running-in-place rather than an overturn of the existing order. Liberal democracy of the twentieth century has a vested interest in maintaining the world social order but allowing individuals, on the basis of relative competitive ability, to find their own place in the social structure.
It is not remarkable, then, that evolutionary theories of the twentieth century are marked by a concern for equilibrium condition and dynamic stability, a playing down of progressivist and perfectionist elements, and a general reliance on the principle that plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. In cosmogony there has been the rise of the steady-state theory of perpetual creation and also of the cyclic expansion-contraction model. Both are characterized by constant movement and change, but neither allows that the universe is going anywhere in particular. In thermodynamics and statistical mechanics there has been emphasis on the local rather than global nature of the law of increase of entropy. It is now admitted that entropy may decrease in other parts of the universe or at other times and that a global statement of the second law of thermodynamics may be too strong. In the realm of organic evolution, progressivism has been entirely abandoned except for a few metaphysical writers. The direction in which evolution is supposed to lead, when a direction is admitted, is that of greater complexity and greater integration leading to greater stability. Modern students of evolution are preoccupied with dynamic stability and equilibrium in a global sense. The technical literature of evolutionary genetics is filled with reference to and studies of stable equilibria. This preoccupation would have seemed strange to the evolutionists of the nineteenth century, who saw, reflected in the process of organic evolution, the tendency toward a better world. The evolutionist of the twentieth century presumably sees, in his view of evolution, “the best of all possible worlds.”
R. C. LEWONTIN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BERGSON, HENRI (1907) 1944 Creative Evolution. New York: Modern Library. ? First published in French.
DARWIN, CHARLES (1859) 1964 On the Origin of Species. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
DARWIN, ERASMUS 1803 Temple of Nature: Or, the Origin of Society; a Poem With Philosophical Notes. London: Johnson.
DIDEROT, DENIS (1830) 1951 Le rêve de d’Alembert, Entretien entre d’Alembert et Diderot, et suite de I’entretien. Edited by Paul Vernlere. Paris: Didier. ? Written in 1769, but first published in 1830.
DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSIUS G. (1937) 1951 Genetics and the Origin of Species. 3d ed., rev. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
MAYR, ERNST 1963 Animal Species and Evolution. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press.
POPPER, KARL R. 1957 The Poverty of Historicism. Boston: Beacon. ? A paperback edition was published in 1964 by Harper.
RENSCH, BERNHARD (1947) 1960 Evolution Above the Species Level. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. ? First published as Neuere Probleme der Abstammungs-lehre: Die transspezifische Evolution.
SPENCER, HERBERT (1857) 1915 Progress: Its Law and Cause. Volume 1, pages 8–62 in Herbert Spencer, Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative. New York: Appleton. ? First published in the Westminster Review.
SPENCER, HERBERT (1864–1867)1914 The Principles of Biology. 2 vols. New York: Appleton.
TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, PIERRE (1956) 1963 La place de I’homme dans la nature: Le qroupe zoologique humain. Paris: Editions du Seuil. ? First published as Le groupe zoologique humain: Structure et directions evolutives.
WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH (1925) 1960 Science and the Modern World. New York: Macmillan.
WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH 1934 Nature and Life. Univ. of Chicago Press.
WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH 1938 Modes of Thought. New York: Macmillan. ? Lectures delivered between 1934 and 1938. A paperback edition was published in 1958 by Capricorn.
II PRIMATE EVOLUTION
When Darwin published the Origin of Species in 1859, only a handful of fossil primates had been found and recognized as such. But during the last three decades of the nineteenth century a considerable series of fossil primates of Tertiary age were recovered in Europe and the Americas. The earliest scholarly attempts to analyze the course of primate evolution from the evidence of these fossils were made by Schlosser in Munich (1887), by Osborn in New York (1902), and by Wortman at Yale (1903–1904 ). Among the earliest monographic studies of early Tertiary primates were those of William K. Gregory of the American Museum of Natural History, who best summarized his views on primate evolution in a detailed review of the North American lemurlike primate Notharctus (1920). Only a little earlier Stehlin (1912–1916) at Basel had published a complementary review of European Eocene prosimians.
Inadequacies of material and methods. There have been several factors holding back full analysis of the course of primate evolution. A major problem results from their presumed early emergence in the tropical forests of the equatorial zones. Because Tertiary vertebrate fossils from these regions are poorly known, the early history of primates remains relatively obscure. Primates of the past, like those of today, were apparently restricted to relatively warm climates, often to tropical forests, and prosimian remains dating after warm, early Tertiary times are not generally found in the northern continents. Exploration for sites in the tropics where Tertiary land vertebrate fossils do occur is being actively carried out today, and it is from these paleontologically little-known regions that most important future additions to knowledge of primate evolution may be expected.
Most of the primate fossils from the early Tertiary (Paleocene and Eocene epochs) consequently are not found in the equatorial regions, where presumably the mainstream of primate evolution has always been located. Therefore, reconstruction of primate history must, at present, be extrapolated in part from fossil evidence from marginal areas. This gap in knowledge of ancient tropical faunas is somewhat lessened because we know that many extinct primates were wide-ranging species and that the higher Old World primates, particularly apes and pre-men, never diversified into a host of separate lineages, as did some groups of mammals, such as bats and rodents.
Thus, differentiation of the main groups and their interrelationships can be reasonably well understood, even from the occasional sampling typical of our imperfect paleontological finds. This is particularly true for the late Tertiary relatives and ancestors of man. However, two theories, originating outside the realm of paleontological evidence, appear to have been responsible for creating a contrary impression. Although the outlook is seldom specifically articulated, some students seem to believe that in order to produce the brain capacities of modern man there must have been many competing early hominid species. With this goes the assumption that the mental capacities of apes and those presumed for pre-men would have made them near masters of their environment and, therefore, so successful that many species would have arisen. These views, together with an overeagerness to create new species and genera, led some early anthropologists and a few modern students to the false conclusion that a great diversity of fossil apes and prehuman species once existed. A confusing welter of ill-founded names exists in the literature on such extinct primates. Those applied to Tertiary apes and hominids have recently been revised by Simons and Pilbeam (1965). Although over a thousand individual specimens of extinct great apes (pongids) and early hominids are now known from European, Asian, and African Miocene-Pleistocene deposits, only a few genera, Pliopithecus, Oreopithecus, Dryopithecus, Ramapithecus, and Giganto-pithecus, can be shown to be distinct and valid. Thus, the main types of close fossil relatives and forerunners of man (Hominoidea) that can convincingly be demonstrated to have existed in the past are about the same in number as the genera of this group that exist today–Hylobates (gibbon), Symphalangus (siamang), Pan (chimpanzee), Pongo (orangutan), Gorilla (gorilla), Homo (man).
As a consequence of the foregoing problems of approach, the study of primate evolution has been hampered. First, the early history of primates is obscured by inadequate knowledge of equatorial vertebrate faunas; and second, understanding of the later history of the particular group that included man’s ancestors has been confounded by the tendency to proliferate invalid genera and species.
Origin of primates
Undoubted primates first appear in the fossil record in North American deposits of early Paleocene age, which are more than sixty million years old. By middle Paleocene, the order had already diversified into three or four different main groups, or families. This would suggest that the initial separation of the order from primitive, insectivore-like stock was considerably earlier, perhaps in the late Cretaceous. Indeed, a species possibly primate, but based only on one tooth, has been reported from late Cretaceous beds in Montana.
The best-known primates of Paleocene times appear to represent specialized side branches, which did not long survive the beginning of the Eocene epoch. Although not directly ancestral, these early species do indicate the starting point of the basic primate arboreal adaptation and give evidence of the gradual transition from nonprimate to primate. It may be that some of the less completely known American Paleocene primates, such as Palaechthon and Plesiolestes, will eventually prove to be near the ancestry of one or more of the primate families of initial early Eocene appearance.
Origin of major surviving groups
Lemurs. At the beginning of the Eocene, pro-simians of lemurlike and tarsierlike aspect appear, nearly simultaneously, in the vertebrate assemblages of Europe and North America but are as yet unknown elsewhere. Three major sorts of primates can be characterized.
The most generalized of these early Eocene pro-simians are the loosely defined Adapidae, including such well-known forms as Pelycodus, and later Notharctus and Smilodectes in North America, and Adapis in Europe. Species of these genera, together with allied forms, apparently did not advance during the Eocene beyond the “lemuroid” condition represented today by the Malagasy lemurs, whom they resemble both in limb-bone structure and in the structure of the ear region of the skull. However, dental patterns in notharctines and adapines do not show trends evolving toward those of modern lemurs; this appears to indicate that known Eocene species of Adapidae were not directly ancestral to the living varieties of lemurs. On the other hand, the family Adapidae–now rather broadly defined–could well represent the family from which modern lemurs and possibly the lorises differentiated (Simons 1962a).
How and when the true lemurs reached their present limited range of distribution in the island of Madagascar is a most intriguing and nearly insoluble problem on the basis of present evidence. If their introduction to this island was by way of the African continent, it might be expected that some evidence of true lemurs would by now have been recovered from the Egyptian Oligocene or east African Miocene deposits, both of which contain warm-climate forest faunas. Although small, evidently arboreal primates have been found in some abundance in these deposits in Egypt and east Africa, none show any significant similarities to the Malagasy lemurs. On the other hand, similarities between lorises and two European late-Eocene primates, Pronycticebus and Anchomomys, at present classified as Adapinae, suggest that the introduction of this group into Africa could have been by way of Europe.
Tarsiers. Enough is now known of the craniology and dentition of the so-called “tarsioid” primates to demonstrate the falsehood of the extravagant opinion of Wood-Jones that Hominidae are to be derived directly from Tarsius-like forms through an ancestral line not shared by the Old World apes and monkeys. What is perhaps more significant is that the Eocene tarsioids so far discovered could not have given rise to the common stem of monkeys, apes, or men either, for they possess non-catarrhine specializations, and all had apparently lost one pair of lower incisors. All surviving members of Anthropoidea have retained these teeth. Nevertheless, these early tarsioids are of great interest because they presumably represent the general level of organization the unknown forerunners of the living higher primates must have reached as far back as the beginning of the Eocene epoch.
The first Anthropoidea. Another major group of primates appeared in the early Eocene, in Europe, Asia, and North America, and is, with one or two exceptions, restricted in temporal range to this epoch. (Gazin 1958 has reviewed the distribution of middle-Eocene members of this family, together with other contemporary North American primates.) Collectively, members of Omomyidae show greater resemblances to Anthropoidea than do other early prosimians. They could well represent the taxon from which all true Anthropoidea differentiated, a probability that is also sound zoogeographically, in view of their Holarctic distribution. Certainty on this point must wait, however, until better knowledge of cranial and postcranial anatomy is available for members of this family. Partial evidence, derived mainly from remains of a species of the North American middle-Eocene omomyid genus Hemiacodon gracilis, shows that this species cannot be regarded as “tarsioid” postcranially (Simpson 1940). This observation, in turn, implies that Anthropoidea in its earliest differentiation may not have passed through a definably tarsioid grade of organization. Rather, the anatomy of both Eocene Necrolemur and Holocene Tarsius clearly indicates that so-called “tarsioids” and the Anthropoidea probably originated in the same segment of early Prosimii. Although serious gaps in the geologic record of primates prevent any very definite attachment of early Tertiary species successions to those of the later Cenozoic, it is likely that some known Paleocene and Eocene types, at least at the generic level, do pertain to the ancestry of living forms. Because climates were much more equable throughout the early Tertiary, with regions as far north as Montana and England supporting a subtropical flora, we can suppose that many of these Paleocene-Eocene genera contained species having a broad north-south range of distribution. Some of the species we now know from northern areas must have had very close allies in the unknown southern faunas. An example of this sort of distribution is provided by one of the large Eocene herbivores. Skulls and jaws of species of the Wasatch panto-dont genus Coryphodon found in the Big Bend region of Texas, near the Mexican border, cannot be distinguished from remains of this animal found in northern Wyoming. This represents a north-south separation of about one thousand miles; if paleontological information on Wasatch faunas were available from Canada to Guatemala, this distribution could probably be extended even farther. Nevertheless, as with most attempts to trace phyletic lineages in given groups of fossils, the need to discover a great many more connecting links remains, and the search in the more nearly equatorial regions for early Cenozoic faunas containing primates is one of our major objectives.
For the Oligocene two sets of primate data from equatorial regions have become available through recent research projects.
The first of these projects has provided new evidence on the question of differentiation of cerco-pithecoid monkeys and hominoids. Discoveries made in Oligocene deposits in Egypt between 1961 and 1966 by Yale expeditions under the writer’s direction have added new data on the nature of the initial appearance of these two superfamilies. A jaw fragment of a new small primate, Oligopithecus savagei (Simons 1962b), shows the typical lower dental formula of Miocene-Holocene Old World Anthropoidea, in combination with what are the most primitively constituted lower molars known in this suborder. Premolar heteromorphy and slightly bilophodont molars, plus certain other characters, suggest relationships, on the one hand, to Eocene Omomyidae, and on the other, to Miocene-Holocene cercopithecoids. Further finds of this small mammal could strengthen the possibility, which now rests almost entirely on the evidence of this single fragmentary jaw, that cercopithecoids arose from Old World omomyids. Miocene monkeys are known from deposits in Egypt and east Africa. The early history of Old World monkeys remains very poorly understood, and much of the known earliest material has not been described.
The emergence of Hominoidea
To date no significant information whatever on upper tooth structure of earliest (Eocene-Oligocene) African or Eurasian Anthropoidea has been published. This has been a serious gap in our knowledge because upper premolars and molars, being somewhat more complex than lower-cheek teeth, allow for more accurate appraisal of taxonomic affinity. Restudy of the previously poorly known upper molars of Pondaungia cotteri from the late Eocene of Burma, together with discovery by the recent Yale expeditions of several partial upper dentitions of Apidium and of isolated upper teeth of Aegyptopithecus and Parapithecus, has greatly added to the data available for consideration of the prosimian sources of the higher primates of the Eastern Hemisphere. Briefly, the dental evidence of these three early species bears on the crucial point of emergence of Hominoidea from Prosimii: the upper molars of Apidium and Pondaungia show the three primary cusps of the trigon unconnected by ridges. The hypocone is large, and a pitted lingual cingulum is usually present. In both these genera several small accessory cusps occur in the trigon between the three main cusps. In their over-all upper molar morphology, species of these two genera equally resemble prosimians and higher primates. Cheek teeth of Apidium, particularly, also show similarities to those of Oreo-pithecus. This may be due to retention of a comparatively primitive molar cusp pattern in the otherwise advanced latter hominoid. Upper molars of Propliopithecus, on the other hand, show the typical pattern characteristic of much later apes, near men, and men. However, the cingulum on the inner side of the upper molars is large, which strengthens the view that this is a primitive character of ape dentitions.
Pondaungia cotteri was described by Pilgrim (1927). This specimen was recovered from the Pondaung sandstone of Burma together with a small mammal fauna, which indicates a late Eocene age for this as well as for another primate, Amphipithecus. Comparisons based primarily on the anthracotheres of the Pondaung sandstone and those of the Fayum early Oligocene of Egypt suggest that the Burmese fossils may be earlier, but the question is by no means definitely settled. At present it seems best to regard Amphipithecus and Pondaungia as of late Eocene age, and since both appear to be hominoids, this indicates the upper limit of differentiation for this major group of primates. As Colbert (1937) has already pointed out for Amphipithecus, both appear to show close ties with Pongidae. Tentative assignment of Amphipithecus and Pondaungia to this family does not seem questionable on grounds of their antiquity, inasmuch as a considerable number of presently existing mammalian families have now been traced back to the late Eocene.
Pilgrim’s illustrations and comments on Pondaungia left much to be desired, and in fact, on the basis of the information he provided, it was hardly possible to accept the species as belonging to the primates. As he mentioned, part of the source of his weak case lay in the fact that a web-like erosion of the enamel of the lower teeth in the type of Pondaungia had obscured their crown patterns. He supposed this to be also the case with the upper molars. Microscopic examination of this material indicates that, while the lower molars do appear to have suffered some erosive damage, the crenulations on the upper teeth represent the natural surface except in one or two broken areas. This sort of crenulation is not unusual among primates, being of frequent occurrence in Eocene Omomyidae and in Miocene–Holocene apes. In conclusion, these features of the upper molars, together with some distinguishable details of the lower teeth and mandibles, suggest an assignment to the Pongidae. Indeed Pondaungia may not be far from the direct ancestry of such forms as Propliopithecus and its less well-known allies from the Oligocene of Egypt. A less likely possibility is that Pondaungia is an advanced omomyid primate with teeth paralleling those of early pongids.
All finds of primates from the Old World Oligocene are distributed throughout some six or seven hundred feet of mainly continental sediments of the Qatrani formation, Fayum province, Egypt–generally regarded as being of early Oligocene age. The classic finds of Parapithecus, Propliopithecus, and Moeripithecus are from the lower part of this series, in the “Fossil Wood Zone,” while the type of Apidium came from about five hundred feet higher. The new species of Apidium and one of Propliopithecus have been found stratigraphically between the two earlier known levels. There are then three primate-yielding levels, of unknown age separation. Enough time had elapsed between their successive depositions, however, to bring about evolutionary changes among the respective primate lineages represented. In December 1963 the Yale expedition recovered from the upper Fayum deposits two new genera and species of primates. One of these, Aegyptopithecus, appears to be a good candidate for the ancestry of Dryopithecus, of Miocene–Pliocene age, and was possibly a forerunner of all subsequent apes. The second new find, Aeolopithecus, resembles gibbons, living and fossil.
Turning to a consideration of primates of the Miocene epoch, which began perhaps about 25 million years ago, there is more abundant information. From South American deposits, located mainly in Argentina and Colombia, a series of monkey species is known. These have most recently been discussed by Stirton (1951). At least partial skulls and jaws are known for species of three genera, Homun-culus, Dolicocebus, and Cebupithecia. These materials show that by Miocene times South American monkeys were structured much as they are today, and therefore they do not provide much evidence as to the origins of this group. Old World monkeys of Miocene age are known only from sites in east Africa and Egypt. The east African Miocene monkey has not yet been named, but that from Egypt was given the rather unfortunate generic name of Prohylobates by Fourtau (Egypt 1918).
Broadly contemporary with these monkeys are species of the Dryopithecus group of apes (including subgenera Sivapithecus and Proconsul), which are apparently close to the ancestry of the living African apes. Also represented in Miocene faunas of Europe and Africa are species of Pliopithecus, an ancient relative of the present-day gibbons and siamangs of southeast Asia.
Toward the end of the Miocene epoch in Eurasia and Africa, perhaps about fourteen million years ago, species of Dryopithecus are contemporary with the oldest undoubtedly manlike primate, Ramapithecus punjabicus. Originally discovered in the Siwalik Hills of north India in beds of Miocene-Pliocene age, this species was named by Pilgrim in 1910, but he did not recognize that it belonged to a major new variety of primate and so considered it a species of Dryopithecus. Lewis (1934) defined the genus Ramapithecus, to which Pilgrim’s species has subsequently proved to belong. Lewis initially pointed out that Ramapithecus has many manlike features in the upper tooth series. Thus, it can reasonably be placed in Hominidae, the taxonomic family of man (Simons 1963; 1964). To date, however, only parts of upper and lower jaws of this animal have been found. Apparently Ramapithecus was a successful and wide-ranging primate. Outside north India, teeth and jaws just like those of the Ramapithecus punjabicus have been found at Fort Ternan in Kenya, east Africa; in Yunnan, China; and just possibly in Europe.
Apart from the fact that facial displays and diet in Ramapithecus must have been more similar to that of true man than to that of the apes (in view of incisor, canine, and premolar reduction–relative to cheek teeth) little can be inferred about this earliest hominid. It cannot be called man or human, because there is no evidence that R. punjabicus manufactured tools. Moreover, nothing is known of its brain size and limb or body skeleton. After this we know little of fossil primates until the earlier Pleistocene.
The Pleistocene and hominid evolution
The Pleistocene was a time of rapid hominid evolution, during which toolmaking first appeared among the ancestors of modern man. In 1925 Dart described an infant skull that he named Australopithecus africanus. In spite of the name, which means “African southern ape,” Dart recognized Australopithecus to be a hominid belonging to the same taxonomic family as modern man, Homo sapiens. Nevertheless, his views were not generally accepted until a large number of fossil men or near men of similar age and structural type were recovered by Dart, Broom, and Robinson in south Africa.
More recently, Australopithecus has apparently been identified in Java and in north and east African deposits. The proposed name Homo habilis, recently coined by Leakey and his associates (1964) on the basis of specimens from Olduvai Gorge in Tanganyika, covers mixed materials, some assignable to the prior south African species Australopithecus africanus and some to Telanthropus capensis and to Homo erectus. In the view of many students (Campbell 1964a), even the first two species are not distinguishable, both belonging to the same small and gracile variety of early man. In addition to the species A. africanus, there is a large and more specialized early hominid form in east and south Africa, which should most correctly be called Australopithecus robustus. Both of these species appear to have been habitual bipeds; the postcranial skeletons are similar to that of Homo sapiens and little like those of apes. Their jaws and teeth, although relatively large, are strongly reminiscent of teeth of later and better-known fossil men. However, in both species, known brain size was apparently little more than a third that of the average present-day Homo sapiens. The small brain size initially caused many students to place Australopithecus close to or with the apes. This early and erroneous placement of Australopithecus has continued to affect balanced understanding of their relationship to living man. Several poorly known or juvenile Australopithecus specimens have been made the “types” of new taxa, said to be more advanced and more like Homo sapiens. Both Telanthropus capensis and Homo habilis fall in this category. As Campbell (1964b) demonstrates, they have not been shown to be different enough from each other or from members of Australopithecus africanus to warrant species identification.
Clarification of these taxonomic problems is crucial to discussion of the course of the mainstream of the early evolution of man and is one of the prime areas for future advance in this science. Definition and delineation of species populations is requisite to understanding of the ancestral lineage of modern man. Unfortunately, most anthropologists and anatomists who have been the namers of fossil men and near men were not adequately trained to define taxa in harmony with the concepts of modern systematics and population genetics. That these inadequacies are still leading to confusion in understanding of human evolution was confirmed in the technically incorrect diagnosis of Homo habilis. Such neglect of the new taxonomy and systematics has seriously affected understanding of primate and human history. In all discussion of earliest men and pre-men, mammalian taxonomy is an area that needs much more sober scientific attention than it has been given so far.
ELWYN L. SIMONS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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CLARK, WILFRID E. LEGROS 1960 The Antecedents of Man. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
COLBERT, EDWIN H. 1937 A New Primate From the Upper Eocene Pondaung Formation of Burma. American Museum of Natural History Novitates 951:1–18.
EGYPT, SURVEY DEPARTMENT (1918) 1920 Contribution à l’étude des vertébrés miocÉnes de l’Égypte, by René Fourtau. Cairo: Government Press.
GAZIN, C. LEWIS 1958 A Review of the Middle and Upper Eocene Primates of North America. Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections, Vol. 136. Washington: The Institution.
GREGORY, WILLIAM K. 1920 On the Structure and Relations of Notharctus, an American Eocene Primate. American Museum of Natural History, Memoirs New Series 3:49–243.
GREGORY, WILLIAM K. 1922 The Origin and Evolution of the Human Dentition. Baltimore: Williams & Wil-kins.
LEAKEY, L. S. B.; TOBIAS, P. V.; and NAPIER, J. R. 1964 A New Species of the Genus Homo From Olduvai Gorge. Nature 202:7–9.
LEWIS, G. EDWARD 1934 Preliminary Notice of New Man-like Apes From India. American Journal of Science Fifth Series 227:161–179.
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III HUMAN EVOLUTION
The modern or synthetic theory of evolution considers evolution to be the result of changes in the gene frequencies in populations. Gene frequencies are altered by means of mutation, selection, migration, and certain chance factors such as drift. When mutations are considered relative to their usefulness to the organism and to the population, mutations occur at random. They are not at random relative to the chemical structure of the organism, and mutations are commoner at some locations on the chromosomes than at others. Mutations are mostly disadvantageous, and their frequency is increased by radiation and by certain chemicals. Selection is the primary agent for bringing order to this process. Over the course of time, those genetic combinations that favor reproductive success become more common; and, conversely, those combinations that are less viable decline. It should be stressed that selection is for reproductively successful populations, and, from the viewpoint of evolution or of the species, the individual is only important insofar as he helps or hinders the success of the population. Variability itself is very important, as it permits the species to adapt to changing conditions; and selection is often for variability rather than for homogeneity which demands a single, limited environment. Migration from one population to another may introduce new genes or change gene frequencies, and this means that genes that are favored by selection may spread throughout the species. Partial reproductive isolation permits adaptation to local conditions and the formation of races, but in the long run it is the species that is the evolutionary unit. Especially when the number of individuals in the breeding population is small–as, in fact, was the case throughout most of human history–chance may cause the gene frequencies of one generation to differ from those of the preceding one. This has been called drift, and it can be a source of variability between small populations of a single species. If populations are founded by very few individuals, on the basis of statistical probabilities their gene frequencies are unlikely to be the same as those of the parent population. In summary, evolution is the result of changing gene frequencies. These changes originate by chance and are ordered by selection. They are modified by migration and certain chance factors. The process of natural selection has both directly and indirectly favored highly variable populations, and there has been no tendency for evolution to produce genetically uniform types.
Biological history
The synthetic theory of evolution has many important implications for social science, but it must be remembered that the concepts most frequently borrowed by the social scientists long antedate modern evolutionary theory. The greatest misunderstanding comes from the notion that evolution is directed toward a particular goal, frequently man himself, and that its course is determined by trends (orthogenesis). The reproductive success of populations is determined by the conditions of the moment, not by ultimate desirability or by the remote future. Reptiles succeeded the amphibians because of structural, physiological, and behavioral advantages that led to numerical and adaptive success, not because reptiles were to give rise to mammals, one of which was to become man. The trends seen in evolution are descriptions of what has actually taken place, and if a trend continues it is because selection in each generation has favored a particular course of events. When there are only a few fossils, the course of evolution may appear simple; but when the record is rich, biological history appears as an incredibly complex web of adapting organisms.
These points are made particularly incisively by Simpson (1964). As he emphasizes, evolution is biological history. The mechanism is revealed in the geneticist’s laboratory, and the record is discovered in the rocks. But there are no laws in the usual scientific sense determining the course of evolution. In biological history there are no ultimate goals, inevitable trends, or vitalistic explanations.
The contrast between thinking about evolution in terms of inevitable trends and as the result of selection may be illustrated by consideration of the length of the toes of man and his ancestors. Since human toes have become much shorter compared to those of any possible ancestral primate, it is often asked whether this trend will continue; and men of the future are pictured as having still smaller toes. But the length of human toes has not been determined by a trend which is continuing into the future, regardless of the circumstances. When our ancestors became terrestrial animals to a greater extent, selection favored more efficient bipedal locomotion. Selection for shorter toes was a part of this process, but the fact that selection was for different proportions in the foot does not mean that selection continues to be for even shorter toes. Probably an equilibrium was reached more than a million years ago, and selection for shorter toes has not continued. There is no trend determining the foot proportions of the future; the notion of an inevitable man of the future with a huge brain, tiny face, small limbs, and so forth finds no support in modern evolutionary theory. Future gene frequencies will be determined by selection (i.e., by reproductive success), and man will become more intelligent only if those individuals with the combinations of genes favoring the development of high intelligence leave more offspring. Evolutionary trends are statements of what has actually taken place in the history of forms of life, but there is no biological momentum that carries past trends into the future.
The study of human evolution is particularly beset with the notions of goal and trend and of evolution as a magic process. It might clarify thinking on the subject to omit the word “evolution” for the moment and to consider the history of the forms of life as revealed by the fossil record, the mechanism of change as shown in the laboratory, and the interpretations of these two kinds of data. The study of man’s biological history means precisely the same thing as the study of human evolution, and it does not carry the suggestion of inevitable trend or progress toward some desired goal. The statement that we may study human biological history, human cultural history, and the interrelation of the two should mean precisely the same thing as that we may study human biological and cultural evolution. Understanding comes from the study of the data, and no information is added by using the word “evolution” in preference to the word “history.”
The importance of using modern concepts is well illustrated by the change in the meaning of the word “origin.” In human evolution “origin” has usually meant a relatively restricted time and place in which a new type arose. Thus one theory held that Neanderthal man arose in Europe, another that he evolved in central Asia. But if the populations of the genus Homo were not reproductively isolated during the latter half of the Pleistocene period, mutations and gene combinations favored by selection might have spread throughout the whole species. The origin of the Neanderthal populations that inhabited Europe during the last interglacial period was not limited to Europe but depended on the extent to which European populations were in contact with populations in other parts of the Old World. In the traditional typological, local sense there really is no “origin” of Neanderthal but many origins at different times and places which became incorporated in the European gene pool some 50 to 150 thousand years ago. The origins of Neanderthal were going on steadily over large areas for long periods of time, and the populations named Neanderthal were in part the result of events (mutations, drift, selection, migration) taking place in other races of the species.
Stages in human evolution
The characteristics of the main stages of human evolution are based on the fossils and on the structure and behavior of the primates that exist today. Both kinds of evidence are necessary to reconstruct the course of human evolution, and it is important to keep in mind the nature of the understanding that each kind of evidence can give. The fossils are the only direct clue to what the ancestors were like, the only evidence on many forms that have no close living relatives, and the only evidence as to the actual time of appearance of the various groups of primates. But the fossils are limited to those hard parts that do not easily deteriorate, largely jaws and teeth. Study of the contemporary primate forms supplements this record in two ways. The changes that are seen in the fossils may be interpreted more meaningfully if knowledge of the living animals is used. For example, changes in the form of the ethmoid bone may be directly related to changes in the sense of smell; or a particular form of limb bone may be interpreted as showing a special loco-motor pattern. In a quite different way the contemporary forms may indirectly suggest characteristics that probably existed in extinct forms. For example, primitive mammals and contemporary prosimians have tactile hairs, scent glands, and a well-developed sense of smell. It is highly probable that these conditions were general for all the primates of the first half of the Age of the Mammals, but there is direct evidence only on the sense of smell. It is probable that this whole complex was reduced at the end of the Eocene or the beginning of the Oligocene, but this may have happened much earlier or later, and different parts of the complex may have changed at different times. If one is interested in general statements about what happened, the evidence is very good. But the more detailed questions one asks, the more the answers are limited to those that may be derived from teeth and bones.
For the first half of the Age of the Mammals the ancestors of man were small, long-snouted pro-simians, not distinguished from the other primates of their time in any remarkable way. The prosimians of the Eocene were successful and highly diversified, and the group underwent a major adaptive radiation resulting in the formation of many distinct families. Many of the most successful groups evolved elongated incisor teeth; and if one examined only the Eocene primates, it might be concluded that these were to be the ultimately successful forms. But the majority of these Eocene primates became extinct after the true rodents appeared, and it may be that competition with the rodents was a major factor in their extinction. Unfortunately, the fossil record is particularly scant at the end of the Eocene and at the beginning of the Oligocene, so it is impossible to determine just which of the families of the early primates are ancestral to the later ones. But the main changes, as outlined below, would be similar regardless of just which lineage is eventually proved to be the correct one. While maintaining hands and feet adapted for climbing by grasping and a primitive quadrupedal posture, some primates in both the New World and the Old World independently evolved a new organization of the special senses and the brain. The primitive sense of smell was reduced, and binocular, stereoscopic color vision evolved. The reduction of the sense of smell is directly reflected in the fossil bone. The changes in vision are inferred from the conditions found in contemporary primates and are mirrored, at least to some extent, in the structure of the bony orbit. The brain increased in size at least four or five times and changed in organization from a primitive dependence on the sense of smell to an organization based on vision as the dominant sense. The change from prosimian to monkey is primarily in the brain and special senses, but in addition the face became shorter and deeper. The special senses and the brain determine what aspects of the external world can be perceived and appreciated and how sensations are organized. In a very real sense the world that we think of as normal (a stereoscopic world of color, in which activity is diurnal) began with the monkeys of the end of the Eocene or the beginning of the Oligocene. Judging from contemporary prosimians, the increase in the size of the brain made a great difference in intelligence. But it must be remembered that this reorganization of the structural basis of experience was an adaptation to a particular kind of arboreal life which took place independently in both the New World and the Old World. Although this organization forms the basis for human experience, it initially evolved because it was useful to monkeys, not to prepare the way for man.
Monkeys (Cercopithecidae) have remained quadrupedal, but the apes (Pongidae) evolved a different locomotor pattern. Apes climb by reaching far up above the head and may hang by one arm, swing below a branch, or reach to the side. This manner of locomotion in the trees probably evolved first as a way of feeding out near the ends of small branches. The structures that make this mode of living possible are complex and include a shallow, wide chest, a long clavicle, a special shoulder joint that involves modification of all bones near the joint, and changes in the elbow, wrist joint, and hand. The fossil record is exceedingly scanty, but this whole complex probably evolved during the Miocene, long after the separation between monkeys and apes. At least many monkeylike features persist in the arm bones of such forms of early Miocene ape as Proconsul and Pliopithecus. Man is similar to the apes in this structure of the trunk and arms (including the form and numbers of vertebrae, the disposition of the viscera, the form of joints and muscles, and the proportions of the trunk and limbs). Again it must be remembered that this complex evolved for a special life in the trees, and it is shared by all the contemporary apes. Man has these features because his ancestors were arboreally adapted apes, not because there was a trend toward man.
By the beginning of the Pleistocene, possibly two million years ago, the family of which man is the sole living representative (Hominidae) was represented by a genus of bipedal, small-brained creatures (Australopithecus). The direct fossil evidence shows that the Hominidae must be at least two million years old; but Australopithecus already had small canine teeth of human form and a pelvis closely approximating that seen in man (Homo), and the foot differed from that of Homo only in details. Prior to the Pleistocene, the Hominidae must have been separated from the Pongidae for some substantial period of time during which these characters evolved. Fragments of jaws dating from the end of the Miocene in India (Ramapithecus) and Africa (Kenyapithecus) suggest that the line leading to the Hominidae may have been distinct at that time; but since the rate of evolution may be very different for different functional complexes, there is no way to tell if these forms were beginning to be bipedal. It has been repeatedly shown that conclusions drawn from such fragmentary remains are likely to be wrong. [See EVOLUTION, article on PRIMATE EVOLUTION.]
Stone tools and animal bones have been found with the remains of Australopithecus; and it is probable that these creatures made the tools and hunted small animals, just as from their anatomy it appears that the behavior of Australopithecus was far more human than apelike. There were at least two species, A. africanus and A. robustus, a small one and a large one. Judging from the evidence of the teeth and from the associated archeological remains, both probably made tools. The small species may have been directly ancestral to the genus Homo of the Middle Pleistocene. The large form lived at the same time as the small one and continued on to be a contemporary of Homo before becoming extinct. As man is approached, there is a tendency to label each specimen as distinct and to emphasize differences instead of similarities. The result is a multiplication of species and genera the more the forms resemble man. Actually, the reverse should be the case. The more a primate is bipedal, tool-using, and hunting, the less likely the form is to speciate and the more likely it is to occupy wide areas with only racial differences.
By the Middle Pleistocene men of the genus Homo were fully bipedal, and there is every indication that their locomotor system had evolved to virtually its present form. Brains were approximately twice the size of those of Australopithecus. Tools were made according to complex traditions of manufacture, which were widely distributed geographically. Large animals were hunted, and fire was used. This fully human way of life appears to have been established by half a million years ago, but it changed very slowly. Approximately fifty thousand years ago men of modern form appeared. Undoubtedly evolution continued, and the populations adapted to local conditions by biological as well as cultural means. But the main events of human evolution had taken place before that time, and culture became increasingly more important in human adaptation. With agriculture and particularly with modern science the whole pattern shifted, numbers increased from a few millions to billions, and recently it is man who has altered the world. Mutation, selection, and migration are changed by the human way of life and at least in part may be brought under human control.
Since the fossil record is so fragmentary, it is important to note that the latest biochemical and cytological evidence supports the classification of the primates and the general stages of human evolution noted above. Immunochemical studies (especially Williams 1964 and Goodman 1963) show that man’s closest living relatives are the great apes, especially the chimpanzee and the gorilla. The small apes, the gibbons, are much less similar both in their immune reactions and in chromosome number and types. The Old World monkeys are still further removed, and the prosimians are both very different and highly diversified. For the first half of the Age of the Mammals man’s ancestors were prosimians whose primary adaptation was climbing by grasping. At the end of the Eocene a monkey-ape group evolved, characterized by changes in the brain and special senses. This group diversified in the Oligocene, and the special ape locomotor and feeding patterns evolved in the Miocene. A human bipedal group separated later and was fully evolved in locomotor and dental characters by the beginning of the Pleistocene, some two million years ago. It should be stressed that the Eocene prosimians evolved into many different forms, most of which became extinct. Subsequently, monkeys and apes evolved into dozens of different genera. No general trend dominates the evolution of the primates, and most of primate evolution has no relation to that of man.
Evolution of behavior
The direct evidence for the course of human evolution outlined above is fragmentary and limited primarily to teeth and jaws. Changes in locomotor patterns are directly reflected in the bones, and in a general way the stages outlined above are probably correct; but so few limb bones are preserved that a very wide variety of interpretations is possible. Turning to the evolution of other behaviors, the evidence is even more indirect and is based primarily on the contemporary forms. The general logic in the use of information from the contemporary primates is that if a structure or behavior is common in a group of living primates it was probably present in closely allied fossil forms. Both parallel evolution and convergence may render such conclusions invalid; and since it is highly adaptable, behavior is particularly liable to these sources of error. An example may make the situation clearer. Primitive mammals probably had a litter of several young. In the primates the number of young is usually reduced to one at a time, and that infant is carried by the mother. The general kind of change is clear, but the details cannot be determined from the record. Marmosets do have twins and galagos more than one young. It is probable that the reduction took place several times, and it is possible that the ancestral apes had more than one young. But the most probable interpretation is that in arboreal primates a single infant carried by the mother was more likely to survive, and that this behavioral adaptation had evolved in the prosimians prior to the evolution of the later primate forms.
The human infant is remarkable in being unable to hold onto its mother, and this not only alters the pattern of human mother-child relations but introduces a division of labor and many social problems that are unique to man. George B. Schaller (1963) observed that the female gorilla also must help her infant for the first six weeks. Thus man is a little less different than had been thought, and perhaps the particular group of apes from which we are descended were more like gorillas in this regard than like all the other apes and monkeys. The matter cannot be proved one way or the other, but it is most likely that the main difference between man and the other primates came with the evolution of large brains in the Pleistocene, long after the human lineage had separated from the other apes.
A problem exists in the examples that follow which is similar to that encountered in our consideration of the number of young in a litter and the degree of dependency of the newborn: that is, comparison of the living forms highlights a situation of importance in the behavior of man, but the time of origin of the behavior can be suggested in only the most general way. However, many important aspects of human evolution can be appreciated only in this way. For example, length of life has increased greatly in man. In small primitive mammals maturity is a matter of months and old age of two or three years. Comparable figures for monkeys are maturity in three or four years and a life span of well over twenty years. In chimpanzees full maturity is in approximately eight to ten years, and the life span is more than forty years. Comparable figures for man are nearly twice as long. Although there is much variation, the time during which the human young enjoy a protected and privileged position has increased, and a human of eight or ten is still learning and playing at an age when most primates would be fully adult. Clearly, selection has favored the long period of development and learning, even at a great biological cost. It might appear that a process based on reproductive success would favor several young and rapid growth, but in the human way of life selection has been for a single infant, growing slowly. Prolonged dependency and the presence of experienced adults have been major factors in the evolution of human society.
In monkeys and apes there is a menstrual cycle of approximately a month in duration. Sexual activity is concentrated in a period of estrus close to the time of ovulation. Females do not come into estrus for a period of some months during the later part of pregnancy and the first part of lactation. These physiological facts have the effect of concentrating sexual activity when conception is most probable and of spacing the infants. The spacing may be further reinforced by a breeding season, or at least a much greater frequency of births in one part of the year. In the human female the basic cycle continues, but estrus behavior has been lost.
Human females experience a period of lowered fertility during early lactation which is probably comparable to that in many monkeys. However, this period is not long enough for the requirements of human infant spacing; the human infant cannot feed itself when it is six months or even a year old. In man the spacing of infants must be extended by taboos and customs which supplement the physiological mechanisms of birth spacing in the non-human primate. The loss of the estrus cycle in the human female may be related to the economic division of labor and the interdependency of the sexes, which is unique to man. This loss may be due to the need of the human female to keep the interest of the food-sharing male; but there may well have also been selective pressure against estrus behavior, which would have been disruptive to the stable, interdependent relationships of a family unit.
The monkeys and apes are almost entirely vegetarian, although most will eat birds’ eggs and insects. Hunting of small mammals has been observed rarely in chimpanzees and baboons. The range in which monkeys and apes forage is small, varying from much less than a square mile in gibbons to some fifteen square miles in baboons and gorillas. From a human point of view it is remarkable that animals with keen eyesight, who are capable of climbing into trees and surveying the scene and who are well adapted for locomotion on the ground, so restrict their normal activities. It is probable that hunting is the behavioral adaptation that caused the change in man’s relation to his physical environment. Intensive hunting would drive game from a small range, and the location of game and the pursuit of wounded animals would lead to the establishment of large territories. In most non-human primates ranges are not defended, and the areas occupied by groups of monkeys or apes usually overlap. Human defense of territory may also be the result of hunting.
Tool use is one of man’s most distinctive attributes, and the skillful use of objects is unique to man. Manipulative skills depend on the brain as well as on the hand, and the large area in the human brain devoted to the hand is probably the result of the new selection pressures that came into being with the beginnings of tool using. Both the evidence of the teeth and of the associated tools and animal bones suggest that Australopithecus was a tool user and had been so for a long time. If this interpretation is correct, then the increase in size of the human brain came long after the use of tools and probably in response to the new ways of life that tools made possible.
Intelligence and learning are not general but are related to specific abilities. For example, human children play with objects as well as with other children. They enjoy practicing using and throwing, and many games are built around objects. In marked contrast, monkeys and apes are tool-dumb, so to speak. Tasks that the human child easily masters are very difficult or impossible for non-human primates. Only the chimpanzee uses some minor tools (Goodall 1964). The same principle can be seen in language. In spite of major efforts, it has proved impossible to teach monkeys or apes to speak. This is because the nonhuman primates lack the neural mechanisms necessary for speech. The sounds of the nonhuman primates convey emotion (such as fear) and the location of the calling animal, and they are important especially when combined with gestures in social interaction. The sound systems of primates are not more complex than those of many other mammals; and, like other mammals, primates can be trained to respond to human sounds. The distinctive character of human speech is the naming of objects, and this requires the linking of visual and auditory parts of the cortex of the brain (Geschwind 1964). The necessary connections are not present in the brains of the nonhuman primates. Once naming of objects had commenced in even the most minor way, the success of this revolution changed selection pressures so that the course of evolution of the brain changed, and structures evolved that ultimately made possible language as we now know it. It is likely that the situation which led to object naming was tool use, and it is the uniqueness of this combination of tools and language to man that accounts for why the other primates did not develop even the simplest languages. If language began at the time the brain was doubling in size between Australopithecus and Homo, this would give a minimum of two million years of stone toolmaking by small-brained bipeds as a time in which the first naming of objects might have occurred. It is tempting to attribute this great increase in brain size to language and all the ways of life that language made possible. But it must be remembered that it is not just increase in size that separates the brain of modern man from that of the contemporary apes. There have been changes of organization in the brain too, and without these changes skills in tool use, language, and social planning would be impossible. Human intelligence is built on specific abilities which are the products of the evolutionary process.
But the world in which man evolved was a very different one from that in which we are living today. Our bodies had evolved to practically their present form some fifty thousand years ago, and since then human adaptations to the environment have been increasingly by technology and custom. This does not mean that evolution has stopped, but it does mean that the direct interrelation that selection had forged between man and his ways of life is no longer functional. As stone tools improved over vast intervals of time, the biology of the users had time to evolve along with their way of life. In the human head we see the product of the interrelations of biology and a succession of ways of life in which selection was for smaller faces and bigger brains. But since the agricultural and scientific revolutions customs have changed so rapidly that there has been no time for corresponding biological evolution to fit the human actors for the modern world. Human biology evolved to be adaptive in a world of small society, great hazards, and personal skill. The human actor in modern society is too aggressive, too dominance seeking, too acquisitive. The kind of planning necessary in the modern world is difficult for an organism built along the lines of Homo sapiens. Many acts which now would be judged undesirable (acts of selfishness, cruelty, and war) are easily learned because they are in accord with basic human biology (Hamburg 1963).
Natural selection can bring about adaptation between biology and a way of life only in very long periods of time, and there is no orthogenesis carrying trends of the past into the future. The fit between organism and society must now be determined by science, and for the first time in all of biological evolution both biology and social life can be planned. But planning can be more efficient if planners remember that the actors in modern technical society are products of the past, of times and ways of life long gone.
S. L. WASHBURN AND JANE B. LANCASTER
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BUETTNER-JANUSCH, JOHN (editor) 1963–1964 Evolutionary and Genetic Biology of Primates. 2 vols. New York: Academic Press.
DEVORE, IRVEN (editor) 1965 Primate Behavior: Field Studies of Monkeys and Apes. New York: Holt.
DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSIUS 1962 Mankind Evolving: The Evolution of the Human Species. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
GESCHWIND, NORMAN 1964 The Development of the Brain and the Evolution of Language. Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., Institute of Languages and Linguistics, Monograph Series on Languages and Linguistics 17:155–169.
GOODALL, JANE 1964 Tool-using and Aimed Throwing in a Community of Free-living Chimpanzees. Nature 201: 1264–1266.
GOODMAN, MORRIS 1963 Man’s Place in the Phylogeny of the Primates as Reflected in Serum Proteins. Pages 204–234 in Sherwood L. Washburn (editor), Classification and Human Evolution. Chicago: Aldine.
HAMBURG, D. A. 1963 Emotions in the Perspective of Human Evolution. Pages 300–317 in Symposium on Expression of the Emotions in Man, New York, 1960, Expression of the Emotions in Man. Edited by Peter H. Knapp. New York: International Universities Press.
Index medicus. ? Published since 1960. Articles are listed by subject matter and author.
MAYR, ERNST 1963 Animal Species and Evolution. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press.
NAPIER, J. R. 1964 The Evolution of Bipedal Walking in the Hominids. Archives de biologic (Liege) 75 (Supplement): 673–708.
OAKLEY, KENNETH P. 1964 Frameworks for Dating Fossil Man. Chicago: Aldine. ? A comprehensive discussion of methods of dating and the dates of fossil man.
PIVETEAU, JEAN (editor) 1957 Traite de paleontologie. Volume 7: Vers la forme humaine… . Paris: Masson. ? The best general source on fossil primates, including man.
SCHALLER, GEORGE B. 1963 The Mountain Gorilla: Ecology and Behavior. Univ. of Chicago Press.
SIMONS, ELWYN L. 1963 Some Fallacies in the Study of Hominid Phylogeny. Science 141:879–889.
SIMONS, ELWYN L.; and PILBEAM, D. R. 1965 Preliminary Revision of the Dryopithecinae (Pongidae, Anthropoidea). Folia primatologica 3:81–152. ? Classification of apes and the origin of man.
SIMPSON, GEORGE G. 1964 This View of Life: The World of an Evolutionist. New York: Harcourt.
TOBIAS, PHILIP V. 1965 Early Man in East Africa. Science 149:22–33. ? Most recent review of Australopithecus and the problems of the origin of man.
WASHBURN, SHERWOOD L. (editor) 1963 Classification and Human Evolution. Chicago: Aldine.
WILLIAMS, C. A. JR. 1964 Immunochemical Analysis of Serum Proteins of the Primates: A Study in Molecular Evolution. Volume 2, pages 25–74 in John Buettner-Janusch (editor), Evolutionary and Genetic Biology of Primates. New York: Academic Press.
Zoological Record. ? Published since 1865. Covers classification and fossils, topics not in the Index medicus.
ZOOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF LONDON 1963 The Primates. Proceedings of the Symposium held on April 12–14, 1962, Symposia 10. London: The Society.
IV CULTURAL EVOLUTION
The grand movement of origin, transformation, and differentiation of our universe, our earth, and life itself is called evolution. Within this total process we are concerned with the transformations that occurred when the biological, or organic, phase arose out of the inorganic and when the later, cultural phase arose from the organic. Despite their interconnections, however, each of these stages has its own characteristic mode and tempo of evolution.
The cultural phase transcended the organic and inorganic when populations of men created new ways of adapting to each other and to the environment. These adaptations occurred after certain gradual changes in the size and complexity of the hominid forebrain made symbolic thought and communication possible. The capacity for, and use of, symbolic manipulation brought forth unprecedented kinds of social behavior. These new ways of behaving were suprabiological in the sense that such natural primate characteristics as jealousy, fear, sex and food appetites, and so on, were so often channeled, sublimated, or otherwise altered by means of social rules. In a few striking respects, in fact, the new modes of social behavior were contrabiological inasmuch as they actually repressed such powerful urges as the sexual, for example, and required sharing rather than competing for scarce food.
The sum total of the social and political rules, technological inventions and economic institutions, the arts, shared beliefs and practices–that is, the culture–tends to persist through time because any particular society maintains these parts integrated with each other and with its environment. Evolutionary changes, therefore, do not correspond to a single world-wide pattern, and each society maintains a certain distinctiveness in the course of change. Thus the culture of mankind generally is an evolutionary stage in the universal process, while particular societies differentiate into cultural genera and species, creating heterogeneity. Sometimes this adaptive process brings forth striking advances that permit greater dominance, all-round adaptability, and growth.
All anthropologists would agree that the earliest human societies must have been small and simple in social organization, poor in technological equipment, without formal legal or governmental institutions, and with an ideology based more on the supernatural than on science. Since these characteristics contrast greatly with modern industrial states, we think of evolution as directional: generally from small to large societies, from simple to complex organizations, from informal to formal political institutions, and so on. The idea of directionality is important because it provides the criteria for classifying separate societies into general stages of the evolution of culture as a totality.
A second characteristic of evolution is the relatedness of the sequence of forms. An important aspect of the interpretation of any particular unit is the investigation of the ancestral forms from which it “unfolded”-its phylogeny.
Not many social scientists are evolutionists, and even the anthropologists who agree that there has been general evolutionary growth disagree about whether there has been enough orderliness in the process for the theory to be useful in classifying cultures or in interpreting a purely historical succession of discrete events. But then, of course, even if the orderliness is agreed upon, it is natural to want to know what causes it, and here further disagreement arises. Most of the different conceptions of the nature and causes of cultural evolution arose in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and a brief historical sketch is useful in describing them.
History of the concept
As primitive societies in various parts of the world became known to Europeans during the age of discovery, two different explanations of their primitiveness were offered. The most widespread belief was theological: they had “degenerated” further from an original state of grace than had civilized peoples. The other, the rationalist explanation that became usual among intellectuals in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was that civilization had evolved from earlier primitive types that must have been similar to the culture of contemporary savages and barbarians. There had been, to be sure, evolutionary notions held by philosophers of the classical traditions–by the Greek Epicurus and the Roman Lucretius, for example– but modern ideas about cultural evolution were propounded most influentially by Turgot, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Condorcet, Helvetius, Diderot, and others in France; Kant and Herder in Germany; Vico in Italy; and Hume, Hobbes, and Ferguson in Britain.
As opposed to degenerationism, all of these writers held to a theory of progress. Although modern anthropologists have commonly thought that this theory was merely a happy giddiness induced by the great economic and political advances of the period, most European scholars were actually pessimistic about progress in the future. While all agreed that progress had taken place in the past, and that discernible, orderly stages of its evolution could be demarcated, only Kant, Turgot, and Condorcet thought that progress was inevitable. There were variations in the names and numbers of stages that were proposed, but most accepted either Turgot’s stages of hunting, pastoralism, and farming, or Montesquieu’s similar typology of savagery, barbarism, and civilization.
Although the modern holistic concept of culture was lacking, the elements that were seen to be evolving were the human institutions of which culture is composed. There was one emphasis in the evolutionary theory that was peculiar to the times –rationalism. Human institutions were viewed as products of the human mind (as indeed in some sense they must be), a mind that was mistaken or irrational in the past, but increasingly less superstitious and more reasonable as time went on. Since civilized man had literally thought himself out of a “state of nature,” the degree of orderliness that lay in human history was due to the progressive improvement of mentality.
In the nineteenth century, evolutionary thought became less philosophical and more influenced by empirical aspirations. Tylor in England and Morgan in the United States were prominent in the creation of ethnological evolutionism; Spencer in England, Saint-Simon, Comte, and Durkheim in France were pioneers in sociology; the reworking of Hegel by Marx and Engels was a creative contribution to political-revolutionary theory. They differed from their predecessors and from one another mainly with respect to the following problems: (1) What is it that evolves–culture in general or only the institutions of specific societies? (2) How does it evolve–by orthogenetic, inevitable progress, by rational thought and intention, survival of the fittest, or an unconscious dialectical struggle? (3) Where is the locus of the evolutionary impulse– in the improvements of technology and the material aspect alone, in the division of labor, the political or ideological aspect, or as a force in the cosmos?
The nature of culture. The ethnologists of the late 1800s, convinced of orderliness in evolution, directed themselves to the delineation of stages of culture, which E. B. Tylor defined in the anthropological sense in 1871. L. H. Morgan (1877) did not use that word, but in his usage, “society” and “ethnical periods” (for stages) referred essentially to the subject matter of Tylor’s concept. Tylor and Morgan, and most ethnologists of their time as well, were concerned with the world-wide manifestation of cultural stages, not with the culture of a particular society. A specific primitive tribe was of interest only as an illustration of aspects of the culture of an entire stage and of a large geographical area.
This concern with culture in its most general sense rather than with particular societies caused a misunderstanding of the ethnological evolutionists by later commentators. Modern anthropologists frequently criticize the nineteenth-century evolutionists as “unilinear,” meaning that the latter believed that all societies inevitably progress through the same stages. This would be a powerful blow at nineteenth-century evolutionary theory, if it were true, but it seems doubtful that any of the evolutionists believed such manifest nonsense. In the statement that seems best to serve modern critics, Morgan said:
Since mankind were one in origin, their career has been essentially one, running in different but uniform channels upon all continents, and very similarly in all the tribes and nations of mankind down to the same status of advancement. It follows that the history and experience of the American Indian tribes represent, more or less nearly, the history and experience of our own remote ancestors when in corresponding conditions. ([1877] 1964, pp. 6–7)
This sounds “unilinear” to a modern ethnologist, whose concern has been restricted to the structure and functioning of unit systems, but inasmuch as ethnologists were not making such studies in the nineteenth century, it seems apparent that Morgan must have meant nothing more than that wherever barbarism (defined by the traits of horticulture or pastoralism) was found, a general stage of hunting-gathering society (savagery) had preceded it and that stages of both had preceded civilization on continents that had achieved civilization. Such a judgment is attested by archeology now as well as by common sense and should evoke no comment, but in Morgan’s day it was worth stating because theories of degeneration and catastrophe were still commonly opposed to evolutionism.
The sociologists tended toward the organismic model for society. A society was thought of as a contained unit made up of interdependent parts, each subserving the others. Evolution was seen as the development of more parts and greater differentiation of them. The “parts” are individuals, groups, and specialized persons and groups. Religions, morals, and political, social, and economic institutions function largely to bolster, integrate, and smooth the relations between the social parts. This early model, refined as nonevolutionary structural functionalism, became characteristic of modern American sociology and British social anthropology but had its roots in the eighteenth-century concern with progress.
The third group, the Marxists, was closer to ethnology than to sociology, at least in its beginning phases under Marx and Engels. In fact, Engels’ Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884) was inspired by Morgan’s Ancient Society (1877) and borrowed heavily from it. The theory of general developmental stages was the same, and the conception of the evolving unit did not have the organismic particularism of the sociologists. As in Morgan’s case, the concept of culture was absent but would have been appropriate, for institutions (especially technological and economic) were not merely subserviently integrative in function but had more of an initiating “prime mover” status than the sociologists believed.
How does culture evolve? The eighteenth-century evolutionists thought of the progressive improvement of the human condition as a mentalistic evolution and thus took an idealist view of the evolutionary process. Some of the language of nineteenth-century ethnological evolutionism reflects this, so that we find such expressions as Morgan’s “growth of the idea of government” and Tylor’s frequent use of “mind” and “mental life” as near synonyms of many aspects of culture. But a very important change occurred in the nineteenth-century view of evolution. As it became more scientifically oriented it posited causal and functional connections between different aspects of culture. Tylor, in his greatest book, Primitive Culture (1871), devoted much of the introductory chapter (“The Science of Culture”) to describing not only cause-effect relations in culture but also the determining of these cultural relations and the thought and will of the individual. The ethnological school of evolution thus made significant moves toward determinism and against assumptions of free will in human affairs.
The “how,” the mechanics of the evolutionary process, was not explicitly described, beyond the suggestion that it was unconscious. We are told that new elements tend to replace older ones if they are better, sometimes, but beyond that one has the impression that evolution was taken as a “given,” that orthogenetic forces had moved mankind ever upward, however fitfully.
There is a recurrent note reminiscent of the eighteenth-century rationalist ancestry: “Now that we understand evolution we can more consciously control it.” Tylor called anthropology a “reformer’s science,” and Morgan said, “The time will come … when human intelligence will rise to the mastery over property… .” This was the deterministic paradox: We can scientifically analyze the evolution of culture because it is orderly (because it is determined); knowing this we can somehow influence the future as we pass, as Tylor put it, “from the age of unconscious to that of conscious progress.”
The sociological wing of nineteenth-century evolutionism pursued the implications of the biological analogy. The rationalist optimism of Condorcet was outdated by the obvious attendant evils of industrialization, especially in England, as illustrated by Malthus’ pessimistic Essay on the Principle of Population. After the great intellectual success of Darwin’s theory of selection by survival (itself suggested by Malthus’ essay), a theory of “social Darwinism” arose, which, whatever its demerits, at least provided a “how” for the evolutionary process: as a result of conflict between societies superior ones replace the inferior. Some added an “internal conflict” aspect: out of the struggle between classes, groups, and even individuals within the society comes the improvement of the society. Walter Bagehot, Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and Ludwig Gumplowicz were the leaders in this mode of thought.
Marx and Engels were even more consistently deterministic and materialistic than the ethnologists and had a much more definite theory of the mechanics of evolution. This theory was orthogenetic in that the impetus for change came from within the society, from the “dialectic” of the class struggle, the resolution of contradictions in terms of either failure or a higher unity. It should be noted that this internal-conflict theory is not like social Darwinism: the ruling or propertied class is not superior. Marx and Engels, like the ethnologists, were insistent on the lawful, determined nature of evolution, and they also believed that evolution could be oriented by the conscious action of man once he understood its processes. Then, by abolishing the capitalist form of production, “Man, at last the master of his own form of social organization, becomes at the same time the lord over nature, his own master–free” (Engels [1882] 1935, p. 75).
Most of the sociologists became less interested in evolution itself than in the more immediate problems of the organismic nature of a society, particularly that of integration. What holds a society together? Following the social contract theories of the eighteenth century, there were psychological theories, mental interaction theories, and imitation theories, all of which took society to be an organismic entity somehow mentally constituted. This was the time when sociology became nonevolutionary, as it mostly remains to this day.
The locus of the evolutionary impulse. Morgan thought that cultural evolution consisted of two distinct aspects-“inventions and discoveries” (the technical order), which evolve in connected, progressive, cumulative relations to one another, and “institutions” (the forms of the family, of government, religion, architecture, property), which stand in “unfolding relations.” By this expression he meant that social institutions originate in a few “primary germs of thought” and thereafter independently change form as well as replace previous forms. Tylor also, although not so explicitly, thought that technology, science, and other aspects of material culture undergo evolution rather independent of religion and “intellectual and moral” progress. Nowhere is it demonstrated, however, that one of these aspects is the “prime mover” and the other a dependent variable or superstructure. But again it should be remembered that Morgan and Tylor were not talking about the process of systemic change in any particular society, hence the matter of functional priority of one part over another simply did not concern them.
The sociologists, preoccupied with social integration, psychology, and mentalism, did not see the initiating locus of evolutionary change in any aspect of culture at all. Spencer and his followers saw evolution as a grand cosmic force that generated complexity out of simplicity and heterogeneity out of homogeneity, aided somewhat by Darwinian “conflict and survival.” A few Frenchmen, most notably Emile Durkheim (1893), posited that the division of labor in society, like the functional specialization of organs in biological entities (again, the organismic model), is related to population increases, greater social density, and larger, stronger societies. But it is not clear what the causes of these developments are, and Durkheim explicitly denied that the division of labor is increased for utilitarian reasons like “the greatest happiness for the greatest number” or by any other kind of intention or plan.
The Marxians, on the other hand, were firm in the conviction that the locus of evolutionary change lies in the technoeconomic (or material) sector, which then affects the nature of the social classes and their interrelations, and that ideology is mere superstructure. As such, it is the last part of culture to change. This form of the old materialist versus idealist philosophical argument persists strongly to this day.
Twentieth-century evolutionism
Most American ethnologists in the first half of the twentieth century repudiated an evolutionism that they misunderstood in favor of a raw ethnographic, “natural history” approach to the study of primitive culture. In Britain and France, and in sociology nearly everywhere, evolutionism succumbed intellectually to a structural functionalism that had greater utility for the practical solution of social problems through political administration in the colonies and at home.
A. G. Keller, an American sociologist, Leslie A. White and Julian H. Steward, American ethnologists, and V. Gordon Childe, a British archeologist, were virtually alone in opposing the antievolutionary temper of the times. It was not until after mid-century that there was any larger shift of opinion toward an evolutionary outlook again, but this took place only in America, only in anthropology, and there only in part.
Twentieth-century evolutionism differs from previous theories in two major respects. The first concerns the cultural adaptations through which evolutionary changes are believed to occur. The concept of cultural adaptation has supplanted the orthogenesis of earlier evolutionists, who had found the only generative impulse in the internal class-struggle dialectic proposed by Marx and Engels and in the social Darwinism of some sociologists. Second, a new theoretical synthesis has been made by the reworking and integration of some of the earlier perspectives that had been thought to be contradictory.
The significance of the adaptation of culture to the natural environment as an important aspect of the evolutionary process was presented as “cultural ecology” by Julian H. Steward. Others have proposed further that in the process of adaptation, the environment includes not only the natural environment but adjustments to other social systems as well. According to this view, inventions and discoveries, borrowings, unconscious historical “accidents,” changes from whatever source, are the raw materials for evolutionary change in culture. Some of these “fit” as improvements in the internal functional arrangements, while others solve external environmental problems with respect to nature or competition: thus they are selected simply because they are superior instruments. The advance of this perspective over eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century ideas of the “inevitability of progress” and orthogenesis is manifest: the evolutionary perspective is not mystical and can accommodate and make more intelligible the variety of historical data we now possess.
One of the historical facts of life that has plagued all orthogenetic schemes is that different societies manifest great variation in rates of evolution, from drastic revolution to the other extreme of non-evolution–i.e., stabilization. And in so many instances a society makes a very rapid rise only to reach a long-term plateau. The theory that evolution proceeds by adaptation, however, allows for all of these eventualities, taking stabilization as much for granted as progress. Stabilization, after all, merely bespeaks the success of the adaptive process: when the culture is successfully adapted, it tends to reject subsequent possible changes. This can render explicable what might seem paradoxical: that a culture “high” in one stage might fail to advance to further heights in the next simply because of its earlier success. And, of course, the more specialized its form of adaptation, the more deeply entrenched and committed to its present environment it becomes.
The perspective of cultural adaptation and selection is particularly useful in reconciling opposing viewpoints derived from the nineteenth century.
What is it that evolves? Is it culture in general, through grand stages, or only particular social systems? The reconciliation of these two views is easy: both are correct. The evolution of the totality is the product of the evolution of particular societies. To be sure, there is but a single evolutionary process, the selection of traits and their functional adjustment via adaptation in particular systems. This is the way societies become differentiated one from the other, but it is also the way some become superior to others in measurable ways. Thus, two different theoretical perspectives are possible with respect to the same data. These are what Sahlins (Sahlins & Service 1960) calls the specific evolutionary perspective as compared with the general evolutionary perspective. The former refers merely to the creation of diversity by adaptive modification of related particular societies. The latter is the measurement of progress; some specific evolutionary changes are significant breakthroughs that can be measured by such objective directional criteria of progress as greater all-round adaptability, greater dominance, or greater complexity of organization. In short, specific evolution refers to our concern with descent-with-modification or adaptive variation; general evolution refers to the progressive emergence of superior forms, stage by stage, which can be related to the directional evolution of the total culture of the human species.
How does culture evolve? Is it in some measure intentionally planned, or is it an unconscious and nonrational process, determined by events outside human awareness? Surely an improvement in ideas has something to do with it, and sometimes ideas must be conscious and rational; this is most obvious in science and engineering but also holds true in the institutional realm. Many political institutions, for example, result from attempts to solve social or economic problems purposefully. But, of course, there are often latent and unintended consequences of even the most manifest political expediency.
Again, it would seem that a reconciliation of the opposed views can be made by means of the adaptation-selection perspective. New culture traits or modifications can have any number of sources: inventions, purposeful borrowings, accidents, unconscious functional shifts, and so on. The selection or rejection of any of these could also involve conscious intentionality, even if but rarely. The selective process in cultural evolution is only roughly analogous to natural selection in biology; certainly the capacity of a person to analyze his own behavior, predict future events, and rearrange his affairs on that basis is a distinctively human trait. It is more difficult to plan and arrange things on a social or political basis, and the greater the demographic scope the more difficult it is; but it does happen. The adaptation-selection perspective has the great virtue of not prescribing either conscious intention or unconsciousness; it can accommodate either and still lead to greater comprehension of cultural change. And further, determinism in human affairs is not equated with unawareness, indeterminism with awareness. Determinism is a perspective that the analyst takes, not a property of the subject matter under investigation.
Where is the locus of the evolutionary impulse? Does it lie in the mode of production, in technology, in the relations of production, in the class struggle, in the division of labor, in man’s view of destiny; or is it a mystical force in the cosmos? It would seem that those who posited mode of production, class struggle, technology, or division of labor were much influenced by the industrial revolution, which has been, of course, a most striking evolutionary prime mover for the past century and a half and promises even more wondrous cultural transformations almost immediately. But has the material, technoeconomic aspect always been the prime mover? The change from primitive chiefdoms to early states and then to empires in Mesoamerica, Peru, and probably elsewhere seems to have been first in the political sector; even the important inventions of writing and mathematics could have originated in the occult mumbo jumbo of priests. The modern evolutionist accordingly wants to know more about particular instances of change and finds no need to insist that the initial loci must be always in the same sector of culture.
Evolutionists of the nineteenth century were more empirical than their predecessors, but their use of ethnographic data was often mere illustration rather than proof of hypotheses. The “comparative method” of some, such as Sir James Frazer, was simply an uncritical, but energetic, “clip and paste.” E. B. Tylor (1888) was a notable exception: he originated a method of statistical correlations in his comparative study of marriage and descent rules. Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg’s work (1915) was another important application of statistics to problems of cultural evolution. Otherwise, both evolutionary theory and the comparative method nearly perished from inattention until mid-twentieth century.
The use of the comparative method began to revive in America during the 1950s, particularly stimulated by George P. Murdock’s creation of the Human Relations Area Files and later the “Ethnographic Atlas.” Formal graphical means of showing correlations and sequences of culture traits in the course of evolutionary changes have attracted attention recently. (See Naroll 1956; Freeman & Winch 1957; Gouldner & Peterson 1962; and Carneiro & Tobias 1963.) The results of these efforts are meager so far, and several unsolved difficulties attend them. The problems of how to define the significant cultural units to be counted and how to select a random sample of them in the absence of an adequate number of ethnographies of unacculturated societies are serious.
The gravest difficulty of all is caused by the tendency of a culture to become specialized as it adapts to its environment, for to the extent that it is special it is incommensurable. Walter Goldschmidt has aptly called this “the Malinowskian dilemma”: Malinowski argued (and successfully demonstrated) that every cultural institution must be understood as a unique product of the cultural whole within which it developed. It would seem to follow, therefore, that the comparative method is wrong, comparing incomparables. Yet, paradoxically, Malinowski often extrapolated from his insights into Trobriand culture to the primitive world in general. Goldschmidt argues that the solution is to compare functions, not institutions: “What is consistent from culture to culture is not the institution; what is consistent are the social problems. What is recurrent from society to society is solutions to these problems” (1966, p. 31).
Julian H. Steward’s studies (1955) of “multilinear evolution” show an awareness of these difficulties. He recommends comparative studies of specific holocultures in evolution, rather than comparisons of isolated traits, in order to find the “regularities” of evolution.
There is a different test of theory that is bound to be used more frequently–the test of fruitfulness. Since one of the main purposes of evolutionary theory is to provide intelligibility to historical data, then the better it fulfills this function, the greater must be its empirical as well as logico-didactic virtues. Guy Swanson’s study of religion (1960) is a good example: light is cast on the development of religion, and at the same time evolutionary theory proves to be useful.
Such empirical applications of evolutionary theory can result in its refinement only to the extent that evolutionists maintain an empirical orientation, willing to change the theory in the service of its intellectual functions. Some of the older evolutionary philosophies, particularly those of Marx and Spencer, were too grand in scope and too schematic to be useful. They also became stultified dogmas as they were used by political parties and academic “schools of thought.” A better fate may be expected of recent evolutionism, judging from the evidence of new empirical attitudes, particularly if its proponents remain guarded against unnecessary and untested preconceptions that can so easily impede a true evolutionary science of culture.
ELMAN R. SERVICE
[See alsoANTHROPOLOGY, articles on THE FIELD and THE COMPARATIVE METHOD IN ANTHROPOLOGY; ARCHEOLOGY, article onTHE FIELD; CULTURE; ECOLOGY. Also related are the entriesINTEGRATION; SOCIAL DARWINISM; SOCIOLOGY, article onTHE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT; and the biographies ofCHILDE; MORGAN, LEWIS HENRY; SPENCER; TYLOR.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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CHILDE, V. GORDON (1936) 1965 Man Makes Himself. 4th ed. London: Watts.
CHILDE, V. GORDON 1951 Social Evolution. New York: Schumann.
COTTRELL, WILLIAM F. 1955 Energy and Society: The Relation Between Energy, Social Change, and Economic Development. New York: McGraw-Hill.
DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSIUS 1962 Mankind Evolving: The Evolution of the Human Species. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
DURKHEIM, ÉMILE (1893) 1960 The Division of Labor in Society. 2d ed. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. ? First published in French.
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GOLDSCHMIDT, WALTER R. 1966 Comparative Function-alism: An Essay in Anthropological Theory. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press.
GOULDNER, ALVIN W. and PETERSON, R. A. 1962 Notes on Technology and the Moral Order. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-MerriU.
HOBHOUSE, LEONARD T.; WHEELER, GERALD C.; and GINSBERG, MORRIS (1915) 1965 The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples: An Essay in Correlation. London School of Economics and Political Science Monographs on Sociology, No. 3. London: Routledge.
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MONTAGU, ASHLEY 1962 Culture and the Evolution of Man. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
MORGAN, LEWIS H. (1877) 1964 Ancient Society. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press.
MUNRO, THOMAS 1963 Evolution in the Arts and Other Theories of Culture History. Cleveland (Ohio) Museum of Art.
NAROLL, RAOUL S. 1956 A Preliminary Index of Social Development. American Anthropologist New Series 58:687–715.
SAHLINS, MARSHALL D.; and SERVICE, ELMAN R. (editors) 1960 Evolution and Culture. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press.
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TYLOR, EDWARD B. (1888) 1961 On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions: Applied to Laws of Marriage and Descent. Pages 1–28 in Frank W. Moore (editor), Readings in Cross-cultural Methodology. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press.
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V SOCIAL EVOLUTION
Evolutionary theory dominated sociological thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but since about 1920 interest in it has, on the whole, given way to preoccupation with systematic analysis of social systems, analysis of broad social and demographic trends, and investigation of the social determinants of behavior (Ginsberg 1932). The recent tentative revival of interest in an evolutionary perspective is closely related to growing interest in historical and comparative studies. It does not, however, denote a mere return to the assumptions of the classical evolutionists, but rather it implies revision and reappraisal of evolutionary theory in the light of recent advances in sociological theory and research.
From the point of view of sociological analysis, the older evolutionary models broke down mainly over two stumbling blocks. The first was the assumption that the development of human societies is relatively cumulative and unilinear and that the major “stages” of development are universal–even if there are many differences in detail and even if not all societies reach every stage of evolution. The second stumbling block was the failure to specify fully the systemic characteristics of evolving societies or institutions or the mechanisms and processes of change through which the transitions from one “stage” to another were effected. Most of the classical evolutionary schools tended, rather, to point out general causes of change (economic, technological, spiritual) or some general trends (for example, the trend to complexity) inherent in the development of societies. Very often they confused such general tendencies with the causes of change or assumed that these general tendencies explained concrete instances of change (Bock 1963).
Attempts to reappraise evolutionary perspectives, therefore, must address themselves to several basic problems inherent in the new analytical developments in sociological theory, on the one hand, and in the general setting of the evolutionary problem, on the other (Wolf 1964; Parsons 1964; Eisenstadt 1963a). The first crucial problem concerns the extent to which change from one type of society to another is not accidental or random but, rather, evinces over-all evolutionary or developmental trends. Second is the question of the extent to which such changes are cumulative within any given society and within any given institutional sphere in different societies (Wolf 1964). Third is the problem of the extent to which such changes do indeed enhance the adaptive potential of a society in relation to its cultural and natural environment–however such adaptation and environment are defined (White 1959; Sahlins & Service 1960).
Furthermore, even if some such common characteristics or trends can be found within different and disparate societies, the question remains as to the validity of talking about the evolution of human society or culture as a whole. Here three sub-problems exist: the first is the extent to which other societies constitute the “environment” of any society–that is, the environment to which any given single society has to adapt and which can enhance the general reservoir of its techniques of adaptation. The second is a question of the extent to which institutions and forms of organization that have adaptive value can be borrowed and transplanted from one society to another, thus enhancing their adaptive potential. And, finally, we must ask to what extent human society is a “system of points” with some common adaptive and integrative mechanisms. As distinct from the general theory of cultural evolution, which in a way assumes the unity of mankind and hence also the internal transferability of institutions or techniques, the focus of sociological analysis is on the relations between the systemic characteristics of societies in interaction with their natural, social, and cultural environments, on the one hand, and some possible broader trends of changes and transformations in their “transbiological” or superorganic abilities and traditions, on the other (Mead 1964).
The starting point of all these discussions, especially from the point of view of the relation between the transformative capacities of any single society and any possible general trends in the development of human societies and human society in general, is the problem of the extent to which such changes may be envisaged as crystallizing into developmental “stages”-a key concept in classical evolutionary thought (Ginsberg 1932). In the older evolutionary school such stages were construed mostly in terms of “specialization” and “complexity,” whereas in recent works these concepts have been to a large extent replaced by that of “differentiation.”
Differentiation and institutional growth
Differentiation, like complexity or specialization, is first of all a classificatory concept. It describes the ways through which the main social functions or the major institutional spheres of society become dissociated from one another, attached to specialized collectivities and roles, and organized into relatively specific and autonomous symbolic and organizational frameworks within the confines of the same institutional system. In broad evolutionary terms, such continuous differentiation has usually been conceived as a continuous development starting from the “ideal” type of the primitive society or band, in which all the major roles are allocated on an ascriptive basis and the division of labor is based primarily on family and kinship units. Development then proceeds through various stages of specialization and differentiation.
Specialization is first manifest when each of the major institutional spheres, through the activities of people placed in strategic roles within it, develops its own organizational units and complexes and its specific criteria of action. The latter tend to be congruent with the basic orientations of a given sphere, facilitating the development of its potentialities: technological innovation, cultural and religious creativity, expansion of political power or participation, or development of complex personality structure.
Second, different levels or stages of differentiation denote the degree to which major social and cultural activities as well as certain basic resources –such as manpower and economic resources– have been disembedded or freed from kinship, territorial, and other ascriptive units (Parsons 1964; Bellah 1964; Eisenstadt 1963a). Although these “free-floating” resources pose new problems of integration, they may also become the basis for a more differentiated social order that is, at least potentially, better adapted to deal with a more variegated environment. Thus, a new set of problems–those of integration–emerges as the very crux of the way in which such resources can be utilized for the crystallization of some general transformative potentials within a society.
Problems of integration. As the more differentiated and specialized institutional spheres become more interdependent and potentially complementary in their functioning within the same over-all institutionalized system, this very complementarity creates more difficult and complex problems of integration. The growing autonomy of each sphere of social activity, and the concomitant growth of interdependence and mutual interpenetration among them, pose for each sphere ever more difficult problems in crystallizing its own tendencies and potentialities and in regulating its normative and organizational relations with other spheres. And at each more “advanced” level or stage of differentiation, the increased autonomy of each sphere creates increasingly more complex problems of integrating these specialized activities into one systemic framework.
The growing autonomy of the different institutional spheres and the extension of their organizational scope not only increase the range and depth of social and human problems but also open up new possibilities for technological development, expansion of political power or rights, and cultural creativity. Growing differentiation also enhances systemic sensitivity to a much wider physical-technical environment and to more comprehensive intersocietal relations. But the growth of systemic sensitivity to new problems and exigencies does not necessarily imply a concomitant development of the ability to deal with these problems, nor does it indicate the ways in which these problems may be solved. At any given level of differentiation an institutional sphere may or may not achieve an adequate degree of integration, and the potentialities unfolded through the process of differentiation may be “wasted”-that is, they may fail to become crystallized into an institutional structure.
Recognition of the integrative problems that are attendant on new levels of differentiation constitutes the main theoretical implication of the concept of differentiation, and it is in the light of the analytical problems raised by this implication that the various questions pertinent to a reappraisal of the evolutionary perspective in social science have to be examined. We are as yet far from any definitive answers to these questions, but at least we can point out some of the most important problems of research in this direction.
Responses to differentiation
The passage of a given society from one stage of differentiation to another is contingent on the development within it of certain processes of change which create a degree of differentiation that cannot be contained within the pre-existing system. Growing differentiation and the consequent structural breakthroughs may take place through a secular trend of differentiation, or through the impact of one or a series of abrupt changes, or both. These tendencies may be activated by the occupants of strategic roles within the major institutional spheres as they attempt to broaden the scope and develop the potentialities of their spheres. The extent to which these changes are institutionalized and the concrete form they take in any given society necessarily depend on the basic institutional contours and premises of the pre-existing system, on its initial level of differentiation, and on the major conflicts and propensities for change within it (Eisenstadt 1964b).
We need not assume that all changes in all societies necessarily increase differentiation. On the contrary, the available evidence shows that many social changes do not give rise to over-all changes in the scope of differentiation but result, instead, mainly in changes in the relative strength and composition of different collectivities or in the integrative criteria of a particular institutional sphere. Largely because the problem has not yet been fully studied, we do not know exactly what conditions facilitate or precipitate these different types of change in different societies and what makes for variations in innovative or transformative capacities among different societies (Eggan 1963; Sahlins 1964).
Even when social change increases differentiation, the successful, orderly institutionalization of a new, more differentiated social system is not always a necessary outcome. Moreover, at any level of development, response to the problems created by the process of differentiation may take one of several different forms (Weber 1922a; Eisenstadt 1963a). The most extreme outcome is failure to develop any adequate institutional solution to the new problems arising from growing differentiation. Aside from biological extinction, the consequences may be total or partial disintegration of the system, a semiparasitic existence at the margin of another society, or total submersion within another society.
A less extreme type of response tends to lead to “regression,” that is, to the institutionalization of less differentiated systems within the more differentiated system that has broken down. Examples include the establishment of small patrimonial or semifeudal chiefdoms on the ruins of the Achaemenid Empire, the development of dispersed tribal-feudal systems at the downfall of the Roman Empire, and similar developments on the ruins of Greek city-states. Many such regressive developments are only partial, in the sense that within some parts of the new institutional structure some nuclei of more differentiated and creative orientations may survive or even develop. Sometimes, but certainly not always, these nuclei “store” entrepreneurial ability for possible–but not inevitable–future developments.
Another possibility, which perhaps overlaps with the last one but is not always identical with it, is the development of a social system in which the processes of differentiation and change go on relatively continuously in one part or sphere of a society without becoming fully integrated into a stable, wider framework. In such situations a continuous process of unbalanced change may develop, resulting either in a breakdown of the existing institutional framework or in stabilization at a relatively low level of integration. Perhaps the best examples of such developments can be found in various “dual conquest” societies (for example, conquest of the sedentary population by nomads in the Mongol Empire) and especially in the pre-independence stages of modern colonial societies.
A fourth, and perhaps the most variegated, type of response to growing differentiation consists of some structural solution that is on the whole congruent with the relevant problems. Within this broad type a wide variety of concrete institutional arrangements is possible. Such different solutions usually have different structural results and repercussions. Each denotes a different structure crystallized according to different integrative criteria and is interpenetrated in a different way by the other major social spheres.
Thus, drawing on examples from the great centralized empires of history, we see that although the initial stages of socioeconomic differentiation were relatively similar in Byzantium, in the later (Abbasside) caliphate, and in post-Han China, each of these societies developed different over-all institutional structures (Eisenstadt 1963a). The Byzantine Empire became a highly militarized and politically oriented system, whereas the caliphate developed a theocratic structure, which was based on continuous attempts to institutionalize a new type of universalistic politicoreligious community. China developed a centralized system based on the power of the emperor and the bureaucracy and, at the local level, on the relative predominance of the gentry; the selective channels of the examination system and the elite formed by the literati were the major mechanisms for integrating the local and central levels.
One very interesting structural solution is the development of a relatively stable system in which the major institutional spheres vary in degree of differentiation. One of the most important examples of such variation occurs in feudal systems, which are characterized by a relatively high degree of differentiation in some of the central cultural roles as against a much smaller degree of differentiation in the economic and political roles.
In cases of such uneven differentiation the more differentiated units of such related societies (for example, the church in feudal or patrimonial systems) often tend to develop a sort of international system of their own, apart from that of their “parent” societies.
The variety of integrative criteria and institutional contours at any level of differentiation is, of course, not limitless. The very notion of interdependence among major institutional spheres negates the assumption that any number of levels of differentiation in different institutional spheres can coalesce into a relatively stable institutional system. The level of differentiation in any one sphere necessarily constitutes, within broad limits, a precondition for the effective institutionalization of certain levels of differentiation in other social spheres. But within these broad limits of mutual preconditioning a great deal of structural variety is possible.
The intersocietal environment. The processes of change and of differentiation, on the one hand, and the development of different integrative responses to them, on the other, do not take place within single, closed societies. They are closely related to the international system that constitutes the broader environment of any society. Each society is related to many others geopolitically, ecologically, and socioculturally. These relations constitute the environment to which each society has to adapt and which may also influence its ability to evolve institutional responses to the processes of change.
Such international geopolitical factors, in the broadest sense, not only provide the general setting for any given society but also give rise to many of the concrete pressures upon it, such as external pressures of population, problems of military security, or adjustment to international trade. Such an intersocietal environment need not always consist of societies of the same type or level of differentiation; it may, indeed, contain many different types of societies. In general, it can be assumed that the more differentiated a society is, the greater is its systemic sensitivity–although not necessarily its ability to cope with these problems–to a wider and more variegated international setting.
Thus, at any given level of differentiation, the crystallization of different institutional orders is shaped by the interaction between the broader structural features of the major institutional spheres, on the one hand, and, on the other, the development of elites or entrepreneurs in some of the institutional spheres of that society, in some of its enclaves, or even in other societies with which it is in some way connected.
The variability in the concrete components of such interaction helps to explain the great (but not limitless) variety of structural and integrative forms that may be institutionalized at any given level of differentiation. Although different societies may arrive at broadly similar stages of evolution in terms of the differentiation of their major institutional and symbolic spheres, yet the concrete institutional contours developed at each such step, as well as the possible outcomes of such institutionalization in terms of further development, breakdown, regression, or stagnation, may differ greatly among them.
Reappraising evolutionary theory
The preceding analysis of processes of change and differentiation and of concomitant institutionalization of new structures indicates some of the problems that are posed by any attempt to reappraise the evolutionary perspective in sociological theory.
First is the exploration of the different mechanisms of social change and the distinction between those conditions and processes of change that create potentialities for transformation and those that do not. It is obvious, as indicated above, that not all processes of social change necessarily give rise to changes in over-all institutional systems. Although the potentialities for such systemic changes (as distinct from changes in patterns of behavior, in the composition of subgroups, or in the contents of the major integrative criteria of different spheres) exist in all societies, the very actualization of these potentialities, as well as the tempo and direction of such changes, varies greatly among different societies (Eggan 1963; Eisenstadt 1963a).
Second, and closely connected with the first, is the problem of how cumulative the development is of different types of institutional organization. Here it seems that in some institutions there may indeed be a “scale” or “semiscale” order of development, although the application of scale analysis to this type of phenomenon has so far failed to detect any perfect regularities (Carneiro 1962; Good-enough 1963). Such scale order is probably to be found least in the sphere of kinship or family institutions, whereas it is more pronounced in those institutional spheres, such as economics, politics, and law, that are most closely connected with technology or with organizational problems (Wolf 1964; Schwartz & Miller 1964).
However, even the existence of such scale order does not necessarily imply that developments in any institutional sphere are necessarily cumulative in the sense that they can be transferred easily from one society to another at a similar general level of differentiation; neither does it imply that their development within any single society or their transfer from one to another must necessarily proceed in a certain order or that “jumps” are not possible. Studies of the modernization of traditional societies are especially relevant from the point of view of the possibilities of such jumps, although similar cases can probably be found in other types of societies also (Eisenstadt 1963b). At most, studies of such scale order indicate that a certain trait or organizational type may be a necessary, but certainly not a sufficient, condition for the emergence of another; even here, the findings of “quasi scales” indicate the possibility of many functional equivalents of any such trait in a sequential series–especially in cases of rapid social change (Schwartz & Miller 1964).
Third is the question of the extent to which the problems arising from growing differentiation and the institutional solutions to these problems are indeed the same in different societies, thus creating some common trend of development. This problem is very close to that of the relation, to use Sahlins’ and Service’s nomenclature (1960), between “specific” and “general” evolution or that of the feasibility of the assumption, as put by Eggan (1963, p. 355), “that these particular developments necessarily add up to ‘the succession of culture through stages of overall progress,’ which is general evolution.” But there appears to be no reason why all societies should reach certain stages of differentiation or why they should necessarily develop the same types of institutional contours once they attain such stages. The most that can be claimed at present is that the processes of differentiation in different societies exhibit similar formal and structural characteristics and that these create somewhat similar integrative problems.
It is in these common characteristics and problems that the fact of the common humanity of all human societies, as well as the possibilities of some common understanding and of intersocietal borrowing and transfer of institutions, is rooted; moreover, these characteristics indicate the existence of some “evolutionary universals” in the development of different human societies (Parsons 1964). However, the variety of possible “functional equivalents” of institutionalized solutions to such problems, as well as the possibilities of “regression,” stress the fact that the paths of development of different societies are neither necessarily common nor given. In other words, there is no reason to assume that there is a necessary relation and congruity between the mechanisms of genetic (here cultural or social) “transmission and change and the route of development of this or that organism or species” (Gellner 1965, p. 17).
This discussion is closely related to the fourth, very crucial problem involved in the reappraisal of evolutionary perspectives: the explanation of the variability of institutionalized solutions to the problems arising from the development of a given level of structural differentiation. Here it should be recognized that the conditions giving rise to structural differentiation and to “structural sensitivity” to a greater range of problems do not necessarily create the capacity to solve these problems.
Creative entrepreneurial elites. The crucial factor is the presence or absence, in one or several institutional spheres, of an active group of special “entrepreneurs”-that is, an elite that is able to offer solutions to the new range of problems. Among modern sociologists Weber came closest to recognizing this factor when he stressed that the creation of new institutional structures depends heavily on the “push” given by various “charismatic” groups or personalities and that the routinization of charisma is critical for the crystallization and continuation of new institutional structures (Weber [1922b] 1963, chapters 4, 10, and 11). The development of such “charismatic” personalities or groups constitutes perhaps the closest social analogy to genetic mutation. It is the possibility of such mutation that explains why, at any level of differentiation, a given social sphere contains not one but several, often competing, possible orientations and potentialities for development.
As yet, we know little about the specific conditions (as distinct from the more general trend toward structural differentiation) that facilitate the rise of new elites–that is, the conditions which influence the nature of their basic orientations as well as their relations with broader groups, strata, and trends of development, and their ability to forge out and maintain a viable institutional order. There are indications, however, that factors beyond the general trend toward differentiation are important. For example, various special enclaves, such as sects, monasteries, and sectarian intellectual groups or scientific communities, play an important role in the formation of such elites. Furthermore, a number of recent studies (see, for instance, McClelland 1961; Hagen 1962) have indicated the importance of certain familial, ideological, and educational orientations and institutions.
Within this context, it is necessary to re-examine the whole problem of the extent to which institutional patterns are crystallized through diffusion from other societies rather than through independent invention within a society. Cases of diffusion might be partially due to successful importation, by entrepreneurial groups on the margins of a given society, of acceptable solutions to latent problems or needs within that society.
Intersocietal borrowing. The problems of the interaction between processes of change and “imitative” elites are closely related to a set of problems bearing on the intersocietal nature of evolution. We have seen that the international setting not only constitutes the environment to which any single society has to adapt itself but also provides a reservoir of responses that may be available to it; for instance, the setting may provide enclaves from which new elites or adaptive techniques and organizations can be borrowed.
The existence of such interrelationships–in terms of both common problems and the possibility of “borrowing” solutions–necessarily underlies the basic mutual resemblance of human societies, and it is in turn closely related to the problem of the extent to which it is possible to talk about general “social” evolution or the evolution of human society as a total entity. However, the existence of such mutual resemblance certainly does not ensure that the development of “human society” as a unified system with common adaptive mechanisms necessarily increases its ability to deal with over-all problems of adaptation. Paradoxically, the very interrelatedness of societies may create problems with which they may not be able to deal. What may seem to be a positive accumulation of available mechanisms and a repertoire of adaptations from the point of view of human society as a whole may yet, because of the lack of intersocietal inte-grative and adaptive mechanisms, constitute a very grave problem.
Limitations of evolutionary theory
The considerations presented above constitute the background for a reappraisal of the evolutionary perspective within the framework of recent sociological theory. An evolutionary perspective, from the point of view of human societies, makes sense only so far as at least some of the processes of change that are inherent in any social system create the potentialities for the institutionalization of more differentiated social and symbolic systems. From the point of view of human society or culture as a whole, such a perspective makes sense only insofar as there exist some mechanisms for the transmission of various institutional and adaptive techniques and for creating some common, intersocietal, adaptive and integrative capabilities and frameworks.
With regard to all these areas, several problems for which there exist as yet no adequate solutions have been pointed out above. They have, in a way, all focused on the interaction between processes of social differentiation, on the one hand, and the formation and activities of different elites, on the other. It is this interaction that makes possible the institutionalization of different integrative principles and concrete structures at a given level of societal differentiation. Any search for solutions to these problems must concentrate on the various aspects of these processes. In this endeavor broad evolutionary considerations indicate ranges of possibilities and types of potential breakthroughs but do not in themselves provide answers.
SHMUEL N. EISENSTADT
[Directly related are the entries on EMPIRES; FEUDALISM; SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS. Other relevant material may be found in ANTHROPOLOGY; DIFFUSION.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BELLAH, ROBERT N. 1964 Religious Evolution. American Sociological Review 29:358–374.
BOCK, KENNETH E. 1963 Evolution, Function and Change. American Sociological Review 28:229–237.
CARNEIRO, ROBERT L. 1962 Scale Analysis as an Instrument for the Study of Cultural Evolution. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 18, no. 2:149–169.
EGGAN, FRED 1963 Cultural Drift and Social Change. Current Anthropology 4:347–355.
EISENSTADT, SHMUEL N. 1963a The Political Systems of Empires. New York: Free Press. ? Contains an extended bibliography.
EISENSTADT, SHMUEL N. 1963b Modernization: Growth and Diversity. Bloomington: Indiana Univ., Department of Government.
EISENSTADT, SHMUEL N. 1964a Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution. American Sociological Review 29:375–386.
EISENSTADT, SHMUEL N. 1964b Institutionalization and Change. American Sociological Review 29:235–247.
GELLNER, ERNEST 1965 Thought and Change. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
GINSBERG, MORRIS (1932) 1961 The Concept of Evolution in Sociology. Volume 1, pages 180–199 in Morris Ginsberg, Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy. London: Heinemann.
GOODENOUGH, WARD H. 1963 Some Applications of Guttman Scale Analysis to Ethnography and Culture Theory. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 19: 235–250.
HAGEN, EVERETT E. 1962 On the Theory of Social Change. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey.
MCCLELLAND, DAVID C. 1961 The Achieving Society. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand.
MEAD, MARGARET 1964 Continuities in Cultural Evolution. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
PARSONS, TALCOTT 1964 Evolutionary Universals in Society. American Sociological Review 29:339–357.
SAHLINS, MARSHALL D. 1964 Culture and Environment: The Study of Cultural Ecology. Pages 132–147 in Sol Tax (editor), Horizons of Anthropology. Chicago: Aldine.
SAHLINS, MARSHALL D.; and SERVICE, ELMAN R. (editors) 1960 Evolution and Culture. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press.
SCHWARTZ, RICHARD D.; and MILLER, JAMES C. 1964 Legal Evolution and Social Complexity. American Journal of Sociology 70:159–169.
WEBER, MAX (1922a) 1957 The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Edited by Talcott Parsons. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. ? First published as Part 1 of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft.
>WEBER, MAX (1922b) 1963 The Sociology of Religion. Boston: Beacon. ? First published in German.
WHITE, LESLIE A. 1959 The Evolution of Culture: The Development of Civilization to the Fall of Rome. New York: McGraw-Hill.
WOLF, ERIC R. 1964 The Study of Evolution. Pages 108–119 in Sol Tax (editor), Horizons of Anthropology. Chicago: Aldine.
VI EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR
The fundamental postulate of the modern biological theory of evolution is that the guiding agency of evolutionary changes is adaptation to the environments that a species inhabits. This is equally true of changes in structural features, physiology, and behavior of organisms. Evolutionary developments maintain the adaptedness of the species when the environments change, or they improve the adaptedness if the environments are more or less stationary. The environment does not, however, impose changes on the organism, as was believed by some early evolutionists, particularly by the adherents of the now almost completely abandoned Lamarckian hypothesis. It is more accurate to say that the environment presents challenges, to which a living species may respond by adaptive modification of its genetic endowment (genotype). If a response is elicited, the adaptedness is preserved or improved; if the species fails to respond, its fitness declines and it may become extinct. The genetic raw materials from which evolutionary changes may be constructed are mutations, that is, alterations in the gene or chromosome structures. The effects that mutations produce vary in magnitude all the way from alterations so drastic that the mutant is inviable (lethal, as a fatal hereditary disease causing death before sexual maturity) to changes so slight that the change in fitness, if any, that they produce can be detected only by means of refined statistical study. Mutant genes may be favorable only in heterozygous carriers (hybrid vigor, or heterosis) but unfavorable in double dose (in homozygous condition). Or a genetic change may be favorable in some environments and unfavorable in others. Or, finally, a mutant gene may be favorable in combinations with some genes but unfavorable in combination with others.
The great evolutionary importance of sexual reproduction lies in that it constantly combines and recombines the various genes present in the species population, enabling the favorable gene combinations to arise and to be tested by natural selection. In sexually reproducing and outbreeding species, such as man, no two individuals (except identical twins) have the same genotype. We inherit our genes from our parents and pass them to our children, but the gene constellation, the genotype, of every individual is unique. By and large, the greater the change a mutation produces, the greater the chance it will be harmful to the organism.
The adaptive evolutionary changes are compounded almost exclusively of the slight mutational changes (sometimes termed polygenic changes). Changes of greater magnitudes are important rather as the source of the genetic pathology, incapacitation, or weakness. Such diseases as phenyl-ketonuria, with its associated mental defects, and schizophrenia, to name only two, are examples of deleterious mutants affecting behavior. Apart from their negative importance for public health, mutations that produce strikingly visible alterations are also important as materials for genetic studies. Most of the pioneering work in genetics was done with genetic variants that must be classed as more or less pathological deviants and that play only negative roles in evolution, contributing to the “genetic load” the population carries.
Natural selection. Mutational changes, those affecting behavior as well as those responsible for structural and physiological alterations, are mostly harmful to the organism. This is the reason why any increase of the frequency of mutations in human populations (for example, through exposure to X rays, other mutagenic radiations, or chemical mutagens) can result only in a reduction of the average fitness of the populations concerned. How, then, can mutations serve as building blocks for adaptive evolutionary changes? The answer is that mutational changes and their combinations are sorted out by natural selection. The majority of mutations that decrease the fitness of their carriers in all environments and in all combinations are cast out of the populations by natural selection; those that are useful in at least some environments and in some combinations are preserved and multiplied.
The action of natural selection is sometimes compared to that of a sieve, separating the useful genetic variants from the harmful ones. This analogy is misleading if it is taken too literally. Human populations, and those of most sexually reproducing and outbreeding species, always carry great stores of genetic variants which arose by mutation in the immediate or remote past. The genetic reassortments, combined with natural selection in changing environments, become a cybernetic process in which the genetic developments that occur at a given time depend upon the changes that have taken place earlier, and, in turn, they condition the developments that may take place in the future.
Mutation, the process that supplies the raw materials from which evolutionary changes can be constructed, is repeatable and reversible; it is a physiological and, in the last analysis, a mechanical process. But the evolution controlled by natural selection becomes a creative process that is unlikely to be reversed or to be repeated. Evolutionary transformations, such as the transformations that have led to the emergence of the human species, are chains of unique, nonrecurrent events.
Importance of environment. Another consideration, particularly relevant in relation to the evolution of behavior, is that heredity determines not fixed “characters” or “traits” but reactions of the developing organism to the environment. The trait “behavior” obviously cannot be transmitted in inheritance, because it is not present in the sex cells, which are the only material bridge connecting the parents with their progeny. But neither is the skin color inherited in this sense, because no skin pigment is present in the sex cells. What the sex cells do carry are genes, and the genes determine the pattern, or path, that the development of an individual will follow in a given sequence of environments. Another individual with similar genes, an identical twin, may develop differently if his environments are different. A carrier of a different set of genes might also develop differently in similar environments.
We observe that human beings vary with respect to a great many traits–skin color, height, weight, head shape, intelligence, temperament, and special abilities, among countless others. As a broad generalization, it is fair to say that whenever the variation in any trait has been adequately studied genetically, it has been found to be influenced by both genetic and environmental factors. In the past, investigators have often tried to determine which traits are genetic or hereditary and which are environmental; such a dichotomy is now recognized as naive and misleading. All traits, or at any rate a great majority of them, are both genetic and environmental. If everybody had the same genes, as identical twins do, people would look and behave more nearly alike than they actually do. Likewise, if the environments in which people grow and develop were made uniform, this would also result in a reduction of the observed structural and behavioral diversity.
Fixity and conditioned plasticity. No living species inhabits an absolutely uniform and constant environment. Organisms have to face many environments, variable both in space and in time. For example, the inhabitants of the temperate and cold climates must survive in both summer and winter environments. Man achieves more and more effective control over his physical environments, but he must face a great and growing diversity of sociocultural environments. There are two ways to become adapted to a diversity of environments, and both have actually been used in the evolutionary process, including human evolution. One is genetic fixity and genetic specialization; the other is genetically conditioned developmental plasticity. In general, genetic fixity is characteristic of traits whose presence and precise form are indispensable for survival and reproduction. The developmental processes giving rise to such traits are said to be homeostatically buffered, so that they can occur in all environments that the species normally encounters in its habitats. Thus, with very few exceptions, all infants are born with two eyes, a four-chambered heart, physiological systems which digest food and maintain a constant body temperature, ability to learn a symbolic human language, etc. Genetic specialization makes the species polymorphic (consisting of two or more genetically distinct forms living and interbreeding in the same territory) or polytypic (consisting of races that inhabit different territories and are genetically adapted to the environments of their respective territories). For example, the darker and the lighter skin pigmentation of some human races is plausibly supposed to fit them to the climatic conditions of the lands in which they originally lived.
Genetically conditioned developmental plasticity is advantageous when the organism profits by having some traits shaped differently in the different environments that it encounters. The tanning of human skin on exposure to sunlight is an example of such a plasticity. It is important to realize that both fixity and plasticity are genetically determined. Natural selection favored the spread and establishment of mutant genes which in some populations make the skin permanently darkly pigmented and in other races make the pigmentation contingent on sun exposure.
Culture. The most significant product, and the paramount determining factor, of human evolution is culture. The relationships between the biological evolution and culture are frequently misunderstood, and it is important to make them clear. Culture is not transmitted biologically through some special genes; it is acquired anew in every generation by learning and instruction, in large part through the medium of the symbolic language. However, the capacity to learn and to instruct and, most essential of all, the capacity to use the symbolic language, is biologically and genetically vouchsafed to every nonpathological human being. An individual whose genes deprive him of these capacities is an obvious misfit, and his genes are likely to be eliminated by natural selection. Conversely, it is safe to assume that the genetic equipment that made the human species capable of developing and maintaining culture has been compounded by natural selection in the course of the prehuman, subhuman, and human evolution.
Of the many existing forms of human culture, the particular one an individual acquires is determined by the society in which this individual is brought up, rather than by his genes. And yet, not only the ability to acquire any culture at all but also the capacity and inclination to choose this or that occupation, role, or trade within a culture may well be genetically conditioned, facilitated, or hindered. The ability to speak is genetically determined, but what a person will actually say is largely independent of genetics.
Human acquired, extrabiological culture is man’s most potent adaptive instrument; it is chiefly by brain, not by brawn, that man controls his environments. Since, however, human environments are preponderantly created by culture, the possession of a genetic endowment that enables members of human populations to adapt themselves to these cultural environments becomes overwhelmingly important. The evolution of the biological basis of human behavior has been controlled by this fact. In all cultures, primitive as well as advanced, the vital ability is, and always was, for every individual to be able to learn whatever is necessary to become a competent member of the culture of which the individual is a part. For this reason, natural selection has favored in human evolution a remarkable plasticity of the behavioral development; man’s cardinal adaptive trait is his educability, that is, his capacity to adjust his behavior to circumstances in the light of experience.
Most individuals can be trained, with a greater or lesser facility, for many or most of the occupations and roles that a given culture requires to be filled. Almost everybody could become, if properly brought up, a fairly competent farmer, craftsman, soldier, sailor, teacher, or priest. This is the valid premise of the tabula rasa theory, from which this theory draws an erroneous conclusion. First clearly stated by John Locke in 1690, this theory is still popular in many circles. It asserts that a human being at birth is a clean slate on which the environment will inscribe a collection of attributes and qualities. The genetically secured developmental plasticity of human behavior, however, is not at all incompatible with genetic diversity. It is eminently probable that an infant at birth is not a clean slate and that some individuals are, because of their genetic endowments, more easily trainable for some occupations than for others. This is certain for some specialized professions; by no means does everybody have the genetic wherewithal to become a fine singer or a first-class composer or performer of music, or to achieve peak performance in sports or in art.
Biologically, this makes sense; the development of cultures and civilizations has not caused the diversity of vocations to become smaller; on the contrary, this diversity increases by leaps and bounds. The biologically adaptive response to this situation is obviously a combination of an educability or trainability, with an underlying genetic diversity to facilitate the division of labor.
The fallacy of racism. While the variants of the tabula rasa theory would make us believe that all the observed differences, especially all the differences in behavior, between people are the products of upbringing and education, the even more pernicious fallacy of racism would claim that these differences are genetically fixed and largely independent of the environment. One superficially plausible argument often given in favor of racist views is worth discussing here, because it will enable us to bring out clearly an important feature of the evolution of human behavior. It is claimed that the variation in psychic or behavioral traits among human individuals and races must be genetically fixed to about the same extent as it is among breeds of domestic animals. Different breeds of dogs, horses, or cattle are indeed clearly different in behavior, temperament, disposition, intelligence, trainability, etc. These differences are very largely genetically fixed, although by careful training and discipline one can modify them to some extent. Why then, it is argued, should the differences between humans be supposed to be anything but genetic?
This argument overlooks a profound dissimilarity between the evolutionary histories of the human species and of the animals that man has domesticated. The behavior of a breed of a domestic animal is an essential part of the complex of characteristics that are selected to fit this breed for its intended use. A work horse should not behave like a race horse, because this would make it dangerous and inefficient, and a race horse should not behave like a work horse if it is to win any races. The laboratory mouse and the laboratory rat are sluggish, unaggressive, and apparently dimwitted compared to the wild mouse and the wild rat. They would hardly survive under the conditions in which their wild ancestors thrive; it has been claimed that these species have degenerated when man has furnished their food and shelter. It is, however, obvious that wild mice and wild rats are inconvenient as laboratory animals, and that is why they are seldom used in laboratories.
What would be rated as degenerate in the wild state is a desirable trait in an animal living in a laboratory cage. Man has seen to it that the genes for fixing and stabilizing desirable behavior are established and that the genes for undesirable behavior are bred out of the animals he has domesticated. Although some writers have seen fit to call man a “self-domesticated” animal (a designation accepted by few biologists), his evolutionary pattern is in many ways just the reverse. As previously stated, natural selection may favor mutant genes that confer a developmental fixity on some traits and developmental plasticity on others; the latter is the case with human behavior. A person who is able to learn whatever modes of behavior fit various professions and vocations available in a human society, and to adjust himself to the ways of life that go with these professions and vocations, is likely to have both a social and a biological advantage. An individual set in his ways, always aggressive or always yielding, unable and unwilling to learn or to be trained, is likely to be discriminated against by natural selection. The great developmental plasticity of psychic traits in man is, thus, no biological accident but, on the contrary, a fundamental evolutionary adaptation that distinguishes man from nonhuman animals.
Ethics. A considerable amount of speculation has been devoted to the problem of whether human ethics could have arisen through the action of natural selection in the evolutionary process. Natural selection is obviously not a benevolent spirit guiding the evolution but a blind and opportunistic process. It is opportunistic in the sense that it promotes the establishment of genes which confer an advantage for survival or reproduction when and where the selection acts, regardless of whether these same genes may be disadvantageous later on. The extinction of countless species of organisms has been due to such a narrow, overspecialized adaptation to the environments that did not endure. Now, it is conceivable that natural selection might encourage genes for altruistic behavior in a species broken up into numerous small colonies or sub-populations. “Altruistic” is in this case to be defined as a behavior benefiting the group (family, clan, tribe) to which the individual so behaving belongs and detrimental to that individual himself. A small population in which genes for such behavior occur may prosper and multiply, despite some of the carriers of these genes sacrificing themselves for the sake of their fellows and thus not transmitting their genes to their own progeny. Conversely, in a large, undivided population, genes for “egotistic” or “criminal” behavior may secure an advantage, if their carriers survive and leave progeny at the expense of other members of the population.
Another possibility is that altruism and egotism are not products of some kind of special genes but, rather, products of cultural developments transmitted not by genes but by learning. C. H. Waddington (1960) has argued that natural selection acts to make man an “ethicizing being” and an “authority acceptor.” Particularly in childhood but also during his entire life, a person is able and even eager to acquire, from his parents or from other persons, ideas about what is good and what is evil and to accept instruction or counsel concerning the desirable ways of living in a society with other human beings. According to this view, man is not born virtuous or vicious but with a capacity for both virtue and vice. Biological evolution does not make man ethically better or worse, but it does promote intellectual alacrity and perhaps a sensitivity to ethical issues.
Future developments. Even more speculative and uncertain are the attempts to prognosticate the future evolutionary developments of human behavioral traits and capacities. This is evidently a part of a more general problem of the evolutionary perspectives of the human species. An opinion often expressed is that the biological evolution of man has virtually completed its course, and from now on any further development will be in the cultural realm. This is true to the extent that cultural changes are more rapid than the genetic ones, and this is, in fact, the reason why the development of the capacity for culture has conferred upon the human species an unprecedentedly high biological fitness. It should, however, be kept in mind that the maintenance, not to speak of further expansion, of cultural capacities is possible only on the basis of sound human genetic endowments. Improvement, maintenance, and prevention of deterioration of these genetic endowments is the task of the applied science of eugenics. Many eugenists have been extremely pessimistic about the genetic future of mankind, believing that the genetic processes which go on in human populations trend inexorably toward biological disaster. Others have urged various remedial schemes, such as sterilization of the unfit, or the artificial insemination of women by semen collected from biologically superior donors and preserved in frozen condition for extensive use over the years. During the first third of the twentieth century, eugenics was often used as a support of ultraconservative social philosophies and racist doctrines. All this has made many social scientists, and the public at large, properly skeptical and suspicious of eugenic schemes. Yet eugenics undoubtedly has a sound core; sooner or later man will be forced to take the management of his evolution in his own hands.
THEODOSIUS DOBZHANSKY
[Other relevant material may be found in EUGENICS; GENETICS; PSYCHOLOGY, article on COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY; and in the biography of DARWIN.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSIUS 1962 Mankind Evolving: The Evolution of the Human Species. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
DOBZHANSKY, THEODOSIUS 1964 Heredity and the Nature of Man. New York: Harcourt.
FULLER, JOHN L.; and THOMPSON, W. ROBERT 1960 Behavior Genetics. New York: Wiley.
HALLER, MARK H. 1963 Eugenics: Hereditarian Attitudes in American Thought. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press.
HIRSCH, JERRY 1962 Individual Differences in Behavior and Their Genetic Basis. Pages 3–23 in Eugene L. Bliss (editor), Roots of Behavior: Genetics, Instinct, and Socialization in Animal Behavior. New York: Harper.
ROE, ANNE; and SIMPSON, GEORGE G. (editors) 1958 Behavior and Evolution. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
WADDINGTON, CONRAD H. 1960 The Ethical Animal. London: Allen & Unwin.
