Theodicy

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THEODICY

Theodicy is a concept developed by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) to justify the existence and absolute perfection of God despite the evil that exists in the world. The term appeared in 1710 in the title of Leibniz's work Theodicy—Essays on the Goodness of God, of the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil, and with it he coined an optimistic variant par excellence on theories of evil. Insofar as science and technology are often interpreted as responses to evil, theodicy is related to their modern emergence.


Background and Emergence

Theories of evil have been developed by Plotinus (204–270), Augustine (354–430), and others in which evil is seen as necessary for universal harmony. Within the framework of the complex theological discussions on the origin of evil, Leibniz's theodicy denies both the idea of God as a malevolent creator of the world (a position taken by certain Gnostics) and the refutation of this theory by Origen (c. 185–254) and Augustine who, in postulating human freedom, attributed moral responsibility for all the evils of the world to human beings, in the form of sin.

Leibniz's particular approach was to interpret perfection as the state of a thing when it attains its highest level of being. This definition highlights God's perfection. From the quantitative point of view, God has all perfections; from the qualitative point of view, these perfections reach their highest form in him. God is therefore omniscient and omnipotent. Despite the impressions that evil, injustice, and suffering give us of the world, God's perfection is necessarily expressed in his creation.

This theory is, paradoxically, a key philosophical element of transition to modernity, a vital bridge to the new philosophies that emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century: the philosophy of history, philosophical anthropology, and aesthetic philosophy. The advance of these philosophies is tied to a new understanding of human nature that rejects the naturalism of seventeenth century thought, as well as traditional Christian theology. All the images of the human that developed in the eighteenth century were optimistic in ways reflecting theodicy—as can be illustrated in moral humanity (Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury [1671–1713]), rational humanity (Jean-Jacques Rousseau [1712–1778], Immanuel Kant [1724–1804]), economic humanity (Adam Smith [1723–1790]), and perfectible humanity (Condorcet [1743–1794]).

Although the idea of a human fall did not immediately disappear, a new concept began to replace it—not exactly of human greatness, but of the ability of humans to do what was necessary to make the world better for the human species. To understand this situation is to recognize the significance of Leibnizian theodicy for modern science and technology, as well as for ethics in the era of modernity. Leibniz's theodicy was both necessary for and representative of the modern world, insofar as it gave expression to a vision of the human condition as one which, aided by science and technology, was no longer characterized by powerlessness, suffering, and evil. These were henceforth looked at outside Leibniz's own metaphysical framework as being essentially surmountable.


Collapse and Continuity

With the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, Leibniz's justification of God in the face of worldly evil collapsed, in a complex historical context where science began progressively to replace religion as the cultural frame of reference. Nevertheless, the semantic core of Leibniz's arguments, that to compensate for evil is in fact the purpose the divine creator had before him, held firm. As Odo Marquard (1989, pp. 38–63) argued, Leibniz provided the teleological framework in which science and technology could become both means and ends. In Leibniz's theology that basic principle is "malum through bonum": God does not make up for evil with good, but evil is rehabilitated by the good it pursues. Tolerance in the face of evil is justified by having the highest good as the end in view, insofar as evil is the condition that makes the good possible.

In this sense, the principle of theodicy is that the ends justify the means. With the collapse of Leibnizian theodicy in its original form, human beings take the place left vacant by the omnipotent creative will and theodicy is transformed into anthropodicy or human progress. Humanity as an end in itself is free to use everything else as mere means, inheriting God's role in order to realize and complete theodicy in history. Every goal achieved became a new means toward another end.

As a result of this teleological sequence of means and ends, what came to predominate was not the possible uses of the means, but the very means themselves. The ends no longer justified the means, the means justified the ends. This logic is linked to the cost/benefit compensation criterion of utilitarianism: Every good has its price. As Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834) wrote in his Essay on the Principle of Population (1798): "There is evil in the world, not in order to produce despair, but rather activity." This idea is equally present in other modern thinkers such as Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733): "There are 'private vices' [malum], but they are 'public benefits' [bonum-through-malum]."


The Example of Cournot and Teilhard

Among those who developed philosophies of history guided by an optimistic approach or who believed in humanity's ascending progress to an ideal state were the Frenchmen Antoine-Augustin Cournot (1801–1877), a teacher of mathematics and author of several works on the philosophy of history, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881–1955), a Jesuit priest, paleontologist, and philosopher of nature. Though sometimes neglected, these two thinkers developed unusual and powerful syntheses that reflect the subtle and penetrating influence wielded by the Leibnizian idea of an omnipotent creative will. Their work had significant repercussions during their own lifetimes, and their theoretical constructs are still surprisingly topical in the twenty-first century: Cournot as a prophet of post-historical technological civilization, Teilhard as the prophet of transhumanism.

For the century in which he lived, Cournot was the thinker who developed with the greatest persistence a philosophy of history in which science and technology take pride of place. His philosophy of history is based on a series of binary opposites: chance and necessity, reason and instinct, passions and interests. With these concepts, his reading of history was finalistic, and he argued for the likelihood or even the inevitability of what has come to be called "the end of history," a partly Hegelian premise that was revived at the end of the twentieth century in a world that claimed the end of ideology, of utopia, of politics, of the human. Hermínio Martins (1998), who has emphasized the importance of Cournot for the philosophy of technology, argues that Cournot's "end of history" semantics do not imply a form of necessitarianism, in the sense of extinction or termination, but more correctly exhaustion, completion, fulfillment, or consummation.

Cournot's temporal interpretation of collective human existence is based on a system of three great time-phases, as found in the work of Auguste Comte (1798–1857) and Karl Marx (1818–1883), and closely related to different kinds of discourse. The first phase has been labeled "ethnological" and is characterized by the subordination of reason to instinct, of the planful to the unreflective; habit and custom predominate, and are accompanied by natural or human disasters. The second stage is the phase of history itself. This is defined by an increase in rationality in thought and action, and by a combination of passions and interests as the springs of action with sufficient power to give rise to colossal events, of which the French Revolution is an example. The third and terminal phase is the closest possible approximation to the ideal, which humanity will never be able to attain. In this phase, "political faiths" decline, as occurred during the French Revolution, and give way to the peaceable play of economic interest and the doux commerce.


This third stage establishes a post-historic society that conquers nature by systematic scientific discovery, technological invention, innovation, and economic growth. Cournot anticipates positions that were further developed in the twentieth century, such as Joseph Schumpeter's routinization of economic innovation and what Alfred North Whitehead calls the "invention of invention," but does not show any significant concern with the possible intrinsic limits of scientific progress, which might bar further fundamental technological advance.

Teilhard's approach to human history also embodies finalism, and the role of scientific and technological advance within it, although his vision embraces different domains from those of Cournot. Teilhard's arguments have roots in the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859–1941), and are part of the new theology of history that seeks to protect theology from the temptation of rationalist hermeneutics. Nonetheless, it did not shy away from dealing with "earthly realities," such as the relationship between humans and nature, the carnal nature of human beings, scientific humanism, and the theology of science. Teilhard's thinking embodied these contributions, and added a lively intuition of the evolutionist and voluntarist scientific and technological type that aroused serious suspicions in Rome. Contravening some basic postulates of Christianity, he argued for the "spiritual value of matter," and developed a conception in which humankind, with its artistic achievements, technological artifacts, and religions, is part of an overall evolutionary scheme in which there exists a progressive manifestation of biochemical complexity on the path to a growing unified consciousness.

In the tradition of the omnipotent creative will, Teilhard argued that perfection lies in the progress not of individuals, but of humanity as a whole, on a path toward unification with God who, being in essence supernatural, is at the same time the natural outcome of evolution. In his main work, The Phenomenon of Man (1959), he develops a suggestive synthesis of science and religion, in the context of a view of the universe as a system that develops from one phase to another with ever-higher forms of consciousness.

Teilhard's speculations anticipated those who favor a transhuman future which appears possible and desirable. These transhumanists are convinced that the new computational technologies are creating a collective human intellect, a kind of cognitive and mental hyperextension of the human mind. Cournot, by contrast, thought that organic life would remain fundamentally inaccessible to mathematical and experimental science, while postulating that increasing knowledge of inanimate nature would be sufficient to ensure technical perfectibility and material progress.


JOSÉ LUÍS GARCIA

SEE ALSO Leibniz, G. W.;Progress.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anderson, Perry. (1992). A Zone of Engagement. London: Verso.

Cournot, Antoine-Augustin. (1861). Traité de l'Encha?ˆnement des Idées Fondamentales dans les Sciences et dans l'Histoire [Treatise on the Chain of Fundamental Ideas in Science and History]. Paris: Hachette.

Cournot, Antoine-Augustin. (1875). Matérialisme, Vitalisme, Rationalisme [Materialism, Vitalism, Rationalism]. Paris: Hachette.

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. (1952 [1710]). Theodicy—Essays on the Goodness of God, of the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil, ed. Austin Farrer, trans. E.M. Huggard. London: Routledge & K. Paul.

Marquard, Odo. (1989). Farewell to Matters of Principle: Philosophical Studies, trans. Robert M. Wallace with the assistance of Susan Bernstein and James I. Porter. New York: Oxford University Press.

Martins, Hermínio. (1998). "Technology, Modernity, Politics." In The Politics of Postmodernity, ed. James Good and Irving Velody. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Ruyer, Raymond. (1930). L'Humanité de l'Avenir d'après Cournot [The Humanity of the Future according to Cournot]. Paris: Alcan.

Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre. (1959). The Phenomenon of Man, trans. Bernard Wall. New York: Harper.

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