Death and Dying
DEATH AND DYING
Death is defined as the irreversible loss of biological life functions, and occurs in all organisms. It is the inevitable conclusion of a finite existence, and is often applied by analogy even to geological features that contain life (the death of a river), social orders (death of a city), or machines (one's car or computer died). Science can study the phenomenon of death, technology may delay its approach, but medicine cannot cure humans of their mortality.
Dying, by contrast, is the process that leads to death, and is a distinctly human event, embedded in numerous moral traditions and well-circumscribed by prescriptions for appropriate conduct in its presence. No other animal attends as carefully to the dying process or accords it such significance. Modern medical technologies, including drugs and therapies, aim to delay the onset of this process (life-saving technologies), extend it (life-sustaining or life-support technologies), take control of it (technologies of euthanasia), or provide comfort (palliative technologies) as the time of death nears. Whereas premodern thought commonly interpreted dying in religious terms, viewing it as a process of transformation from one state to another and calling forth techniques of ritual engagement with larger orders of reality, contemporary technical achievements are the result of aspirations for control over the process that pose challenges in a moral framework.
Historical and Cultural Background
As described by the cultural historian Philippe Ariès (1991), the European experience of death has itself undergone significant transformations. Dying is not simply a basic feature of the human condition and the termination of an individual history; it has its own history. From the Graeco-Roman world up through the first millennium of the Christian era, death was so ever-present as to have been accepted as a normal aspect of human affairs. Theologically death was also often interpreted as a result of living in a fallen world marked by sin. When someone died, people paid their respects but did not dwell on the issue because of the greater importance of the community as a whole.
During the eleventh century in Europe, the rise of individualism brought with it a new perspective on death as a threat not to the community but to the self, which in turn gave rise to the development of Ars moriendi or treatises on the art of dying well. In the sixteenth century the emphasis shifted toward concern for the death of loved ones in a family. The romantic pathos at the death bed of family and friends ironically contributed to the transfer of the event of dying from home to hospital, where it acquired a higher public profile.
How is it, asks Ariès, that "the community feels less and less involved in the death of one of its members"? One answer is that the community "no longer thinks it necessary to defend itself against a nature which has been domesticated once and for all by the advance of technology" (Ariès 1991, p. 612). Another is that individualism has fractured the sense of solidarity. As death ceases to be a public threat it is progressively transformed into an emotional issue and relegated to the realm of privacy. Medical science and technology are brought in to study the process and reduce the pain, but behind this rational management "the death of the patient in the hospital, covered with tubes, [becomes] a popular image, more terrifying than the … skeleton of macabre rhetoric" (Ariès 1991, p. 614).
There are, however, other perspectives on death and dying that have likewise been impacted by scientific and technological change. Outside European traditions, for instance, the Hindu view embraces death as part of a great spiritual journey. The soul is in a state of continuous evolution and awareness from the limited to the limitless. Death separates the indestructible soul-body from the weakened physical-body. The soul-body rein-carnates a physical-body, which matures and develops the soul-body in a life and death cycle. The act of rein-carnation enables the soul to renew its work of resolving karma or moral effects arising from failures to conduct oneself in harmony with the dharma or moral order of the cosmos. The fulfillment of this process leads to liberation from the cycle of rebirth in a state called moksha and is characterized by sat chit ananda or limitless being, awareness, and bliss.
One influential Buddhist tradition The Tibetan Book of the Dead (from the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries), a guidebook for the deceased that echoes similar Egyptian, Daoist, and even Kabbalist literature, teaches how death is a process of moving toward pure truth. Once liberated from the confines of a mortal body, awareness enters a series of intermediate states called bardos in which it experiences various, sometimes frightening visions. To work through these bardos calls for assistance in order to attain either reincarnation or nirvana, a state in which confusion and suffering cease.
Across these various cultural perspectives one common theme is a distinction between natural and unnatural death and dying (Young). Natural deaths are associated with old age and disease, unnatural with accident and murder. In Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism natural death has a normative value, thus implying criticism of the technological or artificial manipulations of the dying process, especially in the form of active euthanasia. Insofar as the natural is also seen as a manifestation of the spiritual, such a view reaffirms death as a gateway between the natural and the supernatural.
It is in reaction against such metaphysical perspectives—perspectives that have much in common with the premodern Christian views—that the Enlightenment gave birth to the typically modern, empirical explanation of death and efforts to take instrumental control of dying. From the invention of the microscope and the discovery of a small pox vaccination emerged the germ theory of disease. According to germ theory, microbes enter a body and attack its metabolic functioning. Public health initiatives are thus required to develop external means of protection against such attacks. With the discovery of antibiotics physicians were able to go inside the body and kill germs there as well. Death is no longer considered a consequence of sin, but is simply the result of disease and old age.
The Psychology of Dying and Death Redefined
Further developments in scientific and technological medicine have made it possible not only to protect from and respond to disease, but to aggressively manage the dying process with lifesaving or life-support technologies and to provide high-tech palliative care—and even take control of it with techniques for euthanasia. Psychological models of the dying process (which faintly echo the traditional guidebooks for the dying) and efforts to redefine death itself highlight alternative responses to the challenges thus raised.
The most popular psychological analysis of the dying process is On Death and Dying (1969) by Elizabeth Kübler-Ross. In her thanatology, she distinguishes five stages of dying through which people progress when informed that they have a terminal illness: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. This analysis has become so influential that some advocate its application in other situations in which people suffer loss or experience traumatic change. Indeed in the face of issues arising from revolutionary new technologies such as human cloning, there is room to argue that a culture passes through stages in which there is public denial of the possibility, anger at its scientific creation, bargaining for how it is to be used, depression that it seems inevitable, and finally acceptance as just another aspect of the advanced technological condition. Others, however, advocate modification and revision of Kübler-Ross's model, although no one has rejected the general idea that in the course of dying people typically go through different stages. To what extent this description is a normative as well as a descriptive paradigm remains unclear.
Kübler-Ross and others (see Moody 2001) also claim that empirical studies of the dying process and especially near-death experiences confirm the existence of an afterlife. This is a highly contentious position that nevertheless to some extent makes common cause with traditional guidebooks for the art of dying. More widely accepted are manuals that provide psychological guidance that extend Kübler-Ross's original approach (see Byock 1998).
In contrast to psychological studies of the dying experience, which was simply an open research question inviting scientific scrutiny, the need to redefine death was made acute by techno-medical advances. Death was traditionally defined in metabolic terms and indicated by cardiac or pulmonary arrest. But with the invention of artifacts that are able to substitute for the functions of heart and lungs, the human metabolism can often be indefinitely sustained. The Karen Ann Quinlan case of 1975, in which parents were initially denied the right to remove their comatose daughter from life support, was only one of a series of related cases that brought this issue to public attention, and served as a powerful stimulus to the creation of the field of bioethics. In response the 1978 Presidential Commission on the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, in conjunction with the American Bar Association (ABA), the American Medical Association (AMA), and the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, proposed a Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA). According to this draft act, "An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory function, or (2) irreversible cessation of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead." The draft UDDA has in various forms been enacted in most of the United States and has become the most widely adopted standard.
Tensions in Autonomy
As dying and death are reconceptualized under the influence of ever-advancing science and technology, a host of related decisions become progressively problematic—especially with regard to autonomy, one of the fundamental principles of contemporary Western ethics. The individual right to choose or self-determine whether or not to be placed on life-sustaining treatment is typical. Traditionally people did not have the right to choose their deaths. Age, accidents, sicknesses, and disease determined it for them. Individuals were ultimately passive as death approached. The goal of the patient-physician relationship was no more than the easing of symptoms related to life-limiting illnesses or the aging process.
All this changed as personal autonomy became a moral ideal and medical procedures and therapies altered what constituted unpreventable death and sustainable life. For example, during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries many patients with life-threatening conditions such as polio were sent home to die. By the late 1920s, lifesaving treatments such as the iron lung enabled them to live for years in machines that breathed for them. Under such conditions, even mere acceptance of whatever contemporary medical procedure has the most professional momentum behind it constitutes a choice, and the traditional attitude of passive acceptance in the face of extreme illness increasingly means an acceptance not of nature but of science and technology.
The dying and those who care for them are thus faced with progressively difficult decisions regarding nutrition, hydration, antibiotics, ventilation, and a host of more aggressive medical technologies. Dilemmas become especially apparent when advanced techniques of life-support enable sustaining basic metabolic functions with little hope for full recovery. Attempts to reflect on the dimensions of autonomous decision making under such conditions involve at least four overlapping tensions: (a) informed consent and ignorance; (b) private decisions and public demands; (c) curative care and futile care; and (d) benefits of treatment and the burden of care.
The tension between informed consent and ignorance is particularly difficult to negotiate when considering high-tech medical treatments under the stress of illness and pain that may well be terminal. Although there is a widely shared consensus that patients must be informed about and freely consent to treatments, how much should patients be expected to understand? What are the communication responsibilities of medical professionals? Even when patients claim to understand, can they always be trusted? What if they want to avoid becoming knowledgeable about their condition or desire to abdicate decision making to others, whether family members or medical professionals?
When confronting tensions between private decisions and public demands in a pluralistic society, it is commonly argued that private decisions take precedence. Presumably personal values inform private decisions while public attitudes differ and reflect fragmented cultural, religious, and emotional biases. For example, although most Americans express public opposition to euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide, they are personally more accepting when faced with extended, terminal suffering and pain. Thus there is a tendency to promote individual choice. Certainly most states and many countries give people the opportunity to make their wishes known with respect to possible life-limiting illnesses in the form of physician directives, medical powers-of-attorney, and do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders.
A third tension arises between curative care and futile care. The desire to extend life is pervasive in Western cultures, but life support treatments sometimes prolong death more than they extend life. Curative care employs life-supporting technologies with the goal of recovery, but the consequences of living on continuous life-support, without hope of recovery, must be considered as well. The alternative of palliation or comfort care that allows the process of dying to take its course is another option. There are even instances when an otherwise curative procedure such as chemotherapy may be used as a palliative treatment.
Closely related to the curative versus futility tension is one between quality of life and quality of function. Quality of life issues generally revolve around physical or mental disabilities, which may impede but not destroy a person's ability to interact with and engage the environment. For example, persons with head injuries confined to hospital beds may be aware of the environment and engage the world around them. Although their quality of life is altered, such circumstance does not justify withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment. Quality of function issues, however, may justify withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments when the ability to function is seriously impaired due to some significant pathology. Persons with head injuries who are in a persistent vegetative state and unaware of or unable to engage their environment have a low quality of functioning.
Finally tensions exists between the benefits of treatment and the burden of care. Life-support treatment always comes with both physical and financial costs. Therapies such as ventilation carry risks of infection, aspiration, and skin breakdown. When outcomes are successful, benefits are usually taken to outweigh burdens, although burn victim Dax Cowart has argued that this is not always so (Kliever 1989). Moreover while it is generally agreed that financial costs should not be the determinative factor when considering life-support, they must be considered. As the private burdens and public costs for funding life-support technologies rise, some argue that there are instances in which individuals may have a duty to die.
Burdens of care also often raise questions of equity and social justice. In principle all persons should have equal access to life-saving and life-sustaining technologies. In reality the poor, uneducated, and uninsured are far less likely to be treated or have the opportunity to make decisions about such treatment. At the same time, although it is commonly argued that death and dying decisions must relate to personal needs, some forms of this position have been challenged as excessively individualistic.
The Question of Modernity
Once viewed as spiritual experiences, in the early-twenty-first century death and dying are often considered no more than the cessation of metabolic or brain functioning. However, related issues continue to provoke strong responses because views on death and dying emerge in a variety of cultural contexts. It often appears that as technology and medicines advance, the fear of death increases, encouraging greater efforts to prolong life. Daniel Callahan (1973, 2000) argues that a fundamental rejection and fear of death is at the foundation of modern science and technology.
Certainly in Western scientific and technological culture, death has a negative connotation. Attempts to deny death are manifest both in the scientific efforts to map its physiological details and genetic basis as well as in technological efforts to hold it at bay as long as possible. Denial is further reinforced through the sequestering of the aged, ill, and dying, especially in the United States. Such individuals are institutionalized in hospitals, long-term nursing facilities, and retirement villages. Euphemisms such as slumber, expired, and passed away further reinforce the denial of death. Even contemporary religious customs enforce denial by limiting grieving time and trying to help families cope with personal losses.
Yet in an insightful reflection on death and dying in relation to the ideal of autonomy and technological mastery—what is termed the instrumental activism of the West—Talcott Parsons and Victor Lidz suggest an alternative interpretation. They identify a range of efforts to control and manage death and dying through "scientific medicine and public health services designed to protect life; insurance, retirement, and estate planning to manage the practical consequences of deaths; and mourning customs that emphasize recovery of survivors' abilities to perform ordinary social roles soon after the death of family members, friends, and associates" (Parsons and Lidz 2004a, p. 597). From such perspective, what others described as attempts to hide or ignore death are seen as techniques for its management under conditions in which there is no strong cultural consensus about the meaning of either life or death, short of what can be concluded from the empirical evidence (that it is bound to occur) and postulated on the basis of scientific theory (its evolutionary benefits to both organisms and society).
To what extent might these same techniques be integrated into a different cultural context in which death and dying continue to be experienced as a spiritual transition between worlds? The question is not easy to answer, and may not be answerable at all apart from historical efforts at adaptation. But whether the standard bioethical efforts to promote patient autonomy, equity of access, and a quality hospital experience can transcend the contemporary cultural framework remains unclear.
ERIC T. HAMMER
CARL MITCHAM
SEE ALSO Brain Death;Cancer;Euthanasia;Euthanasia in the Netherlands;Medical Ethics;Playing God;Right to Die.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ariès, Phillipe. (1991). The Hour of our Death, reissue edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. French original 1981. An influential study of the cultural experience of death.
Barley, Nigel. (1997). Grave Matters: A Lively History of Death around the World. New York: Henry Holt. A popular review of anthropological knowledge.
Bulger, Ruth Ellen; Elizabeth Meyer Bobby; and Harvey V. Fineberg, eds. (1995). Society's Choices: Social and Ethical Decision Making in Biomedicine. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Byock, Ira. (1998). Dying Well: Peace and Possibilities at the End of Life. New York: Penguin Riverhead Books.
Callahan, Daniel. (1973). The Tyranny of Survival and Other Pathologies of Civilized Life. New York: Macmillan.
Callahan, Daniel. (2000). The Troubled Dream of Life: In Search of a Peaceful Death. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Dunn, Hank. (2001). Hard Choices for Loving People. Herndon, VA: A & A Publishers.
Fox, Renée C., ed. (1980). "The Social Meaning of Death." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 447: 1–101.
Kliever, Lonnie D., ed. (1989). Dax's Case: Essays in Medical Ethics and Human Meaning. Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University Press.
Kübler-Ross, Elizabeth. (1969). On Death and Dying. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Lo, Bernard; Delaney Ruston; Laura W. Kates; et al. (2002). "Discussing Religious and Spiritual Issues at the End of Life: A Practical Guide for Physicians." Journal of the American Medical Association 287(6)(February): 749–754.
Moody, Raymond A. (2001). Life after Life: The Investigation of a Phenomenon—Survival of Bodily Death. San Francisco: Harper.
Parsons, Talcott, and Victor Lidz. (2004a). "Death, V: Death in the Western World." In Encyclopedia of Bioethics, 3rd edition, Vol. 4, ed. Stephen G. Post. New York: Macmillan.
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Pattison, E. M. (1990). "Biomedical Definition of Death." In Dictionary of Pastoral Care and Counseling, ed. Rodney J. Hunter. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press.
President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. Defining Death: Medical, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
Tobin, Daniel R, M.D., with Karen Lindsey. (1999). Peaceful Dying. New York: Perseus Books.
Young, Katherine K. (2004). "Death, II: Eastern Thought." In Encyclopedia of Bioethics, 3rd edition, Vol. 4, ed. Stephen G. Post. New York: Macmillan.
INTERNET RESOURCE
"Withholding and Withdrawing Life-prolonging Treatments: Good Practice in Decision-making." General Medical Council. Available from http://www.gmc-uk.org/global_sections/search_frameset.htm.
