Reality
REALITY
Reality denotes the realm of things existing outside of, and independently of, the mind. Derived from the Latin res, "thing," the word is often applied to the world of the senses. By contrast, the world of reality is distinguishable from the realm of imagination or that of intellectual abstraction. The absolute intelligibility and even the existence of a world of reality have been challenged, most notably in modern philosophy (see knowledge, theories of).
Two questions might be asked concerning reality: "Are things as they appear?" and "Do they even exist at all?" Light from a white object, passing through a green pane of glass, might convey to an observer behind the glass the impression that the object itself was green. René descartes, in his Discourse on Method, suggested the possibility that the senses themselves transform the impressions they give of objects in a similar manner. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel kant answered that one knows reality only as previously transformed by his own senses and intellect. What one knows, therefore, is not things themselves but certain subjectively transformed appearances, phenomena. Hence the philosophy of phenomenalism. A further step would then be to ask if anything at all corresponds outside the mind to the appearance within the mind. A negative answer yields the philosophy of solipsism, which affirms that internal appearances are all that exist, that oneself is the sole existing reality.
Since the knower has no way of verifying the existence and nature of reality except by the use of his senses and intellect, whose objective validity phenomenalism and solipsism call into question, the legitimacy of the foregoing questions must be examined. To question whether other things exist besides oneself, one must imply his own existence, which he knows in the same way as he knows the existences called into question. To acknowledge one's own existence, therefore, is equivalent to acknowledging the existence of other things. Similarly, when one asks if things are as he conceives them to be, the question presupposes an awareness of the identity of the senses as distinct from the object of perception. It further presupposes that, with due caution and attention, the mind can forestall any misinterpretation of sense data. To one who has a cold, for example, food may seem tasteless; yet he realizes that it is not the food that has lost its savor, but rather his senses that are not normal. So one may invent questions leading to solipsism and phenomenalism, but the mind does not actually raise them. In fact those who profess such doubts do not adhere to them in practical life.
Although the term "reality" as denoting the totality of things existing independently of mind is usually identified with reality as perceived by the senses, one cannot arbitrarily restrict the scope of existing things to the sensible world alone. If immaterial things such as soul, angels, and god, exist, they too are real and actually constitute, by their plenitude of being, a superior realm of reality.
See Also: distinction, kinds of; knowledge; realism.
Bibliography: aristotle, Meta. 1003a.20–1012b.30. thomas aquinas, In 4 meta. 1–17; De ver. 1.1. v. mathieu, Enciclopedia filosofica, 4 v. (Venice–Rome 1957) 3:1903–13.
[p. conway]
