PHILOSOPHY

Of Greek origin (φιλσοφία), the term philosophy is a neologism attributed to pythagoras; it means literally "love of wisdom," and represents philosophy as a high or supreme achievement of man and philosophers as aspirants to or proponents of wisdom. In this relatively strict sense, philosophy implies both the process of questioning and the results of this interrogation as embodied in a personal or public enterprise of value to mankind. Such expressions as "the philosophy of X "—when X can stand for art, advertising, government, and so forth—reveal that philosophy is taken to mean also an outlook on or a background to a given topic, subject, or enterprise. This broader meaning embraces academic philosophy as well as the philosophy of the man on the street; it makes philosophy equivalent to the sum total of basic views or principles accepted by a particular age or group.

Even this general meaning of the term, however, implies a distinction between philosophy and its proponents. Each philosopher has a personal conviction, and this even before he may make this public by means of verbal or written symbols. Yet one praises and esteems or deprecates and condemns not philosophers but what they proffer. Thus arises the basic question: What is philosophy? Any significant answer implies some ability to identify the content of philosophy as distinct from that of other branches of learning or to characterize the invariants in different forms of philosophizing. The difficulty of this task arises from the very nature of philosophy itself. Unlike other branches of knowledge, philosophical knowledge is both involutional (in the sense of growing more inward through reflection) and evolutional (in the sense of opening new domains for consideration). Accordingly, as a whole it is not static and closed; rather, it is dynamic and evolutionary. Each generation, and each philosopher for that matter, limits or enlarges its scope and colors or shades its meaning.

This dynamic and evolving character helps to account for the disagreement among philosophers themselves and for the phenomenon of philosophical schools or systems (see pluralism, philosophical). Through such disagreement, however, as well as by genuine rapport, philosophers function as catalysts for the philosophical enterprise itself. Sometimes their efforts are misunderstood; this serves as the occasion for the rise of antiphilosophers, who attack philosophy from their own notions of what philosophy should be. They may underscore its failures in contrast with scientific success, deride its abstractness as opposed to the needs of daily life, or belittle its expressions as vacuous in comparison to religious vision. When the issues at stake have been settled, philosophy may have adopted a new position within culture or assisted in clarifying important issues for its very accusers. Thus man can be regarded as somehow trapped in a philosophical net; he can escape such confinement only by some point of view, but this itself will constitute his philosophy.

History. Granted that one may write the history of philosophy from a variety of points of view, there seem to be some common traits that the past life of philosophy reveals. In the first place, the philosophical enterprise seems to be a constant search for an integral and unified master plan as coextensive with, and explanatory of, the entire range of human experience. A second trait of philosophy derives from its constant renewal from the exigencies of practical life. Whether the problems be labeled as personal, social, political, or religious and whether they spring from technology or from other developments, man's everyday questions lead him to philosophical reflection. A third, and possibly more controversial, trait of philosophy is its zeal for truth and for certitude in knowing. This is at once its most demanding and its most frustrating characteristic, one that seems to motivate all philosophers but that leaves many of them unsatisfied with their accomplishments. The philosophical task requires, moreover, that the philosopher express his insights in meaningful symbols. This relatedness to the liberal arts is a fourth trait that seems to characterize most philosophical investigation.

Prior to Christianity. Considering philosophy in its broadest sense, one cannot name the first philosopher or delineate precisely philosophy's moment of nativity. Restricting consideration to academic philosophy, however, one may say that Western philosophy began with the Greeks partly as a result of their own genius and partly as an offshoot of Eastern thought. Compared, then, to the total age of the universe or of man, the life span of philosophy is short.

Western philosophy, which is of primary concern in this article, first began to take on a recognizable form or structure among the Greeks about the 6th century b.c. Its primitive trait can be designated as interest, or wonder, over the changes taking place in the universe. The first philosophers, far from being presumptuous in their attempts to understand nature and being, spoke of themselves not as wise men but as lovers of wisdom. Philosophy, wisdom, knowledge, and truth—all were seen by them as synonymous and as valuable in themselves. They tended to identify philosophy with all true knowledge. Gradually, and especially in the eyes of the Ionians, it became a matter of privilege to have an orderly set of responses to questions concerning the nature and origin of both the universe and its contents, and especially of man himself. The ability to answer questions, then, came to be presupposed in the philosopher; the asking of the questions themselves, however, represented the first stage of the art of philosophizing.

Classical philosophy as a total outlook on the world and as somehow equivalent to knowledge in general developed largely with socrates, plato, and aristotle. The latter two thinkers especially can be regarded as having broached the major issues with which Western philosophical thought has concerned itself to the 20th century, albeit in different ways. What does it mean for anything to be or to become? What are the origins, the conditions, and the final terms of being and becoming? Who is man and how is he related to being? What does it mean to know and to be known, and what are the conditions and requirements of knowing? In what ways are being and knowledge related? The major branches or areas of interest for philosophers also were marked out during this period: orderly thought was pursued in logic, then came mathematics and the philosophy of nature, after which personal and political activity was studied, and all was finally seen to culminate in metaphysical wisdom.

Again, already with Socrates and Plato, philosophy became self-conscious. Anything worthy of the name philosophy was expected to possess certain attributes: (1) it was to be universal, orderly, and systematic; (2) it was not to be transitory but necessary, even an eternal type of knowledge; and (3) it was not merely a response to questions by the ordinary man, but something attained by the very few. In brief, it was to be science in the strict sense, and thus it came to be equated with all true and certain knowledge. To be a mathematician or a metaphysician, to be an astronomer or a musician was, in some participative sense at least, to be a philosopher. After about 400 years of growth, then, philosophy was considered as an open but all-embracing system, asking and answering questions about anything and everything, but answering them securely and definitively.

There were many attempts during this period, even by philosophers themselves, to challenge this concept of total and supreme wisdom. The sophists and the various proponents of skepticism introduced subsidiary currents that were to reappear in later centuries. But, by and large, the classical Greek thinkers had the greater influence. They set the course that philosophy was to follow, for the most part, in its subsequent history.

Philosophy and Christianity. It is somewhat surprising that philosophy survived the dramatic opposition of Christianity to its own world-view. Offering a set of new proposals, new terminology, and a complete way of life, Christianity claimed superiority over current and earlier forms of wisdom that were merely human. But philosophy was too well entrenched to succumb readily, and the need for a rapprochement soon became evident. True, in this first confrontation, there was the tendency of Christians to denigrate philosophy and of philosophers to ridicule or degrade Christianity. Both movements, however, survived and benefited from the encounter. Christianity opened new domains for philosophical consideration: the notion of a personal God and the possibility of knowing about His inner life; the idea of God as creator and as related to men and the world; the conception of a basic value of each man in God's sight. Christianity benefited likewise, especially in its aim to make all things Christian: it aspired to join the words of Christ with those of men to provide a unified outlook on the world. This task, however, was not accomplished with any tour de force for centuries. The first successful synthesis, in the 5th century, still perdures as the Augustinian-Platonic current of thought (see augustinianism). An alternate synthesis, Thomistic aristotelianism, took form in the 13th century after assiduous preparation by such thinkers as anselm of canterbury, Arabian and Jewish philosophers, abelard, and countless other Christians and non-Christians (see thomism). A third proposal was the via moderna of the 14th and 15th centuries, originating with william of ockham (see ockhamism; nominalism). Others may yet be in the offing, for the rapport between Christianity and rational thought is a perennial problem facing Christians, one that they may well solve differently in succeeding generations. (see patristic philosophy; scholasticism; christian philosophy.)

Philosophy and the Sciences. The new sciences of the 17th century and later did not originate completely de novo. The currents of ancient philosophy reappearing in the Latin West in the 12th and succeeding centuries, along with countless other influences, conspired to make science possible. No one can fail to give credit, of course, to Galileo and his fellow pioneers. But the contributions of medieval philosophers also played an important role, particularly by way of synthesizing and transmitting the aggregate of human knowledge to the innovators.

The first and most immediate effect of the new sciences on philosophy was that of deliberate or implicit imitation. As the sciences grew and expanded, a retinue of philosophers, with F. bacon in the forefront, hoped to found a "new philosophy" that would be, in effect, a universal science. R. descartes, B. spinoza, and G. W. leibniz were among those who sought to model the new philosophy on mathematics. British empiricists inclined more to the experimental sciences as a basis for their philosophizing. The many thinkers who conceptualized within the framework of kantianism and hegelianism, as well as logical positivism, endeavored to use both mathematics and the positive sciences as models for their philosophies. More recently, philosophers such as H. bergson and W. james saw philosophy and science as two complementary but radically distinct branches of learning.

Another effect of the new sciences on philosophy was the attempt to assimilate scientific findings into philosophy or even to erect philosophies exclusively on a scientific theory or viewpoint. Thus Darwin's theory of evolution, Einstein's theory of relativity, Brouwer's intuitionism, and Freud's libido have formed the basis for much philosophizing, to say nothing of the "scientific philosophy" of Hans Reichenbach and the Vienna Circle. Related to this development is the problem of philosophical methodology as contrasted with that of the sciences. Are the sciences themselves unified or distinguished by their methods; and, in any case, are their methods distinct from those of philosophy? [see methodology (philosophy)].

The increasing concern of science with problems earlier regarded as those of philosophy has forced philosophers to reconsider the various dimensions of the philosophical enterprise. The tendency of some to regard all knowledge as science and to leave the domain of spirit, élan vital, will, aesthetic experience, and life to philosophy occasionally has manifested itself. Others have seen the overlap of interest as an indication of the basic unity of science and philosophy as these seek satisfactory, if complementary, solutions to the same problems (see philosophy and science).

Transitional and Contemporary Trends. Apart from the concern with science, philosophers in the 20th century have become increasingly aware of man and his problems. Even the new philosophers of despair are as much prophets of hope as they are of man's ill-fated condition. Before pretending to discuss the very being of all things, these thinkers philosophize about man and his experience in the everyday world. They designate man as historical, as consciousness, as body-self, as transcendence, and in general as a being-in-process toward a future; but they also see an ontological dimension in human modes of being and activity. They regard men as the responsible authors, with or without God, of their private and public philosophies and their effects. In their opinion science, concerned with specialized experience, builds an abstracted world of its own; but, through technology, science can help free man for his historical tasks. Religion and the arts are seen as closer to man's workaday world, adding to the meaning of life in the present and for the limitless future.

Definition. There is no definition of philosophy that is agreed upon uniformly by all philosophers. However, if the consideration is restricted to views of philosophy that are commonly accepted in the classical and scholastic tradition on the one hand, and in the modern tradition on the other, it becomes possible to mark out fairly broad areas of agreement.

Classical and Scholastic Tradition. Thinkers in the classical and scholastic tradition tend to regard philosophy as a habit of mind or a body of natural knowledge that results from the use of special methods and that enables one to explain in a more or less profound way the sum of human experiences. It differs from common knowledge in that it is acquired and evolved systematically, although it must take its beginnings from ordinary experience. Insofar as it considers everything knowable and is not restricted to one or other species or kind of entity; it is more universal in its concern than are the special sciences; in a certain way it includes even them and their objects in its consideration.

A more detailed description of philosophy, as considered in this tradition, may be had by enumerating the questions and problems it commonly treats. Thus one of its areas of inquiry concerns the procedures to be used in the acquisition of knowledge; another concerns the world of nature and related topics such as motion, time, and space; yet another concerns life and its meaning, the nature of man, and his various cognitional and appetitive activities; another concerns morality, social and political life, the nature of law and other institutions that preserve the common good; still another concerns being, its attributes, its categories, and its principles.

Thinkers in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, particularly, accent the certain and causal character of philosophical knowledge. Though not holding that every subject investigated by philosophers permits absolutely certain judgment, they regard truth and certitude as the goal of philosophy and insist on the availability to the human mind of at least some starting points on which philosophical reasoning can be solidly grounded. Philosophy, in their understanding, remains ever open to further extension and development, but it is not subject to change with regard to first principles and other self-evident truths on which this development is based, except in the sense that these come to be more deeply comprehended and understood with the passage of time. Thus they define philosophy as all certain and evident knowledge, grasped either directly or through causal analysis and demonstration, that man can attain through human reason alone, and this both in the speculative order and in the practical order, but in the latter only as this enables man to reach his ultimate end. Being concerned with all knowledge, philosophy is not merely one science but is an aggregate of several different sciences; since its unity is merely analogical, it cannot be defined strictly. Its certain and evident character separates it from conjecture and from mere personal opinion, and also from divine faith which, though certain, is not evident to the human mind. Again, it is purely natural knowledge, and this separates it from sacred theology, which makes use of knowledge that can be had only through the acceptance of divine revelation.

Modern Tradition. Attempts by modern philosophers to define philosophy can be explained in terms of the interrelationship between subject and object; for them, the confrontation of subject and object is what generates philosophical content. No philosopher in the modern era denies the function of subject in philosophizing. Materialists, empiricists, and phenomenalists may reduce the subject or his experience to brute matter or to sense imagery, and a monist or a subjective idealist may merge subject with object. But all seem to concur that philosophy is a reflection on the subject's experience; it is the response of the self to whatever appears to be nonself. In the early 20th century greater emphasis than theretofore was placed on the subject as central in all philosophizing. Though philosophy may be a true report or counterpart of extramental objects, like all knowledge it is regarded as indigenously personal; it is evoked from, surrounded by, and presented in symbols that spring from a field of consciousness also manifesting the philosopher himself. From this point of view, philosophy is what a philosopher considers it to be. He himself is the final referent for its veridical meaning. Philosophers employ a wide variety of designations—such as science, wisdom, freedom, Weltanschauung, Dasein, and Lebenswelt —to denominate this personal aspect of the subject-for-philosophy.

But philosophy is generally conceded to be about something—whether this be termed object, being, idea, matter, principle, self, cause, thing, spirit, or will. The object of philosophy is regarded by some as that which comes to or is conveyed into the subject; others consider the object as that to which the subject reaches out, as that toward which he is tendential, or even as that which he finally attains. Object, as the counterpart of subject, is thus accorded different values by various philosophers. It is therefore evident that one can have philosophical content in the modern sense at its sober minimum in the solipsist subject or at its ecstatic maximum as concerned with a great plurality of objects. No matter which factors are highlighted, however, philosophy comes out to be a reflection on, and a derivative of, the fusion between subject and object. It is a content by way of personal reflection, and a content that is reflected also in the dialogue philosophers have, at least among themselves, about intersubjective relationships (see subjectivity; objectivity).

Scope. The following survey of the branches or domains of philosophy adopts the traditional classification of knowledge into speculative, with its three degrees or levels, and practical, with its realms of art, prudence, and moral science (see sciences, classification of). It may be argued that this distinction is either indefensible or inapplicable to modern thought, but the fact remains that no newer classification is generally accepted. The problem here proposed, of course, presupposes an answer to the question: What kind of totality is philosophy? Some hold that it is an integral, organic unity: it studies being in general and in particular: it encompasses large issues and ferrets out minor details; but it is uniform in outlook, the sole differentiation within it arising from the variety of topics it considers. Others view philosophy as, say, primarily metaphysics or logic: other branches they regard as philosophical only by way of participation. Whatever position is maintained, however, contemporary philosophy can be understood without too much distortion as a historical development from the following branches of classical philosophy: logic; philosophy of nature and psychology; mathematics and its philosophy; metaphysics, including epistemology and natural theology; and the practical domains of art, ethics, and politics.

Logic. Traditional philosophy views logic in one way as propaedeutic to higher learning. Logic teaches the modes of correct thinking in terms of the concept, the judgment, and reasoning. Throughout ancient and medieval times, logic was closely allied to other branches of learning, though there were some noteworthy attempts at liberating it from its affinity to psychology and to metaphysics. Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant are key figures in the struggle to give logic an outlook and a domain of its own as distinct from metaphysics; G. Boole, G. Peano, G. Frege, B. russell, and E. husserl, on the other hand, are prominent among those who strove to depsychologize logic. As a result of these influences, one may identify at least three aspects of logic. In its first aspect, which is more traditional, logic functions as a tool or instrument subserving other branches of learning. In its second aspect, logic becomes a discipline in its own right that is concerned with the forms of thought; this usage is best exemplified in logistics, or mathematical logic, or symbolic logic. phenomenology unveils a third aspect of logic. It proposes a methodology whereby answers can be sought to the question: What is involved in, or what is the very meaning of, concepts such as God, or velvet, or atom? (see logic; logic, history of; logic, symbolic.)

Philosophy of Nature and Psychology. The earliest philosophies of nature served as a background for the rise of the physical, biological, and psychological sciences. Plato's Timaeus and its many commentaries, together with Aristotle's physical treatises and their medieval and early modern commentaries, go far to explain why 17th-century scientists came to regard themselves as the new philosophers of nature. A series of epochal discoveries, however, altered this situation and gradually separated the philosophical from the scientific world-view. Evolutionary theory and such sciences as biology, paleontology, geology, and anthropology challenged the static conception of nature latent in some presentations of ancient thought. The discovery of analytical geometry, of the calculus, and of non-Euclidean geometries provided new instruments for investigating the world of change. Similarly, new concepts associated with quantum theory and the theories of relativity led to the questioning of all centuries-old world pictures. As a result, the very possibility of a philosophical outlook on the world independent of scientific knowledge was seriously challenged. Philosophy was confined to the roles of evaluating the proposals of science and of defending human values against the encroachments of technology. More recently, however, the philosophy of science has made its appearance, and one finds scientists returning more to philosophical conceptions of the world of nature. The traditional philosophy of nature likewise has strong support among those who aspire to harmonize its basic tenets with the changed outlook of science. (see philosophy of nature.)

A similar upheaval led to the divorce of philosophy from psychology and its branches. The nature, function, and ultimate disposition of man is an age-old question treated extensively in the Platonic and the Aristotelian traditions. For both, the study of man was primarily the study of psyche or soul, and the problem of the body-soul relationship was of paramount importance. With the rise of new sciences more directly concerned with man, however, various philosophies (dualistic, monistic, materialistic, etc.) were developed in attempts to answer the question: Who is man? Psychology and its attendant disciplines, separated in time from these philosophies, developed a closer affinity to the natural sciences.

Mathematics and Philosophy. No branch of learning has longer or closer contact with philosophy than mathematics. Except for extreme empiricists and materialists, philosophers have frequently regarded mathematical science as the exemplar of sophisticated thought, as the limit of certitude toward which other branches of learning converge. Early philosophers, regarding mathematics as the science of quantified being, conceded it a position inter-mediate between those of metaphysics and of the philosophy of nature. Modern thinkers, influenced by new discoveries in mathematics, have modified these views. But the closeness of mathematics to philosophy still is witnessed in current concerns over the foundations of mathematics and related topics in the philosophy of mathematics. (see mathematics, philosophy of.)

Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Natural Theology. No subject of learning in man's history has been the recipient of warmer accolades or more virulent gibes than metaphysics. For some, metaphysics is more divine than theology; for others, more diabolical than astrology. Nor is any other subject matter as much confounded with other subjects and forced to wear the masks now of a logic, now of a psychology or an anthropology, and so on. Traditionally, metaphysics is the science of being in general, as contrasted with other branches of learning whose proper concern is particular being. Metaphysics, then, functions as a wisdom to all the sciences and arts, including the art of life itself. After its hegemony in this latter regard was challenged by the Christian faith, metaphysics became an instrument for exploring Christian mysteries. Throughout the early Christian and medieval periods of thought, it thus retained its contact with other branches of learning. The new sciences, however, made sport of metaphysics along with the decadent science with which it was associated. All too often, metaphysicians reacted by continuing to expound their science in traditional form—neither receiving from, nor contributing anything to, the new sciences.

The outstanding success of these sciences, however, together with the rise of totally new philosophies, has served to awaken metaphysics from its slumber. Some scholars, appalled at the implications of the new sciences and their methods, raised the cry "back to metaphysics." The problem of the nature of human knowledge was reopened and led to the development of the branch of metaphysics called epistemology—a discipline of key importance in modern philosophy. From the throes of these and other movements, a renewal of metaphysics is currently in progress. The new metaphysics sees man as intentional-toward-being, as consciousness, as freedom, as transcendence—as a questioner to whom being is both manifest and hidden. (see metaphysics; metaphysics, validity of.)

Traditionally, metaphysics culminates in natural theology, with its proofs for God's existence and its study of His nature. This is another area of metaphysics that is undergoing renewal as the result of many factors, e.g., the problems associated with the theories of evolution and relativity, the question of man's function in this world as a being-toward-death and his ultimate disposition, and the renewed interest in Eastern philosophy. Thus the principal questions of theodicy are again being brought into focus: Can God be conceptualized in human categories and regarded as totally immanent to all being? Does He transcend all human categories? Is He at once immanent and transcendent? A greater merging of religious, philosophical, and scientific thought is in evidence; and channels are being opened by Christian philosophers that may lead to more agreement on the concepts of God in metaphysics and in revealed religion. (see theology, natural; existential metaphysics.)

Arts and Philosophy. The ordering of the arts among themselves and the function and meaning of art were discussed by Greek thinkers as well as by their medieval heirs. A much discussed question was whether or not beauty is to be enumerated among the transcendental properties of being as such. The beauty of human works of art was seen to lie in their successful imitation of nature or in their exemplification of a truth of religious message. The introduction of Greek and Roman classics in the Renaissance gave great impetus to the arts, with the result that new theories of the nature of art were proposed by artists themselves and by philosophers. aesthetics generally has limited its analyses to the fine arts; its current tendency is to stress the creativity of the artist and the modes in which he symbolizes his cultural milieu [see art (philosophy); poetics (aristotelian); liberal arts].

Ethics and Politics. In traditional thought, the intellect has always been viewed as directive of human action. As in art, so in moral science, reason serves as a counselor and guide affording practical principles for all of man's activity. Two main areas have consistently been recognized: ethics, relating to the sphere of individual man and his responsibility, and politics, concerned with man's social and political nature.

The traditional outlook on ethics has insisted that the good is in things and that man's choice and conformity to this good affords him whatever happiness is available in this life. This doctrine, accepted for centuries, gave way in modern thought to Kant's ethical formalism. The notion of value, more recently, has opened up new directions for studying man's significance and his role in forming his future. (see ethics; ethics, history of; value, philosophy of.)

Among the Greeks, the social and political orders held primacy over the individual and his personal concerns. This effective subordination of ethics to social and political philosophy was only gradually challenged in the modern era by such writers as J. J. rousseau, T. hobbes and the British empiricists. Contemporary discussions are concerned with the basic tenets of social and political philosophy and how these are to be differentiated from, and at the same time related to, the findings of the social and political sciences.

Philosophy and the Catholic Church. The historical relationship of the Catholic Church to philosophy is a patchwork of light and darkness. No one can deny, of course, the greatness of an augustine or of a thomas aquinas. Lights of the philosophical world as well as of the Church, such thinkers are symbolic of the positive aspect of this relationship: the interest, concern, and support of philosophy by the Church. This general belief in reason and in philosophy is attested in various ways: (1) official pronouncements on the value of philosophy for Catholic and specifically for seminary education; (2) the traditional role of philosophy in the Church as subserving theological interests and needs; (3) discussions on the possibility of a Christian philosophy; (4) the notion of a philosophia perennis that continually reworks and reshapes a basic philosophical message in accord with Christian revelation. In the U.S., Catholics manifest their interest in philosophy by requiring it not only in seminaries but in collegiate education as well; by sponsoring philosophical journals; and by their membership and support of the American Catholic Philosophical Association and similar congresses and movements.

On the other hand, one cannot fail to acknowledge that leading authorities in the Church have often been unfriendly or openly inimical to certain philosophers and their teachings or that they favor some doctrines over others—often for insufficient or prejudicial reasons. Some of these episodes are intelligible within their historical context, whereas others are not. Occasional clashes between philosophers and Church authorities illustrate the perennial tension within the Church itself between freedom and authority. It is not to the purpose to recount here the long history of these episodes. It need only be pointed out—while admitting that tactical blunders have been made in the past—that the Church can no more be indifferent to philosophy than philosophers can be to each other's proposals. If one believes in an open society and in the freedom of knowledge, he can no more deprive the Church of its say than he can other interested parties and critics.

Teaching of Philosophy. If the nature of philosophy and of its branches is difficult to describe and if the relationship of philosophy to other branches of knowledge is quite complex, what can be said of the teaching of philosophy? It is evident, in the first place, that this question can be asked (and answered) only by those who have a definite view of human knowledge and its personal and cultural functions. Both the order and the method of teaching philosophy must be determined by one's personal outlook as well as by cultural and student needs. For those who grant philosophy a place in the curriculum, its content and method of teaching vary depending on what philosophy is considered to be, viz, either a form of wisdom that completes other types of knowledge, or an introduction to religious knowledge, or a personal outlook on the totality of experience, or a rigorous academic discipline, or a combination of any or all of these views. Probably the best teachers of philosophy are those of Socratic lineage who are both generalists and specialists, who awaken their students to reflection and also give them material on which to reflect, and who thus propound the simple truth that philosophy is not only a search for wisdom but is itself the wisdom that is sought.

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[e. a. maziarz]