Monad
MONAD
From the Greek, μονάς, a unit or individual entity, a monad is a simple, unextended, substantial, dynamic being of a psychical nature that reflects and represents the whole universe within itself, spontaneously and more or less consciously, without direct interaction with any other being. Monads are previously interrelated on the basis of a similarity of composition and a preestablished harmony.
The concept of the monad goes back to the later philosophy of plato, who sought an original unit (μονάς) from which to derive the many. In a similar manner, neo-platonism postulated the One (ἓν), a self–subsistent principle from which numbers emanate, again to explain how many come to image the one. nicholas of cusa accepted the explanation of the School of Chartres that God is the One, who reveals Himself in the world and is above all present there and to whom all beings are related as to an original source, so that He is "all in all" (quodlibet in quolibet ). Giordano bruno also adopted the monas, but as psychically animated and spatially extended. He thought of it as an atom, a microcosm that encloses the macrocosm.
G. W. leibniz, for whom the monad became a principle of a dynamic panpsychism, began by seeking to improve upon the notion of substance as developed by R. descartes. He thought of monads as metaphysical points, psychical centers of force, and the substantial elements of which the universe is composed. They are true atoms, but at the same time overlapping units, making up "higher monads" and thus the hierarchical forms and
structures of all things, crowned by the divine monad as the source and mind of the universe. In themselves they are indestructible; according to Leibniz, they were created by God and can be destroyed only by Him. The Leibnizian monad is the recapitulation and ultimate extension of the formula of B. spinozam: Deus sive natura sive substantia; yet, because Leibniz relates all monads to the first monad (God), his theory is essentially different from that of Spinoza.
The entire monad theory is based upon the implications of the Parmenidean identification of thought and being. The result is that a similarity in image is identified with a similarity of being, an identification that is itself untenable. In Leibniz's time, those who discussed monads were H. More (1614–87), F. M. van Helmont (1614–99) and G. vico; those later influenced by Leibniz in the compilation of an inductive metaphysics include R. H. lotze, H. Driesch, and E. Becher (1882–1929).
See Also: monism.
Bibliography: f. c. copleston, History of Philosophy (Westminster, Md. 1946–) 4:295–319. a. plebe, Enciclopedia filosofica, 4 v. (Venice–Rome 1957) 3:669. r. eisler, Wöterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe, 3 v. (4th ed. Berlin 1927–30) 2:169–172. w. cramer, Die Monade: Das philosophische Problem vom Ursprung (Stuttgart 1954).
[j. hirschberger]
