Jaspers, Karl
JASPERS, KARL
Philosopher; b. Feb. 23, 1883, Oldenburg, Germany; d. Feb. 25, 1969, Basel. Jaspers established himself as one of the leading existentialists of his time, although he himself did not accept the label existentialist. He followed his father into the study of law (1901), received his doctorate in medicine (1909) and married Gertrud Mayer in 1910. He worked as a scientific assistant in a psychiatric clinic, where he applied the methods of phenomenology to clinical psychiatry. He became a lecturer in psychology in 1913, and there began his transition from psychology to philosophy. He obtained his first post as lecturer in philosophy in 1916 at Heidelberg. In 1921 he was named professor of philosophy at Heidelberg. During this time he developed a friendship with Martin hei degger, which ended because of their differences over the growth of the Nazi party. He remained at Heidelberg until 1937, when the Nazis forced him to resign. He was reinstated in 1945, where he worked to rebuild the university and urged a national acknowledgment of guilt for the horrors of Naziism. Disappointed with the response he received, in 1948 he moved to Switzerland and became a professor at the University of Basel. He advocated a political unity to the world wherein various entities could live together in peace. His disapproval of the manner in which German democracy was developing after the war caused him to surrender his passport in 1967 and apply for Swiss citizenship.
Thought. When a student once asked him by what label he would like to be known, he retorted: "by that of a philosopher." For Jaspers philosophy was philosophizing and arose out of the philosopher's own life situation. Philosophy is not a body of knowledge accessible to consciousness in general, but rather a thoroughly personal struggle to understand life and by that activity to rise above objective knowledge (Dasein ) to Being-for-oneself, where a person is conscious of the limits of science and of his basic freedom as a responsibility. To exist authentically, one must also accept his individual and collective past—his historicity—and make his free decisions with this in mind. Furthermore, communication with other unique existences of the present and of the past is a condition of self-fulfillment, a requirement of the good life.
Jaspers's special contribution to modern philosophy is his analysis of the critical fringes of human existence, what he calls the "limit-situation" (Grenz-situation ). Limit situations, such as the death of another and one's own projected death, suffering, conflict, failure, and guilt lead the self to the edge of transcendence. As the objective world falls to pieces, personal existence is in a position to hear the voice of transcendence. At this level, faith becomes operative. Faith must not be considered a sure, objective, and communicable conquest of reason. Philosophy can only point to an experience of God; each person is left to himself for the last step. Being-for-oneself brings with it access to this intuitive cognition, a type of experience not to be equated with traditional mysticism. For Jaspers, contact with transcendence comes in rare high moments through reading "ciphers." Myths, religions, and philosophies are commentaries on the original ciphers: nature, history, and personal existence. None of these reveal a definitive truth about transcendence. On the other hand, they are the means through which one must acquire his personal convictions about the ultimate meaning of life.
In describing the limit-situation Jaspers tells us that every human being faces two unsettling experiences. First are the antinomies. These refer to the irreducibility of life to thought. The constructs of reason are always a distortion of the particularity and progressive character of truth. Second are the experiences constituting the limit-situation proper. These are the experiences on the boundary of our empirical existence (freedom, suffering, death, guilt). Here we become aware of the limits of objective thought.
Limit-situations can be resolved only by experience, not thought, because they involve contradictory poles (freedom-destiny, good-evil, life-death). Human existence is suspended between the law of the day and the passion of the night (i.e., between objective thought and existential aspirations). It is in the acceptance of this tension that the subject transcends mysticism and positivism and finds his salvation.
Bibliography: Main works. Allgemeine Psychopathologie (Berlin 1948). Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (Berlin 1925). Philosophie, 3 v. (Berlin 1956). Works in English. Man in the Modern Age, tr. e. and c. paul (London 1951). Reason and Existenz, tr. w. earle (New York 1955). The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, tr. r. manheim (New York 1949). The Origin and Goal of History, tr. m. bullock (New Haven 1953). "On My Philosophy," tr. f. kaufmann, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. w. kaufmann (New York 1956) 131–158. Literature. p. a. schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers (New York 1957). b. welte, La Foi philosophique chez Jaspers et saint Thomas d'Aquin, tr. m. zemb (Paris 1958). p. ricoeur, Gabriel Marcel et Karl Jaspers: Philosophie du mystère et philosophie du paradoxe (Paris 1948). k. piper, ed., Karl Jaspers' Wirk und Wirkung (Munich 1963). c. wallraff, Karl Jaspers: An Introduction to His Philosophy (Princeton 1970). j. f. kane, Pluralism and Truth in Religion: Karl Jaspers on Existential Truth (Chico, CA 1981). l. h. ehrlich, Karl Jaspers: Philosophy as Faith (Amherst 1975).
[j. k. luoma/
l. a. blain/eds.]
