New Deal
NEW DEAL
During the New Deal years, from 1933 to the end of world war ii, the nation experienced an era of protracted economic crisis and social dislocation, a dramatic change in national political alignments, and then mobilization for total war. A society contending with changes and emergencies of this order, especially with an enormously popular reformist President in office, cannot easily avoid profound challenges to its constitutional order; and so it was for America in this era. Every major aspect of political controversy in this period found expression of varying kinds in constitutional discourse and conflict, and these constitutional battles both reflected and actively intensified the bitter ideological polarization that bedeviled the nation's politics.
When the New Deal era came to a close just after the war, the constitutional as well as political landscape of the country had been transformed. With respect both to governmental institutions and policies and to formal constitutional doctrine, things as they had stood in 1933 had been largely swept away. The transformations of governance and politics in the New Deal era brought far-reaching reform of constitutional law, accomplished without benefit of formal constitutional amendment on any question except the repeal of prohibition. The new constitutional order that emerged, moreover, would stand firmly for half a century as the basic framework of the modern welfare, regulatory, and national-security state. In most particulars, the new order proved durable enough to survive determined efforts by neoconservatives in the 1980s to overturn some of the most important New Deal doctrines and reforms.
president franklin d. roosevelt at the outset of his presidency characteristically struck a pose that seemed to dismiss offhandedly the need for worries about constitutional difficulties. "Our Constitution is so simple and practical," he declared in his first inaugural address in 1933, "that it is possible always to meet extraordinary needs by changes in emphasis and arrangement without loss of essential form." But what changes in "emphasis" and "arrangement" he had in mind! Even the legislative programs and executive actions of the "First Hundred Days" posed a broad challenge to prevailing doctrines in constitutional law, especially regarding the protection of vested economic rights against government's hand and the proper limits of the national government's authority in the federal system. Nor did the challenge recede or soften significantly in the years immediately following, as Roosevelt and his party generated a prolix legislative and administrative record that would repeatedly inspire bitter constitutional controversies.
Virtually every element of the New Deal administration's policies, especially their idealistic nuances and implications, bore the imprint of Roosevelt's own thinking. The direction and extraordinary scope of the New Deal's challenge to the traditional role and perogatives of the states, for example, were signaled early by Rooselvelt when he was governor of New York: "In our business life and in our social contracts," he declared in 1929, "we are little controlled by the methods and practices employed by our forefathers." Why, then, he asked, be "content … to accept and continue to use the local machinery of government which was first devised generations or even centuries ago?" This kind of iconoclasm and willingness to experiment with governmental structures structures was soon to be directed against the states. Impatience with antiquated institutional legacies was linked with Roosevelt's robust "Old Progressive" faith in bringing enterprise to bear on social and economic problems. Hence, the President readily endorsed the regional approach (exemplified by the tennesee valley authority act of 1933) to problems that trascended state lines. Similarly, he was sypathetic to a national planning approach (as was espoused by his National Resource Planning Board and the agricultural price-support and production-controll efforts); and he also fostered the system of direct federal grant-in-aid support to city governments for public housing, airports, and other projects in ways that dramaically enhanced municipal autonomy within the states.
Perhaps of greatest long-run importance to governmental practice was Roosevelt's own proclivity to devolve on appointive agencies and their expert staffs the responsibility for defining the "public interest" in the course of setting regulatory policies—a preference shared by the New Deal majorities in Congress as they crafted the design of new regulatory agencies. Roosevelt regularly pressed on Congress and the public the urgency of the social and economic programs he was proposing—both the programs of the "Hundred Days," designed to break the terrible spiral of despair, and those of the ensuing years, designed to effect enduring reforms, including a systematic (and, to many, a radical) redistribution of income and wealth. The argument for urgent action, for room to experiment, and for administration with maximal flexibility and discretion was cast from the start in terms of the necessities associated with a "national emergency." As New Deal programs expanded, however, this view was translated into the more general argument for wide-ranging agency discretion and a reliance on experts for policy making. In the context of the war emergency after 1938, this tendency became even more pervasive.
The question remained: what constitutional principles, if any, restrained such claims by the chief executive? The New Deal answer in light of the Depression crisis tended increasingly to be couched as a majoritarian rationale: "Does anybody believe," asked Senator Lewis Schwellenbach of Washington, one of Roosevelt's closest allies in Congress, "that the founding fathers intended to set up a form of government which would prevent that government from solving the current problems of the people?" Roosevelt phrased the issue similarly in his first radio speech of his second term, the address in which he fired the first shot in the court-packing battle. It was the entire "modern movement for social and economic progress through legislation" that was at stake, the President declared, referring dramatically to "one-third of a nation ill-nourished, ill-clad, ill-housed." He rejected as outrageous the notion that the judiciary might deny Congress the authority "to protect us against catastrophe by meeting squarely our modern social and economic conditions."
In private correspondence with Schwellenbach, the President referred to their common view of the constitutional issues as the cause of "liberal democracy." New Deal victories by "overwhelming" popular majorities in 1932 and 1936, the President repeatedly contended in his public messages on the constitutional question, had provided an "overwhelming mandate" for immediate action to put the programs of "liberal democracy" in place.
Roosevelt and the constitutional imperatives embodied in his programs for this "liberal democracy" successfully prevailed beginning in 1937, as a new majority in support of the New Deal emerged virtually overnight on the hughes court and later became a dependable reliance for Roosevelt as he made new appointments. Similarly, the President would prevail in virtually all particulars when he assumed vastly expanded executive emergency authority in the military and foreign-policy realms during the prewar neutrality period and the years of combat in a global arena that followed the Pearl Harbor disaster.
The President thus placed his personal stamp on the most dramatic political initiatives of the era; however, there were also more enduring legacies of the New Deal in the nation's constitutional development. An inventory of this heritage from the 1930s and World War II must embrace not only the dramatic changes that were ardently debated in their own day, but also the various effects of conflict and innovation only dimly discerned by either friends or critics of Roosevelt's social and economic programs and the wartime initiatives.
Prominent in the inventory of change was the movement of national authority and active intervention into many vital areas of social and economic life that before 1933 had been left by Congress largely to the states and had been only marginally affected by national law. A vast array of legislation from 1933 to 1937 bespoke this dramatic occupation by Congress of policy areas that traditionally had been extremely decentralized in practice; some of them, moreover, had been specifically designated by the Supreme Court's conservative majority as being within the exclusive purview of the states as a matter of tenth amendment guarantees, or as a matter of judicially defined categories that differentiated "national" from "local" activities under terms of the commerce clause or in light of the doctrine of a limited number of enumerated powers.
Thus, by 1941 the working constitutional system had become a system in which formal constitutional issues of federalism had been recast completely in light of new realities generated by New Deal innovations. A definitive redistribution of both policy responsibilities and power had occurred. There was comprehensive restructuring of agriculture as a managed sector, a formal preemption of labor law through the Wagner Act and its guarantees of the right to organize, adoption of minimal federal standards for wages and hours, and the establishment of a vast regional energy and economic development program through the Tennessee Valley Authority. Federal regulatory authority was extended over the securities markets, and there was a dramatic expansion of national regulation in the transportation, antitrust, and banking fields. The New Deal also instituted the first massive entitlement programs with the passage of the social security act in 1935; this measure became the foundation stone of the modern national welfare state.
One concomitant of this powerful move toward centralization of governmental responsibilities was a transformation in the distribution of funds and expenditures. In 1929, with expenditures of $2.6 billion, the budget of the national government was only one-third the amount of state and local expenditures; but a decade later, federal expenditures were $9 billion, exceeding the combined amounts spent by state and local government. Linked with this aspect of new "giant government"—emergence of the national government as a modern Leviathan—was the New Deal's explicit adoption in 1938 of Keynesian principles for fiscal policy. Although growth of the national government establishment was not in itself a development that implicated constitutional questions directly, as a reality of governance and power, "big government" transformed the entire context of the debate over constitutional principles.
More explicitly cast in constitutional terms was the matter of federal grants in aid to state and local government, which rose from $193 million in 1933 to a floodtide level of $2.9 billion in 1939. Although welfare and relief comprised some eighty percent of these sums in each year, the vast aggregate amount in 1939 embraced a range of new programs for natural-resources management, public housing, and health services as well as the more traditional highway aid and agricultural research funds. In this arena of initiative, the Supreme Court posed no serious obstacles; in the 1923 case of frothingham v. mellon, it already had upheld the practice of attaching conditions to federal grants. Decisions in the late 1930s reaffirmed this view. Taken as a whole, the grant-in-aid programs became an important element of what has been termed the modern system of cooperative federalism, displacing the older principles and practices of dual federalism.
In its devastating response to the early New Deal measures for industrial reorganization and agricultural market controls, the Supreme Court in schechter poultry corporation v. united states (1935) did strike down key legislation in part because of what it found to be a promiscuous violation of the principles of separation of powers. After the new liberal majority had established the credo of Roosevelt's "liberal democracy" in a dominant position in the Court's decisions after 1936, however, the delegation of rule-making authority to the new administrative and regulatory agencies won virtually routine approval with the Justices. Indeed, judicial deference to agency discretion became one of the most durable—and also most problematic—features of the longer-term New Deal legacy in American law.
For the most part, it was regulation of economic interests that was at stake when challenges were raised against administrative prerogatives; and as the Court abandoned its commitment to defend economic or entrepreneurial liberty on the same basis as it would the political elements of liberty (see preferred freedoms), such challenges lost their doctrinal authoritativeness. Not until the 1960s did political leaders and legal scholars entirely sympathetic with the goals of New Deal-style benefit programs and regulatory regimes begin to worry much about excessive paternalism and discretion. They became concerned particularly with the degree to which the New Deal legacy had produced a system of social benefits, franchises, subsidies, and services that were dispensed by elaborate bureaucracies. In this system, some groups and individuals were favored, while others might be held virtually in thrall because of Byzantine or Kafkaesque procedural standards or simply because of high-handedness and capriciousness. Only then, thirty years after the system had begun to emerge from New Deal legislation and twenty years after the Administrative Procedure Act became law, were the Constitution's procedural guarantees reappraised with a view toward real equality of treatment and fairness in the agencies' administration of social programs and regulations.
When war broke out in Asia and Europe, the Roosevelt administration's policies carried the "emergency" doctrine and delegation of powers to an entirely new level. In September 1939, the President declared a "limited emergency" by executive order, thereby assuming the authority to expand the military forces and to take other measures under war statutes. After the Pearl Harbor attack, the two war powers acts (December 1941 and March 1942) gave the President unprecedented delegated powers under which he erected a massive bureaucracy with coercive powers to direct mobilization. The March 1941 Lend-Lease Act also delegated the spending power, providing the legal basis for over $50 billion in grants of supplies and credits to the Allies.
In one of the most extraordinary documents in the entire history of American constitutional law, Roosevelt in September 1942 threatened that if Congress failed to meet his wishes with respect to repealing a section of the price-control laws in light of the war emergency, he would assume the power to nullify the law on his own authority. Congressional deference averted a constitutional confrontation on the issue.
The war period was of special importance with respect to civil liberties. In one of the most grievous violations of any groups' rights in the modern era, the Roosevelt administration authorized by executive order 9066 (later validated by Congress) the removal in 1942 of the entire Japanese-ancestry population from the West Coast and their prolonged internment in concentration camps until nearly the end of the war. Meanwhile, the army took advantage of a declaration of martial law in Hawaii by the territorial governor in the hours after Pearl Harbor, maintaining a comprehensive military regime with suspension of civilian justice in criminal matters until late 1944, long after any credible threat of invasion of the Hawaiian Islands had passed. In the notorious japanese american cases (1943–1944), the Supreme Court upheld the removal and internment decisions; but when the Hawaiian policy was finally challenged (duncan v. kahanamoku), the Court ruled that the army had acted illegally in suspending civilian government and justice beyond the time justified by military necessity.
Although the wartime record on civil liberties was thus marred by excesses of the military authorities—and although the army in each instance had full support of the White House—the more enduring heritage of the New Deal in race relations and constitutional equal protection has a different face. Although failing to support federal antilynching bills or any positive civil rights legislation that would have attacked segregation, Roosevelt and the agency administrators generally pressed hard to see that blacks received an equitable share of the benefits of federal welfare and relief programs. The President supported the Justice Department's creation in 1939 of what became the Civil Rights Division; and within a few years, this unit's lawyers had undertaken a variety of prosecutions—the most significant being the case of united states v. classic (1941)—challenging racial discrimination in the electoral process in the southern states. The Justice Department's new concern for equal rights and civil liberties also served to enhance the significance of Supreme Court decisions (including especially hague v. cio in 1939) (that were then strengthening first amendment guarantees and laying the essential doctrinal groundwork for the much farther-reaching civil liberties and civil rights jurisprudence of the warren court era. In sum, racial equality and civil liberties had been brought within the ambit of the New Deal agenda—the essential counterweight to unrestrained majoritarianism that many feared was embodied in Roosevelt's attack on the Court in 1936 and even, albeit in a more reflective mode, in the constitutional theories calling for "judicial self-restraint" championed in the wake of the Court fight (see judicial review and democracy).
The American constitutional order in 1945, at President Roosevelt's death, had thus witnessed far-reaching changes in the allocation of state versus federal powers, in the extent and style of intervention by government in social and economic affairs, and in the role of the national authorities in regard to individual rights and liberties. In the realm of doctrine, the Supreme Court had reinterpreted the commerce clause so completely that the Justices would soon declare it to be simply "as broad as the economic needs of the nation" (American Power & Light v. SEC). After the decision of wickard v. filburn (1942), the economic regulatory powers of the Congress seemed to be plenary, with no economic activity protected from congressional determination of what was of national significance. As early as 1934, in nebbia v. new york, the Court had discarded traditional economic due process and affected with a public interest doctrine—two of the main props of traditional vested rights analysis that had been used to restrain severely the state's regulatory powers. In united states v. darby lumber company (1941) the Court cast into the dustbin of history, it seemed, the old view of the Tenth Amendment, declaring now that the amendment "states but a truism" and was merely "declaratory." Meanwhile, the New Deal administration posed a new challenge to state sovereignty over valuable natural resources by asserting a federal property claim based on "paramount rights" over the offshore oil and any other resources of the continental shelf, long considered to be under state ownership out to a distance of three miles. With the emergence of the new civil rights and civil liberties jurisprudence exemplified by Classic, the university-segregation decision of missouri ex rel. gaines v. canada (1938), and other decisions, the potentialities of the emerging changes in law became clear. Whether one interprets these changes, as friends of the Roosevelt Administration sought to do, as a "return to the Constitution" (a reversal of conservative doctrines that had become dominant in violation of correct principles), or instead, as a positive advancement of law to meet the urgent requirements of a modern industrial society in crisis, the New Deal era did indeed bequeath to postwar America a constitutional order dramatically transformed.
Harry N. Scheiber
(1992)
Bibliography
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