Hong Kong and Macau

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Hong Kong and Macau

Hong Kong comprises an extension of China's Guangdong province and some 235 islands including Hong Kong Island. It has a land area of 1,100 square kilometers (425,000 square miles) and had an estimated population of 6,855,125 in 2004. Level land is at a premium as most of Hong Kong consists of rugged hills and mountains. A large percentage of Hong Kong's people live and work in high density areas on the northern side of Hong Kong Island and across the water at Kowloon. Since the early 1950s an increasing number of refugees from China forced the government to build large housing estates in selected areas throughout the southern part of an area north of Kowloon known as the New Territories. Dotted throughout the New Territories and most of the smaller islands are numerous traditional villages where life has remained relatively unchanged over the past 100 years.

british colony to chinese special administrative region

Hong Kong was made a Special Administrative Region within the People's Republic of China (PRC) on July 1, 1997, after being a British Crown Colony for some 156 years. Prior to British settlement Hong Kong Island was a haven for smugglers, fishermen, and those fleeing from or plotting against imperial rule. While British colonial rule gradually ameliorated the worst excesses of the local Chinese population, it did not temper their sense of adventure and desire for both wealth and freedom. In the early days of colonial rule, Hong Kong developed a reputation as a dynamic but unsavory place where the opium trade, organized crime, and unscrupulous entrepreneurs who paid little heed to ethics, law, and protocol thrived.

Throughout the twentieth century Hong Kong gradually established itself as a major port and a center for business and trade. From the 1970s, Hong Kong entered a period of record economic growth which, along with the other East Asian "dragon" economies of Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea, created the phenomena now known as the East Asian Economic Miracle.

Until the 1990s the people of Hong Kong were recognized only for their energy and financial acumen and were thought to be disinterested in politics. As recently as the transfer of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, most commentators were still describing the people of Hong Kong as politically apathetic.

Britain gained increasing control over Hong Kong in three successive stages over a sixty-year period. It began with the raising of the British flag on Hong Kong Island on January 20, 1841. After a number of territorial disputes between Britain and China, the British managed to establish full sovereignty over Hong Kong Island and a perpetual lease over the Kowloon peninsula in 1860. Toward the end of the nineteenth century a number of European powers as well as Japan and Russia began to seize Chinese territory. The British feared Hong Kong would be attacked and sought a 99-year lease from China over the New Territories to establish a defensible border at the Shenzen River.

During the later colonial period the political expression of the people of Hong Kong became increasingly focused on establishing rights and freedoms within the British system. There was no serious effort on the part of any group of Hong Kong residents either to reunite with China or to gain independence. Hong Kong, therefore, is one of the few European colonies where there was no independence movement of any significance and where there were only a handful of people who thought unification with the motherland would be desirable.

When it became obvious in the early 1980s that the Chinese would not renew the New Territories lease the British realized that Hong Kong would no longer be a viable entity with only the Hong Kong Island and Kowloon. In the following negotiations, China made it obvious that while it would accept nothing less than full sovereignty, it did concede it would have to allow Hong Kong a high degree of political autonomy to preserve stability and prosperity. At the same time, many prominent political figures in Hong Kong were beginning to realize that only by democratizing the structures of government and allowing only local candidates to stand for election could they limit the power of the central government in Beijing.

In 1984 Britain and China signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration (SBJD), which allowed the orderly transfer of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. The SBJD guaranteed that the common-law legal system would continue for the next fifty years. The SBJD also stated that the political structure would be subject to a number of stages that would ultimately lead to the full democratization of the Legislative Council and left the possibility open that the chief executive officer's (CEO) post could be subject to a similar process after 2007. Until that time, the CEO would be selected by an 800-person election committee appointed by the central Chinese government.

Up until 1984, Hong Kong had been administered by a governor and the legislative and executive councils. The roles of both councils had been largely advisory. The British now proposed that an increasing number of seats in the Legislative Council would be subject to election and that both the legislature and the executive should play a greater role in decision-making. In both the 1984 and the 1988 Legislative Council elections, twelve members were elected through functional constituencies such as law, social services, and education, and another twelve were elected via an electoral college.

basic law

The people of Hong Kong were far from satisfied with what they saw as a token attempt at democracy. They became even more concerned when China presented its mini-constitution for Hong Kong, known as the Basic Law.

Following China's suppression of pro-democracy activists in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in June 1989, over a million Hong Kong residents took part in a demonstration against China's brutal treatment of its own people. David Wilson (b. 1935), Hong Kong's governor from 1987 to 1992, responded by allowing the creation of political parties and making eighteen indirectly elected seats open to direct election through the geographic constituency model for the 1991 Legislative Council elections. The British government responded to what it saw as merely incremental changes and the shabby treatment of its prime minister, John Major (b. 1943), on a recent trip to Beijing by dismissing Wilson and appointing a career politician, Chris Patten (b. 1944), as its governor.

Although Patten realized his proposals for political change would have to comply with the Basic Law, they were still a marked improvement in terms of democracy and political participation. The net effect of the Patten reforms was to extend the electoral franchise to 2.7 million voters and make every one of the sixty seats in the Legislative Council subject to either direct or indirect election.

The Basic Law thus provides that Hong Kong's chief of government is the CEO, elected by an 800-member electoral committee that reflects the preferences of Beijing. There is also a sixty-seat Legislative Council: half elected by popular vote and half elected by functional constituencies. The judiciary is headed by Court of Final Appeal for the Hong Kong region. Although the Basic Law does allow democratization to proceed in a number of stages, the main focus is on methods to ensure law and order and to ensure that the CEO has similar powers to a British colonial governor until at least 2007.

In the Legislative Council elections held in September 1995 the pro-democracy candidates won nineteen of the twenty-five directly elected seats and fell only a few seats short of achieving a majority. Hong Kong's retrocession to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 has not changed the voting pattern. Rather, voting turnout numbers have increased along with support for pro-democracy parties and candidates.

beijing's influence

The first CEO selected by the China-appointed election committee, Tung Chee-hwa (b. 1937), installed on July 1, 1997, was seen by critics as weak, indecisive, and willing to go along with Chinese demands without consulting the people of Hong Kong. They argue that he failed to carry through with the democratic reforms outlined in both the Basic Law and the SBJD and also to introduce measures that would stimulate Hong Kong's flagging economy.

Under Tung's tutelage the Chinese exerted increasing control over business, the legal process, local politics, and security, and the civil liberties enshrined in both the SBJD and the Basic Law have been steadily eroded. In 1999 he allowed the powers inscribed in the Basic Law for the Court of Final Appeal to be, essentially, transferred to the National People's Congress in Beijing. A year later Pacific Century Cyberwork acquired one of Hong Kong's largest companies, Cable & Wireless HKT, making it obvious that China was backing one of its "patriotic" protégés, media mogul Richard Li, and that this practice was now becoming commonplace.

In July 2003, Tung was forced by the weight of public opinion to withdraw a bill that would have allowed the same draconian laws in operation in China, regarding free speech, civil liberties, and media censorship, to apply to Hong Kong. The passing of the bill would have outlawed large public demonstrations and groups such as Falun Gong in Hong Kong. The large protest rallies held over a number of days against the bill led to its withdrawal and the resignation of two of Tung's most prominent cabinet ministers.

By the middle of 2004 the people of Hong Kong had become increasingly concerned regarding Beijing's attempt to influence the outcome of the Legislative Council elections and threatening those prominent in the democracy movement. A number of leaders from the usually pro-China business community claimed that the democratic movement was now so large and broadly based that China's attempts to muzzle it were proving counterproductive and that the destabilizing effects of China's constant intervention in Hong Kong's affairs was posing a threat to Hong Kong's economic future.

At the same time, leading figures in the pro-democracy movement—including founding chairman of Hong Kong's Democratic Party, Martin Lee (b. 1938); professor and former chairman of the Democratic Party, Yeung Sum (b. 1947); and legislator Audrey Eu (b. 1953)—realized that, although most Hong Kongers desired democracy, they also wanted political stability and did not wish to see confrontation with Beijing continue. For the first time since 1997, a spirit of compromise took hold in which all parties, including the Chinese, began trying to find a way to solve the ongoing problems of political stability, autonomy, and civil rights, as well as discussing ways to improve Hong Kong's business environment.

Tung Chee-hwa resigned in 2005, two years before his term was ended. While he claimed to have left due to ill health, there is belief that Beijing may have played a role in his resignation.

macau

Macau lies some 50 miles west of Hong Kong and sits at the mouth of the Pearl River Delta. Macau comprises the geographic extension of China's Guangzhou province and the islands of Taipa and Coldane. Macau is considerably smaller than Hong Kong as it is only 18 square kilometers (7 square miles) and is home to approximately 450,000 residents. With the advent of large ocean growing vessels Macau lost its role as a trading port some time ago and for the past 150 years has mainly survived on gambling, tourism, and activities generally associated with organized crime.

Like Hong Kong, Macau was declared a Special Administrative Region of China in 1999 after being a Portuguese possession since 1557. Throughout Macau's long colonial history China has played a far greater role in its affairs than it has in Hong Kong. China did not recognize Portuguese sovereignty until 1862. Since the communist-inspired riots of 1966 and 1967 Portuguese authority has been in decline while Chinese influence has steadily increased.

On April 25, 1974, Portugal experienced a coup d'etat and the new government informed China that it wished to hand control of Macau back to China. Fearing that Chinese control would lead to the destabilization of Hong Kong, the Chinese government refused to discuss the issue. However, in 1979 Portugal and China came to a secret agreement that stated Macau was Chinese territory under temporary Portuguese administration. In 1987 China and Portugal signed an agreement in which sovereignty was officially transferred to China on December 20, 1999, and that Macau would become a Special Administrative Region with its own mini-constitution.

There are, however, some significant differences between the arrangements made for postcolonial Hong Kong and postcolonial Macau. Those who held Portuguese passports in 1999 were able to transfer Portuguese citizenship to their children and grandchildren while remaining residents of Macau. This was not the case in Hong Kong, where some people were left stateless in 1997. Although the desire for democratic governance is not as strong in Macau as it is in Hong Kong, China has allowed for partial democratization to occur in a number of stages.


In 2001 the number of democratically elected seats to Macau's Assemblia Legislativa (Legislative Assembly) rose from eight to ten out of twenty-seven members. In 2004 the number of democratically elected seats rose to twelve out of twenty-nine members. Macau's mini-constitution, also called the Basic Law, allows for the full democratization of the Assemblia Legislativa but does not stipulate a date. Like Hong Kong, Macau is, essentially, governed by a China-appointed CEO who selects seven of the members to the Assemblia Legislativa. The remaining members are appointed by local civic associations comprised of Macau's financial elite. In practice, the CEO, business groups, and Chinese officials get together and appoint all members that are not elected.

The low support for pro-democracy candidates suggests that the Macanese readily accept what is, in effect, indirect rule from Beijing and that this is unlikely to change in the near future. Edmund Ho (b. 1955), appointed Macau's CEO in 1999, has claimed that the main challenge facing Macau is the reduction of the strong influence exercised by organized crime on most aspects of public life. However, as the profits of gambling provide half the government's revenue and the role of the sex trade has only increased along with tourism since 1999, there is little likelihood that issues relating to human and civil rights will be given any prominence as organized crime and China's political interests seems destined to maintain a stranglehold.

See also: China (PRC).

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Ross Grainger