BRAHMAN

The origin and meaning of the term brahman are shrouded in mystery. Using the verbal root √bṛh, Western Indological scholars derive such meanings as "sacred magical power" (Hermann Oldenberg), "form, formulation" (Paul Thieme), "priestly utterance," "energy that is expressed in paradoxical terms" (Louis Renou), and "the live connection that holds the cosmos together" (Jan Hesterman) The meanings of brahman in the ancient "heard texts" (śrutis ) and later Indian philosophical systems are not unrelated to these meanings. For example, the Vedic understanding of the brahman survives in Bhartrhari's concept of the "śabda brahman." Likewise, the ideas of power, energy, and cosmic unity among opposites are taken up in the Vedāntic notion of the brahman as absolute reality. The notion of the brahman as the sacred power within a priest may have contributed to an identification of the brahman with the inner spirit (ātman ). This transformation of a much older notion into a discursively idealized philosophical concept resembles the way the concept of logos was transformed into "logic" "Vernunft," and "language."

Etymologically, the word brahman has two constituent components: the verbal root √bṛh and the suffix matup. The verbal root √bṛh means "to grow" and "the great," and together with the suffix provides two allied meanings: "the greatest" and "the root of all things." In the Vedic hymns the term brahman not only refers to the power contained in the words recited but also to the mysterious power present in the utterances of the Vedic hymns. Though the idea of brahman as the ground of all things is not entirely absent in the Vedas, the primary goal was to search for the power connecting the microcosm with the macrocosm.

Brahman in the Upaniṣads

This sense of power continues in the Upaniṣads (e.g., Kaṭha Upaniṣad), which say that the various devas (gods; literally, "the shining ones") each carry out their respective jobs for fear of the brahman (6.3); Kena Upaniṣad states that the various devas have no power outside the power of brahman residing in them. The brahman of the Upaniṣads is much more than a power; it is the cause of the origination, sustenance, and destruction of the world (Taittiīya Upaniṣad, 3.1.1). In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, when Yājñavalkya is questioned about the number of gods, he initially responds by saying that 3,306 gods were simply manifestations of thirty-three gods, and then successively reduces the number to six, three, two, one and a half, and then one. This god is none other than the brahman, and all other gods of the Vedas, the senses, and the mind are said to be the various powers of brahman (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 3.9.1–10). The central question in the Upaniṣads is framed as follows: "What is that by knowing which all else becomes known?" (Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, 1.13) The answer given is "brahman." If brahman is the source of everything, then brahman is also the core of each individual being, and this core is called ātman. In many places in the Upaniṣads the two terms brahman and ātman are used synonymously. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad asks: "What is ātman ? What is brahman ?" (5.11.1, ko nu ātmā, kiṃ brahmeti ?) When the inquiry pertains to the source of the universe, the word ātman is used, and in other cases when the inquiry is regarding the true self of a human being the word brahman is used. To the Upaniṣadic seers the brahman and the ātman signified the same reality, one within, and the other without.

The Upaniṣads describe brahman both negatively and positively. It is described as neither gross, nor subtle, nor short, nor long, nor red, nor adhesive, without shadow, darkness, air, space, attachment, taste, smell, eyes, ears, speech, mind, light, breath, mouth, and measure, and without inside and outside (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 3.8.8), and that who consists of mind, whose body is life, whose form is light, whose conception is truth, whose soul is space, containing all works, desires, odors, and tastes, and encompassing the whole world, the speechless and the calm (Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 3.14.2).

Brahman in VedĀnta

The exegetical effort to construe these different groups of sentences to resolve any apparent contradiction shaped the understanding of brahman in the Upaniṣadic schools. Two hermeneutic principles were applied: accord priority and finality to the positive texts, or since negation implies a prior affirmation that is then negated, the final import of the Upaniṣads may be taken to be expressed in the negative texts, the positive ones simply preparing the ground for it. The latter hermeneutical principle is adopted by Śaṃkara, the most well-known exponent and defender of the school known as Advaita Vedānta (nondualistic Vedānta); and the former by Rāmānuja, the founder of Viśiṣṭādvaita (qualified nondualism), and Madhva in his Dvaita Vedānta.

Advaita VedĀnta

From the perspective of Śaṃkara's nondualistic Vedānta, brahman is one without a second; the world is false (māyā, in a rather technical sense of "presented appearance") and the finite individual and the brahman are nondifferent. The brahman can neither be comprehended by rational minds, nor be expressed or literally referred to in the language, nor be an object of knowledge. It does not have qualities (because all determination is negation), and so it cannot be described or defined. While using language to refer to brahman is natural, it does not achieve its goal. Language refers to an object either by its direct power of meaning (abhidhā ), or as its suggested meaning (lakṣaṇā ). Normally, the suggested meaning is sustained and supported by its relationship to the literal meanings, but in the case of language referring to the brahman, the meaning may be said to be "only the meaning function, but not an actual meaning" (Bhattacharyya 1930). There is a pointing, as one points to something with one's finger, toward a small, almost invisible star, accompanied by a series of descriptions each one of which is then canceled, leading the listener to identify, even in the absence of an identifying description of, what is being pointed at. Brahman is described as saccidānanda, that is, as sat (existence), cit (consciousness), and ānanda (bliss), with reference to its essence (svaūpa lakṣaṇā ), whereas brahman as the cause, sustainer of the universe, and so on with reference to its accidental attributes (taṭastha lakṣaṇā).

It is important to keep in mind that from a strictly Advaita point of view no positive description can be intrinsic when the thing being described lacks any positively determining qualities. Nevertheless, Advaita Vedānta describes the brahman as existence, pure consciousness, and bliss. These three are not qualities or qualifying attributes of the brahman. Advaita Vedānta holds that these familiar terms must be understood in their negative implications, not as referring to what brahman is, but rather as pointing to what the brahman is not. Sat points to the fact that the brahman is not asat (nonexistent); cit suggests that the brahman is not acit, that is, jaḍa (insentient matter); and ānanda points to that, in the experience of the brahman, there is no duḥkha, no unsatisfied desire. The negative statements in this regard more closely approach the intrinsic nature of the brahman. In this light one can say that in Advaita Vedānta, Benedict (Baruch) de Spinoza's principle "all determination is negation" holds good of the infinite: no determination of it is possible. Underlying this account are a theory of meaning and a theory of language that are of particular importance, and, that possibly, found their first systematic exposition in the Buddhist theory of apoha (the negative theory of meaning).

The thesis of Advaita Vedānta is logically substantiated (1) by a critique of difference (bheda nirodha ) and (2) hermeneutically by an exegesis of the śrutis. To these one may add (3) a phenomenological and experiential dimension that would consist in showing that in its search for freedom from all suffering, human subjectivity passes through levels of ordinary experience: the waking-bodily, the dreaming-psychic, and the dreamless sleep (the seemingly total inaction and quietude). Finally, there is the experience of the brahman, which goes beyond the distinction of the subject and the object and which is articulated in such famous mahāvākyas (great sentences) of the Upaniṣads as "I am he" and "thou art that." Knowing the brahman, according to the tradition of Advaita Vedānta, is to become the brahman. It is not knowing an object, however large and great in its dignity, that stands over against one as an other; rather, it is an experience in which all otherness is canceled, and one discovers that within oneself nothing else remains to be achieved. When there is no duality between the subject and the object, there is no duḥkha or fear. A modern account of the phenomenological stages of a path to freedom is found in Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's The Subject as Freedom (1930).

ViŚiṢṬĀdvaita VedĀnta

In his Viśiṣṭādvaita, that is, "one reality (brahman ) with qualifications," Rāmānuja holds that all knowledge necessarily involves distinctions and differentiations. It is impossible to know an object in its undifferentiated form; therefore, both pure identity and pure difference are false. The brahman as God possesses cit (matter) and acit (self); all three are real (brahman, cit, and acit). Though real, the last two are dependent on the brahman. Consciousness presupposes the self of which it is an essential attribute (dharmabhuta jñāna ). Perhaps the most original aspect of Rāmānuja's philosophy is the rejection of the principle that to be real means to be independent. Although soul and matter are substances in themselves, in relation to the brahman they are attributes. They are God's body and he is their soul. The self is substance and quality, an organ and organism of the brahman. Rāmānuja's theory of apṛthaksiddhi viśeṣaṇa, that is, the adjectival theory of inseparability, explains this relation. Just as qualities are real and cannot exist apart from the substances in which they subsist, similarly matter and soul are parts of the brahman and cannot exist without the brahman.

Rāmānuja used the same Upaniṣadic texts that Śaṃkara used, but arrived at a different conception of the brahman. Rāmānuja holds that the Upaniṣadic texts such as neha nānā asti kiṃcena (there is no multiplicity here) do not really deny the multiplicity of objects, names, and forms, but asserts that these objects do not have any existence apart from the brahman. Thus, all negative texts of the Upaniṣads, which assert that none of this is the brahman, are construed to mean that none of it in its presumed independence is the brahman. However, the positive sentences, for example, "all this is the brahman," mean that everything belongs to the brahman as the ultimate totality. Whereas for Śaṃkara the brahman is pure consciousness devoid of any distinctions, a pure identity without any difference (nirguṇa ), Rāmānuja's brahman is identity-in-difference. The brahman creates the world out of acit by an act of will, so creation is a real act of will. Ignorance (māyā or avidyā ) in this system is no longer creative of illusory world, and the finite individuals are not illusory. It is indeed true, Rāmānuja concedes, that some Upaniṣadic texts articulate the brahman as wielder of a magical power (māyā ). However, māyā for Rāmānuja properly understood is the unique power of God by which God creates the wonderful world of objects. He vehemently criticizes Śaṃkara's theory of the world as false appearance. The created world, for Rāmānuja, is as wonderful as the brahman himself.

If someone were to ask how the one contains the many, Rāmānuja would respond with the grammatical principle of sāmānādhikaṇya (coordination). According to this rule, the words in a sentence with different meanings can denote one and the same thing. Rāmānuja's interpretation of the classical text "this is that Devadattaḥ" explains this rule clearly. For Rāmānuja, Devadattaḥ of the past and the Devadattaḥ of the present cannot be entirely identical, because the person seen at the present and the person seen in the past are different, have different meanings, and yet both refer to the same person. Similarly, unity and diversity, the one and the many, can coexist; they are not contradictions and they can be reconciled in a synthetic unity. Thus, he does not deny the many: the many, on the contrary, characterizes the one. Mokṣa comes about with the knowledge of the brahman together with devotion (bhakti ).

Dvaita VedĀnta

Madhva carries much further the protest against the nondualism of Śaṃkara than Rāmānuja. Whereas for Śaṃkara the texts teaching difference have a practical value in that they steer one in the right direction and lead one to the real teaching of the Upaniṣads, that is, the teaching of nondifference, for Madhva the texts teaching difference convey the true import of the Upaniṣads. Substance is one of the ten categories that Madhva accepts. Out of the twenty substances that Madhva enumerates, he accepts, like Rāmānuja, three as the most important: brahman or God, matter, and selves.

Bheda (difference) is the central category in Madhva's philosophy. This is another way of saying that each object is unique; each object possesses its own nature, which accounts for one object's difference from another object. The brahman or God is the only independent reality. God has a divine body and is transcendent. However, since God is the inner controller of all souls, he is also immanent. God creates the world by his will and brings into existence the world of objects and selves. Objects and selves, though real, eternal, and irreducible to each other, are dependent on the first. At the time of the dissolution of the world, God transforms material objects into undifferentiated matter and selves into disembodied intelligences. It is important to note in this context that even in the state of dissolution God, matter, and selves remain distinct. Unlike Rāmānuja, for Madhva no two souls are alike. Thus, whereas Rāmānuja advocates qualitative monism and quantitative pluralism of souls, Madhva advocates both qualitative and quantitative pluralism of souls. Since the immediate cause of bondage is ignorance of the real nature of the brahman or God, the soul must acquire the knowledge of the real nature of God to attain mokṣa. It is important to remember in this context that knowledge by itself does not and cannot remove ignorance; knowledge is only a qualification for release, which in the final analysis depends on God's will. No matter how hard an aspirant may try, he or she cannot gain such an immediate knowledge, unless God chooses to reveal himself to him or her.

Śaivism

Finally, apart from the previously discussed classical understandings of the brahman, there is another nondualistic school known as Śaiva Siddhānta. Of its many representative schools and thinkers, Kāshmir Śaivism of Abhinavagupta is the most well known. In his nondualism Abhinavagupta argues that brahman alone is. He painstakingly attempts to bridge the gulf between the one and its many phenomenal differences by positing many levels of consciousness, descending from the one to the many. Māyā or avidyā is now construed as a śakti or the power of the brahman -consciousness; consciousness is not a mere prakāśa (illumination) but also śakti (force). Indeed, the two in their difference are also one. While, on the one hand, Abhinavagupta wishes to preserve both the one and the many in the being of brahman, he makes it a graded dynamic process instead of using a static set of categories like the part and the whole. The one brahman -consciousness or pure cit objectifies itself into "I," and this power of self-objectification is called vimarṣa śakti (the reflective power), from which arises the power of referring to intentional objects that lie concealed within it. This process yields a domain of seemingly independent objects. Kāshmir Śaivism has been a major influence in the shaping of the concept of the "integral brahman " of Sri Aurobindo's philosophy.

Other systems of Indian philosophy do not advance a concept of the brahman. Although Sāṃkhya-Yoga seems to have had a theistic form in addition to the better-known atheistic form, it does not develop a concept of the brahman, nor do the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools. The latter systems come perhaps closest to such a project when they substantiate their concept of God as an infinite self, all knowing, omnipresent, which is called Iśavara in the school. Despite the fact that the authors may cite many texts of the Upaniṣads in support of their theism, one misses in these schools any attempt to take into account the śruti texts in their totality.

To sum up: The brahman is the absolute reality in the school of Vedānta. The relationships of the one with the many preoccupied its thinkers, leading them to postulate a fundamental category to explain the connection. These categories range from pure identity (tādātmya having that as its self), apṛthakasiddhi (the relation of no separate existence), pure difference, and a progressive self-differentiation through self-objectification and intentionality. In the nondualistic Vedānta, the brahman, in the words of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, is (Spinozistic) "the substance becoming spirit," bringing together two different concepts of monism into one, resulting in the position that the only reality is the spirit. The following crucial issues remained: How does the one spirit become many? How to understand self-differentiation? Where to locate the power of creativity? Does it belong to the cit or consciousness as an inalienable aspect, or is it an "other" to consciousness? In the latter case, the basic otherness is not a product of ignorance. However, can one escape this problem by saying as nondualist Vedānta says, that ignorance is not a real other and not a nonreal other? Is not this nonreality itself a creation of ignorance? Thus, dialectic of one and many seems to have had an interminable hold on Indian metaphysical theories.

See also Causation in Indian Philosophy; God in Indian Philosophy; Mind and Mental States in Indian Philosophy; Self in Indian Philosophy.

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Bina Gupta (2005)