Piracy

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PIRACY

Piracy, defined here as larceny at or by descent from the sea, figured prominently in the formative years of the United States. Piracy was associated first with English colonization in an Atlantic world dominated by Iberian powers, then with indiscriminate poaching by colonial outcasts and rebels on the growing plantation economy at large. By the 1660s, Atlantic piracy constituted a seaborne variety of organized crime. Alongside these developments, piracy came to be closely associated with the transatlantic slave trade and with imperial warfare "beyond the line." Some pirates were former slavers, some were former slaves. Nearly all made frequent stops in West Africa in the course of their plundering voyages. With regard to war and legality, the line between piracy and privateering, or state-sponsored paranaval plundering, could be quite thin. A spate of diplomatic incidents related to privateering abuses in peacetime and against allies led not only to disastrous conflicts such as the War of Jenkins's Ear (1739–1743), but ultimately to the formation of professional navies and coast guards throughout the Atlantic.

As the United States came into being in the late eighteenth century, piracy was almost universally regarded as a crime not unlike terrorism in the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries. No one wished to be called a pirate. As with terrorism, the use of the term piracy in legal and journalistic circles was broadened substantially to help promote a range of causes. These included the early-nineteenth-century suppression of the transatlantic slave trade and the more effective anticorsairing campaigns of 1801–1805 along the Barbary Coast of North Africa.

Reaching back to early colonial times, Elizabethan corsairs were among the first Englishmen to reconnoiter and settle North America's eastern seaboard. Their successors, the seventeenth-century buccaneers, found hideouts, markets for stolen goods, and occasional plunder from Cape Cod to Cape Canaveral. By 1700, ports such as Providence, New York, Norfolk, and Charleston served as prime recruiting grounds for Anglo-American raiders, some of them disgruntled and overworked merchant seamen. The so-called Great Age of Piracy (c. 1660–c. 1720) only ended following a concerted and bloody campaign of extermination prosecuted by English admiralty courts both at home and in the American colonies. Governors of Virginia and Massachusetts figured prominently in this process. Captain William Kidd (c. 1645–1701) of New York was an early casualty, dying by execution, and North Carolina-based "Blackbeard," or Edward Teach (d. 1718), a late one, dying in battle.

privateering

Though much reduced as a result of this campaign—and with it the general rise of the British navy—Anglo-American piracy and privateering continued throughout the eighteenth century. Privateering, in some ways comparable to the extensive military subcontracting of later times, was an accepted if unconventional means of complementing formal naval power. Admiral Edward "Old Grog" Vernon's failed 1741 siege of Cartagena de Indias, in what would become Colombia, was typical in its blend of formally trained European and colonial paranaval combatants. The policy of commissioning privateers continued through the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) and well beyond, playing a significant role in the American War of Independence (1775–1783) and the War of 1812 (1812–1815). From the merchant-victim's perspective, being robbed by privateers was much like being robbed by pirates.

Hundreds of privateers were commissioned by U.S. authorities during the American War of Independence, and they met with some success. New England–based raiders were particularly active off the coast of Nova Scotia, but others ranged as far as the English Channel. American privateers had an early advantage against their British adversaries, as Parliament was reluctant to issue letters of marque and reprisal against a state that it preferred not to recognize. After 1777, when such letters were issued, British privateers found few vulnerable colonial vessels; most were themselves armed and dangerous. Instead, British predators focused on the tacit—and later open—allies of the fledgling U.S.: France, Spain, and the Netherlands. French shipping suffered most: whereas 183 American vessels taken by British privateers were condemned by London's Prize Court between 1777 and 1783, French vessels numbered 872.

Privateering remained a conveniently cheap buttress to overextended naval forces on both sides during the War of 1812. Outstanding U.S. privateers such as Johnston Blakely and Otway Burns ranged throughout the Atlantic, pillaging and destroying whatever British shipping they could find. British privateers responded in kind. French-born Jean Lafitte, a privateer and smuggler based in the labyrinthine Barataria bayou of Louisiana's Gulf Coast, eventually sided with U.S. forces under Andrew Jackson in the decisive 1815 Battle of New Orleans. Multinational privateers such as Lafitte switched sides often, taking advantage of the chaos generated by Latin American independence movements (1810-1824) and shifting post-Napoleonic alliances. After the War of 1812, Lafitte smuggled slaves, some stolen from Spanish vessels, into the southern U.S.

slave trade

Piracy was also intimately linked to slavery. The same Elizabethan corsairs who had founded Virginia and other colonies first entered the transatlantic economy as contraband slavers, illegally supplying Spanish Caribbean planters with Africans kidnapped and purchased in Upper Guinea. The trend continued; the first Africans brought to Virginia in 1619 were carried by Dutch corsairs who had stolen them from the Portuguese (who had in turn bartered for them in Angola). The later buccaneers were also familiar with the growing transatlantic slave trade, some as victims, others as professional slavers. Though not known for their scruples, pirates of the Great Age, such as Blackbeard, occasionally freed slaves or incorporated them into their crews. More often they sold them to planters and merchants. An often-forgotten fact is that England's early-eighteenth-century suppression of Atlantic piracy enabled the rapid expansion of the slave trade that marked the post-1760 period.

Yet the same empire that benefited most from the slave trade eventually turned against it. Although economic reasons such as the industrial revolution have been cited, this British turnabout was in large part due to the efforts of prominent religious figures, many of them Quakers. British and U.S. abolitionists of several religious persuasions agreed that the slave trade was an outrage and must be universally suppressed. Interestingly, both U.S. and British legislators chose to elide slave trading and piracy in the first decades of the nineteenth century, making the former a capital crime for the first time. By 1814 the British were able to commit substantial, warhardened naval forces—some fresh from epic battles with Napoleon and his allies—to the cause of slave trade suppression. They requested and received help in patrolling West African waters, albeit intermittently, from the infant U.S. Navy.

The United States formally declared slave trading a variety of piracy in 1820. It is often forgotten that this declaration came amidst a wave of widely reported and vicious Caribbean piracy, mostly executed by Spanish Americans rebelling against their colonial overlords. Although Cuba itself remained "faithful," as the Spanish put it, Cuban renegades-turned-pirates in this era were said to have invented the legendary practice of walking the plank, among other tortures much publicized in the U.S. press. Some such miscreants were also said to be slavers. Still, application of the law proved difficult. Many American jurists regarded the Atlantic slave trade as a legitimate, if unsavory, business, and viewed the 1819 law as part of an emotionally driven, moral crusade to undermine slavery. Defenders of the slave trade were not rare, since slavery itself still figured prominently in the U.S. economy. Throughout the era of suppression, contraband slaves reached southern plantations through ports in Texas and Louisiana.

The crux cases linking piracy and the slave trade, however, involved mostly British interdiction of U.S. and foreign vessels engaged in trading slaves to Brazil, Venezuela, and Cuba. Since Cuba was nearest at hand and because it remained a colony of Spain, the U.S. embargo of slaving vessels inevitably produced significant international incidents. Under Pinckney's Treaty (1795) and other agreements, the United States had promised to respect Spanish laws, vessels, and cargoes—and also to help Spain fight piracy. Thus, seizures and mutinies, including those of the Amistad (1839) and the Creole (1841), tested the will of U.S. courts to enforce the letter of the 1819 law. On-board rebellions were particularly troublesome for judges and diplomats. Was slave mutiny aboard a foreign vessel piracy or self-liberation? Ultimately, the latter definition prevailed, but suppression of the slave trade as a form of piracy was never seriously pursued by the U.S. Navy or courts and remained a point of considerable friction between North and South.

barbary wars

Perhaps better known than the West African slave trade's links to piracy during America's formative years was U.S. suppression of the so-called Barbary pirates of North Africa between 1801 and 1805. This campaign, also pursued by the U.S. Navy—and the fledgling marines—aimed to secure U.S. commercial access to the Mediterranean Sea. Pursued at first reluctantly by President Thomas Jefferson, the campaign sought to end the long-established Algerian and Tripolitan practices of hostage taking and tribute extortion in exchange for free passage beyond the Straits of Gibraltar. Despite setbacks, the effort proved mostly successful, and it gained popular support in part from a growing literature alleging enslavement of white Americans, some of them women, in Muslim "pirate" compounds. Once again, matters of captivity and redemption crossed over with changing interpretations of piracy and its suppression.

After 1840, sporadic acts of piracy occurred in U.S.-claimed waters and against U.S. vessels abroad, but no significant cycle of piracy would emerge to match those of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Instead, piracy would become firmly ensconced in U.S. literature and other forms of popular culture. Edgar Allan Poe's short story, "The Gold-Bug" (1843), is an early example. Since then, the fascination has persisted.

See alsoBarbary Wars; Slavery: Slave Trade, African .

bibliography

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DuBois, W. E. B. The Suppression of the Slave-Trade to the United States of America, 1638–1870. New York: Longmans, Green, 1896.

Earle, Peter. The Pirate Wars. London: Methuen, 2003.

Eltis, David, and James Walvin, eds. The Abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade: Origins and Effects in Europe, Africa, and the Americas. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981.

Kitzen, Michael L. Tripoli and the United States at War: A History of American Relations with the Barbary States, 1785–1805. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1993.

Parker, Richard B. Uncle Sam in Barbary: A Diplomatic History. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004.

Pennell, C. R., ed. Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader. New York: New York University Press, 2000.

Rediker, Marcus. Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age. Boston: Beacon, 2004.

Ritchie, Robert C. Captain Kidd and the War against the Pirates. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986.

Starkey, David J. British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century. Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1990.

Kris Lane

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