ISRAEL.

Relations between Israel and Europe are as much a product of the history of representations as they are of diplomatic history. These relations are permanently marked by the fact that Israel had its beginnings in Europe, both in the most profound cultural sense and in terms of the origins of a large part of its population. Relations between these two entities, in both their conflict-ridden history and their long-term affinities, cannot be understood without taking into account this fundamental fact: for Europe, Israel is not something external produced by a combination of geography and geopolitics. And conversely, Europe remains for Israel, beyond the conflicts, disagreements, and schisms between them, an indispensable matrix for understanding itself.

A EUROPEAN HISTORY, A RUPTURE WITH EUROPE

Israel's human, intellectual, and cultural origins must be sought in Europe. Born in Europe, the modern Zionist project grew out of the nation-building movements that multiplied in the wake of the "springtime of nations" in the second half of the nineteenth century. Inherent in it is the contradiction that continues to mark relations between Europe and Israel to this day: Jewish nationalism emanated from Europe, yet it manifested itself in a radical rupture separating it from the Old Continent. The liberal idea of the nation-state, applied to the Jews, provided the foundations of the Zionist project. But Israel's birth and genesis must also be understood in terms of a radical break between Judaism and Europe. The idea of Zionism, while it cannot be reduced to a simple reaction against anti-Semitism, is based on an interpretation of European history that sees Jewish emancipation as a resounding failure. Israel's national memory rests on a reading of European history wherein anti-Semitism, because it nullifies the goal of shared citizenship, definitively discredits the political ideal of the Enlightenment. This reading was confirmed after the fact by the Holocaust, a venture in which Nazi Germany was the mainspring, but which could not have been conceived without significant intermediaries across the Continent and without a certain complacent, or even consensual, passivity on the part of Europe's population.

In cultural terms, too, Europe's repudiation played a prominent role for Zionism. The history of Europe's Jews has been interpreted as a long litany of discrimination, humiliation, and vexation that culminated in the "degeneration" of the Jew, to use the term coined by Max Nordau (1849–1923), the counselor and close friend of the Zionist leader Theodor Herzl (1860–1904). The rupture with the Old Continent was intended to allow for "regeneration," the birth of a new Jew, freed at last from the stigmas of exile. From the Zionist perspective, the normalization of the Jew necessarily implied a break with Europe. Israel's mistrust of Europe, of which recurrent expressions may still be found at the beginning of the twenty-first century, has its origins in this metahistorical narrative produced by Zionism.

ISRAEL AND EUROPE: A COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL HISTORY, 1948–1967

The relationship between Israel and Europe must also be situated within the complex framework of colonial relations. Great Britain was the major tutelary power for Zionism. Beginning with the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, in which Britain affirmed its support for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, British history and Israeli history have remained braided together. Britain became in 1921 the Mandatory power in Palestine, and therefore oversaw the early stages of what was to become the Arab-Israeli conflict. Great Britain played an ambivalent role in the region, defending its own interests above all, and not hesitating, in order to do so, to pit the Jewish and Arab communities against each other. By limiting Jewish immigration into Palestine, at a time when in Central Europe it was becoming urgent for Jews to find places of refuge, and by strongly suppressing Jewish attempts to establish means of self-defense in the face of the Arab revolts, Great Britain pursued a classic colonial policy that left a lasting and bitter residue. It was finally against British colonial power that Israel won its independence in 1948.

The regional role of the European powers did not end with decolonization. The first years of Israel's existence were marked by the establishment of privileged relations with France, its most important ally until the Six-Day War in 1967. This alliance was largely based on the fact that France, the colonial power in Algeria, saw Israel as a natural partner in the common fight against the Arab nationalism of the Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970) era. The commonality of European and Israeli interests reached a climax during the joint military operations Mounted by the English, the French, and the Israelis against Egypt in the Suez Crisis of 1956. The end of France's presence in Algeria in 1962, and to an even greater extent, the economic pressure exerted by the oil-producing Arab countries during the consecutive oil crises and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, permanently called into question diplomatic relations between the European countries and Israel. After the Six-Day War the United States replaced France as Israel's foremost strategic partner.

ISRAEL: EUROPE'S BAD CONSCIENCE

Relations between Israel and Europe were profoundly affected by the Holocaust. Europe after World War II felt a special responsibility toward the state into which a large share of the survivors were pouring. Israel became an acute reminder of the Old Continent's criminal past, transforming its bad conscience into an element that is crucial for understanding the dynamic of the relationship. Europe's position vis-à-vis Israel is by turns animated by great compassion for Israel's experience and by a severity of judgment in which can be discerned a desire, by designating Israel as guilty, to assuage a collective bad conscience that continues to be obsessed by the Shoah. It is certainly in terms of this characteristically European dynamic that Europe's stances toward Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict must be reread. Thus, at the time when Europe's institutions were being put in place during the 1960s, privileged relations with Israel formed immediately and naturally. In economic, commercial, scientific, and cultural agreements, an intense cooperation was established that resisted the various political crises. Acknowledged as a privileged partner, Israel was linked to the building of Europe. And yet, an integration of Israel into Europe was not seriously envisioned.

1967–2005: THE ENTRENCHMENT OF INCOMPREHENSION

The Six-Day War was a major dividing line in Israeli-European relations. After its conquest of new territories, Israel for the first time no longer appeared to be the victim of Arab hostility, but as a regional power that was responsible for blocking—or was even the main obstacle to—peace in the Middle East. From the time of the war with Lebanon in 1982, and to an even greater extent since the two Palestinian revolts against Israeli occupation in 1988 and 2000, relations between Israel and Europe have seemingly been characterized by a profound incomprehension. The European Union was built around a historic reconciliation between former belligerent parties and declared itself a haven of peace. This new reality resulted in an inability to understand Israel, a country determined to go it alone in the name of its extraordinary suffering and an ethnic and religious identity that is also difficult for most Europeans to understand.

Israel is engaged in a dynamic of insisting on the need for borders to guarantee Jewish continuity and survival, at a time when much of Europe is preoccupied with the disappearance of borders. The Jews, who were the precursors in the desire to transcend boundaries, now find themselves in the camp of those who stress their positive role. This contradiction cannot help but engender a strong incomprehension that is often tinged with hostility. Israel's identity, recognized as legitimate in the aftermath of the Holocaust, is out of synch with the postnational principles in vogue in early-twenty-first-century Europe. There is an erosion of the sympathetic capital that Europe and the Europeans once felt for the Jewish state. Brutality on the West Bank, and Israel's close alliance with the United States, put Israel squarely in the camp of George Bush and the set of advisors who led the invasion of Iraq. Anti-Americanism and anti-Israeli sentiment went hand in hand.

This critical reading of Israel by Europe is matched by an equally intense skepticism on the part of Israel. Many contemporary examples could be cited of mistrust in the face of what Israeli public opinion sees as the return of an old demon to European territory. The second intifada, and to an even greater extent the war in Iraq and its effects, have given Israel the sense of a return of anti-Semitic modes of reasoning. This negative vision of Europe, which in the early twenty-first century has spread in Israel, also reflects a profound demographic, sociological, and cultural shift within Israeli society. Public opinion in Israel is experiencing relations with Europe as a new betrayal. The comeback of a substantial level of anti-Semitic actions and discourse is convincing Israelis of the resurgence of old demons, and all of it contributes to an increase, among Israelis, in negative judgments about Europe. In Israel's eyes, Europe appears as a monster with multiple archaeological strata: a brutal, anti-Semitic past, a present that is indifferent or even hostile to Israel, and a new brand of anti-Semitism.

Relations between Israel and Europe in some respects recall recent difficulties in transatlantic relations. Similarly built on a community of values and interests, relations between Europe and the United States have been strongly shaken by Europe's rejection of the power politics unilaterally deployed by the United States.

The relationship between Europe and Israel is a magnifying mirror for twentieth-century history. This relationship brings to bear particularly painful episodes from the past that continue to have a decisive impact in the present. As is the case for transatlantic relations, however, the relationship between Israel and Europe is based on deep and shared beliefs, and this means that it is not optimistic to believe that it will transcend the repeated crises that have characterized it at the turn of the twenty-first century.

See alsoAnti-Americanism; Anti-Semitism; British Empire, End of; Egypt; European Union; Holocaust; Jews; Suez Crisis; World War II; Zionism.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aron, Raymond. De Gaulle, Israel and the Jews. Translated by John Sturoch. New York, 1969.

Avineri, Shlomo. The Making of Modern Zionism: Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State. New York, 1981.

Avineri, Shlomo, and Werner Weidenfeld, eds. Integration and Identity: Challenges to Europe and Israel; A Project of the Bertelsmann Foundation. Bonn, Germany, 1999.

Finkielkraut, Alain. La réprobation d'Israël. Paris, 1982.

Hertzberg, Arthur, ed. The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader. New York, 1972.

Sachar, Howard M. Israel and Europe: An Appraisal in History. New York, 1999.

Jacques Ehrenfreund