MIRANDA V. ARIZONA

MIRANDA V. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). One of the core concerns of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination is the use of coerced confessions. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court codified this concern by prescribing rules for police interrogation. Specifically, any person who is in custody must be warned, before questioning begins, that: "he has the right to remain silent," "anything he says can be used against him in a court of law," "he has the right to an attorney," and he may consult with his attorney at any time. Only if the individual "knowingly and intelligently" waives these rights—a waiver that may be with drawn at any stage of questioning—may his statements be used against him.

The 5–4 Miranda ruling has always been controversial. Critics contend that these rules hamstring law enforcement, despite Ernesto Miranda's conviction at a retrial where his confession was excluded. The Court created numerous exceptions to the Miranda rules, and Congress attempted to overturn them in a rarely used provision of the 1968 Crime Control Act. The Supreme Court struck down that provision in United States v. Dickerson (2000), saying that the Miranda rules "have become part of our national culture."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brooks, Peter. Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law and Literature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.

Leo, Richard A., and George C. Thomas III, eds. The Miranda Debate: Law, Justice, and Policing. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998.

White, Welsh S. Miranda's Waning Protections: Police Interrogation Practices after Dickerson. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001.

Jonathan L.Entin

See alsoCivil Rights and Liberties ; Police Power .