Triage

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TRIAGE

The metaphor "triage" (a French word meaning "to pick or sort according to quality") gained entry into medical parlance from a military context in which Napoleon's chief surgeon, Jean Larrey, found it necessary to categorize wounded soldiers needing treatment according to a utilitarian principle: those whose wounds, even if left untreated, were such as not to preclude a return to the battlefield; those sustaining mortal wounds for whom treatment would be futile; those needing immediate attention for whom there would be hope for survival and eventual return to active duty. Only the last group would be given medical attention when human, medicinal, and facility resources had to be rationed. Strategies for "triaging" in times of warfare, natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, famines, etc.), and civil defense planning have marked the modern era. Similarly and more routinely, contemporary health care practice necessitates the application of triage where patients must be sorted or prioritized because of restricted medical resources. Hospital emergency rooms often designate a triage nurse whose task it is to order those seeking treatment according to greatest need and best potential for benefit.

Medical Care. The highly technical nature of modern medicine has further contributed to the complexity of selecting patients for treatment. For example, advances in organ transplant technology utilizing both natural and artificial organs offer new hope to patients with life threatening vital organ failure, but the supply of transplantable organs remains limited and the selection of recipients presents an ethical as well as a logistical dilemma. In organ allocation the utilitarian questions of "Who has greatest need?" and "Who might benefit most?" are further complicated by possible considerations of social worth and equality of persons. Should younger patients with as yet untapped potential for social contribution be chosen over the retired, or those with disabling mental or physical handicap? If three patients are equal in need and in their potential to benefit from treatment, and there are resources for treating only one, what criteria or selection principle will accord with the traditional Christian belief in a fundamental obligation in justice to recognize the irreducible, inalienable equality of all persons?

Some ethicists (e.g., Joseph Fletcher), appealing to a pragmatic distributive or allocative justice, propose that we choose on the basis of the good of the greatest number or the social interest. Thus, a bank president and father of four children would be chosen to receive treatment over an unemployed single person or a prison inmate. Paul Ramsey, and most Roman Catholic moral theologians, espousing a principle of the absolute equality of persons (commutative justice), argues that selection among medically equal and suitable patients be by random choice (e.g., lottery, choosing straws, or "firstcome, first-served") so as to avoid reducing the value of persons to their social worth. To do otherwise, it is argued, is to enter upon a "slippery slope" with implications unacceptable in a Christian ethic. Decisions based on social worth criteria are highly relative and rooted in a value system in which power and material things take precedence over persons. Further, the power entrusted to selected decision or policy makers, who would be calculating and evaluating the social value of another, raises disturbing ethical questions about who decides and who decides who decides.

The power at stake here is not just power for persons but power over persons. Ramsey and others object that there are some things we can do which we ought not to do, things which in the extended calculus hold potential for disproportionate harm to the humanum which is to be sustained by a Christian ethic. In a more positive vein, Ramsey observes that blind or lottery selection of persons to benefit from rationed medical resources emulates God's own indiscriminate care for us.

The social distribution of health care also invokes the ethical consideration of triage when a choice must be made between providing for a few patients whose need is critical and those for whom there is immediate, though limited, potential for benefit; expensive, even esoteric, treatments (e.g., the artificial heart); and supplying a large number of persons, especially the poor and underprivileged, with more routine medical care and preventive medicine (e.g., vaccines, dietary supplements). Many Christian ethicists maintain that in public policy concerning health care

priority ought to be given to that kind of preventive medicine or treatment of acute disease which will raise the general standards of health, especially for the young, over elaborate modes of treatment for the aged or seriously handicapped (Ashley and O'Rourke, 240).

A factor in this position is a recognized distinction between Biblical justice and the justice prevalent in secular society. The latter is avowedly impartial and favors individualistic opportunism. Those who find access and the financial means to pay have a right to benefit. Biblical justice, on the other hand, is not impartial and individualistic, but biased in favor of the poor and decidedly social in its thrust (see option for the poor).

Social Triage. The "lifeboat ethics" conundrum is yet another example of the metaphor of triage, here, social triage. The world population explosion, with attendant world hunger, confronts the developed nations with a disturbing specter: providing medical aid and food to underdeveloped countries will insure burgeoning population growth and, ultimately, increased starvation, unless such aid is contingent upon compulsory population control. Garrett Hardin (1980) argues for such contingencies in his "lifeboat ethics" proposal, cautioning the developed countries against lowering their own standards of living and health care lest their children, who ensure the future of the human race, become similarly deprived and lose their edge. Hardin contends that no amount of aid can reverse the plight of the underdeveloped nations. His utilitarian ethic effectively dictates that one save oneself even at the cost of sacrificing the other.

Hardin's assessment of the imminence of the over-population crisis is disputed by others who, nonetheless, do acknowledge a significant socio-economic and political problem confronting the world community. Some Catholic ethicists contend that

the advanced countries by introducing modern medicine [into underdeveloped nations] … upset the ecological balance and produced a rapid population growth, without at the same time producing the standard of living which in developed countries motivates and facilitates responsible parenthood (Ashley and O'Rourke, 241).

Rather than "sailing away," the developed nations are bound by principles of distributive and Biblical justice to restore the balance which they helped to destroy by raising the standards of living and education in the underdeveloped world. When resources are scarce those who stand to benefit most from enhanced opportunity are those whose need is greatest.

Bibliography: b. m. ashley and k. d. o'rourke, Health Care Ethics: A Theological Analysis (rev. ed. St. Louis 1982). j. f. childress, "Who Shall Live When Not All Can Live?" Readings on Ethical and Social Issues in Biomedicine, r. w. wertz, ed. (New Jersey 1973) 143–153. r. a. mccormick, "Justice in Health Care," Health and Medicine in the Catholic Tradition (New York 1984) 75–85. g. outka, "Social Justice and Equal Access to Health Care," On Moral Medicine: Theological Perspectives in Medical Ethics, s. lammers and a. verhey, eds. (Michigan 1987) 632–642. a. verhey, "Sanctity and Scarcity: The Makings of Tragedy," ibid., 653–657. p. ramsey, The Patient as Person (New Haven, 1970); Ethics at the Edges of Life (New Haven 1977).

[r. m. friday]

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