IMMANENCE APOLOGETICS

Immanence here refers to relative immanence, not the philosophy of absolute immanence condemned by Pascendi (Enchiridion symbolorum ³¹ 2103, 2106) and Humani generis (Enchiridion symbolorum 3878, 3894). Absolute immanence rules out the possibility of anything transcendent or supernatural. Relative immanence admits this possibility and provides a method for studying the steps of the approach to Christianity. Though it is used as apologetics for Christianity, it is properly an apologetics for the supernatural. Since it draws its arguments from a study of human actions, it might also be regarded as a philosophy of action.

Historical Background. St. Justin's apologetics recognized in man a germ of truth (λόγος σπερματικός) that finds its fulfillment only through union with Christ, the logos. Apart from St. Augustine and a few other exceptions, apologists of succeeding ages have argued their case with external proofs. The most important reemphasis of the internal or subjective arguments came from Cardinal V. dechamps (1810–83). He wrote: "There are only two facts to verify, one is in you [the human heart], the other is outside you [the Church]. They search for each other to embrace each other, and of both of them you are the witness" (see Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique 2:610). Though Cardinal Dechamps stressed the subjective aspect of apologetics, the scientific study and organization of this aspect of apologetics was the independent work of Maurice blondel (1861–1949).

Absolute immanentism was the prevailing philosophy at the beginning of the 20th century. In reaction to it, Blondel's deeply Christian spirit led him to seek a solution to the apparent mutual exclusion of immanentism and Christianity. Immanentists held as valid only those truths coming from within. Their principle was: "Nothing can enter man which does not issue from him and correspond in some way to a need for expansion. Neither historic fact, nor traditional teaching, nor an extrinsic, superadded obligation is reckoned as truth for him and admissible as precept if it is not in some way autonomous or autochthonous" (Lettre 34). Traditional external apologetics was unacceptable unless its arguments corresponded to some need for expansion within man. Writing as a philosopher, Blondel attempted to show that such an inner need for Christianity existed. According to him, immanentism leads autonomously and spontaneously to a confrontation with Christianity.

Blondel's Method of Immanence. He accepts the immanentist's principle cited above as his point of departure. To discover man's inner needs referred to in this principle, he studies man's actions since they are the most perfect expression of the human personality. They involve the whole man; in them man commits himself in one way or another. Through a regressive analysis of man's actions, he comes to discern the fundamental needs and desires inspiring man's actions. Between man's will involved at this deep level (his implicit, or willing-will) and his will involved in his actions (his explicit, or willed-will) lies a conflict. His implicit will seeks one thing, but the explicit will acts otherwise; man's actions do not seem to be able to satisfy the demands of his inner will. A dialectic exists between the implicit will (voluntas ut natura ) and the explicit will (voluntas ut elicita ). Blondel's method of immanence seeks to equate these two wills: "equate within conscience itself what we seem to think, to wish and to do with what we really wish and think" (Lettre 39).

In reconciling these two wills, Blondel distinguishes three steps. First, it is through a manifestation of this inner will that the nonbeliever can come to see that Christian truth and life concern him. His awareness of these inner needs and demands leads him to recognize a twofold impossibility: (1) the impossibility of not recognizing the insufficiency of the natural order and of not experiencing a further need; and (2) the impossibility of finding within oneself the wherewithal to satisfy this religious need (L'Action 319). The discovery of these inner demands and the impossibility of satisfying them does not follow any set pattern but varies as forms of human activity vary. The general conclusion, however, is the same; namely, that the necessary condition for the perfection of human action is inaccessible to human action.

Confronted with this impossible situation, man passes on to the second and crucial step through his recognition and acceptance of a new affirmation, namely, that there is a unique necessary being (unique nécessaire ). He affirms either that he himself is "god," his own master, the unique necessary being, or that this unique necessary being exists outside himself, the omnipotent God of the universe. To consider oneself as god is to revert back to the frustration of the first step. To acknowledge God exists, however, is to admit one's powerlessness; God is needed to satisfy the demands of the inner will. Here the supernatural is involved in a general, undetermined sense. In speaking of the absolute necessity of the supernatural in this sense, Blondel is referring to man's acknowledgment of his inevitable dependence on the Creator. Man sees he cannot enter into communion with God except by God's initiative and sovereign action. It is the creature's recognition of his need for his Creator. Even men unacquainted with Christianity admit this absolute need. It means opening oneself to the divine action, whatever it be. Many have failed to distinguish Blondel's general use of the term "supernatural" in this step and have rejected his method as denying the gratuity of the strictly supernatural (see Bouillard 86–131).

In the third step the interested nonbeliever studies the religions that would specify the notion of the generic supernatural idea referred to in step two. No sincere study could overlook the Christian explanation of the supernatural order. The dogmas of Christianity are considered as a hypothetical answer to man's needs. Neither the reality nor even the intrinsic possibility of this hypothesis is an issue at this point. The nonbeliever studies the correspondence of these hypothetical truths to his needs. If the Christian hypothesis is seen as the answer to those needs, Christianity then becomes a necessary hypothesis. If preaching effectively shows him that this hypothesis is a reality, he has a practical obligation to accept it. God's gift of faith, however, must intervene for the nonbeliever to be converted and receive the reality of Christian truth and life. In this third step, therefore, one sees the internal apologetics of relative immanentism join with the external apologetics of tradition to form an integral apologetics including both the subjective and objective aspects.

Appreciation of Immanence Apologetics. Blondel's writings on this subject have been a source of controversy since they first appeared. The two main charges brought against them are naturalism and fideism. His supposed denial of the gratuity of the supernatural has already been treated. Despite numerous clarifications of his teachings, critics still disagree in their interpretation of his idea of the supernatural (cf. Bouillard, Duméry, and Nicolas for opposed interpretations). As regards fideism, some have thought that this method overstressed the study of action to the point of neglecting the role of the intellect. Blondel, however, notes the role of the intellect both in the theoretical considerations preceding action and in the practical or experimental knowledge associated with action. One of the main values of immanence apologetics is its reemphasis of subjective apologetics as part of an integral apologetics. In this respect it has helped to throw light on the question of miracles and the relation of faith and reason.

See Also: conversion, iii (psychology of); conversion, ii (theology of); miracles (theology of); obediential potency; supernatural existential.

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[r. x. redmond]