Free Will

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FREE WILL

Sometimes called free choice or free decision (Latin liberum arbitrium ), free will is an ability characterizing man in the voluntary activity of choosing or not choosing a limited good when this is presented to him. It is the basis for asserting man's unique dignity among creatures, as well as for maintaining that he is a person. On it is founded much of the tradition of Western law and morality. Again, it has important consequences in the social order; a person's outlook on man as a strictly determined being or as an autonomous moral person is bound to condition, to some extent, his attitude toward the rehabilitation of criminals and of the mentally ill.

In view of the long history of the concept of free will, and the divergence of views regarding it, this article first sketches the evolution of the concept and its status in modern thought, and then gives a detailed analysis based on the teaching of scholastic philosophers. Arguments against free will are mentioned here only in passing, since these are given fuller treatment elsewhere.

History of the Concept of Free Will

The main stages in the development of the notion of free will may be characterized as follows: the philosophical bases were first proposed by Greek thinkers; these were then developed systematically by patristic and medieval writers, under the influence of the Christian religion; then controversies arose in later scholasticism, traceable largely to the Protestant Reformation and its underlying causes; and these were followed, finally, by the diversity of views that typifies modern thought on the subject.

Greek Origins. The early Greeks generally believed that inanimate things, as well as human beings and the gods themselves, were subject to the fates. Consequently these thinkers did not attempt to change the order of things, but sought to be in harmony with the rest of the universe. Again, in the ancient world freedom was viewed more in a political than in a metaphysical setting. The free man was the one who could participate in the political order, who, unlike the slave, was not ruled by someone above him. Nevertheless, even then certain philosophies contained implicit suggestions of human free choice.

Pre-Socratics. The followers of Pythagoras seem to have simultaneously advocated both freedom and determinism. In their theory of metempsychosis, they argued that the state of a man in his new life depended on actions he performed in his previous life. At the same time they held that all things in the universe were interconnected with an unknown, but probably discoverable, series of number relationships, and that whoever found the key to these would be able to control human affairs. The sophists taught that man, by clever argument, could change the course of human events; they also argued over whether or not a man deliberated about acts he performed. From this it may be inferred that they acknowledged some degree of free choice in man, even if the outcome was subject to the will of the fates. The Eleatics necessarily denied human freedom, in consequence of their pantheistic monism. Similarly democritus, and the Greek atomists generally, adhering as they did to a strict mechanism, denied contingency of any kind in the universe.

Classical Thinkers. It was with socrates that the Greek notion of human freedom shifted emphatically from a political concept to the psychological notion of individual subjective freedom. Socrates was one of the first Greek philosophers to stress the need for internal self-control. External authority had broken down under the attacks of the Sophists. Consequently the new law Socrates taught was based not so much on external authority as on the mastery (Gr. ἐγκράτεια) each man has of himself. Since, for Socrates, no man does evil knowingly, and since his future depends upon what he knows, man must possess some degree of freedom.

Plato's myth of reincarnation implied moral responsibility. In fact, the whole of the Republic may be described as an extension of Socrates's notion of ἐγκράτεια. Aristotle himself did not explicitly discuss either liberty or free will, although both concepts can be found in his works. He disagreed with the teaching of plato and Socrates that a wicked man is necessarily ignorant of what is good. Experience, he said, shows otherwise; a man who is truly good can still choose what is evil.

Later Evolution. Like the Eleatics, the Stoics denied freedom of choice as a result of their materialistic pantheism, holding, as they did, that all changes in the universe were due to inexorable laws. For them, a man could be called free only if he willingly accepted these laws. philo judaeus held that man's freedom is rooted in his intelligence. plotinus taught that the human soul is free so long as it does not become involved in the world of matter. Moses maimonides, on the other hand, maintained the freedom of the will in an unqualified way.

Patristic and Medieval Development. With the introduction of Christianity into the mainstream of Western thought, free will came to be studied in more detail. Two teachings of the Christian religion influenced this development. One was that man was created by God and commanded to obey a divine moral law; at the same time, he was promised an eternal reward or punishment. But reward or punishment imply that a man has free choice, for otherwise such sanctions are meaningless. The second was that the first man had incurred original sin and that man, as a result, needed redemption by grace.

Patristic and medieval writers were not so much concerned to prove the existence of free will as they were to establish the roots of freedom, its relation to reason, and its theological implications. St. ephrem the syrian, for example, taught that man has freedom; that this freedom is rooted in his intellect and will; and, because of this, that man is the image of God. Other patristic writers defended free will against the pagan teaching that fate ruled the universe.

Augustine and Anselm. In the early Church St. augustine was beyond question the greatest exponent of the Christian teaching on human freedom. His major concern was to reconcile man's freedom in relation to contingent acts with the foreknowledge God necessarily possesses. Augustine insisted on the freedom of the human will; yet he insisted on the necessity of grace as a basis of merit. He also asserted that an omnipotent and omniscient God would necessarily know, from all eternity, the infinite number of motives to which the will of each man might consent.

By the time Augustine composed his treatises, the Latin term libertas had several meanings in the Christian world. It could mean freedom of the will, or freedom as opposed to slavery—whether this is slavery to sin or slavery to death. Consequently when St. anselm of canterbury took up a discussion of liberty he distinguished between the power to choose what is good or evil (arbitrium ) and the power to choose what is actually good for one's nature (libertas ). For St. Anselm, free choice is not so much an ability to choose between good and evil as it is an ability to maintain rectitude of the will.

Thomistic Doctrine. St. thomas aquinas argued that man is free with respect to finite goods but that he is determined to the infinite good. That is to say, the human person, encountering a finite object, can accept or refuse it; he can do so because the object can appear either as good, since it has actuality, or as lacking in good, since it lacks the actuality possessed by a different object. Aquinas held that a human person would not be free if he directly encountered an infinite good his intellect clearly recognized as such. But since man, in this life, is not confronted directly with an infinite good, he is not necessitated by the objects of this world. To reconcile the contingency of human choice with God's foreknowledge, Aquinas emphasized that man is in time whereas God is outside time, and that past, present, and future are simultaneously present to the Divine Mind. Thus fore knowledge, while meaningful to man, has no counterpart in God.

Yet God is not only omniscient, He is omnipotent; and in His omnipotent providence He brings into actuality all events that have happened, that are happening, and that will happen in the universe. This raises a problem: If an omniscient and all-provident God also effects whatever happens in the universe, how can God's activity be reconciled with man's freedom?

Later Scholasticism and Protestantism. Among Catholic philosophers and theologians two main positions have been formulated to solve this problem. Both positions claim their origin as further refinements of the teaching of St. Thomas, and both were developed in answer to the positions of Luther and Calvin.

Dominican and Molinist Theories. Dominican theologians for the most part teach that God premoves each man toward his freely chosen goal, because every act of a creature requires that God first move the creature. This premotion is in conformity with the nature of the creature premoved. Thus an infinitely powerful God infallibly premoves man, a free agent, to choose a particular goal freely, while premoving other creatures toward their goals with necessity. God's premotion is inevitable in view of his omniscience. Since it is inevitable, it may be called a decree, and in this sense is logically prior to divine knowledge of creatural activity. (see premotion, physical.)

The Molinist position differs from the Dominican chiefly in two respects: instead of referring to a divine premotion, Molinists think it more precise to speak of a divine concurrence with man's will; and, secondly, they hold that God's knowledge of what a free being would choose, if the necessary conditions were supplied, is logically prior to His decree of concurrence or premotion. (see concurrence, divine.)

St. Thomas himself notes that part of the difficulty in resolving the question of God's premotion and of man's free choice lies in the need to use a more apt terminology when speaking about God, since terms can be predicated of God only analogically. In the problem at hand terms such as premotion or foreknowledge are applied to God as if He existed in time, whereas He is an infinite being existing outside of time.

Protestant Reformers. Among the controversies of the Reformation, the doctrine of free will was a crucial point of difference between Protestant and Catholic theologians. Martin luther and John calvin strongly denied freedom of the will, basing their arguments on scriptural texts, especially those of St. Paul. Luther concluded that man is predestined to such an extent that he can never truly be said to have power over his own fate. Luther did not deny all human freedom; but he believed that the freedom man possessed after original sin was not enough freedom to allow him to work out his redemption.

Calvin's denial of free will went further than Luther's. He asserted that man cannot perform a good act unless necessitated to it by God's grace, and that man can in no way resist such grace. It is absurd, said Calvin, to speak of man cooperating with grace, because this implies the possibility of rejection on man's part. see predestination (in non-catholic theology).

Modern Thought. Consequent on the 16th-century discovery of large numbers of regular movements in the universe, some philosophers attempted to extend physical determinism to the sphere of human action. This inclination still persists, although it is counterbalanced by other tendencies in modern thought that defend the reality of freedom.

Determinists. Thomas hobbes held that the notion of free subject was as self-contradictory as that of round quadrangle. Deliberation, for Hobbes, was nothing more than a succession of desires and aversions, each counterbalancing the other, until a final state was reached. This final state Hobbes called "the will act." Since each desire and aversion had been caused, Hobbes concluded that the will act itself was caused; hence the will act is not free. Yet he maintained that man does have freedom to act, since he can act once he has willed it.

B. spinoza concluded that only God is a free cause and that all human actions are subject to strict determinism. J. O. de La Mettrie, on the basis of his materialism, also denied freedom of the will. Arthur schopenhauer taught that a man knows the successive acts of his will after they have occurred, but that he does not foresee his future acts. Man only thinks he is free; if he were actually so, he would be able to foresee his future acts. J. F. Herbart's denial of free will resulted from his initial assumption that the methods and presuppositions of psychology are identical with those of physics.

Descartes, Hume, and Schelling. The writers mentioned above may safely be characterized as determinists; others cannot be located in a neat category, because their works contain elements of both determinism and freedom. René descartes, for example, wavered between Jansenism and Molinism. David hume held that from one standpoint man's acts are free, whereas from another standpoint they are not. He asserted that man's choice is necessitated as much as that of any material agent. Acts of choice are strictly determined by preceding feelings or motives, as well as by character. Nevertheless, since man himself makes the choice, in this respect he may be called free. Friedrich schelling held that man's actions are simultaneously predictable and free. Man himself makes a choice, but his choices are determined by his character, which, in turn, is the result of previous choices. Freedom, for Schelling, is fundamentally the power of choosing between good and evil.

Proponents of Free Will. A variety of positions may be found also among advocates of free will. Some preserve deterministic elements in their teachings. N. malebranche, for example, saw that if his position on causality were carried far enough, it would deny human responsibility for any acts. Not wishing to go to this extreme, he asserted that religion and morality would be meaningless unless man is free. G. W. leibniz held for freedom of choice, although his theory should likewise have ended in a mitigated form of determinism. He held that, while free acts must be motivated by reason, reason must judge to be best what seems to be best.

Some writers accept freedom of the will as a given fact but deny any attempts at a strict demonstration. Blaise pascal, for example, said that freedom could be known only by means of a religious experience. Immanuel Kant held that it could not be demonstrated scientifically, but that it is implicit in the categorical imperative. Similarly, contemporary existentialists are prone to accept free choice as a foundation for their philosophical positions. Karl jaspers, for example, maintains that each man is a unique being who goes beyond what he already is, and locates his new state of being in the process of exercising his freedom. Martin heidegger states that, within certain limits, man can be responsible for his destiny by freely choosing his possibilities, especially his destiny to death. Jean Paul sartre affirms that freedom is a distinctive characteristic of man. Gabriel Marcel and Emmanuel Mounier teach that man realizes himself as a person only in his acts of commitment. (see existentialism; personalism.)

Philosophical Analysis of Free Will

The foregoing history of the concept of free will shows not only the diversity of thought on this subject, but also the necessity of distinction and definition when attempting to analyze man's free activity. Scholastic philosophers, pursuing such a program, have arrived at refined notions of free will, its distinction from voluntarity and related concepts, and various influences to which it is subjected. The following is a survey of common scholastic teaching in this area.

Preliminary Distinctions. The term free will is customarily regarded as an accurate translation of the Latin expression liberum arbitrium; yet the more exact translation is free choice or free decision. One reason for objecting to "free will" is that this expression is interpreted too often to mean that every voluntary act is by definition a free act preceded immediately by an act of deliberation. Such is not the case.

Voluntarity. The designation "voluntary" means that an act was, at one time or another, willed freely; but it does not always mean that an act here and now being performed is a free act. Acts that have become ingrained as habits were perhaps at one time willed; and insofar as they were once willed and arose from the will principle, they may be called voluntary; but once established as habits, they should no longer be called free. Other acts resulting from a previous act of choice may also be called voluntary, but not, strictly speaking, free. These are virtually voluntary acts, that is to say, acts that, once chosen, are executed without requiring a new act of choice. A man who has chosen to go for a walk does not have to continue making a choice for each step he takes while walking. Insofar as he chose to be doing what he is doing, his act is virtually voluntary, although not completely free. (see voluntarity.)

Deliberation. Again, not every act a man performs is voluntary. The actions a man performs are commonly divided into human acts (actus humanus ) and acts of man (actus hominis ); a human act is one following some kind of deliberation, whereas an act of man is not preceded by deliberation. A reflex movement of the body, for example, would be an act of man and not a human act.

Definition of Free Will. To avoid confusing freedom with voluntarity and nondeliberate acts, free will is usually defined as the freedom possessed by a human being who, encountering an object he evaluates as finite, may choose whether or not to yield to the attraction of that object.

Such a definition obviously requires further exposition and clarification. Any object, insofar as it is actual and attractive, may be called a good. Yet the will can be attracted to such an object only so far as it recognizes this as some kind of good. A good that can satisfy only to a limited extent is called a particular or finite good, whereas one that can satisfy in every conceivable respect is called the universal or supreme good (see good, the supreme).

According to St. Thomas Aquinas, the human will is strictly determined in its nature toward an object recognized intellectually as the universal good. (According to duns scotus, the human will, absolutely speaking, would not be necessitated even in this case.) For St. Thomas, then, freedom of choice is exercised only with regard to objects recognized as particular goods. A man is not determined to these because particular goods may be viewed in two opposing ways: (1) they may be seen as good, i.e., according to the proportionate good they possess when compared to the universal good; or (2) they may be seen as lacking in good, i.e., to the extent that they lack goodness when measured against the universal good. Thus, any finite good can be considered under an aspect of desirability or undesirability when compared to the universal good. As desirable, it can attract the will; as undesirable, it cannot.

Further Distinctions. Assuming that the object in question is a particular good, further notions are helpful for clarifying what is meant by freedom of the will. These include the concepts of freedom of exercise, freedom of specification, elicited and commanded acts of the will, license, indifference, and spontaneity.

Exercise and Specification. Freedom of exercise is freedom to adopt or reject a particular good. This is the basic freedom of the will. Freedom of specification, on the other hand, is freedom to choose between one particular good and another, when several such goods are available. This is not found in every case involving freedom of the will. A person who elects to achieve a goal may find that only one particular good is available to achieve it. In such an eventuality he has no freedom of specification.

Commanded and Elicited Acts. Freedom of exercise and freedom of specification both apply to elicited acts of the will, as distinguished from commanded acts. Elicited acts are those taking place within the will itself; e.g., acts of desire or of choice. Commanded acts are those desired or chosen by the will, yet executed by another power. Suppose, for example, that an athlete desires to run faster than any man has ever run before. His desire is an elicited act; but his act of desire alone will not accomplish the result he seeks. He can accomplish this only by his ability to run. In such a case he is free to seek the goal; whereas he is not necessarily free to attain it.

License. Freedom of the will should not be confused with license. License is the ability to choose an object that, although satisfying, does not perfect the nature of the chooser. The ability to consume poisoned food or to read a salacious book is license, not freedom, because poisoned food or such reading do not make a person more human—they work against his humanity. Freedom, as opposed to license, is the capacity of a person to pursue, without extrinsic or intrinsic necessity, goods that can fulfill his nature.

Indifference. Freedom of will may be defined also as a condition of indifference with regard to finite goods. Such indifference can be understood either as indifference within the will itself or as indifference within the object. Indifference within the will is further subdivided into active and subjective. Active indifference is the neutrality of the will to act or not to act for a finite object. Subjective indifference (sometimes called formal indifference) is the neutrality of the will precisely as the subject in which active indifference is rooted. Indifference within the object (sometimes called objective indifference) is the dual aspect presented by a finite object whereby it can be considered from one standpoint as possessing desirable attributes, and from another standpoint as lacking the attributes possessed by another desirable object.

With these distinctions understood, freedom of the will may be more accurately described as the active indifference in virtue of which the will has dominion over its own act, through its power over the last practical judgment of the intellect, which presents the finite object to the will as a good to be adopted.

Spontaneity. Such freedom is not to be confused with spontaneity. Spontaneity signifies something arising within a thing from its internal principles and independently of external agents. The life activities of a plant are spontaneous; yet they are not free, since they arise from internal necessity.

Faculties Acting on the Will. The most important of the powers of the soul that influence choices of will is obviously the intellect (see faculties of the soul). The will is necessitated toward anything that is understood to be in some way satisfying; such understanding is a function of the intellect. Therefore a person's choice of an object is partly guided by his intellect. On the other hand, since even understanding of an object is a finite good for the person considering it, he may refuse to acquire a complete understanding, and his truncated intellectual act may thus result in a distorted concept of the object. Because of this, he may be attracted toward an object that here and now he considers good, whereas a more complete understanding of the same object would have presented it as undesirable.

The will can also be affected indirectly by objects of the sense powers, insofar as such objects are presented with a vividness rarely found in intellectual activity. Sense impressions and physical states, as a consequence, can influence a person's intellectual deliberation and choice. Examples of physical states are: (1) an inherited physical makeup whereby one person tends to react more readily and with greater emotion than another; (2) organic dispositions at certain ages of life—e.g., the youth, with his whole future open to him, is more optimistic, less cautious, and more subject to physical drives than the middle-aged man; and (3) organic modifications acquired by an individual himself. Some of the latter may be purely transitory, such as the effect of stimulants or depressing agents. Others may be more or less fixed, such as the pathological condition set up in the nervous system as the result of an addiction to dope.

Free Will and Unconscious Influences. The powers and contents of mind referred to above are considered as existing in the field of consciousness at the time they exert their influence. Other contents of mind, outside the field of consciousness, can be shown also to influence a person's act of choice. Because of such unconscious influences, some writers have argued that a man cannot be called free in his choice, because he is not aware of everything affecting him at the time. This objection, however, does not hold, because the act of free choice is itself made on the basis of conscious judgments. Free will should be considered more as an ability to select between influences, than as an absence of influences. One's own awareness is witness to the fact that he chooses consciously. If his belief is illusory in this case, then no datum of consciousness would seem to have any truth value.

Free Will and Mental Illness. It has also been objected that freedom of the will has been outmoded by what is called "the irresistible impulse." The term is defined in various ways, but the common note is that of a deprivation (sometimes called a destruction) of the free agency of the individual so that he has an uncontrollable impulse to act. Yet it is inaccurate to speak of an irresistible impulse; it would be more correct to say that the impulse was unresisted. It is generally held by psychiatrists that even in severe cases of an obsessive-compulsive reaction a patient could continue resisting the "compulsive" urge, even though this would require an enormous expenditure of anxiety. Uncommon effort may be required for a neurotic to reject the object of a compulsive urge; but this is far different from saying that his will has been destroyed. Again, weakened resistance to an unresisted impulse may be more or less severe at different times for the same neurotic; these are mitigating circumstances in determining the morality of his actions, but it is] incorrect to say, on this account, that his will has been destroyed. If his will were destroyed, it would be impossible both practically and theoretically for a physician to cure him. After the unconscious content influencing a patient has been uncovered, the major effect of therapy is to have the patient choose a more constructive mode of action.

Freedom of will has also been denied in the case of psychotic patients. Psychosis may be generally described as a condition where the sufferer is markedly out of contact with some area of reality and is not aware that he is out of contact. (The psychotic who is hallucinating, for example, sincerely believes that the voice commanding him to kill his children is real.) Therefore, the objector argues, since the psychotic does not possess the true knowledge required for making a free choice, he is not free. To answer this objection, the notion of responsibility must be clarified and a distinction made between subjective responsibility and objective responsibility. By responsibility is meant the capacity to determine one's own acts, or the capacity to be deterred by sanctions or consequences. A person has subjective responsibility if he has freedom to act or not in accordance with his evaluation of the object and, while acting, is aware that he might have done otherwise. A person has objective responsibility if his choice is made on the basis of a true understanding of the situation in which he makes his decision. In the case of the man hallucinating, he would be subjectively responsible if he were free to act or refuse to act on the commands he heard from the voice; but he would not be objectively responsible if he were not in possession of objectively true knowledge, and thus was not free to make an objectively true choice. He would not be guilty of his act, even though subjectively responsible. It must be kept in mind, of course, that here it is a question of a psychotic's action as directly rooted in his psychosis. It is not necessarily true that every action this same individual would perform is totally lacking in responsibility, because he may have some degree of mental clarity in other areas of his life.

See Also: freedom; choice.

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[p. nolan]

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