Fear

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FEAR

An emotion arising from awareness of something seen as an imminent danger affecting oneself. It has interested philosophers at least from the time of plato (Leges 644D; 646E) and Aristotle (Rhetorica 1382a19–1383b11), and has been the subject of intense study by modern psychologists. Definiteness of an object in fear and the occurrence of this emotion in adequately functioning persons have usually been bases for distinguishing fear from anxiety. Since fears of definite things, however, also appear as signs of mental disturbance (e.g., a phobia for closed places or moving vehicles), presence of an "attitude of fear" or a tendency to see danger everywhere better serves to distinguish anxiety from fear.

Moral Aspects. Since responsibility in a moral sense implies the voluntariness of a human act, the question arises as to the influence of fear on the voluntary character of an action. Voluntariness implies some movement on the part of the will, which, in turn, presupposes knowledge, for only a known good moves an appetitive power. A person is morally responsible, then, when he knows what he is doing and retains freedom of action, at least in the sense of having it in his power to do or not to do a given act. Voluntariness implies some movement on the part of the will, which, in turn, presupposes knowledge, for only a known good moves an appetitive power. A person is morally responsible, then, when he knows what he is doing and retains freedom of action, at least in the sense of having it in his power to do or not to do a given act.

In an action done because of fear, there is at least some consent on the part of the will, for we are led to do what we do, not because of the fear itself, but in order to avoid the evil that is feared. Therefore, in an action done out of fear, the voluntary character of the action remains, for it is enough to make an act voluntary that the will contribute something to the action that is done, and this condition is realized in an action done because of fear. It is also clear that fear exerts an influence on the degree of voluntariness of the action, and to the extent that it does, fear diminishes the voluntariness and therefore the responsibility of the action.

To put the matter generally, actions done because of fear remain voluntary and responsible although they become involuntary in a certain respect, and thus lessen responsibility to that extent. What is done out of fear is involuntary in the sense that it is contrary to what would be the will's inclination apart from the circumstances that evoke the fear. A man at gunpoint hands over his wallet to a robber; he would not presumably be willing to dispossess himself in this way except to avoid the evil that threatens him. But the action is, in an absolute sense of the term, voluntary, for the will, in the actual circumstances, prefers to sustain the loss rather than to endure the consequences of resistance. There is thus a mixture of voluntariness and involuntariness in what is done. The action is said to be voluntary simply or absolutely speaking, but involuntary in a certain respect (secundum quid ). The element of involuntariness shows some goodness in the will, even if the action is an evil one, and to that extent diminishes culpability.

This analysis of fear does not include, however, a situation in which a person is so overcome by an impending evil that fear causes him to lose rational control completely. An action performed by a person in such a condition would not be voluntary at all. Voluntary action is always in some way subject to reason. No degree of fear that falls short of depriving a person of the use of reason renders him incapable of controlling his action. Both civil and ecclesiastical laws expressly recognize the influence of fear where contractual obligations are concerned, and in certain cases declare obligations undertaken under the influence of fear to be either void or voidable.

See Also: appetite.

Bibliography: m. b. arnold, Emotion and Personality, 2 v. (New York 1960), an extensive and profound analysis of fear and the other emotions. d. b. lindsley, "Emotion" in s. s. stevens, ed., Handbook of Experimental Psychology (New York 1951). m.l. reymert, ed., Feelings and Emotions: The Mooseheart Symposium in Cooperation with the University of Chicago (New York 1950). r. w. leeper, "A Motivational Theory of Emotion to Replace 'Emotion as Disorganized Response,"' Psychological Review 55 (1948) 5–21. a. t. jersild, "Emotional Development" in l. carmichael, ed., Manual of Child Psychology (2d ed. New York 1954) 833–917. h. selye, The Stress of Life (New York1956). thomas aquinas, Summa theologiae 1a2ae, 6.6. h. davis, Moral and Pastoral Theology, 4 v. (5th ed. New York 1946). j. a. oesterle, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1957) 67–69.