Clean Water Act
Clean Water Act
Rapanos v. United States
When Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA), 86 Stat. 816, in 1972, it gave the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers the authority to regulate the discharge of any pollutants into "navigable waters." The Corps has given a broad reading to the term "navigable waters," which has led to lawsuits by land developers and property owners who believe their property is not linked to navigable waters. The Corps extended its control by regulating wetlands in the United States (approximately 300 million acres) which drain into tributaries of navigable waters. The Supreme Court has approved the regulation of wetlands that are adjacent to navigable waters but the regulation of more remote wetlands remained unresolved. In Rapanos v. United States/Carabell v. Army Corps of Engineers, ____U.S.____, 126 S.Ct., ___L.Ed.2d ___ 2006 WL 1667087 (2006), the Court failed to deliver a clear ruling on how courts and the Corps are to deal with wetlands. In the plurality decision, Justice Anthony Kennedy announced a "significant nexus" test that appeared to give the federal government continuing control over the management of wetlands.
John Rapanos, a Michigan real estate developer, owned three parcels of land about 20 miles from Lake Huron which he wanted to use for a shopping center. The state of Michigan classified the parcels as wetlands because after a heavy rain the water from these fields flowed into a drainage ditch, then into a small stream that emptied into Lake Huron. Under the CWA a permit is required before a landowner may drain or fill a wetland. When it became clear that Rapanos would not receive a permit, he had the land filled in with sand. He was convicted of criminal charges for his actions and a civil action was filed by the federal government seeking multimillion dollar fines. Rapanos claimed that his property was not a wetland but a federal district court concluded otherwise. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower court ruling that the Corps had not exceeded its authority under the CWA.
The Supreme Court could not reach a majority conclusion. Four justices held that the Corps had exceeded its authority and that a new definition of wetlands was required. Four justices dissented, arguing that prior Court precedents and deference to the Corps justified the lower court rulings. Justice Anthony Kennedy, in a separate opinion, announced a new test for determining whether land could be classified as a wetland under the CWA. Because of this splintered decision, Kennedy's opinion appeared to give the most guidance to the lower courts and the Corps. However, Chief Justice Roberts, in a concurring opinion, lamented the fact that the Court had failed to reach a majority conclusion "on precisely how to read Congress' limits on the reach of the Clean Water Act." Because of this failure lower courts "and regulated entities will now have to feel their way on a case-by-case basis."
Four conservative justices (Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito) voted to restrict the definition of wetlands. Justice Scalia, writing for the four justices, argued that the Corps of Engineers had exceeded its authority "beyond parody" by regulating land that contained nothing but drainage ditches, storm sewers and "dry arroyos in the middle of the desert." The federal encroachment on local lands had diminished the ability of the states to manage land and made the Corps look like "a local zoning board." Scalia proposed that the only wetlands subject to the CWA were those "with a continuous surface connection" to actual waterways, "so that there is no clear demarcation between 'waters' and wetlands." The linkage between a wetland and a waterway also had to be defined more restrictively. He contended that the waters adjacent to the wetlands must be "relatively permanent, standing, or flowing."
Justice Kennedy disagreed with this interpretation. He argued that the current regulations gave the Corps too much discretion to classify land as wetlands but there was no need to establish a restrictive bright-line rule advocated by Scalia and the other three justices. Instead, Kennedy proposed the adoption of a "significant nexus test" that would be applied on a case-by-case basis. Under this test the wetlands must have a significant nexus to a body of water that is actually navigable. This meant that even temporary channels could qualify as a tributary to navigable waters. He pointed out that the Los Angeles River in California is dry for much of the year, yet it can send "torrents thundering" down its steel and concrete protected waterway for short periods of time. Kennedy believed the Corps needed to rewrite its regulations to identify "categories of tributaries" that were "significant enough that wetlands adjacent to them are likely, in the majority of cases, to perform important functions for an aquatic system incorporating navigable waters." Though he voted to vacate the lower court ruling so the district court could conduct hearing based on his significant nexus test, Kennedy believed the federal government could make its case for the Rapanos wetlands. The wetlands drained into a stream that flowed into Lake Huron.
Justice John Paul Stevens, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, contended that the Kennedy test "will probably not do much to diminish the number of wetlands covered by the act in the long run." However, in the short term the test "will have the effect of creating additional work for all concerned parties." Stevens believed the Court should have paid more deference to the Corps's regulations, which attempt to manage a complicated system of water management. He also accused Justice Scalia and the conservatives of judicial activism in attempting to rewrite the CWA.
S.D. Warren Company v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection
The federal Clean Water Act, 86 Stat. 877, sets standards and review processes for industries that discharge material into navigable waters. Under § 401 of the act a federal license will be issued to a business if the state certifies that water protection laws will not be violated. A Maine company that operated a number of hydroelectric dams sought to renew its federal power licenses and questioned the need to submit to the water certification as part of the renewal process, arguing that it did not discharge into the river any pollutants when it returned the water used to generate electricity. The Supreme Court, in S.D. Warren Company v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection, ___U.S.___, 126 S.Ct. 1843, ___L.Ed.2d ___ (2006), rejected this argument and held that the government did not need to show that something was added to the water before it was returned to the river to trigger this Clean Water Act provision.
The S.D. Warren company operated a series of dams on a 25-mile span of the Presumpscot River in Southern Maine to generate electricity for its paper mills. Each dam created a pond, where water was funneled into a canal, sent through turbines, and then returned to the river. The company had operated the dams since 1935 and had a license to do so from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). In 1999, the company sought renewal of its licenses for five of its dams. It applied for water quality certification from the Maine Board of Environmental Protection, which was assigned the job of enforcing this Clean Water Act requirement. However, Warren filed its application under protest, contending its dams did not discharge into the river any materials, thus making it exempt from the Clean Water Act. The Maine agency certified the dams but required Warren to maintain a minimum stream flow and to allow passage of migratory fish and eels. FERC then issued new licenses to the dams. Despite winning renewal of the licenses, Warren pursued legal action against Maine's clean water certification process. The case eventually made its way to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which ruled that Warren's dams did discharge into navigable waters for Clean Water Act purposes.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, upheld this interpretation of the Clean Water Act. Justice David Souter, writing for the Court, noted that the dispute turned on the meaning of the word "discharge." The Clean Water Act did not define this term but it provided that the "term 'discharge' when used without qualification includes a discharge of a pollutant, and a discharge of pollutants." The act did define pollutants to mean "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source." Justice Souter rejected the claim that "discharge" was limited to this definition, opting instead to construe the word in its ordinary or natural meaning. When applied to water, the word 'discharge' meant a "flowing or issuing out." The Court had adopted this definition in prior water cases, including a 1994 case involving the Clean Water Act that involved hydroelectric dams. Though the Court's opinion did not discuss whether the dam had added anything to the water, even the dissenting justices agreed that the discharge of water from the dam was within the sphere of the Clean Water Act. In addition, Justice Souter pointed out that the federal Environmental Protection Agency and FERC had read "discharge" to include releases from hydroelectric dams.
Warren presented three arguments as to why the ordinary meaning of "discharge" should not be used. He first argued that a proper reading of the act's provision demonstrated that "discharge" was linked to a requirement that an "addition" of pollutants to water be made for Clean Water Act coverage. The company contended that because the release of the water from the dams added nothing to the river, "the water flowing out of the turbines cannot be a discharge into the river." Justice Souter discounted this claim, finding that the company had improperly sought to "convert express inclusion into restrictive equation." Warren also argued that the Court's recent decision in South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S.95, 124 S.Ct. 1537, 158 L.Ed.2d 264 (2004), required it to find no discharge under the act. Justice Souter concluded that this case was not on point because it involved a different section of the Clean Water Act, § 402. The two sections were "not interchangeable, as they serve different purposes and use different language to reach them." Section 402 had a more specific focus, requiring a permit for the "discharge of any pollutant" in the navigable waters of the United States. The triggering statutory term was not "discharge" alone but the "discharge of a pollutant." This term was narrower than the language of §401 because it defined this phrase to require an "addition" of a pollutant to the water. Section 401 did not require that something be added to the water before triggering the coverage of the act. Finally, Warren tried to use legislative history to show that Congress had inadvertently let the word "includes" in the definition of "discharge" after an unsuccessful attempt to deal with "thermal discharges" in § 402. Warren contended that Congress carelessly retained the word "includes" in § 401 when it really meant to limit the term "discharges" to the discharge of pollutants. Justice Souter rejected this claim as well, finding that Congress "probably distinguished the terms 'discharge' and 'discharge of pollutants' deliberately, in order to use them in separate places and to separate ends." The Court generally presumed that when Congress used particular language in one section but omitted it in another section of the same law, it acted "intentionally and purposely."
Justice Souter also found that the discharge of the dam water back into the river did alter water quality by limiting river flow and by modifying the chemical balance of water in ways that can affect aquatic organisms. These changes justified the use by the states of the Clean Water Act to protect against "the broad range of pollution."
