Nyaya

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NY?YA

NY?YA Ny?ya philosophy is also called pram?na sh?stra, or the science of correct knowledge. The objective of the Ny?ya is ?nv?kshik?, or critical inquiry. Its beginnings go back to the Vedic period, but its first systematic elucidation is Akshap?da Gotama's Ny?ya S?tra, dated to the third century b.c. This text consists of five books. After an overview, the text begins with the nature of doubt and the means of proof. Next it considers the nature of self, body, senses and their objects, cognition and mind.

The Ny?ya system supposes that we are so constituted as to seek truth. Our minds are not empty slates; the very constitution of the mind provides some knowledge of the nature of the world. The four pram?nas through which correct knowledge is acquired are: pratyaksha, or direct perception; anum?na, or inference; upam?na, or analogy; and shabda, or verbal testimony.

Gotama mentions that four factors are involved in direct perception: the senses (indriyas), their objects (artha), the contact of the senses and the objects (sannikarsha), and the cognition produced by this contact ( jn?na). Manas, or mind, mediates between the self and the senses. When the manas is in contact with one sensory organ, it cannot be so with another. It is therefore said to be atomic in dimension. It is because of the nature of the mind that our experiences are essentially linear, although quick succession of impressions may give the appearance of simultaneity.

Dharmak?rti, a later Ny?ya philosopher, recognizes four kinds of perception: sense perception, mental perception, self-consciousness, and yogic perception. Self-consciousness is a perception of the self through its states of pleasure and pain. In yogic perception, one is able to comprehend the universe in fullness and harmony.

Anum?na (inference) is knowledge from the perceived about the unperceived. The element to be inferred may be the cause or the effect of the element perceived, or the two may be the joint effects of something else.

The Ny?ya syllogism is expressed in five parts: (1) pratijn?, or the proposition: the house is on fire; (2) hetu, or the reason: smoke; (3) ud?harana, the example: fire is accompanied by smoke, as in the kitchen; (4) upanaya, the application: as in the kitchen, so too in the house; (5) nigamana, the conclusion: therefore, the house is on fire. This recognizes that the inference derives from the knowledge of the universal relation (vy?pti) and its application to the specific case ( pakshadharmat?). There can be no inference unless there is expectation (?k?nksh?) about the hypothesis, which is expressed in terms of the proposition.

The Ny?ya attacks the Buddhist idea that no knowledge is certain by pointing out that this statement itself contradicts the claim by its certainty. Whether cognitions apply to reality must be checked by determining if they lead to successful action. Pram?, or valid knowledge, leads to successful action, unlike erroneous knowledge (vipary?ya).

In the twelfth century, the Navya-Ny?ya system was founded by Gangesha Upadhyaya. It developed a highly technical language to formulate and solve problems in logic and epistemology.

Subhash Kak